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PLATONIC THEOLOGY
VOLUME I

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PLATONIC THEOLOGY

VOLUME I • BOOKS I–IV

ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY

MICHAEL J. B. ALLEN

with John Warden

LATIN TEXT EDITED BY

JAMES HANKINS

with William Bowen

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Introduction

The *Platonic Theology* is a visionary work and the philosophical masterpiece of Marsilio Ficino (1433–99), the Florentine scholar-philosopher-magus who was largely responsible for the Renaissance revival of Plato. Though an independent, scholastically trained thinker, Ficino was profoundly influenced throughout his life by the rational mysticism of Plotinus (third century A.D.), the founder of the Neoplatonic interpretation of Plato, and by the later Neoplatonism of the fifth century Proclus and his disciple, Dionysius the Areopagite. The latter, significantly, he identified, along with most others during the Middle Ages and the early Renaissance, with St. Paul's Athenian convert on the Hill of Mars (Acts 17:34) and thus as bearing witness to a complex Neoplatonism at the very onset of Christianity. From the 1460s Ficino became an accomplished scholar and exegete of the texts of these and other Neoplatonists, and soon achieved a penetrating, comprehensive understanding of the intricacies of Plotinian and Proclian metaphysics and a remarkable grasp too of its pagan development and history. However, he was also committed to reconciling Platonism with Christianity, and Platonic apologetics with the Church Fathers and the great Scholastics, in the hope that such a reconciliation would initiate a spiritual revival, a return of the golden age with a new Pope and a new Emperor. In this regard he speaks to some of the recurrent millenarian and prophetic impulses that galvanized Renaissance Italy and witnessed their culmination in the ministry of Savonarola at the end of the fifteenth century.

In addition to these and to the traditional concerns of theology and philosophy, as a scholar Ficino was also fascinated by music, magic and harmonic theory, by medicine, astrology, demonology, mystical mathematics and aspects of the occult, and by the idea of an ancient pagan mythological philosophy, God's trinitarian gift of wisdom to the poets and sages of the gentiles. But he was also committed to them as a teacher, cultivating many pupils, friends and admirers and sustaining a correspondence with a huge group of influential members of the elite — ecclesiastics, merchants, poets, diplomats, civil servants, the *signori* and *principi* themselves including Lorenzo de' Medici — who eventually constituted a personal circle, sometimes, if misleadingly, thought of as the Florentine Platonic academy. In part he was in quest of patronage — his books, now some of the most valuable of the incunabula, required hefty subventions in the burgeoning world of the printing press. But this reaching out to patrons itself subserved an abiding educational and pastoral idealism, the hope that he could teach his irenic and ecumenical Platonism to those who could best advance it and its religious cause, and best profit from it themselves as men of faith and of intellect. In this Platonic evangelizing he was eminently successful and his impact was European-wide and long-lasting. His Platonism is indeed one of the keys to our own understanding of the art, thought, culture, and spirituality of some two and a half centuries.

If Ficino's several long commentaries on Plato, Plotinus, and the Areopagite, his controversial book on psychological, pharmacological and astrological therapy, the *De vita*, his many letters and other treatises, translations and commentaries, are all central to an understanding of his philosophy and its impact, none is more so than the *Platonic Theology*, a work that probably played a role in the Lateran Council's promulgation of the immortality of the soul as a dogma in 1512. A product of the early 1470s, the years that saw Ficino completing his first monumental translation project, the complete works of Plato, and at the same time preparing to enter the priesthood (he was ordained in 1473), it was his mature attempt to sketch out a unitary theological tradition, and

particularly a theological metaphysics. This he fervently believed stretched back to Orpheus and beyond, to Hermes Trismegistus and Zoroaster, even as it had culminated in the Christian revelation most luminously articulated for him by the Areopagite, Augustine, and Aquinas. Furthermore, though a work of personal if not autobiographical apologetics, the *Platonic Theology* was very much a product of its Renaissance Italian, specifically Medicean, context. A *summa theologica*, it was a *summa philosophica* and a *summa platonica*, a bold, albeit problematic, attempt to appropriate ancient philosophy, and particularly late ancient philosophy, for the *ingeniosi*, the intellectuals, the forward wits of the republic and its governing elites. This may in part account for its style which sets out to emulate in Latin what Plotinus had achieved in his Greek: that is, to approach sublimity in an unadorned and apparently artless way that is nonetheless syntactically and rhetorically challenging, with its frequent asyndeton (making the reader work it out), its unbalanced periods (drawing the reader into the mazes of the argument), its occasional direct address, and its intermittent flights of poetic imagery contributing to a sense of allocutionary trance. Significantly, Ficino tries to avoid scholastic terminology even as he deploys scholastic concepts (thus we sometimes have to rescholasticize his formulations in our own minds in order to grasp them).

Whatever its missionary goals, however, Ficino always thought of the *Platonic Theology* as his own *magnum opus* and as his longest and most fully orchestrated work of independent philosophical inquiry — even though it cannibalizes various letters and treatises, its archaeology indeed posing several scholarly challenges. At its center is not just his spiritual search for reassurance and conviction that an afterlife awaits us and that death is not the termination of consciousness and accordingly of the self, but also his concern to redefine and thus to reconceive the constitution, the *figura*, of the human entity. While engaging the hallowed notions of mind, soul, spirit, and body, he focuses on the nature and powers of the human soul and its spiritual chariot or vehicle, and on its central place in the hierarchy of God's creation. But the effect is not just to elaborate the medieval, and specifically the scholastic, positions, but also to revive a number of ancient theosophical themes and to anticipate the revolutionary cosmologies of the late Renaissance natural philosophers and astronomers, with their Sun-centering of Man, their new orders of magnitude in measuring time as well as space. For Ficino devises more complex ways of reconceiving hierarchy itself as a unitary plurality, apprehensible through musicological, mathematical, and magical images; as an ordered song which is both inside and outside the soul both as unitary self and as all things — a part become the whole, a whole of parts and in parts, in the world and yet in God as God.

Hence, while theological conservatives can read the *Platonic Theology* and find traditional arguments in abundance, a more radical reading detects the pressure of reemergent unorthodoxies, even heresies — the positions associated with Pelagianism, Origenism, Docetism, Arianism, even Gnosticism with its emphasis on the light-filled nature of man and his stellar origins and ends. Though temperamentally mild, and not destined for the prison or the stake like Bruno and Campanella, Ficino was a bold and speculative thinker who resurrected and indirectly advocated two ancient ideals we now link largely because of him to the Renaissance. The first was that of the magus with his power over a nature dominated by sympathies and hidden ciphers and signs and in pursuit of the secrets of macrocosmic transformation. The second was the ideal of the daimonic soul in search of poetic, amatory, prophetic, even priestly ascent into the realm of pure Mind and Will, of Knowledge and of Love — the soul, that is, in search of interior transformation and illumination both in the traditional terms of faith and belief, and in the necessarily more elite terms of understanding, of intellectual consciousness. For all its debts to the medieval and classical pasts, the *Platonic Theology* is consequently one of the philosophical texts that speaks most memorably to the spiritual, intellectual, cultural and quasi-scientific preoccupations of its own lustrous but troubled age.

In all likelihood, the actual writing — or rather dictation — of its eighteen constituent books took place between Ficino's completion of his *Symposium* and *Philebus* commentaries in 1469, and his completion of the *De religione christiana* in 1473/4, the years, that is, which immediately followed his drafting out of the complete Plato translation in the 1460s. As with the translation, however, the publication was delayed and he had several years to polish, add to, perhaps even reconfigure parts of his argumentation. The work eventually saw the light in 1482 and was then republished with his second Plato edition which appeared in Venice in 1491 and subsequently in the three editions of his own *Opera Omnia* published in Basel in 1561 and 1576 and in Paris in 1641. It was part and parcel, therefore, of a lifelong philosophical and sacerdotal commitment: to inaugurate a Platonic revival.

As the work's title would suggest, its leaves contain a number of references to Plato and the Neoplatonists, though fewer than we might have first anticipated, given Ficino's luminary status as the Renaissance Platonist and the density of Platonic cross-referencing in his Plato and Plotinus commentaries. But it is also at times indebted to Aquinas's *Contra Gentiles*, particularly in Book II, though the debts are individually unacknowledged. Occasionally Ficino took passages almost verbatim from, or paraphrased or adapted, Thomas's argumentation, and he was clearly interested in aligning sections of his own work with that of the saint who was already emerging as the ultimate scholastic authority.

Interestingly, however, the title also points to three other debts which are neither to Plato nor to St. Thomas. *Theologia Platonica* is the title of Proclus's greatest work, though few of Ficino's readers would have immediately recognized this. Arguably, Ficino's borrowing of this title was a tribute to his immense debt to the last of the major ancient Platonists, the one who had been, by virtue of the chance accessibility of certain texts, the standard-bearer of the Platonic tradition throughout the Middle Ages, and some of whose works Aquinas himself had studied by way of the Latin translations of a fellow Dominican, William of Moerbeke. But Proclus had always been for the Christian West a controversial figure, given his rejection of Christianity, his sophisticated polytheism, and his elaboration of a number of pagan ideas. Ficino persistently hesitated to acknowledge his debts to him and sometimes took care explicitly to refute Proclian positions in favor of Plotinian ones. His choice of "Platonic Theology" as a title may therefore have a corrective rather than an encomiastic intent in that he probably intended his *summa* should supplant Proclus's and provide the true synthesis of Platonism and theology that had eluded his pagan predecessor.

Interestingly, Ficino's brilliant, eclectic friend and rival, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1463–94), had also planned to write a "theology," specifically a "poetic theology," whereas Ficino himself constantly refers to the "ancient theology" and to the "ancient *(prisci)* theologians" who had been its guardians. These terms surely signal the emergence of new, more comprehensive ways of theologizing in contexts outside of, if ancillary still to, Christian analysis and exposition. Both Ficino and Pico were committed to rediscovering a gentile theological tradition (which was effectively a natural or perennial theology, though the last term was the invention of Agostino Steuco), a tradition that had served enlightened interpreters in antiquity, albeit in a variety of capacities, as a counterpart to, and as a handmaiden of, the Mosaic theology God had granted to Israel. Ficino certainly wanted a new Platonizing theology for a new kind of audience: not other theologians and believers intent on clarifying their understanding of the architecture of faith; not modern materialists following in the footsteps of the ancient materialists; not radical Aristotelians who espoused the Averroist position on the unicity of the intellectual Soul and denied personal immortality; and not empiricists and skeptics. Rather, his intended audience was the *ingeniosi*, the intellectuals, perhaps especially youthful intellectuals, who were the Florentine counterparts to Socrates' most gifted interlocutors and questioners, and who required intellectual conviction as a part of, if not always as a prerequisite for, their acceptance of Christianity and a fervent commitment to it. If not materialists, Averroists or skeptics themselves, they were nonetheless, like Plato's precocious adolescents, minds requiring training in the disciplines of logic and dialectic, and in the proper ways of proceeding from the many to the One and from the One to the infinite many through the intermediate steps of the finite species, of the Ideas. This may account for the array of persuasive but sometimes disparate arguments Ficino adduces for his positions. For, while the *Platonic Theology* does have a grand architecture, it is not the tightly woven, internally consistent and self-referential architecture of Thomas's two great *summae*. Instead, it opens up a number of lines of inquiry and persuasion, as if in some degree it were trying to introduce into a medieval formatting something of the open-endedness of Plato's dialogic inquiry.

Ficino's subtitle on the other hand, *On the Immortality of the Soul*, comes from the identical titles of a treatise of Plotinus, the *Enneads* 4.7, and of an early work of Augustine. Although immortality is a resonant Platonic theme — witness the *Phaedo* — the choice obviously reflects Ficino's indebtedness both to Plotinus, the second Plato, and to the great saint who had been reconverted by reading him (or his follower Porphyry) in the Latin translations of Marius Victorinus. For Ficino was convinced that the Platonism of Plotinus was the soul philosophy, the living light that had shone across the darkness of corporeal death bringing hope and comfort to the minds of the ancients. And he believed, with St. Augustine, not only that the soul will achieve immortality, but that it is intrinsically and everlastingly immortal, immortal from its creation, and therefore by nature angelic, divine, made in the image and likeness of the eternal. Human reason, however, in its laborious discursiveness and its persistent skepticism, has a difficult time being persuaded of this. Some of the chapters seem to reflect the intellectual toil that accompanied Ficino's apologetical commitment, his awareness of the ancient doubts and the depths of their foundations; and for all their affirmations and visionary flights, they are not a serene achievement. Even as they compel and fascinate and probe and adduce, they hardly persuade us that Ficino was himself fully persuaded, however much he hoped or yearned to be. Rather, they indicate the difficulties that Ficino was encountering at every turn and that stemmed not from his articulation of Christian dogma so much as from his engagement with the Neoplatonic system itself. For Neoplatonism throughout its long history and development has propounded a difficult set of metaphysical as well as ethical and psychological doctrines. Indeed, it is metaphysics that ultimately emerges as Ficino's preoccupation here, and as his most lasting yet challenging contribution. For he saw the "problem" of the soul, its life, its mastery over death, as in essence a metaphysical, and specifically as an ontological issue, whatever the attendant epistemological, ethical or aesthetic implications.

Determining Ficino's final metaphysical position, however, is itself a complex matter. In the past, Paul Oskar Kristeller, followed by Raymond Marcel, has claimed that Ficino created a five-substance hierarchy — the One, Mind, Soul, Quality, and Body (or Matter in extension) — in order to highlight the central and nodal position of the soul. But Ficino almost certainly adopted and then adapted this pentadic structure from Proclus, and read it back into Plotinus, then into Plato, and thence into the pre-Platonic sages stemming from Zoroaster. Nonetheless, the soul's metaphysical centrality entails its occupying the middle rung of the ladder, its being the central link in the cosmic chain; and therefore its being the cosmos in miniature, the little totality, the all here in us which mirrors the All There which is also us. These mystical or paradoxical formulations centered on Soul had long been embedded in the Neoplatonic tradition, but they were given new valencies and a new urgency by Ficino's presentation of them, preoccupying him indeed in the years leading up to his ordination and supplying him with the philosophical basis for his priestly mission as a Platonic exegete and seer. In a variety of ways he explored neglected areas precisely in the animatology of the Platonic tradition, which had been subordinated since Plotinus to a preoccupation with Mind as the highest intelligible reality even as Mind had emanated from the One. For Soul's emanation from Mind concerns Ficino less than its return, its ascent to Being, Life and Intellect — to the triad of which formally, originally, ultimately it is part — and thence its ascent within its own unity (its mind's head or flower) to mystical union with the transcendent One.

This present volume is the first of five planned and presents the *Platonic Theology*'s books I–IV. Volume 2 will contain books V–VIII; volume 3, books IX–XII; volume 4, books XIII–XV; and volume 5, books XVI–XVIII with some attendant texts. Each volume will however contain its own notes and index of names. The final volume will contain a comprehensive index of names and subjects, an index of sources, and a concordance to the Basel edition of 1576 and the edition of Marcel. In preparing the translation and notes, we have made use of materials assembled by Prof. Patricia Vicari of the University of Toronto, who had organized a collaborative project in the 1970s to work on an annotated English translation of the *Platonic Theology*. These eventually consisted of electronic files for the early books of the Latin text, based on Marcel's, and of draft translations (with a few notes) of a number of the books by Prof. John Warden, also of the University of Toronto, Dr. Wendy Helleman, and Prof. Yun Lee Too (some of these having been variously annotated by Dr. Christine Africa, Prof. Bruce McNair, and Dr. Sean Mulrooney). In 1998, Prof. Vicari approached Prof. William R. Bowen of the Centre for Reformation and Renaissance Studies at Victoria College in the University of Toronto in the hope of reviving the languishing project, and he kindly brokered the present arrangement with us, since we were contemplating the work for the I Tatti Renaissance Library. He also corrected the old electronic files of the Latin text, and prepared a machine-readable version of Marcel's text for the later books; this has been of great use in preparing our own Latin text.

While building where possible on the labors of our predecessors, and particularly of John Warden, and while we have both cross-checked each other's work, nevertheless, the responsibility in this first volume for establishing the Latin text lies with James Hankins, and for producing the English translation with Michael Allen, who is largely responsible too for the identification and verification of sources and for the introduction.

The prime debt of all who have labored on this project is surely to the late Paul Oskar Kristeller, to whose memory this volume is gratefully dedicated. It was Kristeller who laid out the basis for an understanding of Marsilio Ficino's thought in the English-speaking world and who established the canon and chronology of his works. A second and comparable debt is to Raymond Marcel for his pioneering scholarship in editing the *Platonic Theology* in 1964–70, identifying many of the sources, and providing a French translation. While we have made our own judgments and on occasion disagree with his readings or renderings or identifications, his was the achievement we set out to emulate.

M. A. and J. H.
1 October 1999
A discessu illius
Phoenicis philosophorum
quingentesimo anno

THEOLOGIA PLATONICA
DE IMMORTALITATE
ANIMORUM

IN OMNIBUS QUAE AUT HIC AUT ALIBI A ME
TRACTANTUR, TANTUM ASSERTUM ESSE VOLO QUANTUM
AB ECCLESIA COMPROBATUR.

WHATEVER SUBJECT I DISCUSS, HERE OR ELSEWHERE,
I WISH TO STATE ONLY WHAT IS APPROVED
BY THE CHURCH.

Capitula librorum Theologiae
de immortalitate animorum
Marsilii Ficini Florentini
divisae in libros XVIII

Primus liber ascendit usque ad deum. Capitula primi libri:

Cap. I Si animus non esset immortalis, nullum animal esset infelicius homine.

Cap. II Corpus natura sua nihil agit.

Cap. III Supra formam divisam in corpore extat forma individua, id est anima.

Cap. IV Anima rationalis per substantiam immobilis est; per operationem est mobilis; per uirtutem est partim immobilis, partim mobilis.

Cap. V Super animam mobilem est immobilis angelus.

Cap. VI Super angelum est deus, quoniam anima est mobilis multitudo, angelus multitudo immobilis, deus immobilis unitas.

Secundus liber disputat de deo iam invento.

Cap. I Unitas, veritas, bonitas idem sunt et super ea nihil est.

Cap. II Non sunt dii plures inter se aequales.

Cap. III Non sunt dii plures alius super alium sine fine.

Cap. IV Dei virtus est infinita.

The Theology on the Immortality of Souls
by Marsilio Ficino the Florentine
Divided into Eighteen Books:
Chapter Headings.

The First Book ascends up to God. Its chapter headings:

Chapter 1 Were the soul not immortal, no creature would be more miserable than man.

Chapter 2 Body does not act of its own nature.

Chapter 3 Above the form that is divided in body there exists an indivisible form, namely, soul.

Chapter 4 In its substance rational soul is motionless; in its activity it is mobile; in its power it is partly motionless and partly mobile.

Chapter 5 Above mobile soul is motionless angel.

Chapter 6 Above angel is God; for just as Soul is mobile plurality and angel motionless plurality, so God is motionless unity.

The Second Book discusses God
who has now been discovered.

Chapter 1 Unity, truth and goodness are the same thing, and above them there is nothing.

Chapter 2 There is no plurality of gods equal to each other.

Chapter 3 No plurality of gods exists one above the other without end.

Chapter 4 God's power is unlimited.

Cap. v Deus semper est.

Cap. vi Deus est ubique.

Cap. vii Deus omnia agit et servat et in omnibus omnia operatur.

Cap. viii Deus agit per suum esse quicquid agit.

Cap. ix Deus intellegit seipsum primo, ac etiam singula.

Cap. x Deus intellegit infinita.

Cap. xi Deus voluntatem habet perque illam extra se efficit omnia.

Cap. xii Voluntas dei necessaria simul et libera est, et agit libere.

Cap. xiii Deus amat et providet

Tertius liber descendit a deo et comparat invicem gradus rerum ad medium gradum et hunc ad alios.

Cap. i Descensus per quinque gradus fit, per quos est factus ascensus. Qui gradus invicem congrue comparantur.

Cap. ii Anima est medius rerum gradus atque omnes gradus tam superiores quam inferiores connectit in unum, dum ipsa et ad superos ascendit et descendit ad inferos.

Chapter 5 God is everlasting.

Chapter 6 God is omnipresent.

Chapter 7 God moves and preserves everything and does all things in all.

Chapter 8 Whatever God does He does through His own being.

Chapter 9 God understands Himself first and every individual thing too.

Chapter 10 God understands infinite things.

Chapter 11 God possesses will and performs all actions external to Himself through His will.

Chapter 12 The will of God is necessary and free at the same time, and acts freely.

Chapter 13 God loves and provides for His creation.

The Third Book descends from God and compares the grades of being with the middle grade and the middle grade with the rest.

Chapter 1 We descend through the five levels by which we ascended, and make an appropriate comparison between them.

Chapter 2 The soul is the middle level of being. It links and unites all the levels above it and below it when it ascends to the higher and descends to the lower levels.

Quartus liber dividit in species suas gradum rerum medium, id est, animam.

Cap. I Tres sunt animarum rationalium gradus. In primo est anima mundi, in secundo animae sphaerarum, in tertio animae animalium quae in sphaeris singulis continentur.

Cap. II Animae sphaerarum movent sphaeras per legem fatalem et movent in circulum, quia ipsae sunt circuli.

The Fourth Book divides the middle grade of being, that is, soul, into its species.

Chapter 1 There are three levels of rational souls: in the first is the world soul, in the second the souls of the spheres, in the third the souls of the living creatures contained within the individual spheres.

Chapter 2 The souls of spheres move the spheres in accordance with the law of fate; they move them in a circle because they are themselves circles.

Marsilii Ficini Florentini Prohemium In Platonicam Theologiam De Animorum Immortalitate Ad Laurentium Medicem Virum Magnanimum

1 Plato, philosophorum pater, magnanime Laurenti, cum intellegeret quemadmodum se habet visus ad solis lumen, ita se habere mentes omnes ad deum, ideoque eas nihil unquam sine dei lumine posse cognoscere, merito iustum piumque censuit, ut mens humana sicut a deo habet omnia, sic ad deum omnia referat. Igitur sive circa mores philosophemur, animum esse purgandum, ut tandem factus serenior divinum percipiat lumen deumque colat; sive rerum causas perscrutemur,[1] causas esse quaerendas, ut ipsam denique causarum causam inveniamus inventamque veneremur.

2 Neque solum ad id pietatis officium Plato noster ceteros adhortatur, verum etiam ipse maxime praestat. Quo factum est ut et ipse sine controversia divinus et doctrina eius apud omnes gentes theologia nuncuparetur, cum nihil usquam sive morale sive dialecticum aut mathematicum aut physicum tractet, quin mox ad contemplationem cultumque dei summa cum pietate reducat. Quoniam vero animum esse tamquam speculum arbitratur, in quo facile divini vultus imago reluceat, idcirco dum per vestigia singula deum ipsum diligenter indagat, in animi speciem ubique divertit, intellegens oraculum illud 'nosce te ipsum' id potissimum admonere, ut quicumque deum optat agnoscere, seipsum ante cognoscat. Quamobrem quisquis Platonica, quae iamdiu omnia latina feci, diligentissime legerit, consequetur quidem cuncta, sed duo haec ex omnibus potissima, et pium cogniti dei cultum et animorum divinitatem, in quibus universa consistit rerum perceptio et omnis institutio vitae totaque felicitas. Praesertim cum Plato de his ita sentiat, ut Aurelius Augustinus eum, tamquam christianae

The Proem to the Platonic Theology Concerning the Immortality of Souls Written by Marsilio Ficino the Florentine And Dedicated to Lorenzo de' Medici, A Man of Noble Soul

1 Noble-souled Lorenzo! Plato, the father of philosophers, realizing that our minds bear the same relationship to God as our sight to the light of the Sun, and that therefore they can never understand anything without the light of God, considered it just and pious that, as the human mind receives everything from God, so it should restore everything to God. Hence in the sphere of moral philosophy one must purify the soul until its eye becomes unclouded and it can see the divine light and worship God. And in the examination of causes, the final object of our search into them should be the cause of causes, and once we find it we should venerate it.

2 Nor does our beloved Plato only urge this pious duty on others, but he himself takes the lead. And that is why he has been considered indisputably divine and his teaching called "theology" among all peoples. For whatever subject he deals with, be it ethics, dialectic, mathematics or physics, he quickly brings it round, in a spirit of utmost piety, to the contemplation and worship of God. He considers man's soul to be like a mirror in which the image of the divine countenance is readily reflected; and in his eager hunt for God, as he tracks down every footprint, he everywhere turns hither and thither to the form of the soul. For he knows that this is the most important meaning of those famous words of the oracle, "Know thyself," namely "If you wish to be able to recognize God, you must first learn to know yourself." So anyone who reads very carefully the works of Plato that I translated in their entirety into Latin some time ago will discover among many other matters two of utmost importance: the worship of God with piety and un-

veritati omnium proximum, ex omni philosophorum numero elegerit imitandum, asserueritque Platonicos mutatis paucis christianos fore.

3 Ego vero, cum iampridem Aureliana auctoritate fretus summaque in genus humanum caritate adductus Platonis ipsius simulacrum quoddam christianae veritati simillimum exprimere statuissem, ad illa quae dixi duo prae ceteris diligenter incubui, ideoque universum opus *Platonicam Theologiam de immortalitate animorum* inscribendum esse censui.[2] In quo quidem componendo id praecipue consilium fuit, ut in ipsa creatae mentis divinitate, ceu speculo rerum omnium medio, creatoris ipsius tum opera speculemur, tum mentem contemplemur atque colamus. Reor autem (nec vana fides) hoc providentia divina decretum, ut et perversa multorum ingenia, quae soli divinae legis auctoritati haud facile cedunt, platonicis saltem rationibus religioni admodum suffragantibus acquiescant et quicumque philosophiae studium impie nimium a sancta religione seiungunt, agnoscant aliquando se non aliter aberrare quam si quis vel amorem sapientiae a sapientiae ipsius honore vel intellegentiam veram a recta voluntate disiunxerit. Denique, ut qui ea solum cogitant quae circa corpora sentiuntur rerumque ipsarum umbras rebus veris infeliciter praeferunt, platonica tandem ratione commoniti et praeter sensum sublimia contemplentur et res ipsas umbris feliciter anteponant.

4 Hoc in primis omnipotens deus iubet. Hoc omnino humana res postulat. Hoc caelestis Plato quondam suis facile deo aspirante peregit. Hoc tandem et ipsi nostris Platonem quidem imitati, sed

derstanding, and the divinity of souls. On these depend our whole perception of the world, the way we lead our lives, and all our happiness. Indeed, it was because of these views that Aurelius Augustine chose Plato out of the ranks of the philosophers to be his model, as being closest of all to the Christian truth. With just a few changes, he maintained, the Platonists would be Christians.

Relying on Augustine's authority, and moved by an immense love for humanity, I long ago decided that I would try to paint a portrait of Plato as close as possible to the Christian truth. And I have concentrated my efforts especially on the two topics I have mentioned. That is why I have deemed it appropriate to entitle the whole work *The Platonic Theology: On the Immortality of the Soul.*[1] My main intention in writing it has been this: that in the divinity of the created mind, as in a mirror at the center of all things, we should first observe the works of the Creator, and then contemplate and worship the mind of the Creator. I believe—and it is no empty belief—that divine providence has decreed that many who are wrong-headed and unwilling to yield to the authority of divine law alone will at least accept those arguments of the Platonists which fully reinforce the claims of religion; and that irreligious men who divorce the study of philosophy from sacred religion will come to realize that they are making the same sort of mistake as someone who divorces love of wisdom from respect for that wisdom, or who separates true understanding from the will to do what is right. Finally, I believe that those for whom the objects of thought are confined to the objects of bodily sensation and who in their wretchedness prefer the shadows of things to things themselves, once they are impressed by the arguments of Plato, will contemplate the higher objects which transcend the senses, and find happiness in putting things themselves before their shadows. 3

This is what almighty God especially demands. This is what the human condition absolutely requires. This is what immortal Plato, with God's favor, accomplished without difficulty for the 4

divina dumtaxat ope confisi, operoso hoc opere moliti sumus. Sed utinam tanta veritate id perfecerimus, quanta veritatis divinae veneratione tractavimus, adeo ut non aliter quodvis apud nos probatum esse velimus quam divina lex comprobet.

Opus autem ipsum tibi, magnanime Laurenti, iudicavi prae ceteris dedicandum, non ut philosophica tibi aperiam — de quibus iamdiu ita disputas ut non tam tibi, qui haec iam videris miro quodam ingenio consequutus, quam ceteris priscorum arcana videar editurus — sed quod et nos beneficio tuo id otium quo facilius philosophari possemus consecuti sumus,[3] et Plato noster hoc nostro erga te officio gratulaturus admodum videatur, quoniam, quod ille in magnis quondam viris potissimum exoptabat, ipse philosophiam una cum summa in rebus publicis auctoritate coniunxeris.

people of his own day. And this is what I, in imitation of Plato, but wholly dependent on God's help, have labored to achieve for the men of my own day in this present work, the fruit of much labor. I can only hope that the truth that I have arrived at reflects the veneration for divine truth with which I approached it. For I would not want anything proved in these pages which is not approved by divine law.

It was not in order to introduce you to philosophy, magnanimous Lorenzo, that I decided this work should be dedicated to you in preference to others. It has long been obvious from your philosophical disputations that it is not to you but to others that I need to reveal the secrets of the ancient philosophers, since you have already grasped them it seems with your astonishing natural ability. Rather, I do it for two reasons: firstly, because it is thanks to your generosity that I have the leisure to be able to practice philosophy, and secondly, because it seems to me that our beloved Plato would be particularly pleased by this act of respect towards you. For you have achieved what he looked for above all else among the great men of antiquity: you have combined the study of philosophy with the exercise of the highest public authority.

LIBER PRIMUS

: I :

Si animus non esset immortalis, nullum animal esset infelicius homine.

1 Cum genus humanum propter inquietudinem animi imbecillitatemque corporis et rerum omnium indigentiam duriorem quam bestiae vitam agat in terris, si terminum vivendi natura illi eundem penitus atque ceteris animantibus tribuisset, nullum animal esset infelicius homine. Quoniam vero fieri nequit ut homo, qui dei cultu propius cunctis mortalibus accedit ad deum, beatitudinis auctorem, omnino sit omnium infelicissimus, solum autem post mortem corporis beatior effici potest, necessarium esse videtur animis nostris ab hoc carcere discedentibus lucem aliquam superesse. At si lucem suam humanae mentes nequaquam respiciunt, 'clausae tenebris et carcere caeco', unde saepenumero cogimur propriae divinitati diffidere, solvamus, obsecro, caelestes animi caelestis patriae cupidi, solvamus quamprimum vincula compedum terrenarum, ut alis sublati platonicis ac deo duce in sedem aetheream liberius pervolemus, ubi statim nostri generis excellentiam feliciter contemplabimur.

2 Ceterum, ut evidenter appareat qua ratione potissimum mentes hominum mortalia claustra resolvere, immortalitatem suam cernere, beatitudinem attingere valeant, conabimur sequenti disputatione pro viribus demonstrare, praeter pigram hanc molem corporum qua Democritiorum, Cyrenaicorum, Epicureorum consideratio finiebatur, esse efficacem qualitatem aliquam atque virtutem ad quam Stoicorum Cynicorumque investigatio sese

BOOK I

: I :

Were the soul not immortal, no creature would be more miserable than man.

1 Since man's mind is never at rest, his body is frail and he is totally without resources, the life he leads on earth is harsher than that of the beasts. Had nature set exactly the same term to his life as she has to the other creatures, no animal would be more miserable than man. But man by his worship of God comes closer to God than all other mortal things, and God is the author of happiness. So it is utterly impossible that man should be the most unhappy of all. However, only after the death of the body can man become any happier. It seems therefore to follow of necessity that once our souls leave this prison, some other light awaits them.[1] Our human minds, "immured in darkness and a sightless dungeon,"[2] may look in vain for that light, and we are often driven to doubt our own divine provenance. But I pray that as heavenly souls longing with desire for our heavenly home we may cast off the bonds of our terrestrial chains; cast them off as swiftly as possible, so that, uplifted on Platonic wings and with God as our guide, we may fly unhindered to our ethereal abode, where we will straightway look with joy on the excellence of our own human nature.

2 In order to show clearly how best the minds of men can unlock the bars of mortality, witness their own immortality and thus achieve a state of blessedness, I shall try, as best I can, to prove in the following discussion: [first,] that besides this inert mass of our bodies, to which the Democriteans, Cyrenaics and Epicureans limit their consideration,[3] there exists an active quality or power, to which the Stoics and Cynics direct their investigation;[4] and

contulit. Supra qualitatem vero, quae cum materiae dimensione dividitur et mutatur omnino, formam quandam praestantiorem existere, quae, licet mutetur quodammodo, divisionem tamen in corpore non admittit. In ea forma rationalis animae sedem veteres theologi posuere. Hucusque Heraclitus, Marcus Varro, Marcusque Manilius ascenderunt. Super animam rationalem extare mentem angelicam, non individuam modo, sed etiam immutabilem, in qua videntur Anaxagoras et Hermotimus quievisse. Huius denique mentis oculo, qui cupit veritatis lumen et capit, solem ipsum praeesse divinum, in quem Plato noster purgatam mentis aciem dirigere iussit, docuit et contendit.

3 Proinde cum huc ascenderimus, hos quinque rerum omnium gradus — corporis videlicet molem, qualitatem, animam, angelum, deum — invicem comparabimus. Quoniam autem ipsum rationalis animae genus, inter gradus huiusmodi medium obtinens, vinculum naturae totius apparet, regit qualitates et corpora, angelo se iungit et deo, ostendemus[4] id esse prorsus indissolubile, dum gradus naturae connectit; praestantissimum, dum mundi machinae praesidet; beatissimum, dum se divinis insinuat. Ita vero nostrum animum se habere atque esse talem, rationibus primo communibus, secundo argumentationibus propriis, tertio signis, quarto solutionibus quaestionum asseverabimus.

[second,] that beyond quality, which is divisible along with matter's dimensions and subject to all manner of change, there exists a higher sort of form, which, though it is in a certain sense changeable, admits of no division in a body. In this form the ancient theologians located the seat of the rational soul. This was the point [in the argument] reached by Heraclitus, Marcus Varro and Marcus Manilius.[5] I shall also attempt to show that beyond rational soul exists angelic mind, which is not only indivisible but unchangeable as well. This is the point where Anaxagoras and Hermotimus rested content.[6] But the eye of angelic mind, which seeks for and finds the light of truth, is ruled by the divine Sun itself. It is towards this that Plato urges, instructs and enjoins us to direct the gaze of the mind, once it has been purified.[7]

Once we have ascended so far, we shall compare in turn these five levels of being: body (bodily mass), quality, soul, angel and God. Because the genus of rational soul, which occupies the midpoint of these five levels, appears to be the link that holds all nature together — it controls qualities and bodies while it joins itself with angel and with God — I shall demonstrate: [first,] that it is in fact completely indissoluble, because it holds together the different levels of nature; next, that it is preeminent, because it presides over the framework of the world; and finally, that it is most blessed when it steals into the bosom of the divine. I shall seek to establish that the condition and nature of soul is such as I have described, firstly by general arguments, secondly by specific proofs, thirdly by signs, and lastly by resolving questions. 3

: II :

Corpus natura sua nihil agit.

1 Quoniam corpus apud Platonem ex materia quadam constat et quantitate, atque ad materiam extendi et affici pertinet solum, et ipsa extensio affectioque passiones quaedam sunt, quantitas autem aut nihil est aliud quam extensio ipsa materiae, aut si quid aliud est, est tamen res quaedam talis, ut et divisioni subiecta sit semper et materiam sequentibus omnibus subiiciat passionibus et nihil effundat in materiam alienam; consequens est ut corpus ipsum, quatenus corpus, agat quidem nihil, sed soli passioni subiiciatur.

2 Idem quoque ex eo patet, quod ad actionis cuiusque naturalis perfectionem tria potissimum exiguntur. Primum, ut agens in seipso potentissimum sit. Secundum, ut ad motum promptissimum. Tertium, ut facile penetret patiens atque ipsum patiens agenti proxime uniatur. His omnibus moles corporis impedimento esse videtur. Primum, quia cum in partes plurimas porrigatur, virtus agens in ea dispersa est et a seipsa distans et distracta quam plurimum. Virtus vero sicut unione augetur, ita dispersione minuitur. Idcirco siccitas vim tum caloris, tum frigoris auget, quia unit; humiditas vero debilitat, quia dispergit. Deinde, quo maius corpus est, eo secundum seipsum pigrius ineptiusque ad motum. Igitur quanto magis augetur corpus, tanto magis retardat motum ac differt diutius actionem. Nempe vis levitatis sursum tollit scintillam velocius quam flammam. Vis gravitatis celerius deorsum trahit lignum, si acutum fuerit, quam si latum. Postremo, cum corpus quodlibet suum impleat locum ac locus unus duobus corporibus nequaquam sufficiat, commigrare in unum corpora nequeunt ac etiam soliditate densitateque sua penetrationem mutuam prohi-

: II :

Body does not act of its own nature.

According to Plato, body is made up of matter and of quantity.[8] 1 It is characteristic of matter only to be extended in space and affected by action; and extension and being affected are passive conditions. But quantity is nothing but the extension of matter; or, if it is anything else, it is such that it is always subject to division even as it subjects matter to an unending sequence of experiences and has no affect on any other matter than its own. It follows from all this that body in itself does not act but solely is acted upon.

The same point becomes clear from the following argument. 2 For each natural action to be accomplished, three requirements must be met: first, the agent must be most powerful in itself; second, it must be most ready for motion; and third, it must easily penetrate the object being acted upon, so that the object is immediately united with the agent. The mass of the body seems to be a hindrance to all of these conditions. In the first place, because of the extension of the body in many parts, the acting force in it is dispersed and distant from itself and broken up to the utmost degree. Power increases with union, but diminishes with dispersion. Dryness, for instance, increases the intensity both of heat and of cold by uniting it; dampness weakens it by dispersing it. Secondly, the larger a body is, the more sluggish it is; by its very nature it is unsuited for motion. So the bigger a body grows, the slower it is to move, and the longer the action is delayed. The power of lightness, for instance, makes a spark fly up more rapidly than a flame; the power of heaviness makes a log fall more rapidly if it is pointed than if it is wide. Thirdly, since any body fills its own space and one space cannot accommodate two bodies, bodies cannot coalesce

bent. Itaque distantia partium virtutem agendi debilitat, molis amplitudo retardat motum, crassitudo penetrationem corporum impedit. Et quod deterius est, si distractas corporis alicuius partes natura coarctet ad augendam ex unione virtutem, interim crassius corpus ipsum evadit et ineptius ad ingressum. Ac si rarefaciat ipsum ad acquirendam motus penetrationisque facilitatem, statim virtus agendi dispergitur. Quapropter cum tres esse debeant perfectae actionis conditiones, corpus aut habet tres[5] alias illis adversas aut unam illarum accipiendo, non accipit aliam. Oporteret[6] quippe brevitatem simul habere, levitatem et raritatem. Quae quidem tria ad incorporalem quendam habitum corpus ipsum reducunt, ut omnis agendi virtus sit ad naturam incorpoream referenda.

3 Nonne ex ipsa quantitate multitudo partium est tum in agente, tum in patiente, tum in medio horum spatio? At propter primum illud remissior actio est, quae aliter esset admodum vehementior. Propter secundum paulatim transigitur, quod subito impleretur. Propter tertium sero peragitur, quod cito consummaretur. Quapropter ad vim quandam incorporalem pertinere videtur vehemens, cita et subita operatio. Idem nobis ostendit ignis, qui sua tenuitate prae ceteris elementis naturae spiritali propinquat. Est autem efficacissimus omnium. Momento enim paene facit quod alia corpora longo tempore. Admixtionem in se aliorum non patitur, qualem cetera corpora patiuntur. Scintilla ignis, si detur materia, totum ferme occupabit orbem. Reliqua elementa non tantum, non tam cito, non tam vehementer seipsa diffundunt. Hic autem, quia tenuis est, fit potens. Quia potens fit, latus evadit potius quam converso. Fit etiam luminis, quod incorporale dicitur, capax, cuius actio fit momento. Et modicus aer in vasis summo vas in aquae summo sustinet, etiam si multorum lapidum pondere oneretur. In fulgure quoque et bombarda plane perspicitur quantum

in one space: their solidity and density prevent them from penetrating one another. To sum up, the space between parts weakens the power to act, the bulk of bodily mass retards motion, and density impedes bodies' penetration. What is worse, if nature forces the scattered parts of a body together in order to increase its power by union, the body becomes denser meanwhile and less suitable for penetration. If nature makes it less dense in order to facilitate motion and penetration, the power of acting is dispersed forthwith. And so, since these three conditions are required for accomplishing action, body either possesses three other conditions hostile to these three, or it accepts one of them but not another. What body would need is smallness, lightness, and lack of density all at the same time; but these would take it back to being a certain incorporeal habit.[9] So all power of acting must be attributed to an incorporeal nature.

Isn't it from quantity that we have a multitude of parts in the agent, in the patient, and in the space between them? Because of the first, an action which would otherwise have been very vigorous is very sluggish; because of the second, what would have been completed instantaneously is gradually accomplished; because of the third, what would have been done rapidly takes a long time to finish. So vigorous, rapid and instantaneous action seems to belong to some sort of incorporeal force. Take fire, for instance. Because of its rarity it comes closer to the nature of spirit than the other elements. Of all the elements it is the most effective agent, however. In scarcely a moment it can perform what it takes other bodies a long time to do. It does not admit of any blending with other elements, as is the case with other bodies. With a single spark, if there is fuel enough, it will fill almost the whole world. The other elements do not extend themselves out so far, so quickly or so vigorously. It is because fire is so fine and subtle that it becomes powerful. Because it becomes powerful, it extends outwards, not the other way around. It is capable too of giving light, 3

ignis aerque valeant. Denique, caelum, quanto minus crassum est quam cetera, tanto luce, motu, effectu est mirabilius. Si igitur corpus, quanto propinquius fit incorporeis, tanto ad agendum fit efficacius, quis non videat agendi vim in natura incorporali consistere?

4 Quod hinc etiam intueri licet quod sicut primum in natura, qui deus est, agit in omnia, nihil patitur, ita ultimum, quod est materia corporalis, pati oportet ab omnibus, agere vero per se in aliud minime, cum nihil sit infra ipsam, quod ab ipsa patiatur. Ac si in summa infinitaque unitate infinita est agendi virtus, in multitudine infinita nulla est virtus agendi, sed infinita patiendi natura. Infinitam multitudinem corpus esse Pythagorici arbitrantur, quoniam absque fine dividitur. Si quid igitur agere corpora videantur, non ex ipsa sui mole, ut Democritii, Cyrenaici, Epicurei putaverunt, sed ex aliqua vi et qualitate illis insita operantur. Nec iniuria. Ubi enim contrariorum oritur oppositio, ibi naturalium corporum editur actio. Oppositio illa nascitur in genere qualitatum.

5 Adde quod materia sub omnibus his corporibus una est, una quoque interminata dimensio. Si igitur actio a materia proveniret aut dimensione, una esset omnium operatio. Nunc vero cum diversae appareant diversorum corporum actiones, non per materiam dimensionemve unam, sed per varias ipsorum formas qualitatesque operantur. Merito, quoniam qua ratione sunt, eadem agunt. Sunt autem non per molem in specie hac aut illa, sed per hanc formam aut illam. Per formam igitur operantur, praesertim cum agens patienti propinquet per formae qualitates prius quam per terminos quantitatis, ac per formae vim transeat in materiam

which is regarded as incorporeal, and the action of light is instantaneous. Another example: a little air at the top of a barrel keeps the barrel floating on the water's surface, even if it is loaded down with the weight of many stones. Lightning and cannon-fire too demonstrate quite clearly the power of air and fire. As a final argument one can note that the heavens, which are the least dense of all, are the most remarkable for their light, motion and power to act. If a body becomes a more effective agent the closer it is to the incorporeal, is it not obvious that the power of acting resides in an incorporeal nature?

We can grasp the same point in the following way. What is first in nature, that is, God, acts on everything but is never acted upon. So what is last, that is, corporeal matter [or body], has to be acted upon by everything. It can never act on anything else of itself, for nothing exists below it which could be the subject of its action. And if in the highest unity, being infinite, there exists an infinite power of acting, then in infinite plurality there exists no power of acting at all but rather an infinite capacity for being acted upon. The Pythagoreans think that body is infinite plurality, because it is endlessly divisible. So if bodies appear to act in any way, they do not do so by virtue of their own mass, as the Democriteans, Cyrenaics and Epicureans supposed, but through some force and quality implanted in them. This is hardly surprising. For action arises in natural bodies when opposition arises between contraries. Such opposition is born in the genus of qualities.[10] 4

Furthermore, the same matter and the same indefinite spatial extension underlie all bodies. So if action proceeded from matter or extension, all would act in the same way. As it is, since the actions of different bodies are obviously different, they do not act through a single matter and extension, but through their own distinctive forms and qualities. By virtue of what they are, properly speaking, they also act. But they are in this or that species, not because of their mass, but because of a particular form. So it is 5

alienam potius quam per quantitatis dimensionem, et singula materiae puncta non dimensione attingat, sed qualitate. Sic per frigiditatem aqua frigefacit, ignis per caliditatem calefacit potius quam per molem. Ignis enim non quia amplissimus, sed quia ferventissimus urit. Ac si totus eius calor quasi ad punctum sui redigatur, propter maximam unionem potentissimus erit ad comburendum. Sic[7] beneficio qualitatis, praesertim in angustum coactae,[8] provenit actio.

6 Hinc fit, ut causae naturales effectus producant suos qualitate similes causarum potius quam aequales quantitate. Ac si contingat interdum aequales provenire, necesse est prius apparuisse persimiles, quasi per qualitates actio peragatur, postquam necessario in eis atque per eas effectus causas referunt. Ideo filii statim nati paene omnes complexione et figura parentum similes sunt, aequales autem magnitudine rarius et posterius. Sed quis haec non viderit? Neque enim si corpori magno propinquas magnus efficeris, at si calido certe calescis; neque ullo sensu percipis quantitatem, nisi prius sensum qualitas moverit. Quis enim quam magnus sit paries iudicabit, nisi hanc ipsam magnitudinem color lumenque ad oculum usque perduxerit? Ac iudicium quantitatis magis priusque propter distantiam perditur quam luminis et coloris, quasi sit efficacia motionis in qualitate.

7 Quod hinc perspicue confirmatur, quod res quaelibet appetitum ratione boni, quae qualitas est, semper movet, non ratione magni aut multi, alioquin semper quae maiora plurave sunt eligeremus. Nunc vero in his quae mala putamus, minora pauciorave eligimus. Qualitas autem ideo corpus esse non potest, quia duo corpora eodem in loco sine mutua offensione omnino conflari non possunt: qualitates vero plures in eodem pariter confunduntur. Siquidem in mellis materia color flavus, dulcedo et odor, tres quali-

through form that they act. This is for [three] particular reasons. To begin with, an agent first approaches the object to be acted upon by way of form's qualities before doing so through the limits of quantity. Next, it is through the power of form, not through quantitative extension, that it can pass into alien matter. And finally, it reaches each individual point of that matter not through extension but through quality. It is by coldness that water gets cold. It is by heat, not mass, that fire gets hot. Fires do not burn because they extend far, but because they are extremely hot. Indeed, if all its heat were concentrated into a single point, its power to burn would become most intense, because of the high degree of unification. Thus action arises thanks to quality, especially when quality is concentrated.

That is why natural causes produce effects like themselves in quality rather than equal to them in quantity. If occasionally the effects do turn out to be equal in size, they have to have first appeared very similar in appearance (an action accomplished as it were by qualities). Afterwards, necessarily, in and through their qualities, the effects resemble their causes. Thus almost all children resemble their parents in complexion and features when they are newborn, but equal them in size only occasionally and much later. The point is obvious to anyone. You do not become big by approaching a big body; but you certainly get hot if you approach something hot. Nor do you perceive quantity with any of your senses unless one sense has first been affected by quality. For who can judge the size of a wall unless color and light have brought its bigness before the eye. Further, the judging of quantity is lost with distance more and earlier than the judging of light or color. It is as though motion's efficacy consists in quality. 6

The point is clearly demonstrated by the fact that our desire is aroused by something because it is good, not because it is large or multiple; and goodness is a quality. Otherwise we would always choose what is larger or more numerous. In fact, with those things 7

tates ubique simul reperiuntur; quaeque enim guttula mellis flava, dulcis, naribusque suavis. Accedit ad haec quod omne corpus natura sua in longum, latum, profundum extenditur. Qualitas autem non sua natura videtur extendi. Nulla enim esset qualitas alicubi non extensa. Insunt tamen puncto, unitati, numero, harmoniae, virtutibus qualitates aliquae[9] non extensae. Qualitas igitur non est corpus. Praesertim quia si naturalis ipsi esset extensio, quanto latior fieret, tanto fieret et robustior; fit autem dispersione debilior.

8 Igitur qualitas, per se quodammodo individua, in corporis dimensione dividitur. Siquidem ratione quantitatis solum fit divisio, cum divisio ex uno semper deducatur in plura. Servat tamen qualitas etiam in corpore quandam indivisibilis naturae proprietatem. Nam, ut Platonici arbitrantur, albedo, quae est in parte quavis corporis albi,[10] non proprie dicenda est pars albedinis illius quae est in corpore toto, immo partis albedo dici debet potius quam pars albedinis. Nempe si album corpus plures in partes diviseris, in singulis partibus eadem restabit albedinis ratio, vis quoque et actio similis; non tamen amplitudo eadem vel aequalis.

9 Ideo non ad qualitatem proprie, sed ad corpus ratione quantitatis divisio pertinet. Ad qualitatem praecipue in exiguum redactam pertinet actio. Haec utique corpus non est, ac maxime cum ad punctum colligitur fit incorporea. Quo fit ut incorporalis naturae virtute, non ex materia corporum proveniat operatio.

we deem evils, we choose the smaller or the fewer. Quality cannot be body, however, because two bodies cannot be brought together in the same space without mutual repulsion, whereas several qualities can be blended together in the same object. The matter of honey, for instance, always possesses a combination of three qualities, yellowness, sweetness and fragrance. Every drop of honey is yellow, sweet and fragrant in the nostrils. Again, every body by its very nature is extended in length, breadth and depth. But quality by its very nature appears to be unextended, otherwise no quality would not be extended somewhere. Yet some qualities that are unextended are present in the point, in unity, in number, in harmony, in powers. So quality is not body. Indeed, if extension were natural to it, the bigger it became, the stronger it would be; but being dispersed in extension makes it weaker.

So quality, indivisible itself in a way, suffers division in the extension of body. Division of course happens only by reason of quantity; for division always proceeds from the one into the many. Yet quality preserves some property of its indivisible nature even when it is in a body. For, as the Platonists put it,[11] the whiteness which is in a particular part of a white body should properly not be called part of the whiteness which is in the whole body. It should be called the whiteness of a part rather than part of the whiteness. Suppose you cut a white body into several parts: in each individual part will remain the same rational principle of whiteness, and the power and like action of whiteness; but the size will not be the same or equal. 8

Hence division, strictly speaking, is not a characteristic of quality, but of body by reason of its quantity. Action pertains to quality, especially when quality is concentrated. So quality is not body; and when it is concentrated in a single point, it becomes totally incorporeal. Hence the activity of bodies does not arise from matter, but from the power of an incorporeal nature. 9

: III :

Supra formam divisam in corpore extat forma individua,[11] *id est anima.*

1 Iam igitur a corpore ad qualitatem ascendimus. Qualitatem vero more platonico omnem formam divisam in corpore appellamus. Sed numquid in ea Stoicorum Cynicorumque more sistendus est gradus? Minime. Qualitas forma quaedam est. Formae natura simplex, efficax, agilis ad agendum, unde forma a physicis actus saepe vocatur. Natura huiusmodi in materiae inficitur gremio: ex simplici divisibilis impuraque, ex activa passioni obnoxia, ex agili fit inepta. Ideo neque mera forma haec est, neque vera, neque perfecta. Non potest haec prima forma esse, si mera non est. Unumquodque enim prius sit saltem secundum genus oportet quam inquinetur.

2 Item, non potest esse forma prima, si non est vera. Unde enim mens hanc formam arguit non omnino veram esse, nisi inde ubi ipsa cernit aliquam veriorem, ad quam comparata haec deficit et falsa quodammodo esse convincitur? Ubinam mens veram ipsam videt formam? Profecto aut extra se aut intus eam conspicit. Si extra se prospicit, certe alicubi in natura est forma quaedam vera, superior qualitate. Si in seipsa mens intuetur eam, non deest menti vera forma; non ergo deest mundo.

3 Praeterea validior quidem veritas est quam falsum, cum veritas esse sine falso possit, falsum absque veritate consistere nequeat. Non enim falsum quicquam dicitur, nisi saltem verum sit illud esse falsum; neque valet quicquam, nisi verum sit ipsum valere; neque vere intellegitur esse falsum, nisi per veritatem; neque falsum dicitur, nisi quod fallit; neque fallit, nisi per imaginem verita-

: III :

Above the form that is divided in body there exists an indivisible form, namely soul.

So far we have ascended from body to quality. Quality is the name we give, in the Platonic manner, to all form which appears, divided up, in body. But should we stop at this point as the Stoics and Cynics do? Certainly not. Quality is a sort of form. Form's nature is simple, effective, swift to act. That is why the natural philosophers often call it "act." Such a nature is contaminated when it is in the bosom of matter. Instead of being simple, it becomes divisible and impure; instead of being active, it becomes subject to passion, to being acted upon; instead of being swift to act, it becomes clumsy and incompetent. So this sort of form is neither pure nor true nor perfect. If it is not pure, it cannot be the primary form. For everything must first exist as a pure example of its kind before it is corrupted. 1

Again, if quality is not the true, it cannot be the primary form. For how can the mind prove it is not entirely true, unless it can turn away to perceive another truer form in comparison with which quality is found wanting and shown to be in a manner false? Where then does the mind see the true form? It must either gaze outside itself or within. If it looks outside itself, then a true form, superior to quality, exists somewhere in nature. If the mind gazes within, then a true form is not absent from the mind, and therefore not absent from the world. 2

Furthermore, the truth is stronger than what is false, since the truth can exist without the false, whereas the false cannot exist without the truth. For nothing can be said to be false unless it is true that it is false. Nothing has validity unless it is true that it has validity. If a thing is truly understood to be false, then it is by 3

tis. Si igitur veritas est falso validior, et forma minus vera, videlicet qualitas, in ordine rerum est aliquid, multo magis vera forma in rerum ordine reperitur. Praesertim cum quanto intellectus praestantior veriorque est quam sensus, tanto intellegibilis forma praestantior veriorque quam forma sensibilis esse debeat. Per haec patuit qualitatem non posse esse primam formam, tum quia mera non est, tum quia non vera.

4 Constat idem quoque quoniam non perfecta. Primum enim in quolibet genere totius generis est principium. Quod est aliorum principium sequentia continet. Nihil igitur sui generis deest illi quod est in suo genere primum. Quemadmodum sol, si inter lucida primum est, nullo caret luminis gradu, cetera sub eo lucida, ut sidera atque elementa, non totam capiunt luminis plenitudinem. Quoniam igitur prima forma omnes formarum perfectiones complectitur atque idcirco imperfecta esse nequit, recte concluditur formam illam quae dicitur imperfecta primam esse non posse.

5 Adde quod qualitas, quia ita inhaeret materiae, ut cum ea dilatetur et dividatur, materialis, ut ita dixerim, prorsus evadit ac,[12] si a materia separetur, corrumpitur. Quocirca seipsam non sustinet, sed a materia tamquam subiecto sustinetur. Quod vero seipsum sustinere non potest, multo minus ex seipso subsistere. Itaque cum in alio iaceat, ab alio certe dependet. Oritur enim qualitas aliquando, cum mutetur et pereat. Nihil autem aliquando oritur a seipso. Quod enim genito praestat initium, generato[13] praecedat oportet. Nihil autem sibi ipsi praecedit. Qualitas igitur, cum ab alio oriatur et nihil oriri nisi a superiori aliquo valeat, non potest esse naturae principium.

truth that this is understood. A thing is not called false unless it deceives, and it does not deceive except by the appearance of truth. So if the truth is stronger than the false, and if the form that is less true, namely quality, exists as something in the order of things, then *a fortiori* a true form must exist in the order of things. In particular, insofar as intellect is superior to and truer than sense, intelligible form must be superior to and truer than sensible form. So it is clear that quality cannot be the primary form, because it is not pure and because it is not true.

The same conclusion follows from its not being perfect. For the primary member of any genus is the principle of the whole genus. What is the principle of other things contains all that follow upon it. So what is first in its genus lacks nothing of its genus. The Sun, for instance, being first among luminaries, lacks no degree of light, whereas the other luminaries inferior to it, such as the stars and the elements, do not possess the full plenitude of light. The primary form therefore contains all the perfections of the subsequent forms and so cannot be imperfect. We are thus correct in concluding that a form described as imperfect cannot be the primary form. 4

Because quality inheres in matter in such a way that it is expanded and divided together with matter, one could say that in the end it becomes material, and, if it is separated from matter, corrupted. It does not sustain itself but is sustained by matter as though by a substrate. If a thing cannot sustain itself, much less can it exist on its own. As it lies fallow in something else, it is certainly dependent on that something. Since quality is liable to change and destruction, it must be born from time to time. But nothing is ever born from itself. For what gives a beginning to what is born must precede what is born. But nothing can precede itself. Since quality is born from something else, and nothing can be born except from something superior to it, quality cannot, therefore, be nature's principle. 5

6 Verum unde trahit originem? Numquid a materia? Nequaquam. Quoniam cum materia commune et informe subiectum sit, atque idcirco, quantum in se est, semper et ubique ad omnes formas aeque se habeat, undenam id provenit ut alias et alibi aliis formis ornetur, nisi ab aliquo superiore quod eam et alibi et alias aliter afficit? Praeterea, si materia sibi ipsi datura sit formam, quaerimus utrum ipsa virtute sua prius habeat eam formam, quam sibi sit praebitura, aut non habeat? Si non habet, neque concipere quidem potest; sin habet, non est utique materia prima, sed aliquid ex materia et formae virtute compositum.

7 Atque de hac ipsa virtute similiter inquiremus, numquid eam habeat a seipsa an ab alio. Quod si habet ab alio, ab alio quoque habet formam; sin a se, numquid hanc similiter habet per aliam virtutem sibi itidem propriam atque ita in infinitum progrediemur? An potius virtutem illam non per aliam possidet virtutem, sed per essentiam? Si ita est, essentia materiae idem erit ac virtus sive substantia effectiva formarum, et fons erit formarum potius quam subiectum — immo erit forma potius quam materia, et forma omnium praestantissima, forma omnis divisionis impatiens. Neque fluctuabit, ut nunc, labentium varietate formarum, sed per essentiam sempiternam formis erit praedita sempiternis.

8 Ex his colligitur materiam non habere suapte natura vim ullam formarum procreatricem, quia formare seipsum non potest informe subiectum cum nihil omnino agere queat, siquidem actio a forma provenit a qua provenit esse. Ac si materia quae subest arti, quamvis forma non careat, non tamen a se ipsa, sed ab artis forma ad formam ducitur artificii, certe materia, quae naturae subiicitur, cum sit informis, non a seipsa, sed a naturae forma[14] ad formam ducitur naturalem.

6 But whence does it arise? From matter? Surely not. Matter of itself is a common substrate and possesses no form; it relates to all forms insofar as it can in an identical manner, whatever the occasion or the place. How then can it be embellished with different forms at different times and places except by way of something higher that affects it in different ways at different times and places? If matter is to give form to itself, we wish to know whether or not it already possesses that form by way of its own power before it bestows it on itself. If it does not possess that form, it cannot in fact conceive it. If it does possess it, then it is not prime matter, but something composed from matter and from the power of form.

7 In that case, we have to inquire about this power. Does matter have it from itself or from another? If from another, then it has the form too from another. If from itself, then does it similarly possess the power because of some other power that similarly belongs to it, and so on *ad infinitum*? Or does it have the power, not through some other power, but through its own essence? In that case, the essence of matter will be the same as the power or the substance that brings forms into being: matter will be the source of forms rather than their substrate. Or rather, matter will be form rather than matter, indeed the highest form of forms at that, the form that brooks no division. It will not fluctuate (as it now does) with the variety of fleeting forms, but by virtue of its eternal essence it will be endowed with the eternal forms.

8 From this we can conclude that matter in its own nature has no power to procreate forms. A formless substrate cannot give itself form, being completely incapable of action, since action comes from form which is the source of being. If the matter which is shaped by art, although not lacking form, is made not by itself but by the form of art into the form of an artifact, then certainly the matter which is subject to nature, although it is formless, is made not from itself but from the form of nature into a natural form.

9 Unde igitur erit qualitas? Forsitan ab alia qualitate, puta quod ignis alius alium generet? Neque id quidem. Nam qualitas, quia esse nequit absque fomento materiae, ideo materiae suae non dominatur, multo minus dominabitur alienae. Non igitur potest corporis alicuius qualitas corpus aliud sola sua potestate formare. Corpus quidem naturale per ipsam molem, quae soli passioni subiicitur, agit nihil; per qualitatem vero non agit sufficienter. Haec enim, quandoquidem non habet sufficientiam existendi, non praestat corpori sufficientiam operandi. Profecto, quia ignis prius genitus fuit ab aliquo quam ipse aliud generaret, prius sibi convenit ut sit effectus quam ut efficiens. Effectui conditio haec innata est ut pendeat aliunde. Quapropter quotiens ignis aliquid operatur, agit tamquam superioris causae instrumentum. Si enim ignis hic aut ille esset causa generandi ignis prima — id est summa, cum a causa alicuius generis prima genus profluat universum — totum ubique ac semper ignem efficeret. Itaque faceret cum se ipsum, tum ignem quemlibet qui ante ipsum fuit et qui post erit. Cum igitur ignis hic aut ille non sit prima generationis huiusmodi causa, quaerimus cuius sit causae instrumentum. Numquid[15] ignis alterius? Nequaquam. Primo, quia aequa est illa causa, non superior. Deinde, quia vel exstinctus est iam ignis ille unde hic ante manaverat, vel remotissimus. An forte instrumentum est aliorum elementorum? Neque id quidem. Non est enim in dissimilibus et contrariis elementis ulla ignis generandi ratio, cui ignis hic alium generaturus tamquam instrumentum subiiciatur. Num igitur instrumentum fit caeli? Minime. Non enim ignis hic remotissimi illius corporis instrumentum fieri potest aliter quam per medium. Media vero haec corpora sunt inepta. Ac potius inter caelum sive ignis sphaeram atque dissimilia elementa ad ignem hunc in terra gignendum inter-

Where then does quality come from? Perhaps it is from another quality as one fire generates another? But this cannot be the answer. For quality cannot exist without the kindling of matter, and so is not in control of its own matter, much less matter extraneous to it. Thus the quality of one body cannot give form to another body through its own power alone. The natural body has no power to act through its own mass, which is passive and can only be acted upon. Nor does it have adequate power to act through quality. For the mode of existence of quality is not sufficient to provide body with an adequate mode of activity. A fire, for instance, has first to be generated by something before it can generate another; it needs to be an effect before it can be an efficient cause. It is characteristic of an effect that it depends on something else. If follows then that when fire acts in any way, it acts as the instrument of a higher cause. For if one particular fire were the first cause of the generation of fire, were, in other words, the highest cause (since any genus as a whole proceeds from the genus's first cause), it would be responsible for the production of all fire whenever and wherever it occurred. Thus it would be responsible for producing itself and any fire that came either before or after it. But since no particular fire can be the first cause of this kind of generation, we must ask about the cause of which it is [just] the instrument. Is it the instrument of another fire? Certainly not: first, because that cause is equal, not superior to it; and second, because the fire from which our fire had originated would either be out by now, or far away. Is it then the instrument of the other [three] elements? Again the answer is no. In dissimilar and contrary elements no rational principle exists for the generation of fire to which this fire (which is about to generate another fire) can be subject as instrument. Could it then be the instrument of heaven? Far from it. This fire can be the instrument of such a distant body only by way of an intermediary. But the intermediary bodies are not suited to the task. Or rather, one has to posit another fire 9 ponendus est ignis aliquis hunc ignem generaturus, quam converso. Similiter in singulis rerum naturalium speciebus argumentabimur.

10 Quamobrem praeter omnes huiusmodi formas inesse oportet omnibus et praeesse substantiam quandam incorporalem per corpora penetrantem, cuius instrumenta sint corporeae qualitates. Quo enim pacto qualitates singulae, quae suapte natura instabiles inordinataeque sunt, aut stabilem ordinem in generationis successione servarent, nisi per ordinem altioris causae stabilem regerentur, aut ad eosdem effectus statutis temporum curriculis semper reverterentur, nisi una eademque causa esset, quae illas quovis tempore ducens statutis temporibus similiter duceret?

11 Mens humana quotidie a particularibus formis ad universales absolutasque se confert. Item, super naturales formas certis astrictas materiis per mathematicas, quibus incerta materia sufficit, ad metaphysicas, quae neque certa neque incerta materia indigent, ascendere solet. Praeterea, a dimensionibus, quae tam situ quam partibus egent, ad punctum sine partibus, sed quodammodo circa situm; rursus a punctis ad numeros, qui partibus quidem indigent, situ vero nequaquam; demum a numeris ad unitatem, cui neque situ neque partibus ullis opus est, sese attollit. Atque ultra unitatem individuam sed accidentalem ad substantialem se unitatem, id est formam, transfert individuamque essentiam, accidentium fundamentum simul atque[16] originem, tamquam ad fixum quendam et in seipso manentem accidentium per se mutabilium alterique semper haerentium cardinem. Si tantam ad ascensum rationalem mens humana potentiam habet, quae et pars quaedam est universi

placed between the heaven or sphere of fire and the other elements, in order to account for the generation of this fire on earth. That other fire will generate this fire, not the reverse. A similar argument will apply to the [other] individual species of natural things.

Therefore over and above all these quality forms, there must be a certain incorporeal substance [or form] present in and ruling over all objects; and this penetrates the bodies, and the corporeal qualities are its instruments. For how else would individual qualities, which are by nature unstable and without order, preserve a stable order in the succession of generation, unless ruled by the stable order of a higher cause? And why should individual qualities always return to produce the same effects at certain appointed intervals of time, unless the one and the same cause that leads them at any [one] time were likewise to lead them at appointed times? 10

The human mind in its day-to-day activities proceeds from particular forms to universal and absolute forms. From natural forms, which are limited to definite bits of matter, it customarily ascends by way of mathematical forms, for which indefinite matter will suffice, to metaphysical forms, which have no need of matter, definite or indefinite. Likewise it ascends from dimensions, which require both location and parts, to the point, which has no parts but in a sense has location; and again from points to numbers which need parts but not location. Finally, it wings its way from numbers to the unity which needs neither parts nor location. It travels beyond the unity which is indivisible but accidental to the unity which is substantial, in other words to the substantial form; it travels to the indivisible essence, at once the foundation and origin of all that is accidental, as to something fixed, and to the axis, in itself unchanging, of all that is in itself accidental, changeable, always clinging to another. If the human mind has such a capacity for rational ascent, though it is only a part of the universe and en- 11

et mens corporeis[17] vinculis impedita, multo certe maiorem ad idem in seipso possidet universum, praesertim cum infimae mentis ordo ab universi ordine trahat originem. Ubi vero ad agendum potentia maior viget, ibidem naturaliter et magis et citius proditur in actum.

12 Accedit ad haec quod si quaelibet rerum genera ad unum quiddam in suo genere quodammodo indivisibile reducuntur, cuius simplicitate[18] consistunt, ut puta motus tempusque ad momentum, forma naturalis ad gradum minimum naturalem, geometricae dimensiones ad signum, numeri ad unitatem, cur non etiam substantiae genus ad indivisibilem substantiam redigatur? Ut quemadmodum figurae omnes, quae inaequalitatis participes sunt, ad circularem omnium aequalissimam referuntur, circularis ad indivisibile centrum, totius aequalitatis initium, ita formae accidentales divisibilesque ad substantialem divisibilemque formam, forma huiusmodi ad substantialem et indivisibilem reducatur. Atque ut ultra qualitatem, quae non decremento solum sed etiam remissioni subiecta est, substantialis corporalisque forma est quae a remissione est libera, quamvis decrescat, ita super hanc esse debet substantialis forma quae neque remittatur neque decrescat, ut ascensus qui in melius proficit, perficiatur in optimo. Talis erit substantia incorporea, quae in primis hoc habet, ut natura sua minui nequeat. Quam oportet alicubi secundum propriam[19] formam in natura subsistere.

13 Individua siquidem et simplicia dividuis necessario praecedunt atque compositis. Unumquodque enim ante sit oportet quam protendatur et tumeat. Indigent quoque haec illis, non converso; ab illis enim haec sumunt exordium et terminantur ad illa. Quapropter si haec secundum propriam formam in rerum natura subsistunt, multo magis oportet illorum quoque genus alicubi secundum

cumbered by the chains of the body, even more certainly the universe possesses within itself a far greater capacity for the same ascent, especially as the order of the lowest mind takes its origin from the order of the universe. What has a more vigorous capacity for action will naturally produce action more quickly and on a larger scale.

If all the universal genera, moreover, are led back to one something in their individual genus, which is in a way indivisible and by whose simplicity they exist — for instance, change and time to the moment; natural form to the minimum natural degree; geometrical dimensions to figure; numbers to unity — why shouldn't the genus of substance be led back to an indivisible substance? We know that all mathematical figures, which participate in inequality, are led back to the figure of the circle, which is the most equal of all figures; and that the figure of the circle is led back to the indivisible center, which is the beginning of all equality. In the same way, forms that are accidental and divisible are led back to the form that is substantial and divisible; and this form to the substantial and indivisible form. Similarly, just as beyond quality, which is liable to decrease and even remission,[12] exists the substantial bodily form which is not subject to remission although it can decrease, so above this there must exist the substantial form which can neither fall into remission nor decrease, in order that ascent towards the better may be perfected in the best. Such will be the incorporeal substance, its principal characteristic being that it cannot be diminished. It must exist somewhere in nature according to its proper form. 12

Indivisible and simple things necessarily come before what are divisible and composite. For every single thing must exist before it can be extended or enlarged. The divisible and composite need the indivisible and simple, not the converse; for they arise from them and end in them. Therefore, if the divisible and composite exist according to their proper form in universal nature, *a fortiori* it must 13

formam propriam reperiri. Nempe ex eo quod natura efficacius meliusque materiam suam movet quam ars suam, coniicimus principalem formam in natura[20] materiae suae magis dominari quam principalem formam in arte materiae suae. Si dominatur magis, duo concluduntur, tum quod propius quam ars adest materiae secundum situm, tum quod magis quam ars secundum substantiam excellit materiae suae, magisque potest per se sine illa existere.

14 Movet autem ad idem me talis ratio plurimum, quod qualitates omnes, quia formae in alio sunt, quotiens generant formas, in alio generant. Non enim possunt liberiorem prolem quam ipsae sint gignere. Generant formas in materiae gremio. Materiam vero ipsam, quae in alio minime iacet, sola illa facit servatque forma, quae non iacet in alio. Materia enim neque ex se est, cum imperfecta sit et non agat ex se, neque ex qualitatibus quas antecedit ipsa, sed ex forma quadam quae materiam antecedit. Talis est penitus incorporea. In talis formae virtute operationeque fundantur qualitatum virtutes operationesque, postquam in illius opere opera semper fundantur illarum. Sed de hoc alias.

15 Nunc autem meminisse oportet materiam ipsam, ut Mercurius Trismegistus Timaeusque putant, esse informe nonnihil, nihilo proximum, quod primo infiniteque sit patiens. Unde sequi Plotinus existimat ut propinqua ipsius materiae dispositio, id est dimensio qualitasque, et vanissimum quiddam sit et, quantulumcumque est, totum sit passio quaedam. Dimensiones enim nihil esse aliud quam materiae ipsius extensiones; qualitates vero nihil aliud praeter eiusdem affectiones, affectiones videlicet umbratiles et labentes, tamquam umbras quasdam eminentium arborum in torrente. Demum concludit neque materiam, cum sit primum patiens, neque dimensiones qualitatesve, cum sint primi patientis

be possible to find the genus too of indivisible and simple things existing somewhere according to their proper form. Given the fact that nature sets its matter in motion more efficiently and to better purpose than art does its matter, we can infer that the principal form in nature dominates its matter more than the principal form in art dominates its. If that is so, two things follow: first, that in terms of position it is closer to its matter than art is to its; and second, that in terms of substance it excels its matter more than art excels its. Thus it is more capable of existing in itself and without matter.

In reaching this conclusion I am particularly swayed by the following argument. All qualities exist as forms in another, and so, whenever they produce forms, they produce them in another. For they cannot beget children more free than they are themselves. They beget forms in the womb of matter. But that form alone that does not subsist in another makes and preserves the matter that does not subsist in another. For matter neither exists of itself—as it is imperfect and does not act of itself—nor does it exist because of qualities that it itself precedes. Rather it exists because of some form that precedes it. Such a form is totally incorporeal. The powers and activities of qualities are based on the power and activity of such an incorporeal form inasmuch as their works are always based on its work. I discuss this further elsewhere. 14

Here we should recall that matter (and I am quoting the views of Mercurius Trismegistus[13] and Timaeus[14]) is without form. It is not nothing, but it is next to nothing, being primarily and to an unlimited extent that which is acted upon.[15] In Plotinus' view it follows from this that the disposition closest to matter, namely dimension and quality, is completely insubstantial and exists, howsoever insignificantly, as a totally passive state.[16] For dimensions are nothing other than extensions of matter itself, and qualities are nothing other than the affections of the same—mere shadows that come and go like the reflections of lofty trees in a rushing stream. 15

passiones primae, esse prima actionum principia posse. Ita Plotinus. Alii vero quidam aliter,[21] quamvis ad eundem finem, ita distinguunt. Profecto aiunt materiam ipsam agere nihil posse; quantitatem quoque, si est extensio ipsa passiva materiae proficiscens a causa quadam materiam extendente, agere nihil, cum sit primi patientis perpetua passio. Sin autem est quasi forma quaedam, per quam causa materiae motrix extendit materiam, agere forte nonnihil in materiam propriam, quia sit medium, quo causa illa materiam videtur extendere. Sed in materiam alienam nihil penitus operari, quoniam semper distare cogitur[22] agens a patiente quod impedit actionem. Qualitatem vero in materiam tam alienam quam propriam secundum Peripateticos aliquid operari.

16 Quod si a materia quae in neutram agit materiam, ad qualitatem quae quodammodo movet utramque, per mediam quantitatem quae solum in alteram, scilicet propriam, quodammodo operatur, nos ratio ducit, numquid a quantitate, quae nullo modo movet materiam alienam, absque medio ullo ad rem illam transibimus, quae omnino moveat alienam? Nequaquam. Qualitas autem est proxima quantitati. Itaque non est omnino sufficiens qualitas ad extrinsecam actionem. Si ergo claudicat ad agendum, a substantia superiore dirigitur, quae omnino sit potens. Merito qualitas claudicat, quoniam eo ipso momento quo nascitur, spargitur per materiae latitudinem profunditatemque et quasi Letheo flumine mergitur. Quo fit ut, antequam ipsa agat quicquam, a materia quasi inficiente quodammodo superetur. Numquam ergo vis eius vincit per se materiam. Idcirco numquam per se movebit, nisi a superiore causa roboretur. Roboratur profecto et ducitur a vita quadam, quae etiam ex luto non vivente, quando ranae generantur et muscae, vitam gignit ac sensum, ex una deformique materia fimi varios speciosissimosque procreat flores, per varia et speciosissima

Finally, Plotinus concludes that neither matter, since it is the prime patient, nor dimensions and qualities, since they are the first passive states of the prime patient, can be the first principles of actions. Thus Plotinus. Others, though they reach the same general conclusions, establish different distinctions. They agree that matter itself cannot initiate action; and that quantity too, if it is the passive extension of matter proceeding from some cause that extends matter, can do nothing, since it is the perpetual passive state of the prime patient. But if quantity is a sort of form by means of which the moving cause of matter extends matter, it does perhaps do something to its own matter. For it is the intermediary by means of which that cause appears to extend matter. But quantity can do nothing whatsoever to matter other than its own, since an agent is always necessarily distinct from a patient that impedes action. Quality, on the other hand, according to the Aristotelians, can do something both to its own and to alien matter.

The argument has led us from matter, which acts neither upon its own nor upon alien matter, to quality, which in some way gives motion to both, by way of quantity, which affects only one sort of matter, namely its own. Should we then proceed without some intermediary from quantity, which in no way affects matter other than its own, to something that in the full sense may move matter other than its own? By no means. Yet quality is the closest thing to quantity. So it is not fully capable of action outside itself. If it is crippled when it comes to action, it is controlled by a higher substance which is fully capable. It is not surprising that quality is crippled; for at the moment of its birth it is scattered through the breadth and depths of matter, plunged, one might say, in the stream of Lethe. So every time it tries to do anything, it is overwhelmed by matter, as by something infecting it. It has not the strength to get the better of matter on its own. So it cannot set anything in motion on its own, but only when strengthened by a higher cause. What gives it strength and direction is a kind of life, 16

semina, quae cum saepe non inveniantur in fimo, necessario in vita ipsa sunt. Sparsas quoque materias cogit in ordinem. Ordo a ratione procedit; ratio consistit in vita; vita in virtute quadam indivisibili,[23] siquidem mors divisione et resolutione contingit. Rursus ex frigidorum corporum collisione generat ignem, et quando reflexio radiorum in speculo aut calens ferrum per qualitatem ignis accidentalem calefacit lanam, vita illa per vitalia ignis semina substantialem ignis[24] speciem producit in lana.

17 Quid denique in nobis putamus esse, quod nutrimentum haud violenter consumit, sed suaviter et ordinate concoquit et digerit; quod tam mirabiliter ad vivam redigit formam alimenta non viva; quod gravia sursum, levia deorsum absque manifesta violentia praeter, immo super illorum naturam, prout usus vitae postulat, continue transfert; quod pugnantia inter se conciliat vincitque in unum? Certe non simplex calor igneus, non alia qualitas ulla pugnantium, non natura dividua, non nuda naturae proprietas, immo vero superior quaedam et individua et vivifica virtus. Sicut autem in nobis, ita et in universo considera atque ex his omnibus[25] collige: formas corporales non habere ex se invicem generationem sufficientem, sed causam postulare insuper aliquam altiorem. Quae quidem superior causa, si rursus forma esset similiter iuncta materiae, ab alia iterum substantia superiore descenderet. Tandem, ne fiat in infinitum progressio, ad formam aliquam perveniendum est quae nullis sit mixta corporibus. Tanta vero est in genere formarum virtus ad id, ut a materia separatae esse possint, ut etiam si quis illas esse quidem coniunctas ex se dixerit, verum ex ipsa men-

which can create life and sensation even out of lifeless mud, as in the generation of frogs and flies; a life which can beget from a pile of ugly dung a variety of beautiful flowers by way of a variety of beautiful seeds, which, as they are not often found in dung, must necessarily be in life itself. Life brings scattered bits of matter into order. Order comes from reason. Reason consists in life. Life consists in one indivisible power (for death occurs through division and dissolution). Again, life generates fire from the collision of cold bodies; and when the reflection of the Sun's rays in a mirror or a hot piece of iron, by way of the accidental quality of fire, sets wool aflame, it is this life, by means of the living seeds of fire, that produces the substantial form of fire in the wool.

In us exists something that rather than consuming food all at 17 once, breaks it down and digests it gently and in an orderly way. What do we suppose this is? What is it that brings inanimate foodstuffs to animate form in such a remarkable manner? What continually makes the heavy go upwards and the light downwards as life's need requires without any visible signs of force, in a way that is contrary to, indeed superior to, the nature of the objects? What is it that reconciles and forces unity on these objects in conflict? Certainly, it is not the simple heat of their fire, nor any of their other qualities; nor is it their divisible nature or their nature's bare property. Rather, it is some higher power, indivisible and life-giving. What we observe in our selves apply to the universe as a whole, and conclude from all these arguments as follows. Bodily forms do not have sufficient power among themselves to generate anything living, but require the assistance of some higher cause. This higher cause, if it too were a form similarly joined to matter, again would itself descend from some further higher substance. Eventually, if we are to avoid infinite regress, we must reach some form which is unmixed with any bodies. But the power in the genus of forms is such that they can exist apart from matter. Even if someone were to claim that in themselves forms are joined but tium contemplatione seiungi, hinc saltem fateri cogatur mentes ipsas esse seiunctas, quandoquidem ipsae alia separant.

18 Quod hinc rursus apparet, quia substantia per naturam et dignitatem prior est quantitate ac reliquis accidentibus. Et quia quod prius est, potest esse a posteriore seorsum, potest esse substantia quaedam sine quantitatis divisione. Si potest, utique est aliquando, ne desit naturae ista perfectio, ne frustra sit ista potentia. Nam in his quae ad praecipuum universi ordinem pertinent, ita se res habet, ut quicquid potest esse aut iam sit, ut physici opinantur, ne contingat in aeternis mutatio, aut saltem sit aliquando, ne aliquid sit semper inane. Ac si vita, quae sola origine naturali antecedit sensum, iam nunc per se existit alicubi sine sensu, multo magis substantia, quae quantitati tam dignitate quam origine praestat, consistit nunc in rerum ordine seorsum a quantitate, praesertim cum perfectius sit universum, si substantiae quaedam sint solutae a vinculis quantitatis, quam quod sint vitae quaedam sensus expertes.

19 Averroes ex Aristotelis sententia probat corpoream substantialemque caeli formam carere materia, quia videlicet ibi nulla sit ad diversas formas potentia, quae propria est natura materiae. Ibi tamen dimensio est: eiusmodi formam inter naturales formas atque divinas esse mediam arbitratur, quia naturales formae cum materia simul quantitateque sint, divinae ab utrisque penitus absolutae; caeli vero forma utrarumque media sit, ne ab extremo ad extremum sine medio transeatur. Quapropter eam cum quantitate quidem esse, sed sine materia, consentaneum esse censet. Hinc nos hunc in modum argumentamur. Cum substantialis forma soleat in materia potius quam in quantitate iacere atque habeat secundum generis naturaeque ordinem maiorem cum materia quam cum

they are separated conceptually by the mind, that person would still have to admit that minds themselves have a separate existence since they separate other things.

This is further shown by the fact that substance is, by nature and rank, prior to quantity and to other accidents. Now because what is prior can exist apart from what is posterior, a substance can exist without quantitative division. If it can exist, then somewhere it does exist, lest this perfection [of substance] be absent in nature, and lest the potentiality [for substance] be there in vain. For as regards those things which pertain to the eminent order of the universe, whatever can exist either already does exist — as the physicists believe — lest change were to befall what is eternal; or at least it exists at some time, lest something were to remain always without substance. And if life, which precedes sense only in terms of its origin in nature, does at this very moment exist somewhere of itself and without sense, there is all the more reason why substance, which excels quantity in origin as in rank, should now exist somewhere in the order of nature separate from quantity. This is especially the case since the universe would be more perfect if certain substances were free of the chains of quantity than if certain lives were free of sense. 18

Averroes,[17] following Aristotle's view, proves that the corporeal and substantial form of the heavens contains no matter,[18] since the heavens do not possess that potentiality for diverse forms which is the proper nature of matter. The heavens do, however, have dimension. Averroes believes that the form of dimension exists midway between natural forms and divine forms, since natural forms exist together with matter and quantity, and divine forms are totally free of both, but the form of the heavens must be midway between the two, lest nature were to proceed from one extreme to another without an intermediary. Averroes considers it reasonable, therefore, that the form of the heavens exists with quantity but not with matter. But I would extend the argument as follows. 19

quantitate proportionem, si alicubi absque materia potest esse, multo magis alicubi seorsum a quantitate consistere potest.

20 Praeterea, ut Proclo placet, tria sunt genera corporum. Sunt enim quaedam, ut eius verbis utar, materialia simul atque composita, qualia sunt quae ex elementis quattuor componuntur. Sunt ulterius elementorum sphaerae, materiales quidem, sed quodammodo simplices. Sunt denique caelestia corpora, et simplicia et immaterialia simul. Tria quoque formarum genera ponit, haud aliter quam Averroes. Vult enim generalem formarum definitionem eiusmodi esse: 'Forma est id quo aliquid distincte et actu est et agit'. In hac autem definitione dimensiones omnino nullas includi, subiectum tamen quodammodo forte significari, dum videlicet dicitur, 'quo aliquid', et cetera quae sequuntur. Unde concludit, si quae formae sine subiecta materia sint, sicut caelestes, multo magis et multo plures absque dimensione esse posse simul atque debere.

21 Item sic Proclus et Syrianus ad idem argumentantur. Quod ab alio semper extenditur, necessario dimensionibus est astrictum; quod vero extendit, minime. Materia igitur cum semper ab alio extendatur, necessario dimensionibus obnoxia est. Quia tamen unumquodque prius in se est quodammodo quam extendatur, materia potest individua cogitari. Quapropter principium illud a quo extenditur, multo magis potest sine dimensionibus non modo cogitari, sed esse. Praeterea, omne dividuum est quiddam totum unum ex pluribus partibus constitutum. Quae partes, nisi haberent in se unum aliquid atque idem cunctis commune, numquam totum illud conficerent. Non enim fit unum, nisi ab uno. Rursus, nisi essent participes unitatis, nulla partium esset unum, sed plura in infinitum, et quaelibet pars innumere infinita. Unum illud partibus insitum non est divisum singulatim in singulis; egeret enim

Since substantial form normally subsists in matter rather than in quantity, and since it is, by virtue of the order of its genus and nature, proportionately more related to matter than to quantity, then if it is able to exist somewhere without matter, *a fortiori* it is able to exist somewhere separated from quantity.

A further argument. Proclus' opinion was that three types of bodies exist.[19] First some bodies (to use his terminology) are at once material and composite, such as those compounded from the four elements. Then come the spheres of the elements themselves, which are material, certainly, but in a sense non-composite. Finally come the heavenly bodies, which are at once non-composite and non-material. He also posits, like Averroes, three types of forms. He offers the following general definition of the forms: "Form is that by means of which a thing distinctly both exists in act and acts."[20] This definition entirely excludes the dimensions, but perhaps it does indirectly refer to a substrate when it says "by means of which a thing," etc. He concludes that if some forms can exist without the material substrate, such as the heavenly forms, there is all the more reason why they can and should exist (and in greater numbers) without dimension. 20

Proclus and Syrianus offer the following proof of the same proposition.[21] Whatever is extended by something else is necessarily confined by dimension, while what does the extending is not. So matter, which is always extended by another, is necessarily subject to dimensions. However, because everything exists in itself in a way before it is extended, we can think of matter as indivisible. All the more so then can the principle by which it is extended not only be thought of as without dimensions, but it can actually be so. Moreover, every divisible object is in a sense one whole composed from many parts. If the parts did not possess something that was one and the same and common to them all, they would never form that whole. For the whole does not become one except from what is one. Again, if they did not participate in unity, none 21 ipsum quoque alio copulante. Ergo est idem totumque in singulis. Tale quiddam incorporale esse necesse est.

22 Item, cum omne corporale sit unum quiddam totum ex partibus, quidnam illius unionis causa est? An totum ipsum unit partes vel partes totum uniunt? Vel superius aliquid, quod neque pars sit ullius neque totum ex partibus, partes unit invicem et ad totum? Totum partes sequatur[26] potius quam uniat. Ac si admittatur quod unit partes, incorporeum erit. Si enim sit ipsum quoque dividuum, eget alio similiter uniente. Si partes uniunt totum, absurdum id quidem, quod a multitudine unitati opposita fiat unio, quae fieri debet ab unitate. Reliquum est, ut praeter partes singulas atque totum adsit aliquid unum conspirationis illius causa, quod quidem sit incorporeum, ne cogatur ipsum quoque copula indigere, atque ita abeamus in infinitum.

23 Quapropter non est putandum formam aliquam divisam in corpore apicem esse naturae rerumque principium, praesertim cum oporteat principium rerum vi sua sempiternum fuisse et fore. Fuisse quidem semper, nam neque potuit ex se aliquando prodisse — fuisset enim ipsum ante seipsum — neque ex alio: nihil enim ante primum; reliqua vero non essent umquam, nisi prius fuisset primum. Fore quoque semper, quoniam extincto principio corruunt universa, neque ipsum amplius neque aliud quicquam renasci potest.

of the parts would be one, but several things, and so on *ad infinitum*: every part would be numberlessly infinite. That one thing planted in the parts is not divided up piece-meal in each of the parts, otherwise it too would need another to unite it. Therefore it is the same and it is whole in the individual parts. Such must be something incorporeal.

Again, since everything corporeal is some one whole composed of parts, what is the cause of its union? Does the whole itself unite the parts or do the parts unite the whole? Or does something higher, which is neither a part of anything nor a whole made up of parts, unite the parts together into a whole? [Then] the whole would be following on the parts rather than uniting them. But if we admit it unites the parts, it will be incorporeal. For if it too were divisible, it would require something in turn to unite it. But if the parts are uniting the whole, we will have the absurd result that union, which should be brought about by unity, is being brought about by plurality, which is the opposite of unity. Consequently, beyond the individual parts and the whole, exists one something, the cause of the harmony, which is incorporeal, lest it too is forced into needing a bond (and so we would go on to infinity). 22

So we should not suppose that any form divided up in a body is the apex of nature and the principle of things. The universal principle must always have existed, and must always continue to exist, through its own power. It must always have existed, because it could not have been produced at some time out of itself — for that would involve its pre-existing itself — nor could it have been produced from another — for nothing comes before what is first (nothing else would ever have existed if the first had not existed first). It will always continue to exist, because, if the principle is once destroyed, the totality of things collapses, and neither the principle itself nor anything else can any more be restored to being. 23

24 Habeat ergo necesse est vim infinitam, per quam ex se infinite vivat. Hanc non habebit, si fuerit corporale, nam si dimensiones habuerit infinitas, nihil erit in rebus aliud praeter ipsum; si finitas, vim quoque finitam habebit. Mitto quod alias ostendemus: neque corpus neque corpoream formam et indigam et mutabilem sufficiens motionis principium esse posse, sed omne corporeum ab alio agitari; atque opificem, qui opificio miscetur inficiturque, non posse operi dominari; opificemque esse perfectum primumve mundani operis architectum.

25 Ergo formam corpoream transcendamus et consideremus nunc primam, quae deinceps occurrit. Ut sicut a corpore tamquam infimo ascendimus[27] ad formam corpoream quasi mediam, (quia habet corporis aliquid, dum dilatatur in corpore, aliquid vero non habet, siquidem ipsa non est aliquid ex materia et forma compositum), ita nunc ab hoc medio ad formam sublimiorem, incorpoream scilicet, provehamur quae nihil habeat corporis, quae corporibus distribuat qualitates, quae, quoniam per se subsistit, vera forma et essentia nominatur. Tertia inquam essentia, quam etiam suo loco rationalem animam appellabimus, quam ita irrationalis anima comitatur, ut corpus umbra. Essentia illa et vera et immortalis a Platonicis ideo iudicatur, quia neque partibus indiget, in quas aliquando dissolvi possit et per quas dispersa virtus debilitetur; neque subiecto adstringitur, a quo deserta aliquando evanescat; neque contrariae formae miscetur, qua infici possit; neque vel loco clauditur vel tempori vel motui ob individuam et in se manentem simplicitatem substantiae subest.

The principle must, therefore, possess infinite power by virtue of which it can live eternally of itself. It will not have this power if it is itself corporeal. For had it infinite dimensions, nothing else would exist in things except itself. Had it finite dimensions, it would have finite power too. I will omit other points elaborated elsewhere: that neither body nor bodily form, being imperfect and subject to change, can be a sufficient principle of motion, but that everything corporeal is set in motion by something else; that a craftsman who is intermingled with and affected by his product cannot control his work; and that the perfect or first craftsman is the architect of the world's edifice. 24

Let us pass then beyond bodily form and consider now the primary form which we next encounter. We have ascended from body, which is, so to speak, at the lowest level, up to corporeal form, which is half-way (because it has some aspects of body when it is extended in body, but lacks others since it is not itself something composed of matter and form). Now we should proceed from this midpoint to the sublimer form, the incorporeal form which has none of the characteristics of body, which gives bodies their qualities, and which we call the true form or essence since it exists through itself. Indeed, this is the third essence,[22] which at the appropriate moment we shall call rational soul; the irrational soul accompanies it as a shadow accompanies the body. This essence the Platonists adjudged both true and immortal, first, because it requires no parts into which it could at some point be dissolved, or through which its power could be dispersed and weakened; second, because it is not bound to any substrate without which it would at some point cease to exist; third, because it is not mixed with any contrary form, which might contaminate it; and lastly because it is not constrained by place, nor subject to time or motion (on account of the indivisible and self-abiding simplicity of substance). 25

: IV :

Anima rationalis per substantiam immobilis est; per operationem est mobilis; per virtutem est partim immobilis, partim mobilis.

1 Tertiae huius essentiae naturam qualem esse dicemus? Immobilemne prorsus an potius mobilem? Certe non omnino immobilem, quia ipsa fons est qualitatum fluentium in materiam, quae omni quiete carent. Omnis autem causa secundum naturam propriam agit, ideoque oportet in opere vim aliquam et imaginem causae reservari. Si essentia illa, quae est causa qualitatum, esset prorsus immobilis, quia per naturam suam omnino immobilem ageret, qualitas inde descendens immobilem in se naturam aliquam retineret. Contra vero contingit. Nam tria in qualitate sunt: essentia, virtus et actio; haec omnia versantur in motu. Essentia eius generatur atque corrumpitur; generatio et corruptio per motum efficiuntur; virtus quoque naturae suae intenditur atque remittitur, puta calor magis minusve fervet. Quod autem magis minusve diversis temporibus calet, proculdubio permutatur. Actio quoque idem patitur. Ignis siquidem actio calefactio est. Aquam non momento calefacit, sed tempore. Actio temporalis motus ab omnibus nominatur, ideo qualitas omni ex parte subiicitur motui.

2 Quod hinc rursus apparet perspicue, quod affectio corporis quae per qualitates efficitur non potest per aliquam temporis moram eadem penitus et similis permanere ac semper tum in aliam atque aliam graduum proportionem, tum in melius vel deterius permutatur. Nempe si quis dixerit adultam[28] corporis affectionem

: IV :

In its substance rational soul is motionless; in its activity it is mobile; in its power it is partly motionless and partly mobile.

How shall we describe the nature of this third essence? Is it totally motionless, or is it subject to motion? We can be sure that it is not entirely motionless, because it is the source of the qualities that flow into matter which are constantly restless. Every cause acts in accordance with its proper nature. So some power and reflection of the cause has to be preserved in what it does. If this essence which is the cause of qualities were totally without motion because it always acted in accordance with its motionless nature, the quality deriving from it would retain some motionless nature in itself. What in fact happens is the opposite. Quality has three components: essence, power and action. All three are involved in motion. Its essence is generated and corrupted. Generation and corruption are effected through motion. The power of its nature too is intensified or remitted. Heat, for example, may be more or less intense. What varies in degree of heat at different times is clearly subject to change. The same is true of its action. The action of fire is to make something hot. It does not make water, for instance, hot instantaneously but in time. Now an act in time everyone calls motion. So quality is altogether subject to motion. 1

Clearly, therefore, the disposition of bodies brought about by qualities cannot remain exactly the same and alike for any period of time, but it changes continually either in terms of degree (going from one set of proportions to another) or for better or worse. Were someone to claim that an adult bodily disposition lasted an hour, the Platonists would ask him the following question: Is the 2

permansisse per horam, Platonici ita interrogabunt illum: hora finita, numquid par sit tunc in illa affectione virtus ac in horae principio? Si non sit par virtus, certe non stetit horam, cum in ea hora sit secundum potentiam permutata; si par virtus dicatur inesse, affectio illa horam rursus aliam perdurabit. Aequales enim vires aequalia faciunt. Igitur si per tantam vim permansit horam, per aequalem rursus aliam permanebit. Hora secunda expleta, similiter de virtute illa interrogabunt: parne sit an impar? Si impar, non stetit; sin[29] par, stabit quoque tantundem. Deinceps in infinitum similiter procedent monstrabuntque naturam illam corporis, si modo horam aut horae dimidium steterit, perpetuo permansuram. Perpetuo vero non viget corporis secundum se ullius complexio, cum brevi omnes extinguantur et pereant, itaque vix momentum temporis eaedem[30] perseverant. Et quia in eodem momento incipiunt atque desinunt (in incipiendo autem et desinendo integerrimus existendi habitus minime possidetur); integro vero existendi actu opus est ad agendum, ideo confirmari videtur, quod in superiori disputatione probavimus, non esse in qualitatibus sufficiens agendi principium.

3 Sed ut ad quaestionem hic propositam revertamur. Si est in qualitatibus, quantum ad eas attinet, motio[31] status omnis quodammodo expers, quonam pacto ab ea causa gigni proxime[32] possunt, quae tanto ab ipsis[33] intervallo distet, ut statum habeat omnis motionis expertem? Si ab extremo ad extremum omnia per media transeunt, ut ab hieme per ver in aestatem, ab aestate in hiemem per autumnum, certe inter qualitatem penitus mobilem atque essentiam prorsus immobilem necessario ponendum est aliquid quod partim immobile sit, partim etiam mobile. Itaque substantia illa qualitatum proxime[34] genetrix omnino immobilis esse non potest. Quid ergo dicemus? An istam quoque substantiam omnino mobilem asseremus? Minime. Nam vel esset in genere

power in the disposition the same at the end of the hour as at the beginning? If it is not the same, then the power has not remained unchanged for an hour; for during the hour the disposition has changed with respect to its power. If the power is declared to be the same, then the disposition will last another hour. For equal powers have equal effects. If it lasted an hour with a given amount of power, it will last another hour with the same power. Once the second hour is up, the same question can be asked. Is the power the same or not? If not, then the disposition did not last; but if it is the same, then it will last for the same time again. And so the Platonists will proceed like this *ad infinitum* and demonstrate that the nature of the body, if only it remained the same for an hour or for half an hour, would endure for ever. But no complexion of any body is in its own terms vigorous forever, since all complexions are extinguished in a brief while and perish, and thus they remain the same for hardly a moment of time. Because they begin and end at the same moment — a fully complete habit or condition of existing is incompatible, however, with beginning and ending — and because, in order to act, one needs the act of existing, the argument we reached in the discussion above appears to be confirmed: namely that in qualities a sufficient principle for acting does not exist.

Let us then return to the question we posed. If there is in qualities *qua* qualities a motion totally devoid in a way of rest, how can qualities be produced without an intermediary by that cause which is so far removed from them that it has rest totally devoid of motion? If all things proceed from one extreme to the other through intermediaries — for instance, we go from winter to summer via spring, from summer to winter via autumn — then between quality, which is fundamentally in motion, and essence, which is completely free from motion, we must necessarily posit something which is partly without motion and partly subject to it. So the substance which is the immediate progenitor of qualities 3

corporalium qualitatum — in eo tamen genere sistere gradum non possumus — vel causa, quae in genere superiore locatur, effectum suum sufficienti perfectione non excederet, si substantia, quae qualitatis est causa, non minus quam qualitas[35] vacillaret. Quocirca substantia illa partim stat, partim vero movetur. Tria quidem in se habet et ipsa: essentiam, virtutem, operationem. Quid horum stabit? Quid movebitur? Operatio quidem stare non potest, si duo praecedentia permutentur. Neque moveri essentia, quin sequentia moveantur. Stabit ergo primum, scilicet ipse essentia; mutabitur ultimum, videlicet operatio. Sed medium utrorumque virtus, quid? Stabit et ipsa partim, partim quoque mutabitur.

: V :

Super animam mobilem est immobilis angelus.

1 Hactenus formam quandam supra corporis complexionem invenimus, quam rationalem animam appellabimus, cuius essentia semper eadem permanet. Quod significat stabilitas voluntatis atque memoriae. Operatio autem ex eo mutatur quod non simul cogitat omnia, sed gradatim, neque momento alit, auget et generat corpus, sed tempore. Naturalis virtus manet, quia naturalis eius vigor viget perennis, neque intenditur, neque remittitur. Virtus acquisita mutatur, quia ex potentia in actum, ex[36] actu transit in habitum atque converso. Hucusque ascendit Heraclitus, Varro atque Manilius.

cannot be entirely without motion. What are we to say then? Must we say that this substance is completely subject to motion? No, for either it would be in the genus of bodily qualities — yet we cannot come to a halt in that genus — or the cause which is located in the higher genus would not exceed its own effect with sufficient perfection if the substance which is the cause of quality were as unstable as quality. Therefore the substance must be partly at rest, partly in motion. It, too, has three components: essence, power and activity. Which of these is at rest and which in motion? Its activity cannot be at rest if the former two are subject to change. Its essence cannot be moved without the latter two being moved. So the first, its essence, will be at rest; the last, its activity, will be subject to change. What about the one in the middle, its power? It will be partly at rest, partly subject to change.

: V :

Above mobile soul is motionless angel.

So far then we have discovered some sort of form above the body's 1 complexion, which we shall call rational soul. Its essence always remains the same. This is proved by the stability of the will and the memory. Its activity, however, is liable to change, in that it does not think about all things simultaneously, but step by step; nor does it nourish, increase and generate the body in a single moment, but over the course of time. Natural power remains unchanged, because its natural vigor perpetually thrives, neither intensifying nor remitting. But acquired power does change, because it moves from potentiality to act and from act to habit and then back again. This was the point [in the argument] attained by Heraclitus, Varro and Manilius.

2 Ceterum altius ascendendum, siquidem forma haec non potest esse totius naturae principium. Perfectior enim est operatio stabilis, quae uno momento perfectissime suum opus absolvit, quam quae indiget tempore. Integrior vita, quae tota simul est unita secum, a seipsa non distans, quam quae per diversa temporum momenta porrecta secundum actus affectusque intrinsecos quodammodo a semetipsa distrahitur. Igitur super hanc formam, cuius operatio extrinseca vagatur per tempora, cuius vita, id est intrinseca operatio, quasi quodam fluxu dispergitur, ponenda est alia quaedam forma sublimior, cuius operatio stabilis sit, cuius vita tota simul unita. Siquidem perfecta semper sunt imperfectis anteponenda, propterea quod sicut perfecta in aliquo genere sunt illa quae per suam naturam sunt talia, sic imperfecta sunt quae per se talia non sunt, alioquin essent integerrime talia. Si itaque imperfecta non sunt per seipsa, per superiora coguntur esse.

3 Item, quod movetur ex potentia et otio prorumpit in actum, et terminum aliquem sui motus ac finem expetit, quasi sibi ipsi minus sufficiat, sed illo egeat ad quod motione sua se confert. At vero super id quod ex otio migrat in actum, existit aliquid semper quod actus plenus est atque perennis. Super id quod propter indigentiam transmutatur, existit aliquid necessario quod, quia vel nullius unquam indigum est vel iam plenissimum, non movetur. Praesertim cum id quod movetur, per appetitum proficiendi mutetur, neque possit aliter quam melioris praestantiorisque naturae adeptione proficere, neque habeat rem illam quam quaerit per motionem, sed post motum adipiscatur, non quidem a seipso (quid enim mutari oportuisset?) sed ab alio quodam uberiore.

4 Quod enim sui natura caret termino, ab alio perfectiore termi-

But we must ascend further. For this form cannot be the principle of the whole of nature. For activity which is unchanging and performs its task to complete perfection in a single moment is more perfect than activity which requires time. The life that is at once whole, united with itself, and not distant from itself is more pure and complete than the life that, having been extended over various different moments of time, is pulled apart from itself, one might say, in accordance with its inner actions and feelings. So above this form whose external activity wanders over intervals of time, and whose life, that is, internal activity, is dispersed as it were in a flood, we must posit another form, more sublime, whose activity is constant and whose life is at once whole and united. Since the perfect always takes precedence over the imperfect, it follows that, just as the perfect things in any genus are those which are such by their very nature, so the imperfect are those which are not such (otherwise they would be wholly such). If therefore the imperfect do not exist of themselves, they must exist by way of what are higher. 2

Whatever is moved rushes out from potency and inactivity into act, seeking some terminus and end-point to its motion, as though it were not sufficient to itself but needed that which its motion directs it towards. But beyond what passes from inactivity to act, there always exists something that is full and unceasing act. Above what changes because it is deficient there must be something which does not move because it never needs anything or because it is already completely full. Although what is moved may be changed through [its] desire for improvement, it cannot improve except by acquiring a nature better than or superior to its own. Nor can it have the thing it seeks during motion. It can only acquire it after motion, and not from itself (for in that case no change would have been necessary), but from something else richer and fuller. 3

What naturally lacks an end-point must be given one by some- 4 nandum est. Res mobilis ex se caret termino, quia non quiescit in semetipsa. Ac si res quaedam talis sit rerum principium, quia per operationem suam mutabilem efficiet omnia, nullus erit status in rebus. Nunc vero usque adeo necessarius est aliquis in rebus status, ut etiam motus ipse statu non careat. Nisi enim res, quae per motum aliter atque aliter affici dicitur, maneat in substantia per aliquod tempus eadem, nec mutabit affectiones nec variabitur paulatim, sed momento tota cessabit. Et ipsa ordinatissima caelorum circa idem centrum eosdemque polos revolutio, motionum aequalitas, siderum restitutio, alicuius status est particeps. Atqui quemadmodum quod stat, stat propter unitatem et unitur in statu, quod alias declarabimus, ita quod movetur, movetur propter statum et stat in motu. Movetur inquam propter statum, id est propter quandam motricis virtutis stabilitatem, quae nisi in suo vigore maneret, non servaretur ordo ullus in motu, immo neque motus vel parumper continuaretur. Rursus stat in motu, id est perseverat in norma eadem vel aequali vel simili motionis. Multa etiam sunt quae, etsi secundum aliquam speciem motus moventur, tamen secundum species alias non moventur; partim ergo moventur, partim vero quiescunt. Adde[37] quod cum prima rerum materia sit sempiterna, quod per substantialem mutatur formam, interea tamen permanere cogitur per materiam. Itaque multo magis quod secundum quantitatem qualitatem locum mutatur, manere potest, immo et debet interim per substantiam. Quid plura? Quod nullo pacto manet dum amittit[38] statum, totum simul et motum amittere cogitur. Si itaque est aliqua in rebus stabilitas, non potest rerum principium mobile esse. Quare quod mobile est non est naturae principium. Igitur est aliquid super animam, ut anima, quae natura sua ad intelligendum et non intelligendum est indifferens, cum vicissim ab altero permutetur in alterum, per eius influxum ad intelligendum determinetur, quod in tali genere semper est

thing more perfect. Anything subject to motion lacks an end-point of itself, because it is not remaining at rest in itself. But if such a thing were the principle of nature, and since it will make everything by way of its changeable activity, then there will be no stability at all in things. But, in fact, stability is such a necessary element in things that even motion itself does not lack stability. For unless something affected by motion in various different ways were not to remain the same in substance for some period of time, it would not change affections nor alter by degrees, but altogether cease in an instant. Even the revolution of the heavens, being most ordered around the same center and the same poles, with the equality of its motions and the regular return of the constellations, participates in some stability. Just as what is at rest rests because of unity and is united in its rest (this I will demonstrate elsewhere), so what is moved is moved because of rest and is at rest in motion. When I say it is moved because of rest, it is because of some stability in its motive power. For were it not to remain in its power, it would not preserve any order in its motion; or rather its motion would not even last a short while. Again, it rests in motion, meaning it perseveres in the same, equal or like pattern of motion. Many things which are in motion with regard to one species of movement are not in motion with regard to other species; thus, they are partly in motion and partly at rest. Furthermore, since prime matter is eternal, anything that is changed by way of its substantial form must remain unchanged by way of its matter. *A fortiori*, what is changed with respect to quantity, quality or location can, indeed must, remain the while unchanged with respect to substance. In short, what in no way remains when it loses stability is simultaneously forced to lose all motion too. If, then, any stability exists in things, the first principle cannot be movable. So what is movable is not nature's principle. Therefore something exists above soul, in order that soul — which by its nature is open equally to understanding and to not understanding, switching as it does actu. Tale est quod est semper intelligens sive semper intelligibile actu, quod est idem.

Praeterea, quicquid secundum partem tale est, per illud dumtaxat tale est, quod tale secundum se totum existit, sicut lignum ex parte calidum per ignem calescit, qui ex toto calet, quia quod tale est per naturam suam, puta calidum, sicut totum a natura propria comprehenditur, ita totum ab huiusmodi qualitate. Atque contra, quod per partem est tale, non est tale per semetipsum. Tertia vero essentia illa, scilicet anima, non est secundum se totam intellegentia. Habet enim alias quasdam naturas praeter intellegentiam, expertes intellegentiae. Ergo mens in anima pars quidem est animae; pars quoque est mentis quodammodo, mentis inquam altioris, quae tota solaque mens est. Quippe si anima mentem haberet a semetipsa, in animae substantia ratio propagandae mentis inesset, unde et tota anima esset mens et mens quidem tota atque perfecta et omnis anima mentem haberet, quia in qualibet anima ratio animae reperitur. Et sicut movere corpus, quia per naturam suam animae convenit, animabus singulis inest, ita intellegendi facultas animabus inesset omnibus, etiam bestiarum, si per naturam suam competeret[39] animae. Ac si super naturam minime efficacem esse efficaciorem aliquam necesse est, et mens quae est in anima neque solo sui actu ullum extra se opus efficit, neque efficaci suae animae potentiae imperat, oportet super eam esse mentem suo actu alicuius operis effectricem et efficacis potentiae dominam. Merito sicut animae caput est mens, haec pars eius excellentissima, sic mentis huius, quae non sui ipsius est sed animae, non absoluta sed ad animae huius tracta capacitatem, non clara sed obscura et quodammodo dubia — huius inquam mentis caput est mens quaedam, quae in seipsa est liberaque et lucida. In quo sane illud magorum enodatur aenigma: 'Est res undique lucida, est res undique ob-

from the one to the other in alternation — may be ordered and determined for understanding through the influence, in this genus [of understanding], of that which is always in act. Such a something is what is always understanding or always actually understood, which is the same.

Furthermore, what is partly such is only such because of what exists as wholly such. The log which is partly hot gets its heat from fire which is wholly hot. This is because what is such by its very nature, hot for instance, being totally comprehended by its nature, is totally comprehended by such a quality. On the other hand, what is partly such is not such by way of itself. The third essence, that is, soul, is not in its whole self understanding. For it has other natural characteristics besides understanding and these are without understanding. So mind in the soul is part of the soul but also in some way part of the mind, of the higher mind, which is totally and only mind. If soul from itself possessed mind, the rational principle for generating mind would exist within the substance of soul, and all soul would thus be mind, mind perfect and complete; and every soul would possess mind, because the rational principle of soul is in every soul. And just as the power to move body, since it belongs to soul by nature, is present in individual souls, so the faculty of understanding would be present in all souls, including those of beasts, if it belonged by nature to soul. If above the nature which is less effective there has to be a nature which is more effective, and if the mind which is in the soul can neither produce by its own act alone any effect outside itself, nor rule over its soul's effecting power, then above the mind in the soul has to be a mind which by its own act is the producer of a work, and is the mistress over the power it has to effect it. It is reasonable to conclude then that just as the head of the soul is the mind, its most excellent part, so at the head of this mind, which belongs not to itself but to the soul, and is not independent but tied to the capacity of the soul, and is not clear but clouded and in a way ir-

scura, est media, lucida partim, partimque obscura'. In ordine corporum res undique lucida est stella quaelibet super lunam, obscurus undique est aer, media luna. In ordine vero spirituum mens est lumine plena, anima irrationali vacua, rationalis tenet medium: partem habet intellectualis luminis, parte caret. Ac partem quam habet a deo, ceu luna a sole, alias aliter accipit mutatque figuram. Ideo merito super eam est angelus, qui tamquam stella quaelibet super lunam, et totus semper et eodem pacto sui solis luce refulget.

6 Profecto, ubi natura superior tangit inferiorem, ibi ex infimo sui gradu supremum inferioris attingit, puta, infimum ignis aeris attingit supremum. Natura vero intellectualis corporali est natura superior tangitque illam adeo ut, quod inter corpora praestantissimum est, intellectualis sit animae particeps; inferiora vero quae plurima sunt, nequaquam. Praestantissima vero corpora sunt apud Platonicos caelicolarum daemonumque et hominum. Sed numquid mentes, quae corporibus huiusmodi tributae sunt, mentium altissimae sunt? Nequaquam, alioquin natura inferior superioris absque medio summum consequeretur. Ergo, quemadmodum sub corporibus mente praeditis quam plurima corpora sunt expertia mentis, ita super mentes corporibus insitas quam plurimae mentes sunt nullis attributae corporibus, atque etiam multo plures sunt quam corporum species, quoniam, ut alias ostendemus, rationales animae inter aeternitatem tempusque sunt constitutae. Aeternitatis vero excellentia videtur exigere ut plures in ea quodammodo species perfectionesque quam in tempore sint. Mitto, quod alias demonstrabimus, intervallum inter animas primumque principium infinitum esse, sed spatium inter ipsas atque materiam esse fini-

resolute — at the head of this mind, I repeat, is a mind which exists in itself, free and translucent. Presumably, this explains the riddle of the Magi: "There is something completely clear, something completely murky, something midway, partly clear and partly murky."[23] In the order of bodies what is completely clear is a star above the Moon, what is completely murky is the air, and in between is the Moon. But in the order of spirits the mind is full of light, the irrational soul is empty of light, and the rational soul is the mean between the two, possessing part of the light of the intellect and lacking part. The part it has from God, like the Moon from the Sun, it receives in different ways at different times, and it changes its shape. Justly, therefore, angel is above soul like a star above the Moon, refulgent with the light of its Sun, entire, forever, unchanging.

Where the higher nature comes into contact with the lower, there it touches the lower's highest level with its own lowest level. For instance, the lowest level of fire touches the highest level of air. The intellectual nature is superior to the corporeal nature and makes contact with it to the extent that what is most outstanding among bodies may participate in the intellectual soul, but not the lower elements at all, which are legion. Now the most excellent bodies, according to the Platonists, are those of the celestial beings, of demons and of men. But are the minds attached to such bodies the highest sorts of minds? Surely not, or the lower nature would reach the peak of the higher nature without an intermediary. Therefore, just as below bodies endowed with mind is a multitude of bodies without mind, so above minds implanted in bodies is a multitude of minds unattached to any bodies. Indeed, even more of them exist than species of body, for rational souls, as I shall demonstrate elsewhere, have their existence between eternity and time. The excellence of eternity seems to demand that there should be more species, more perfections, in it in a way than exist in time. I shall not dwell on the fact (which I shall discuss 6 tum, ut nemini mirum videri debeat super animas plures admodum angelorum gradus quam gradus formarum infra animas esse posse.

7 Praeterea, quando ex duobus fit unum, et alterum illorum, quod minus perfectum est, reperitur alicubi per se manere seorsum ab altero, multo magis alterum illud perfectius et minus egenum esse alicubi sine altero poterit. Fit autem animal unum ex intellectuali substantia, id est anima rationali, et corpore. Corpora multa videmus sine huiusmodi intellectu esse ac vivere. Quid igitur prohibet esse mentes plurimas corporibus non unitas? Tales quidem erunt super animas quae sunt unitae corporibus. Proinde mentes coniunctae corporibus, quatenus tales sunt, speciem animalis solae[40] non complent, sed compositae speciei sunt partes atque ut plurimum, ut intellegant, in ea quae sensibilia sunt aspiciunt. Quare et imperfectae quodammodo sunt, et imperfecte agunt.

8 Si igitur ab imperfectis in quolibet genere ad perfecta, quae priora natura sunt, est ascendendum, consequens est ut super coniunctas mentes ad separatas ratio nos perducat, quae et species ipsae sufficienter suas compleant, et intellegendo ad illa quae per se intellegibilia sunt aspiciant. Mens ipsa, quia per intellegentiam et voluntatem non necessario dependet a corpore, et naturaliter formas separat atque circa separatas versatur, et quiete potius quam motu proficit, per naturam est a corpore motuque libera. Idcirco magis naturae suae convenit ut vivat seorsum a corpore motuque, quam ut vivat in corpore atque motu. Multae tamen mentes in corporibus mobilem vitam ducunt. Quare multo magis et multo plures immobilem vitam agunt absque corporibus. Quis neget incorporeae[41] substantiae secundum generis sui naturam convenire magis ut extra corpus sit quam ut in corpore, ideoque plures illius species a corpore seiunctas quam coniunctas esse debere? Quod

later) that the distance between souls and the first principle is infinite, but the space between souls and matter is finite. Hence it ought to surprise no one that many more degrees of angels are able to exist above souls than degrees of forms below souls.

When a single thing is made up of two components, and the one of them that is less perfect is found to have an independent existence somewhere apart from the other, then *a fortiori* the one that is more perfect and less in need should be able to exist somewhere without the other. An animal is made one from intellectual substance, that is, rational soul, and from body. But we have seen that many bodies exist and are alive without such an intellect. Is there any reason then that prevents many minds from being unattached to bodies? Such minds will be above souls united to bodies. Minds joined to bodies, insofar as they are minds, do not by themselves constitute the species of animal. They are parts rather of a species which is composite, and in order to understand they mainly consider sensible objects; and on this account they are in some respect imperfect, and they act imperfectly. 7

In any genus we must ascend from imperfect things to the perfect since the perfect naturally come first. Thus the argument leads us from minds that are conjoined to minds that are separate, minds which as species themselves are enough to constitute their own species and which gaze in understanding upon those things which are in themselves intelligible. Because by way of its understanding and its will the mind does not depend of necessity on body, it naturally separates forms and treats of them in their separation. It profits more from rest than from motion and is by nature free from the body and from motion. Thus it better suits its nature to live apart from the body and from motion than to live in the body and in motion. Yet many minds do lead a life subject to motion in bodies. Even more reason then for there to be minds, very many of them, leading a life free from motion and separate from bodies. Could anyone deny that it is more proper for an in- 8

enim generi cuilibet naturalius est, id in eo existit ut plurimum. Tales quidem sunt angeli, qui si corpora mundi movent, ipsi motis corporibus nullo modo moventur. Animae tamen, dum corpora transferunt, ipsae quoque feruntur.

9 Motor qui una cum moto corpore pervagatur, perpetuum stabilemque tenorem et ordinem movendi non servat, nisi praesit illi motor immobilis. Ideo mundanae revolutionis perpetuus ordo testatur esse aliquos super animas motores immobiles. Elementa quoniam ex fluitante materia constant seque mutuo semper inficiunt, nullum ex se ordinem observarent, nisi a lege caelestis motus ordinatissima regerentur. Cum vero et caelum per se sit perpetuo mobile, ideoque indigum, ordo in suo motu stabilis non ex ipso provenit, sed a superno motore prorsus immobili atque individuo. Non enim in rebus tam diversis mobilibusque stabilis unio perseverat, nisi a stabilissimo et unitissimo cardine, qui tandem ad unitatem ipsam statumque refertur. Sane sicut mobile se habet ad mobile, ita motor etiam ad motorem. Ergo sicut elementum quod movetur mobiliter ad caelum quod movetur stabiliter, sic motor caeli mobilis variusque ad motorem stabilem unitumque, stabile denique et unitum ad statum ipsum unitatemque, reducitur. Profecto motorem sequitur actio illa quae movere dicitur; actionem hanc sequitur illa passio quae moveri, neque fit contra. Non enim priora a posterioribus ducuntur, sed converso. Potest igitur multo magis esse alicubi actio illa quae dicitur movere[42] sine passione illa quae est moveri, quam passio huiusmodi seorsum ab actione. Tamen passio talis in corporibus est seorsum ab actione. Igitur alicubi erit actio procul a passione, ut sicut corpora moventur qui-

corporeal substance, following the nature of its genus, to be outside the body than to be in the body, and that therefore there should be more species of it separated from the body than species conjoined? For whatever is most natural to a particular genus exists in it to the fullest possible degree. Such then are the angels who move the world's bodies but are not moved at all themselves by the motion of those bodies. Souls, on the other hand, when they set bodies in motion, are themselves moved.

An agent of motion which variously moves together with the body it moves cannot keep the tenor and order of the motion regular and stable unless a motionless mover rules over it. So the perpetual order of the world's revolution is evidence that above souls certain movers exist that are motionless. The elements, because they consist of matter in flux and are always contaminating each other, would of themselves preserve no order, unless they were controlled by the strictest law of celestial motion. But since the heaven too is perpetually in motion of itself and therefore wanting, the stable order in its motion does not stem from itself, but from a higher mover that is absolutely motionless and undivided. Such stability and oneness does not persist in things so different from each other and so much in motion, unless it is from some axis, completely stable and completely one, which is ultimately derived from oneness and stability itself. As what is movable is related to what is movable, so mover too is related to mover. So just as an element which is movably moved is related to heaven which is stably moved, so heaven's movable and changeable mover is led back to the mover which is stable and united, and finally what is stable and united is led back to stability and oneness themselves. The action we refer to as "moving" follows upon the mover; and following upon this action is the passion we refer to as "being moved": it cannot happen the other way round. For the prior are not led by the posterior, but the reverse. It is much more likely that the action we call "moving" should exist somewhere without 9 dem, non movent, sic angeli moveant, non moveantur, de quibus inquit Zoroaster:

πῶς ἔχει κόσμος νοεροὺς ἀνοχῆας ἀκαμπεῖς

< id est>: 'Mundus habet intellectuales rectores immobiles'. Igitur sicut qualitates omnino mobiles antecedunt animae partim mobiles partimque immobiles, sic animas antecedunt omnino immobiles angeli.

10 Angelos esse atque esse multos Aristoteles in libro undecimo *Divinorum* ita probat; 'Motum caeli continuum, ordinatum et quantum in se est indeficientem oportet a motore fieri, qui neque in se neque per accidens moveatur. Cum vero motus huiusmodi in caelo sint multi, inter se discreti, specieque et virtute diversi, oportet eos a pluribus eiusmodi motoribus fieri, qui videlicet neque corpora sint, ne cogantur dum movent ab alio interim ipsi moveri atque ita in infinitum necessario procedatur, neque rursus formae in corpore, ne eas una cum moto corpore moveri contingat. Oportet enim ad motorem perfectissimum, id est immobilem, pervenire, ne in motibus ulla umquam transgressio fiat. Motores eiusmodi mentes sunt, siquidem in formis a materia omnino solutis intellegibile atque intellectus est idem'.

11 Haec Aristoteles. Hebraei posterioresque philosophi mentes illas angelos nuntiosque nominant, quorum praecipuos non esse pauciores quam decem alicubi disputat Avicenna, alibi vero multo plures significare videtur. Aristoteles autem haudquaquam pauciores esse quam caelestes motus, eumque numerum probabili se ratione computavisse[43] fatetur. Quod autem necessarium sit sapientioribus se dimittere, quasi qui suspicabatur, ne forte mentes illae secundum actionem suam propriam praecipuamque, id est intellegentiam, potius quam secundum actionem communem atque posteriorem, id est motum, essent dinumerandae. Praeterea, cum illae

the passion we call "being moved" than that the passion should exist apart from the action. Yet such a passion in bodies does exist apart from action. Therefore somewhere action will exist far from passion, in order that, just as bodies are moved but do not move, so the angels may move but not be moved. This is what Zoroaster was referring to when he said: "The world has intellectual motionless rulers."[24] So just as souls, which are partly movable and partly motionless, surpass qualities, which are entirely movable, so angels who are entirely motionless surpass souls.

That angels exist and exist in large numbers Aristotle shows in the eleventh book of his *Metaphysics*: "The movement of the heavens, which is continuous, orderly and, as far as its nature permits, without defects, must come about through a mover that may not be moved either in itself or accidentally. As there are many such movements in the heavens, each separate from the other, different in species and in power, they must be the result of several such movers. These of course cannot be bodies, or they would have to be themselves moved by something when they were imparting motion, and so on necessarily *ad infinitum*. Nor can they be forms in bodies, or else it would come about that they are moved along with the body that is moved. We must have recourse to a perfect mover, that is, to the motionless mover, in order to ensure that no motion would ever deviate from its course. Such movers are minds; for in forms that are totally free of matter what is understood and what understands are the same thing."[25] 10

Thus Aristotle. It was the Hebrews and later philosophers who called these minds angels and messengers. Avicenna maintains at one point that the chief angels number no less than ten; but at another he seems to indicate there are far more.[26] Aristotle argues that the number of minds is no less than the number of motions in the heavens; and he admitted he had calculated a number using a likely proof, but concluded that he should leave the matter to others wiser than himself.[27] He suspected, it seems, that the 11

sint motionum fines, forte vaticinabatur non esse ad motionum numerum numerandas atque posse mentes esse quam plurimas quae non sint movendis corporibus distributae. Quamobrem non iniuria angelos esse paene innumeros et supra significavimus et in praesentia sic ostendimus.

12 Si species rerum naturalium in materia, quamvis in subiecto angustaeque sint, tamen inter se non per subiectum sed per se distinguuntur atque in numerum quam plurimum dilatantur, multo magis substantiae ipsae, quae super materiam in se ipsis vivunt, per seipsas distinctae sunt atque mira quadam absoluti generis sui fecunditate in species quasi innumeras prorsus amplificatae. Praeterea, intellegibile genus suapte natura magis multiplicabile quam corporeum esse videtur, siquidem numeri, dimensiones, figurae, proportiones, raritas corporum, velocitas motionum in ipsis corporibus semper terminata sunt; in mente tamen absque termino pro arbitrio protenduntur. Rursus, quae in materia particularia sunt, in mente universalia fiunt.[44] Denique intellectus ultra corpora cuncta, alia pro arbitrio innumera tam incorporea quam corporea cogitat. Cum ergo intellegibile genus magis admodum quam sensibile amplificari possit, potentiaque tam bona in universo semper inanis esse non debeat, proculdubio iam actu sunt substantiarum species separatarum multo plures, quam species corporalium, praesertim cum potentia praestantior et magis et prius in universo actum sibi suum asciscat, quam debilior. Denique universi ordo, cum sub infinito bono quam optime dispositus sit, exigere omnino videtur ut quae in ipso sunt meliora, quatenus fieri potest, super deteriorum quantitatem multiplicentur, praecipue cum inferiora superiorum gratia sint constituta. Quod quidem in ipsis mundi

minds should be enumerated according to their own peculiar and principal activity, that is, understanding, and not according to a shared and secondary activity, that is, motion. Moreover, although they may be the final causes of motions, he was prophesying perhaps that the minds should not be reckoned [simply] according to the number of motions, and that a very large number of minds could exist which have not been allocated to imparting motion to bodies. So it is not unreasonable to conclude that the angels are almost numberless, as I indicated above and will demonstrate now in the following manner.

If the species of natural objects in matter, although confined within a substrate, are distinguished one from another not because of the substrate but of themselves, and are expanded to the greatest number, then *a fortiori* the substances, which exist independently above matter, are distinguished of themselves, and, given the extraordinary fertility of their genus which is freed from matter, are multiplied into species almost without number. Further, an intelligible genus would seem by its very nature to be more easily multiplied than a corporeal one, since numbers, dimensions, shapes, proportions, the density of bodies, the speed of motions, all are limited in bodies themselves. But in mind they are extended at will and without limit. Again, what are particular in matter become universal in mind. Finally, intellect, which is beyond all bodies, can think at will about innumerable things incorporeal and corporeal alike. Since an intelligible genus can be multiplied much more, therefore, than a sensible genus, and since a potency so valuable to the universe must not be always in vain, many more species of separate substances than species of bodily substances undoubtedly exist in act. This is especially since a superior potency accomplishes its act in the universe more immediately and more effectively than a weaker potency. Finally, the fact that the universe's order has been arranged in the best possible manner under the control of an infinite good would seem to require that everything 12

sphaeris manifeste videmus. Quo enim nobilior sphaera est, eo et amplior, adeo ut terra et aqua, si ad superiora conferantur, quasi punctum ad circumferentiam sese habere putentur. Quod autem in corporibus est dimensio, id[45] in rebus incorporeis numerus esse videtur. Quapropter consentaneum est ut intellectuales substantiae, utpote quae optimae sunt ac per se existunt finesque sunt corporalium omnium quae illarum gratia sunt procreata, longe plures numero sint, quam et[46] sphaerarum motus et corpora omnia. Quod Dionysius Areopagita testatur, dicens plures esse intellectualium species separatas quam corporalium.

13 Merito potentissimus universi creator opus sibi suum quam simillimum reddere et potuit et scivit et voluit. Simillimum vero in hoc ipso potissimum procreavit, quod absolutas mentes, quae ipsi omnium simillimae sunt, ultra coniunctas materiae formas immenso, ut ita dixerim, spatio dilatavit. Hinc illud Danielis prophetae: 'Millia millium ministrabant ei, et decies[47] centena millia assistebant ei'.

14 In distinguendis autem ordinibus angelorum Dionysius ternario novenarioque numero in primis, necnon interdum septenario utitur. Quinetiam duodenarium in Christianorum mysteriis reperimus. Idem et Iamblichus Proclusque Platonici post Dionysium observarunt. Supremos enim et medios angelos ternario et novenario dividunt, sequentes autem septenario, postremos denique duodenario ordinum numero partiuntur. Quoniam vero apud Platonicos gradus corporum sunt rationalium animarum umbrae, animarum vero gradus sunt imagines angelorum, idcirco nonnulli an-

better in it should, as far as possible, be multiplied and should exceed the quantity of worse things (especially since inferior things have been made for the sake of the superior). This is obvious if we consider the world spheres. The nobler a sphere is, the bigger it is. Earth and water vis-à-vis the higher spheres we suppose like a point compared to the circumference. What is dimension in bodies seems in incorporeal entities to be number. So it is reasonable to infer that, inasmuch as intellectual substances are the best, and have an independent existence, and are the ends at which all corporeal entities aim and for which they are created, they must be far more numerous than both the motions of the spheres and the total number of bodies. Dionysius the Areopagite testifies to this when he says that the species of intellectual entities existing separately outnumber those of corporeal entities.[28]

It is reasonable to suppose that the all-powerful Creator of the universe had the capacity, the knowledge and the will to render His work as most like Himself as possible. He has created it most like Himself in that He has taken the pure minds, which of all things are most like Himself, and has exalted and extended them over and above the forms that are combined with matter by an immeasurable space (if I may call it such). Hence, the saying of the prophet Daniel, "Thousand thousands ministered unto Him, and ten hundred thousands stood before Him."[29] 13

In distinguishing the orders of angels, Dionysius made particular use of the numbers three and nine, and occasionally of seven. We find the number twelve in the Christian mysteries. Iamblichus and Proclus, the Platonists, follow Dionysius here.[30] For they divide the highest and middle angels into three and nine orders; but the angels who follow are divided into seven orders, and the lowest angels into twelve. Since for the Platonists, however, the different orders of bodies are shadows or reflections [of the orders] of rational souls, and the orders of souls are images [of the orders] of the angels, accordingly some distinguish the orders of angels according 14 gelorum ordines secundum ordines corporum simul animarumque distinguunt. Sed de his alias.

: VI :

Super angelum est deus, quoniam anima est mobilis multitudo, angelus multitudo immobilis, deus immobilis unitas.

1 Angelum prorsus immobilem esse Platonici arbitrantur essentia, virtute, actione, quoniam semper sit idem, aeque possit, intellegat semper omnia simul et velit eadem et, quantum in se est, agat subito quicquid agit. Haec Platonici. Quid vero dicant alii, alias dicam. Nondum tamen quiescere hic cum Anaxagora et Hermotimo ratio nos permittit, sed altius iubet ascendere.

2 Porro anima, quia mobilis est, ab alio pertransit in aliud. Igitur aliud in se habet et aliud. Quod haec habet, habet et multitudinem. Quapropter anima in seipsa multitudo quaedam est, multitudo inquam mobilis. Angelus qui proxime hanc antecedit, esse nequit immobilis unitas, quia duae quaedam huiusmodi res, quarum una sit mobilis multitudo et altera immobilis unitas, longissime inter se distare videntur. Unitas siquidem multitudini opponitur, immobile mobili. Quoniam ergo res illae ab omni parte invicem opponuntur, proxime sibi non succedunt, sed medio quodam indigent copulante. Animam vero ipsam, quae est mobilis multitudo, angelus absque medio antecedit. Ideo non potest angelus esse immobilis unitas, ne duo extrema sine medio coniungantur. Immobilis certe est, ut supra probavimus, ergo non unitas. Restat ut sit angelus immobilis multitudo. Ubi cum anima conve-

to the orders of bodies and of souls together. But more of this anon.

: VI :

Above angel is God; for just as soul is mobile plurality and angel motionless plurality, so God is motionless unity.

Platonists believe that angel is entirely without motion in essence, power and activity; for it is always the same, its capacity is constant, it understands everything at the same moment, it wills the same things, and, insofar as it can, it does whatever it does instantaneously. That is what the Platonists say. The views of others I will relate elsewhere. But reason does not permit us to rest at this point [in the argument] with Anaxagoras and Hermotimus; it bids us to mount higher. 1

Soul, because it is in motion, passes from one thing to another. So it contains within itself the one thing and the other. Because it has both, it contains plurality. Soul then is in itself a certain plurality, a plurality, I repeat, in motion. Angel, which immediately precedes soul, cannot be a motionless unity; because the distance between these two particular things — one a plurality in motion, the other a motionless unity — appears to be too immense. Unity is, of course, the opposite of plurality, and what is motionless, of what is moved. But since in every respect these two are the opposite of each other, they cannot come one immediately after the other: they need some connecting link. Now angel precedes soul, which is plurality in motion, without any intermediary. Therefore angel cannot be motionless unity, otherwise the two extremes would be joined without an intermediary. But we have already demonstrated that angel is certainly motionless. Thus it cannot be 2

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nit in eo, quod ipse multitudo est, sicut et illa; discrepat autem, quia illa est mobilis, hic immobilis.

3 Multitudinem certe aliquam ponere in angelo cogimur. At qualem? Qualis convenit intellectui, hoc est ut essentiam habeat atque esse vim intellegendi, intellectionis actum rerumque intellectarum species plurimas. Cum vero angelus non sit simplex omnino, sed habeat numerum, super numerum autem unitas esse debeat, quia unitas est numeri totius origo et unione non indiget, multitudo autem natura sua indiget unione, necessarium est super angelum esse aliud quiddam, quod non modo immobile sit, sed unum penitus atque simplex. Ille quidem est deus, tanto rerum potentissimus omnium, quanto est omnium simplicissimus. Siquidem in simplicitate consistit unio, in unitate potestas, deum nemo dicere audeat ex pluribus esse compositum, quia si modo recte compositus fuerit, ex aliquo constabit quod erit tamquam subiectum et aliquo quod erit tamquam forma. Itaque non erit deus undique perfectissimus, cum in eo sit pars altera imperfectior altera et quaelibet pars imperfectior ipso toto. Non erit agens summum, quia non per se totum aget quicquid aget, sed per partem alteram, id est formam. Non erit beatissimus, quia non fruetur ubique seipso: non enim se totum in membro quolibet complectetur. Videbit autem in se aliquid aliud praeter deum, quoniam non idem pars est et totum. Beatior certe futurus est, si quicquid ipse videbit in se, sit ipse, nusquam sibi desit, sed sibimet totus occurrat ubique. Denique pars illa quae ponebatur in deo quasi subiectum, quia secundum se cogitatur informis, seipsam formare non potest. Pars insuper altera quae vicem formae gerebat, quia non consistit in se, multo minus ex se potest existere. Formabitur ergo deus iste compositus a forma quadam superiore atque illa potius erit deus. Haec

unity. It remains then that angel is motionless plurality. It conforms to soul in that like soul it is a plurality; but it differs from soul in that it is motionless while soul is moved.

So we are obliged to posit some sort of plurality in angel. But what sort? It has to be a plurality appropriate to intellect, that is, one that has as its essence and being the power of understanding, the act of understanding, and the many species of things understood. But since angel is not entirely simple but possesses number, and since unity must be above number as the origin of all number and itself not lacking unity (whereas plurality by its very nature lacks unity), then something else must exist above angel that is not only motionless but entirely one and simple. This is God, the most powerful of all in that He is the simplest of all. Since union consists in simplicity, and power in unity, no one would dare say that God is compounded from many things, because if God were compounded correctly, He would consist of something resembling a substrate and of something else resembling a form. In that case, God would not be in every respect the most perfect, since one part in Him would be less perfect than the other and both parts less perfect than the whole. Nor would God be the highest agent, because He would do whatever He does, not by way of His whole self, but by way of one of His parts, the form. Nor would He be most blessed, because He would not be delighting everywhere in Himself; for He would not be embracing His whole self in every part. He would be seeing something in Himself other than God, since the part and the whole are not the same. Undoubtedly He is more blessed if everything He sees in Himself is Himself, and if He is never absent from Himself but everywhere appears whole to Himself. Finally, the part posited in God as a substrate, because one thinks of it in itself as formless, cannot form itself. The other part which performs the role of form, not having an independent existence, clearly cannot bring itself into existence. Thus this composite god will be formed by some higher form, and that higher 3 autem est prima discursio per quam probamus super angelum esse deum.

4 Praeterea, quemadmodum se habet tuus oculus ad corpus tuum, sic tua mens ad animam[48] tuam. Est enim mens tuae animae[49] oculus. Rursus, quemadmodum se habet lumen solis ad oculum corporis, sic veritatis lumen ad animae oculum. Itaque sicut oculus corporis non est lumen, sed virtus luminis capax, ita mens quae est oculus animae, non est veritas, licet capiat veritatem. Mens enim tua veritatem quaerit. Non tamen quaerit seipsam veritas, neque admittit veritas falsum, per quod saepe tuus animus fallitur.

5 Finge animo oculum tuum usque adeo excrescere ut totum occupet tuum corpus et sublata varia membrorum specie universum corpus unus sit oculus. Si amplius hic oculus videbit quicquam, non aliud certe videbit quam lumen idem solis, quod angustus dum erat, prospiciebat. Verum accipiet lumen idem uberius, et colores corporum in ipso lumine conspiciet undique, uno prospectu simul omnes. Neque vertetur huc aut illuc ut videat, sed quiescendo omnes pariter contuebitur. Aliud tamen adhuc lumen erit, aliud oculus. Si enim visus ad lumen comprehendendum est institutus, aliud visus est, aliud lumen. Et lumini nihil est opus visu, cum ipsi lumini nihil sit luminis capiendum. Finge iterum mentem tuam usque adeo super animam invalescere ut, deletis reliquis animae partibus ad phantasiam, sensum generationemque pertinentibus, tota anima mens una sit atque sola: haec mens sola puraque relicta angelus erit. Haec inquam mens ampla eandem veritatem intuebitur quam angusta mens viderat, sed accipiet illam uberius atque in ea res omnes veras unico intuitu conspiciet, ut platonice loquar, neque modo unam aucupabitur, modo aliam. Aliud tamen adhuc mens erit, aliud veritas. Quod sic aperit Zoroaster:

Μάνθανε τὸ νοητόν, ἐπεὶ ἔξω νόου ὑπάρχει

form rather will be God. So much for the first proof that God is above angel.

Your mind is to your soul what your eye is to your body. Your mind is the eye of your soul. Similarly, the light of truth bears the same relationship to the eye of your soul as the light of the Sun to your bodily eye. Your bodily eye is not itself light but has the power to perceive light; so too your mind, the soul's eye, is not itself the truth though it can perceive the truth. Your mind seeks the truth; but the truth does not seek itself, nor does the truth admit the false by which your mind is often deceived. 4

Imagine your eye growing so that it fills your whole body, and, when every species of limb has disappeared, that the universal body is a single eye. If this ampler eye sees something, it will still see nothing other than the same light of the Sun which it saw when it was confined [to the eye-socket]. But it will receive the same light in greater abundance. In the light everywhere it will see the colors of bodies and see them all together at a single gaze. It will not glance from side to side in order to see, but remaining motionless it will regard everything equally. The light, however, will still be one thing, the eye another. If vision was put in us in order to comprehend light, then vision is one thing, light another. Light has no need of vision, as light itself has no more light to receive. Now imagine that your mind has such power over your soul that with the rest of the parts of the soul effaced, those concerned with imagination, sense and generation, your whole soul is one mind alone. This remaining sole, uncontaminated mind will be angel. This mind, I say, in all its amplitude will look upon the same truth as the mind did when it was confined, but it will receive truth in greater abundance, and in truth will observe all true things at a single gaze (to put it Platonically), and not hunt now for one thing, now for another. Yet mind and truth will still be different things. Zoroaster unfolded it like this: "Be aware that the intelligible lies outside the mind."[31] If the mind has been made to 5

id est: 'Scito intellegibile ipsum esse extra mentem'. Quippe si ad veritatem percipiendam instituta mens est, aliud est mens indiga veritatis, aliud veritas. Neque ipsi veritati opus est mente, per quam capiat veritatem. Atqui si ipsa mens idem esset atque ipsa veritas, mens quaelibet veridica esset et omne verum particeps foret mentis. Nunc autem et mentes humanae falluntur et multae res verae sunt quodammodo quae mente carent.

6 Veritas non modo aliud est quam mens, sed et superius aliquid. Eget quippe mens veritate, veritas mente non indiget. Ac latius se fundit veritatis quam mentis imperium. Ars enim intellectualis in formis[50] singulis invenitur; in materia vero informi nequaquam. Vere tamen materia dicitur et omnium naturalium revera subiectum. At vero, si veritas est supra mentem et, quod superius est, non caret bonis inferioribus, non deest mentis perspicacia veritati. Neque tamen duo quaedam sunt in ipsa, perspicacia videlicet atque veritas, sed simplicissima veritas seipsam minime latens, perinde ac si lumen, quamvis non habeat oculum a se distinctum, tamen non lateat semetipsum. Est enim deus perspicacissima veritas et verissima perspicacia sive perspectio, lux seipsa videns, visus seipso lucens, intellectualis perspicaciae luminisque fons, cuius lumine et cuius lumen dumtaxat mentis perspicacia perspicit. Et sicut lignum per participationem quandam calidum dicitur, ignis vero secundum formam calens, sol denique excellentiori modo secundum eminentem virtutem causamque caloris, sic anima mentis partem, angelus mentis formam habet, deus est efficacissima mentis origo. Atque, ut more Plotini loquar, deus ipsa intellectio est: non in aliquo intellectu tamquam potentia, non veritatis velut obiecti, sed in seipsa suique ipsius existens, quemadmodum si visio neque esset in visu aliquo neque luminis alieni visio esset, sed in seipsa maneret suique ipsius visio foret. Ubicumque enim intellectus quasi intellegendi potentia ponitur, etiam si intellegat semetipsum; tamen qua ratione intellegibilis est, prior quodammodo seipso dicitur qua ratione intellectualis consideratur. intelle-

perceive the truth, then the mind in need of the truth is different from the truth. For truth has no need of the mind as a way to grasp the truth. Were the mind and the truth the same, every mind would always speak the truth and every truth would participate in mind. But in the event, human minds are deceived, and there are many truths in a way which are missing a mind [to perceive them].

Truth is not only different from mind, it is something superior. 6 For the mind needs truth, but truth does not need mind. The domain of truth extends further than that of mind. Intellectual art is to be found in individual forms, but is not present in unformed matter. Yet matter is truly called matter and truly it is the substrate of all natural objects. But if truth is superior to mind, and because it is superior does not lack inferior goods, then truth does not lack the clarity of mind. However, existing in it are not two things, truth and clarity, but rather simplest truth, truth not hiding from itself, just as light, though it has no eye separate from itself, does not hide from itself. For God is clearest truth and truest clarity or sight, the light seeing itself, the vision giving light to itself. He is the spring of intellectual clarity and light, by whose light and whose light only the clarity of the mind perceives.[32] We say that wood is hot by a certain participation, but that fire heats in accordance with its form, and that the Sun heats in a more excellent manner in accordance with its eminent power and as the cause of heat. Similarly, soul participates in mind, angel possesses the form of mind, but God is the all-effecting source of mind. As Plotinus would put it, God is understanding itself.[33] God is not in any particular intellect as its potentiality, and He is not the understanding of the truth as of an object. He is understanding existing in itself and of itself. It is as though vision were not in any sight and were not the vision of an alien light, but remained in itself and were the vision of itself. Intellect exists everywhere as the potentiality for understanding, even if it understands itself. Yet insofar as

gibile enim tamquam prius atque praestantius intellectualem virtutem quasi posteriorem inferioremque movet et format et perficit. Idcirco quidam deum potius sive intellegibilis sive intellectionis quam intellectus nomine nuncupant, quamquam haec etiam nomina deo haud propria omnino ratione conveniunt. Sed de his alias.

7 Accedit ad haec quod animae opus est vitalem motum praebere, siquidem ipsa vita quaedam est. Mentis autem opus ordinare per formas. Ipsa enim species quaedam est et secundum species operatur, quod in nostra mente conspicimus. Vitalis ille motus per omnia viventia funditur; rebus carentibus vita non competit. Ordinatio vero per formas convenit rebus etiam non viventibus; hae siquidem ordine specieque non carent. Tanto[51] intervallo mens animam superat, quanto latius funditur formarum ordo quam vita. Quoniam vero ultra formarum ordinem est prima illa informis rerum materia, in qua latent quaedam, ut ita loquar, formarum pullulantium semina, mentis munus, quod terminatur formis, haec informia non complectitur. Ipsa tamen materia bona est quodammodo, quia boni, id est formae, appetens, quia ad bonum suscipiendum exposita, quia bono necessaria mundo. Semina quoque sunt bona, quia sunt formarum bonarum incohationes. Tanto saltem intervallo bonitas mentem superat, quanto longius boni quam speciei tendit largitio. Quo enim res quaeque potentior est, eo longius operatur.

8 Accedunt ad haec huiusmodi rationes. Omnia bonum appetunt; mentem vero non omnia. Non enim assequi mentem et sapientiam omnia possunt, ideoque multa sunt quae eam non appetunt, ne frustra appetant. Si omnia appetendo convertuntur ad bonum, non ad mentem omnia, et quo conversio rerum est, illinc est et profectio, omnia a bono procedunt, non a mente. Quare bo-

it is [itself] intelligible, it is said to be prior in a way to itself insofar as we think of it as intellectual. For what is intelligible, being first and pre-eminent, moves, forms and perfects the intellectual power which is posterior and inferior to it. That is why some people call God the intelligible or the understanding rather than the intellect, although, as we shall see later, even these names are not strictly appropriate to God.

A further argument. The function of the soul is to provide vital motion, since the soul itself is a kind of life. The function of the mind is to order by means of forms. It is itself a kind of form or species and operates by species, as we can see in our own mind. That vital motion flows through every living thing but does not belong to things lacking life. But orderly arrangement by way of forms is proper to even non-living things, for they do not lack order and species. Mind is superior to soul to the same extent that the order of forms extends further than life. But because beyond the order of forms is the universe's formless prime matter where certain seeds of forms lie hidden and ferment, if I may put it like that, the office of mind, which is bounded by forms, does not embrace these formless seeds. Yet matter is in a way good because it is desirous of the good, namely of form, and because it is open to receiving the good, and because it is necessary for a good world. Seeds also are good as they are the rudiments of good forms. Goodness exceeds mind to the same degree the distribution of the good extends further than the distribution of the species. The more powerful each thing is, the more far-reaching its activity. 7

The following arguments bear on this point. All things desire the good, but all things do not desire mind. For not everything is capable of attaining mind and wisdom, and so there are many things that do not desire it, or else they would desire it to no purpose. If all things in desiring are turned towards the good, but not all towards mind, and if all things turn back in the direction whence they departed, then all things come from the good and not 8

num potius quam mens est causa prima rerum. Rursus, quae mentem habent, nondum tamen cessant, sed adhuc bonum quaerunt. Mentis enim proprium est nixus quidam ad intellegendum. Aut post hunc nixum deterius se mens habet aut melius aut aeque. Non deterius, quia operatio ipsa perfectio quaedam est, et ad deterius nihil nisi aut vi aut inscitia labitur, quorum neutrum in ipsam cadit mentem puram et liberam. Non aeque: frustra enim nititur, quod nihil proficit et nihil ad id quod habet adnititur. Ergo ut melius se habeat conatur. Non igitur ipsum bonum est: nihil enim bono melius. Sic mens intellegendo haurit bonitatem, aliunde autem haurit. Si enim in se haberet, non esset nixu opus ut operando proficeret. Illud, unde haurit bonitatem, ipsum bonum est, quod et super eam exstat, cum in eam perfectionis suae liquorem infundat. Quin etiam sapientiam mentemque solo petimus rationis impulsu; bonum vero etiam ante omne rationis incitamentum. Omnisque noster appetitus semper est ad bonum, non omnis semper ad mentem, et intellegentiam ratione boni appetimus, non converso. Pluris ergo natura facit bonum quam mentem, cum et prius et saepius et potius trahat ad bonum. Unde nonnulli satis in philosophia habere se putant, si sapientiam videantur habere, etiam si non habeant; non tamen satis in vita, nisi revera id possideant, quod sibi praecipue iudicant esse bonum.

9 Si bonum naturali instinctu pretiosius mente censetur, censetur et eminentius. Hinc fit ut id quod intellegere est non sufficiat nobis, nisi et bene et bonum intellegamus. Saepe enim ad tempus cognitionem respuimus, si eam suspicamur nobis malam fore atque molestam. Bonum vero ipsum respuere numquam possumus. Saepe etiam rerum speculationi anteponimus voluptatem. Ipsi autem bono, qua ratione bonum est, nihil umquam[52] possumus anteponere. Nihil magis necessarium est quam incitamentum

from mind. So the good rather than mind is the first cause of things. Furthermore, what possesses mind does not stop at mind but seeks still for the good. The proper characteristic of mind is a certain striving for understanding. After this striving, the mind is either worse off than it was before, or better, or exactly the same. It cannot be worse off because activity in itself is a sort of perfection, and because nothing deviates towards the worse except through force or ignorance, and neither of these befalls a mind that is pure and free. It cannot be exactly the same, for then it strives in vain, because it accomplishes nothing and nothing strives for what it already has. Therefore mind is trying to improve itself. It follows then that it is not itself the good. For the good cannot improve. In understanding, the mind drinks deep of goodness, but it drinks from a source other than itself. For were it to have this source within, it would not need to strive for it in order to accomplish its activity. The source from which it quaffs goodness is the good itself, which exists above it, since it can pour down the liquor of its perfection into the mind. We seek wisdom and mind only through the impulse of reason, but we seek the good even before any incitement of the reason. Our every appetite is always for the good, not always for mind. We desire understanding for the sake of the good and not vice versa. Nature then values the good more highly than mind, since it draws us towards the good earlier, more frequently and more strongly. Wherefore some people suppose they have advanced sufficiently far in philosophy if they appear to have wisdom, even though they do not have it. But they do not suppose this of life, unless they truly possess what they judge to be chiefly the good for themselves.

If the good by natural instinct is regarded as more precious than mind, it is regarded as more eminent. Hence to understand in and of itself is not enough for us, unless we understand correctly and understand the good. For often we reject knowledge for a while, if we suspect it will be bad for us and injurious. But we 9

boni, cum bonum ipsum nullus possit nolle. Nihil magis voluntarium est quam boni incitamentum, nam propter bonum omnia, immo bonum in omnibus ubique volumus tam libenter tamque iucunde, ut velimus insuper non posse nolle. Cum ergo in bono summa necessitas cum summa libertate concurrat, bonique imperium summopere necessarium sit subiectis et summopere voluntarium, constat hinc omnia tamquam a patre originem ducere atque huc omnia tamquam ad patriam aspirare.

can never refuse the good. Often too we choose pleasure before the contemplation of things. But we can never choose anything in preference to the good for the reason it is good. Nothing is more a necessity than the inducement of the good, since no one is able not to wish for the good. [Yet] nothing is more voluntary than the inducement of the good, for we wish for all things on account of the good; or rather we wish for the good everywhere in all things so freely and so joyfully that we also wish to be incapable of not wishing it. Thus, since in the good the highest necessity coincides with the highest freedom, and the sovereignty of the good is both entirely a necessity for its subjects and entirely a matter of free will, it is agreed that all things take their origin from it as from their father, and that all things aspire to it as to their fatherland.

LIBER SECUNDUS[1]

: I :

Unitas, veritas, bonitas idem sunt et super ea nihil est.

1 Tribus iam argumentis ostendimus esse aliquid super angelum. Primo quidem esse monstravimus super ipsum simplicissimam unitatem, secundo veritatem, tertio bonitatem. Tria haec unum sunt. Nihil enim aliud est summa unitas quam summa simplicitas. Propter hanc unitatis simplicitatem res quaelibet pura veraque est. Verum quippe vinum est quod purum est vinum. Sic veritas rerum in simplici illa unitate consistit. Atque propter eandem simplicem puramque unitatem res quaelibet sunt bonae. Quodlibet enim tunc se habet bene, quando sibi ipsi atque principio suo unitum est purumque manet, neque rebus deterioribus commiscetur. Ac si in rebus circa idem consistit unitas rerum veritasque et bonitas, merito super ipsas idem est primum ipsum unum verumque et bonum.

2 Quod in iis sit rerum[2] principium, illud argumento est, quod horum vestigia in cunctis reperiuntur, quasi ab his cuncta manaverint et omnia haec cupiunt, utpote quae suum principium repetunt. Singula enim unitatis, veritatis, bonitatis et participia sunt et avida. Super unitatem nihil est aliud, quia nihil est unitate potentius, quandoquidem unio perfectionem cunctis praestat atque potentiam. Verum super eam si vis sit aliquid, duo statim sequentur absurda. Si enim unitas sub aliquo est superiore principio, certe superioris ipsius[3] fit particeps. Inferiora enim a superioribus causis semper aliquid capiunt. Sic non erit haec unitas ipsa, sed aliquid ex unitate quadam et vi superne accepta compositum, eritque multitudo quaedam, non unitas. Ac etiam quod unitati praeponitur,

BOOK II

: I :

Unity, truth and goodness are the same thing, and above them there is nothing.

We have now given three proofs that something exists above angel. 1
We have showed that above it there is unity first in its utmost simplicity, second truth, third goodness. These three are one. For the highest unity is nothing other than the highest simplicity. Because of unity's simplicity, any one thing is pure and true (a true wine for instance is what is a pure wine); so the truth of things consists in this simple unity. And because of this same pure and simple unity, various things are good. For something has well being when it is united to itself and to its principle and remains pure and is not mingled with inferior things. But if the inner unity, truth and goodness in things depends on what is the same, assuredly above things the first one, true and good itself is the same.

That the universal principle dwells in unity, truth and goodness 2
is proved by the fact that their traces are found in all things, as though everything emanated from them, and that all things desire them, inasmuch as they are seeking their principle again. For individual entities participate in, and hunger for, unity, truth and goodness. Above unity nothing else exists, for nothing is more powerful than unity, since union gives everything perfection and power. Indeed, if you wanted something to be above unity, two absurdities would instantly follow. If unity were subject to some higher principle, it would surely participate in this higher principle. For inferior things always receive something from superior causes. Thus it would not be unity itself, but something compounded of a unity and a force received from on high; it would be

nullius erit particeps unitatis. Nam superius principium ab inferiori quoad naturam suam suscipit nihil. Igitur erit aut nihil aut multitudo omni penitus unione privata, cuius nulla pars unum aliquid erit. Neque tota multitudo erit una, neque ulla inerit communio partibus vel ad se invicem vel ad totum.

3 Rursus super veritatem est nihil. Nam simili ratione haec non esset veritas ipsa, sed verum aliquid ex veritate quadam et superioris illius portione compositum. Et illud quod super eam locatur, cum neque sit veritas nec particeps veritatis, falsum est penitus atque nihil. Neque esse potest veritate praestantius, nisi per veritatis vim verum procul dubio sit illud esse praestantius.

4 Similiter super bonitatem non est aliquid. Nam et haec non pura esset bonitas, sed bonum aliquid ac bonitas quaedam commixtione alterius inquinata. Et illud quod bonitati praeponitur, penitus erit malum. Non enim bonum erit, cum sit ultra terminos bonitatis. Neque melius bonitate, cum nihil, nisi per maiorem bonitatis portionem, sit melius. Quomodo autem malum excedat bonitatem non video, cum excessus atque imperium ad bonitatem pertineant. Sunt enim appetibilia tamquam bona. Ergo malum per naturam bonitatis superabit bonitatem et bonitas malo vim praestabit imperii. Praeterea, si est aliud rerum principium super ipsam bonitatem, ipsum certe aliquod ex se munus rebus impertiet, sicut omnis causa solet. Porro, bonitas ipsa munus suum impertit omnibus, id est, unicuique aliquam bonitatem. Quaerimus autem de illo munere quod a superiore descendit principio, utrum sit bonitate donata melius, necne. Melius quidem esse nequit. Quicquid enim melius dicitur, maiori bonitatis portione melius appellatur. Tamen absurdum est superioris principii munus non esse melius inferioris causae munere. Accedit quod cum omnia bonum appetant, si sit aliud principium super ipsum bonum, interrogamus

a plurality, not [a] unity. Next, what is made to precede unity will not participate in any unity. For a superior principle of its own nature receives nothing from an inferior. Therefore it will be either nothing or a plurality utterly robbed of all union. None of its parts will be one something, nor will the plurality as a whole be one, nor will any communion inhere in the parts with regard either to themselves or to the whole.

There is nothing above truth. For, by a similar argument, truth 3 would not be truth itself, but something true compounded from a truth and a portion of that higher something. And that which is placed above truth, since it is neither the truth nor a participant of truth, is utterly false, is nothing. But it cannot be more outstanding than truth, unless, through the power of truth, it is true beyond a doubt that it is more outstanding.

Similarly, there is no something above goodness. For this would 4 not be pure goodness but something good; it would be a goodness adulterated with the mixture of something else. And what is set before goodness would be completely bad. For it would not be good, since it would be beyond the limits of goodness. Nor would it be better than goodness, since nothing can be better except by way of a greater portion of goodness. And I fail to understand how the bad can exceed goodness, when overflowing power[1] and sway pertain to goodness, being desirable as goods. So the bad, through the nature of goodness, would rule over goodness, and goodness would be surrendering the power of rule to the bad. Moreover, if another universal principle above goodness existed, it would certainly bestow something on things from itself, as does every cause. Indeed, goodness does bestow its gift on all, that is, gives a particular goodness to each thing. But, we ask, is this gift, which descends from the higher principle, better than the goodness given to things or not? It cannot be better; for what is said to be better is called better because it has a larger portion of goodness. Yet to have the gift of a higher principle not be better than

utrum ipsum appetant an non. Si appetere dicantur, sequitur quod aliquid expetunt ultra et plus quam bonum. Si negentur illud expetere, stultum id quidem dictum, quod effectus causam primam qua servantur non appetant. Quin etiam ipsa bonitas superius principium cupere compelletur, licet absurdum id sit. Nam omnis ratio appetendi ipsa clauditur bonitate. Nihil igitur super bonitatem extat, quod amari queat. Nullum ergo est principium super ipsam. Quamobrem ipsa unitas, veritas, bonitas, quam invenimus super angelum, ex mente Platonis omnium est principium, deus unus verusque et bonus.

: II :

Non sunt dii plures inter se aequales.

1 Profecto dii plures non sunt, quia nequeunt plura esse principia. Verum sint, si placet, dii gemini, duo scilicet totius mundi principia, hoc et illud. Quaerimus numquid hoc sub illo sit, an sub hoc illud, an aequalia utraque? Si alterutrum sub altero sit, quod praeerit plane erit principium, alterum minime. Si aequalia sunt, interrogamus utrum omnino inter se differant, an omnino conveniant, an partim differant, partim vero conveniant? Primum non concedetur, nam saltem in eo conveniunt, quod utraque sunt aguntque et rerum principia aeque dicuntur. Ac si nullo pacto congruerent, nulla esset in machina mundi concordia. Si secundum illud admittimus, quod omnino conveniant, non duo sunt iam sed, ut cupimus, unum. Sin detur tertium, quod partim congruant in natura, partim discrepent, tunc sane, quia nequeunt per idem

the gift of a lower cause is absurd. Moreover, given that all things desire the good, if another principle exists above the good, we should ask whether they do or do not desire it. If they are said to desire it, it follows that they seek something beyond and greater than the good. If we deny they desire it, we would be saying—and this is folly—that effects do not desire the first cause by which they are preserved. Indeed, even goodness itself would be forced to seek a higher principle, although that is absurd; for every reason for desiring is embraced by goodness itself. Therefore nothing exists above goodness which can be loved. Therefore there is no principle above it. So the absolute unity, truth, and goodness we find above angel constitute, as Plato believed, the universal principle. It is the one, true, and good God.

: II :

There is no plurality of gods equal to each other.

Obviously no plurality of gods exists; for there cannot be a plurality of [first] principles. Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that there are twin gods, that is, two principles of the whole world, A and B. Is B subordinate to A, or A to B? Or are both equal? If either one is subordinate to the other, the dominant one is clearly the principle, the other not. If they are equal, we should ask whether they are entirely different from each other, or entirely similar, or partly different, partly similar. The first option is inadmissible, because they are similar at least in that they both exist and act and are described alike as universal principles. Were there no point of agreement at all between them, no harmony would inhere in the world machine. If we grant the second option, namely that they are entirely similar, then two do not now exist but one 1

consentire et dissentire, una quaedam inest natura communis utrisque, per quam conveniunt; duae praeterea in duobus illis naturae propriae ultra communem naturam, per quas discrepant. Ergo neutrum illorum erit simplex, sed utrumque ex communi natura et proprietate compositum; neutrum erit primum, quia pendet ex illo qui partes inter se diversas conciliavit in unum; neutrum per se sufficiens, cum et totum egeat partibus et alia pars egeat alia; neutrum potentissimum, cum non sit prorsus unitum.

2 Atqui illa natura communis per quam utrisque aequalem utraque habent hoc, ut sint aeque principia, principium erit potius quam illa duo. Immo illud erit principium, quod illis inter se diversis naturam dedit communem. Nam una haec natura quae in aliis iacet et aliorum angustiis circumscribitur, ab ipsa profluit unitate quae, in seipsa consistens, nullo limite coarctatur. Sic ergo natura illa communis et una utrisque provenit aliunde et ab altiori principio.

3 Quin etiam naturae illae duae propriae per quas differunt extrinsecus illis adveniunt. Nam praeter illas nihil reliquum est in utrisque, nisi natura communis et una, a qua, si absolutae[4] nascantur, naturae illae propriae quae duae adiiciuntur, non amplius erunt diversae, ut metaphysici arbitrantur, sed una eademque erit utrisque[5] proprietas, eadem vena scaturiens. Scaturiet enim per absolutum merae naturae modum et refluet intro. Si itaque duae illis insunt absolutae proprietates, necessario accedunt extrinsecus. Quapropter utrumque essentiae suae proprietatem accipit aliunde,

(which is what we want). But if we grant the third option, namely that they could be partly alike, partly unlike in nature, then, since they could not both agree and differ on account of the same principle, they would possess a common nature through which they agree, and two peculiar natures, moreover, in the two of them, over and beyond the common nature, through which they disagree. Therefore neither A nor B would be simple, but each would be compounded from the common nature and the peculiar property. Neither would be first, because they would depend on that which has united their mutually different parts into one. Neither would be self-sufficient, since the whole needs its parts, and one part needs the other. Neither would be all-powerful, because neither is completely united.

That common nature, which A and B each possess in like measure and by virtue of which both of them equally are principles, will be the principle rather than the two of them. Or rather, what gives the common nature to these mutually different principles will be the principle. For this one nature, which lies at ease in some and is cramped within the bounds of others, flows from that unity which depends upon itself and is confined by no limit. That one common nature, therefore, comes to both A and B from elsewhere and comes from a higher principle. 2

Nay, even those two peculiar natures, through which A and B differ, come to them from outside. For except for these two peculiar natures nothing is left in A and B but the one common nature, from which, if they are born perfect, the peculiar natures which are added to A and B will no longer be different, as the metaphysicians suppose.[2] Rather, they will be one and the same property in both A and B, the same vein gushing forth. For the same property will gush out and flow back in accordance with the perfect manner of [its] pure nature. Thus if two perfect properties are present in A and B, they necessarily come from outside. Wherefore each accepts its essence's property from elsewhere, and because each is al- 3 et quia propriam sui naturam aliunde sortitur utrumque, neutrum per se existit, sed fit a principio altiore.

4 In quolibet rerum genere illud quod est generis illius summum, unum est dumtaxat. Si enim sunt duae summae luces, utraque, in eo quod summa lux est, convenit atque est unum. Quod si etiam duo quaedam sunt, per aliam naturam potius quam per lucem differunt. Ergo alia insuper adest natura a luce diversa, cuius contagione lux fiat opaca, neque sit summa. Sic et[6] summus calor est qui frigori aut aliis non miscetur, quia si miscetur, utique impeditur, et vehementior fieri potest, si modo purgetur. Itaque summum in quovis genere et unum est solummodo et unius dumtaxat illius naturae. Puta summa lux et una est, non duae luces, et sola lux est, non lux simul et aliud quiddam. Deus summum est rerum omnium. Unus ergo est deus et simplex: nempe una summa unitas, una summa veritas atque bonitas, deus unus.

5 Unus inquam apud Platonicos triplici ratione. Primo, quia summa est unitas. Nam si quodlibet summum est unicum, quid magis unicum est quam summa unitas? Propria quaelibet rerum innumerabilium multitudo ad propriam redigitur unitatem: multitudo innumerabilium hominum ad unam humanam speciem, equorum ad unam equinam, similiter aliorum. Accipe deinde omnes proprias unitates, quae certo sunt numero terminatae, id est rerum species, easque ad unam communem collige unitatem, scilicet deum, principem specierum, ut sicut multitudines singularium infinitae ad finitas unitates specierum, sic unitates specierum finitae ad unicam super species unitatem referantur. Par est ut sicut proprius quisque rerum ordo ad proprium sui principium unum dirigitur, sic universus ordo rerum ad unum referatur universale principium, et sicut singulae materiae ad materiam unam, omnia membra mundi ad unum corpus, sic omnes mundi naturae

lotted its own nature from elsewhere, neither exists through itself but is made by a higher principle.

In any natural genus what is the highest of that genus is solely one. If two highest lights exist, each, in that it is the highest light, unites [with the other] and one thing results. But if two things still exist, they differ by way of another nature rather than by way of the light. Therefore another nature is also present which is different from the light and by whose contagion the light becomes murky and is not the highest. So too the highest heat is that which is not mixed with cold or anything else. For were it mixed, it would be prevented [from being the highest heat]. It would have the capacity to become more and more fierce only if it were purged. Therefore the highest in any genus is one alone and of that genus' one nature alone. Take the highest light: it is one light, not two, and it is only light, not light together with something else. Now God is the highest of all things. Therefore God is one and simple: indeed, God is the one highest unity, the one highest truth and goodness, one God. 4

For the Platonists, God is one for three reasons. Firstly because He is highest unity. For if whatever is highest is one of its kind, what could be more one of its kind than highest unity? Each particular plurality of innumerable objects is brought back to its own unity: the plurality of human beings to a single human species, that of horses to the one equine species, and so on. Take all these particular unities, which are bound by a certain number, that is, take the species of things, and collect them into one common unity, namely God, the lord of species, in order that, just as infinite pluralities of individual entities may be brought back to the finite unities of their species, so the finite unities of the species may be brought back to the unique unity above species. It is appropriate that, just as each particular order of things is led back to its own one principle, so the universal order of things may be led back to the one universal principle. And just as individual materi- 5 ad naturam unam, omnes mundi vitae ad unam vitam, omnes motus ad unum motum, omnes motores ad unum mundi motorem.

6 Porro, quando plura quaedam et inter se secundum naturam diversa ordine quodam uno mutuoque conspirant, necessarium est ut ordo huiusmodi in illis sit propter ordinem quem ad unum aliquid habeant, qualis est ordo partium exercitus invicem, qui[7] est propter ordinem totius exercitus ad ducem unum. Nam quod aliqua, quae diversa inter se sunt, nanciscantur hoc, ut communione mutua uniantur, non provenit ex propriis eorum naturis, per quas sunt diversa; nam ex iis[8] potius disiunguntur. Neque etiam provenit ex diversis quibusdam ordinatoribus; hi sane per naturas eorum discrepantes, prout discrepant, ad unum ordinem non incumbunt. Atque ita ordo ille plurium mutuus vel casu obtigit vel ab uno ac primo ordinatore est institutus ad unum finem omnia dirigente. Omnes vero partes mundi, quamvis diversae, ordine mutuo conciliantur, quia unum constituunt corpus, mutuant invicem naturas et mutuantur. Inferiora corpora per superiora moventur, superiora per naturam incorporalem. Neque casu contingit hic ordo, quia idem semper et similis est, quia similem semper retexit telam atque similiter. Deus igitur mundi unius ordinator est unus. Unus inquam prima Platonicorum ratione quia est unitas.

7 Est etiam unus secunda eorundem ratione quia est veritas. Summa enim veritas una est. Nam si duae summae veritates esse dicantur, aut una earum habet quicquid habet alter, aut non. Si primum datur, una est, non duae; si secundum, neutra est summa. Deest enim isti illud veritatis quod in illa est, et illi quod est in ista.

8 Iterum est unus deus tertia ratione Platonicorum quia summa

als are led back to one matter—all the world's members to one body—so all the world's natures should be led back to one nature, all the world's lives to one life, all [its] movements to one movement, all [its] movers to one mover.

Next, when several things that naturally differ from each other unite in one common order, necessarily such an order must exist among them on account of the order they possess with respect to one single thing. For instance, the order that exists between the parts of an army is the result of the order of the whole army in relation to the one leader. For the fact that things which differ one from another are able to be united in mutual communion does not arise from their own peculiar natures; for in these they differ, being disunited rather because of them. Nor does it arise from having various different agents impose order on them; for agents who differ in their natures, to the extent that they differ, do not incline towards one order. And so the order shared by many things either arises by chance, or it is imposed by one primary agent who directs everything towards a single end. Now all the parts of the world, however much they differ, are brought together in mutual order, because they make up one body and they borrow natures and are borrowed in turn. Lower bodies are moved by higher bodies, higher bodies by incorporeal nature. Nor does this order come about by chance, because it is always the same and alike, reweaving the like fabric in a like manner. God then is the single agent who gives order to the single universe. God is one, by the Platonists' first argument, because He is unity. 6

God is one, by the Platonists' second argument, because He is truth. The highest truth is one. For were there two highest truths, then either one of them has what the other has, or it does not. If the first, one truth exists, not two; if the second, neither truth is the highest. For one truth lacks the portion of truth in the other, and the other the portion of truth in the one. 7

God is one, by the Platonists' third argument, because He is 8 est bonitas. Summa quippe bonitas quicquid boni reperiri usquam potest complectitur. Ergo si duas induxeris bonitates summas, quicquid boni in una est, est et in altera, alioquin neutra esset summa, et secundum boni ipsius naturam unum sunt, non duo. Neque est aliquid aliud illis admixtum praeter bonitatis naturam quia summae non essent, sed inquinatae. Unum igitur sunt omnino.

9 Denique si dii duo sunt et uterque potest aeque mundum hunc totum efficere, aut neuter faciet mundum ac frustra erit in utroque potentia neque usquam mundus erit, aut alter creabit mundum ac frustra erit in altero potentia generandi, aut generabit uterque totum atque ita duo erunt mundi aequales omnino invicem et simillimi, quorum alter sufficiet, superfluus erit alter. Sin alter totum valet <conficere>,[9] alter vero solummodo partem, qui non valet totum conficere non est deus, et frustra generabit mundi partem quam alter simul cum toto fabricat mundo. Si autem uterque ad dimidiam mundi partem creandam vim habet, neuter cunctorum erit principium. Et quia illae partes in uno toto ad unum finem concurrunt communione naturae, oportebit binos illos deos ad deum unum referri superiorem, ut motus ad unum, qui fit per duos, ducatur ex communione duorum ab uno quodam superiore deducta.

10 Quod si quis asserat a diis geminis duos construi mundos omnino inter se diversos atque dissimiles, cogetur fateri tum deos illos, tum mundos nullo modo inter se convenire. Quo igitur pacto aut uterque illorum est atque est deus unus — vivit, intellegit, operatur — aut uterque istorum est mundus unus, opus et corporale? Itaque convenient mundi gemini invicem. At una natura in qua

the highest goodness. The highest goodness certainly embraces whatever good can be found anywhere. Were you to assume two highest goodnesses, whatever good is in the one would also be in the other (otherwise neither of them would be the highest), so that in terms of the nature of the good they would be one, not two. But nothing else but the nature of the good is mingled with them, or they would not be the highest goodnesses but rather impure goodnesses. So they are completely one.

Lastly, if two gods exist, and each of them is equally capable of bringing this whole universe into being, then neither of them will make the world (in which case the power to generate in both of them will be to no purpose, and the world will nowhere exist); or one of them will create the world (in which case the other's power to generate will be wasted); or both of them will create a whole world (in which case there will be two worlds utterly and mutually alike, only one of which would suffice, the other being superfluous). But if one of them is capable of making the whole world, and the other only part of it, then the one incapable of making the whole world is not God, and he will generate to no purpose the part of the world which the other god made at the same time he made the whole world. If each, however, has the power to create half of the world, neither of them is the universal principle. And since the parts in the one whole join together for one end in nature's harmony, the paired gods will have to be referred to one god who is higher, so that the motion produced by the two gods from their harmony — a harmony derived from some one higher god — may be reduced to one motion. 9

If you maintain that twin gods create two completely distinct and different worlds, you must accept that the two gods and the two worlds never accord in any way. How then does each of these gods exist and how is it one god — is alive, intelligent, and active — and how is each of these worlds one world, and a corporeal work? Therefore the twin worlds will be in mutual accord. But the one 10

conveniunt, ab uno tandem principio trahitur, non duobus. Rursus si dii ambo eundem semper finem appetent, aut alter erit ab altero, aut uterque ab uno superiore, aut saltem in una substantia ambo. Nisi enim ita congruerent, ad eundem finem minime conspirarent. Utcumque sit, unus solus est deus. Sin opus idem semper alter vult, alter non vult, sequitur opus illud et fieri simul et non fieri, esse atque non esse, si modo aeque valet huius dei velle atque illius nolle. Ille enim solus esset deus, cuius semper praevaleret affectus. At si modo consentiant invicem, modo dissentiant, et nunc huius, nunc illius conatus exsuperet, est uterque mutabilis. Neque assentiendum est Manichaeis Gnosticisque philosophis duos esse deos asseverantibus, quorum alter sit bonorum omnium auctor, alter vero malorum. Nam sicut deus, qui bonorum est auctor, summum[10] bonum est, mali totius expers, ita contrarius, summum malum, omni bono privatum. Hic igitur neque aget quicquam, neque cognoscet, neque vivet, neque erit omnino, siquidem esse, vivere, cognoscere bona expetendaque sunt.

: III :

Non sunt dii plures, alius super alium sine fine.

1 Ceterum concedet forsitan nobis aliquis esse quidem deum super angelum, et unum esse deum, ita ut non sint dii plures aequales invicem, esse tamen deum alium super alium sine fine. Hoc licet ar-

nature which harmonizes them is derived in the end from one principle, not from two. Again, if both gods were always to desire the same end, either one would come from the other or both would come from a higher one, or, at the least, share one substance. For if they did not have that much in common, they would not work for the same end. Either way, there is only one god. But if one god wants this same creation but the other does not, then this creation will both come into being and not come into being, exist and not exist, if the one god's yea is equally as strong as the other god's nay. For the god whose will always prevailed would be God alone. But if they were sometimes to agree with each other, and sometimes to disagree, and sometimes one were to have the upper hand, sometimes the other, then both of them would be subject to change. Nor should we agree with the Manichaean and Gnostic philosophers when they declare there are two gods, one the author of all good things, the other the author of all evils.[3] For just as God, who is the author of good things, is the highest good and totally without evil, so His opposite is the highest evil, deprived of all good. He will not be capable, therefore, of action or knowledge; will not be alive; will be entirely without existence. For existence, life, and understanding are all good and are coveted as goods.

: III :

No plurality of gods exists one above the other without end.

Granted, you may say, that there is a god above angel and that he is one, and thus that many equal gods cannot exist. Yet one god could still exist above another without end. Although I believe 1 bitremur ex superioribus confutatum, aliis tamen rationibus clarius refellemus.

2 Si dii sic innumerabiles sint, erunt rerum causae infinitae se gradatim innumere superantes, siquidem ipsi dii rerum causae sunt et innumere alii aliis praeponuntur. Si ita, erunt quoque effectus in mundo innumerabiles. Quaelibet enim causa suum aliquem in rerum ordine producit effectum, atque sicut causae se inter se superant, ita se superant et effectus. Igitur infiniti erunt effectus in descendendo, et innumere deficient sub se deinceps, si causae sint[11] infinitae innumere se superantes. Et cum superior causa semper longius virtutem suam in producendis effectibus iaciat quam inferior, in infinitum erit iactus effectuum,[12] si causarum fuerit infinitus ascensus.

3 Hoc quam absurdum sit, quis non viderit? Primo quidem, si non sit in rebus primum aliquid, non erunt sequentia ulla. Cuncta enim trahuntur a primo, quod quidem si nusquam extet, non erit unde effluxus rerum aliunde fluentium umquam exordiatur. Deinde videmus in rebus alias esse aliis perfectiores, perfectionisque virtutem ascendendo crescere, decrescere descendendo. Quo fit, ut vis naturalis rerum descendendo sensim debilitetur. Unde cogitur alicubi omnino deficere, postquam minuitur paulatim. Ideoque non potest res alia esse sine fine sub alia. Itaque non erunt effectus innumeri. Non erunt igitur innumerae causae, siquidem eo ipso, quod ascendendo crescit perfectio, perspicue constat illam quandoque ad summum venturam fore. Cur iudicamus animam corpore meliorem, nisi quia sit summae bonitati propinquior? Si nusquam esset bonitas summa, sed in infinitum de bono ascenderetur in bonum, per infinitum intervallum omnino distaret a summa bonitate corpus, per infinitum similiter anima. Infinitum alterum non est aut amplius aut angustius altero infinito. Neque erit usquam ratio mensuraque idealis, per quam alia aliis prae-

this position has been refuted by earlier arguments, additional proofs will disprove this more clearly.

Were there innumerable gods, the causes of things would be infinite, each more powerful than the other in numberless succession, since indeed these gods are the causes of things and are set one above the other in numberless succession. Were that so, there would also be an infinite number of effects in the world. For every cause produces its particular effect in the order of things; and as the causes differ in their power, so too do the effects. Thus infinite effects would descend, each one weaker than the one preceding it, in numberless succession, if the causes were infinite, each one excelling the other in numberless succession. Since a higher cause always projects its power to produce effects further than a lower cause, the projection of such effects would proceed to infinity if the ascent of causes were infinite. 2

Surely anyone can see this is absurd. To begin with, if there were no first thing in the world, there would be no consequents. For everything is derived from the first, and were this not to exist anywhere, the source of the issuing forth of things, flowing as they do one from another, would never get started. Secondly, we see in the world that some things are more perfect than others, and that the power of perfection increases as we ascend and diminishes as we descend. Hence the natural strength of things gradually weakens as we descend. Inevitably then, at some point in this gradual diminution, it disappears altogether. So it is not possible to have one thing below another in an infinite series. So there will not be endless effects. So there will not be endless causes, since, inasmuch as perfection increases as we ascend, it is clear that at some point perfection will attain its goal. Why do we consider soul better than body unless it is because it is closer to the highest goodness? If there were no highest goodness anywhere but an infinite ascent from good to good, then body would be an infinite distance from highest goodness, and soul would be similarly. One 3 ferantur. Quare nihilo vel propinquior vel convenientior esset[13] anima ipsi bonitati quam corpus, igitur neque melior; neque angelus melior anima.

4 Proinde quicquid fluit ab alio, natura sua fluitat, quoniam et secundum se nihil est et per fluxum quendam prodit in esse. Si non sit in rebus primum aliquid, res quaelibet emanabit ab alia; omnes igitur fluitabunt. Quapropter nusquam erit unitas, aequalitas, similitudo, status, ordo et restitutio. Nunc vero quia haec rebus insunt, oportet rerum ab alio manantium fluxum duci et cohiberi statu cardinis alicuius ab alio non manantis, perinde ut interminatum fluxum corporum liquidorum terminari necesse est, non alio corpore liquido similiter diffluente, sed corpore solido. Denique superior quilibet gradus in inferiorem aliquid operatur et a superiore[14] accipit aliquid. Si nullus sit gradus in rebus primus nullusque sit ultimus, quilibet gradus medius a gradibus infinitis superioribus dependebit, ac rursus gradus infinitos producet inferiores. Quapropter accipiet a superioribus perfectiones innumeras, cum accipiat a qualibet sui causa boni nonnihil; et infinita munera inferioribus exhibebit, cuique enim aliquid largietur. Quapropter erit immensae virtutis et perfectionum plenus infinitarum. Sic res omnes aeque erunt infinitae. Non erit res alia praestantior alia, non erit causa suo opere melior. Vel forte res quaelibet innumere finita erit, quia innumere ab antecedentibus excedetur. Rursus erit quaelibet infinita, quia sequentia innumerabilia superabit. Nec erit usquam ulla vera scientia, cum nequeant infinitae rerum causae comprehendi. Neque erit in universo quod appetitum mo-

infinite distance is neither greater nor smaller than another. And there would be no rational principle or ideal measure by which some things could be preferred to others. Soul then would be no closer to and have no more in common with goodness than body would; it would be no better than body, therefore, and angel would be no better than soul.

Whatever flows from something else is by nature in flux, for it does not exist on its own but comes into existence by way of a certain flux. If there were no first something in the world, everything would flow from something else, and so all would be in flux. Unity would nowhere exist, nor equality, similarity, stability, order or restoration. But since these do exist in things, the flux of things flowing out one from another must be led and kept in check through the stability of some axis which does not flow out from another. In the same way the interminable flux of liquid bodies must be terminated, not by another liquid body likewise flowing away, but by a solid body. Finally, any higher level does something to the lower, and in turn receives something from the level above it. If there were no first level in things and no last level, every intermediate level would depend on an infinite number of higher levels and in return produce an infinite number of lower. It would therefore receive an infinite number of perfections from the higher, since it receives from any of its causes something good; and it would bestow an infinite number of gifts on those below, for it would distribute something to each of them. So it would be full of measureless power and limitless perfections. Thus all things would be equally infinite. No one thing would be more outstanding than another, no cause would be better than its effect. Or perhaps anything would be infinitely finite, because it would be exceeded endlessly by its antecedents; or yet again, anything would be infinite, because it would rule over endless consequents. No true knowledge would exist anywhere, because one cannot understand infinite causes of things. Nothing would exist in the universe to 4 veat aut sistat, si non sit principium primum ultimusque finis. Huius enim virtute movetur appetitus omnis atque firmatur.

5 Unum igitur omnino sit rerum principium. Vocetur unitas, quia per excellentissimam simplicitatem supereminet omnia; veritas, quia producendo esse dat omnibus; bonitas, quia producta ad se revocando praestat et bene esse. Atque, ut tradit Ioannis Apostoli theologia, theologorum omnium divinissimi, quem platonicus Amelius libenter amplectitur, unitatem vocato principium, veritatem principii rationem, bonitatem denique principii rationalis amorem. Atque haec ipsa substantia, scilicet unitas vera bona, seu veritas una bona, sive bonitas una vera, sit unus bonus verusque deus. Sed quia unitas est, ideo sit veritas; quia unitas vera, ideo bonitas. In unitate implicat cuncta, explicat in veritate, effundit per bonitatem. Cuncta vero postquam inde fluxerunt, refluunt per bonitatem, reformantur per veritatem, restituuntur in unum per unitatem.

: IV :

Dei virtus est infinita.

1 Sicut in summa dispersione est imbecillitas infinita, sic in unitate summa infinita potestas. Actus natura sua terminum non includit. Nam subiici termino passio est, quae actui est opposita. Actus ergo non patitur terminum, nisi quantum subiecto cuidam, ubi aliquid passivae potentiae est, innititur. Actus vero divinus in seipso subsistit. Virtus ipsa efficax, quatenus virtus est, certum graduum numerum non includit. Quid enim prohibet in alio numero sicut in alio virtutem ipsam, ut virtus est, et cogitari et esse? Quapro-

excite or check the appetite, if there were no first principle and ultimate end, for every appetite is excited and fortified by its power.

Let us accept then that one universal principle exists. Let us call it unity, for in the perfection of its simplicity it towers over all. Let us call it truth, for in producing it gives existence to all. Let us call it goodness, for in recalling all things, having once created them, back to itself, it endows them with well-being. St. John was the most divine of all theologians (the Platonist Amelius gladly embraced him),[4] and his theology teaches us to call unity the principle, truth the reason of the principle, and goodness the love of the rational principle. And let this substance — unity that is true and good, truth that is one and good, goodness that is one and true — be the one, the good, the true God. Because He is unity, He is truth; because He is true unity, He is goodness. He enfolds all in unity, He unfolds all in truth, He pours forth all in goodness. After all things have issued from Him, they flow back again through goodness, are reformed through truth, are restored to oneness through unity. 5

: IV :

God's power is unlimited.

Just as extreme dispersion leads to infinite weakness, so in the highest unity dwells infinite power. Act by its very nature contains no limit, for to be subject to a limit is passion, which is the opposite of act. Therefore act is only subject to a limit to the extent that it depends on a substrate which possesses a degree of passive potentiality. The divine act, however, subsists in itself. The active power, insofar as it is power, is not itself confined to a fixed number of levels. For what prevents the power as power from being 1 pter non aliunde graduum accipit terminum, quam vel a passiva potentia cui miscetur vel a causa terminante. Divina vero virtus pura est atque summa.

2 Esse ipsum, prout absolute consideratur, est immensum, quia et infinitis rebus et innumerabilibus modis communicari potest et cogitari. Igitur si alicuius esse sit finitum, oportet illud esse finiri vel per ipsius causam vel subiectum. Neutrum contingit deo. In ipso autem infinito esse ita est infinita virtus, sicut in esse finito, finita. In ipso puro nihilo nullus essendi est habitus, sive verus sive imaginarius. Quis enim sub essendi ratione definiat nihilum? Ergo in ipso esse puro nihil est vel privationis essendi vel potentiae ad non essendum, aut vera aut imaginaria ratione. Igitur neque potest vel cogi vel cogitari non esse quod ad eius spectat aeternitatem, neque potest deesse illi virtutis gradus ullus qui mente queat effingi: alioquin mens, quae dei effectus est, ultra deum sese posset extendere, quae quolibet finito graduum numero valet semper ampliorem aliquem cogitare. Immo etiam frustra ad infinitam progressionem esset mens ordinata, nisi inveniretur terminus aliquis infinitus. Et quia nihil veri bonique veritati ipsi deest et bonitati, omnes in ea gradus insunt quotcumque et intellegi tamquam veri possunt et appeti tamquam boni. Tales sunt gradus innumerabiles.

3 Omne agens tanto est validius, quanto remotiorem ab actu potentiam patiendi producit in actum: maiore siquidem virtute opus est ad aquam calefaciendam quam ad aerem. Sed illud, quod omnino non est, infinite distat ab actu, nec ullam ad esse ipsius actum suscipiendum habet potentiam, de quo planius in sequentibus disseremus. Sive igitur deus aliquid creat nuper ex nihilo, sive continue materiam primam corporum atque essentiam mentium animorumque ex nullo antiquiore subiecto edit et servat semper ab

thought about or from existing on one level as on another? Therefore it accepts no limit as to its levels except from the passive potentiality into which it is mixed, or from a limiting cause. But the divine power is unmixed and is the highest power.

Being itself, considered absolutely, is unmeasurable, because it can be communicated to an infinite number of things and be thought about in innumerable ways. So if the being of anything is finite, it must either be limited by its cause or by its substrate. Neither of these conditions applies to God. In infinite being is infinite power just as in finite being is finite power.[5] In pure nothingness there is no habit [or condition] of being of any sort, true or imaginary. For who can define nothingness by reason of being? It follows that in pure being there is no privation of being, no potentiality for not-being, whether truly or in the imagination. Therefore what pertains to His eternity cannot be compelled or thought not to be; nor can any degree of power which the mind can conceive be wanting to it. Otherwise mind, which is the effect of [i.e., is caused by] God, would be able to extend itself beyond God, the mind which can always think of a further degree in a finite scale of degrees. Or rather, the mind would be disposed in vain for infinite progression unless it found some infinite limit. Given that truth and goodness lack no part of the true and the good, all those degrees, however many, are present to them, degrees that can be understood as true or desired as good. Such degrees are numberless. 2

The further a passive potentiality is from act, the stronger every agent who brings it into act. For instance, one needs a greater power to heat water than to heat air. But what is totally non-existent is infinitely distant from act and has no potentiality for receiving the act of existence. We shall discuss this later in more detail. Whether God created something out of nothing a little while ago, therefore, or whether He continuously produces the prime matter of bodies and the essence of minds and souls using no pre-existent 3 actu primo, id est divino, pendentem, procul dubio immensam possidet agendi virtutem.

4 Quid plura? Motus ordoque tam aequalis per tot saecula huius tam ingentis tam multiplicis machinae docet infatigabilem esse ideoque infinitam in gubernatore potentiam. Finita namque potentia, tempore infinito, immo etiam longo quamvis finito, fatigatur et claudicat. Ab infinita igitur potentia dei intellectus omnes accipiunt ut semper firmiterque intellegant; animae ut sine fine discurrere valeant; materia ut interminatam habeat potentiam capiendi; motus tempusque ut absque termino fluere possint; generatio quoque rerum, sicut placet physicis, ut alterna et interminabili successione queat continuari. Actionem enim motionemque infinitam ab infinita putant virtute originem ducere, et quaecumque vel potentia vel quomodocumque aliter quodammodo infinita dicuntur esse, per summam actuque existentem infinitatem talia esse atque iudicari. Hinc divina natura ab Orpheo ἀτελής τε τελευτή, id est 'infinitus finis', cognominatur.

: V :

Deus est semper.

1 Si res quaelibet tanto est diuturnior, quanto virtus, per quam permanet servaturque, potentior est, deus per infinitam virtutem suam in infinitum et ipse permanet et cetera servat. Item, divina veritas omne rerum antecedit initium, omni rerum fini succedit. Nam et ante cuiusque initium, verum erat initium illud fore, et post omnem cuiusque finem, verum erit finem illum fuisse. Quicquid autem aliquando verum est, est veritate verum. Si autem veri-

substrate, and keeps them in existence ever dependent on the prime act, that is, His act divine, He undoubtedly possesses an unlimited power of action.[6]

In short, the movement and the order of this vast complex machine, so regular over so many centuries, demonstrate that the power of its governor is inexhaustible and therefore infinite. For finite power over the course of infinite time, or even over a long period of finite time, becomes tired and halting. It is from God's infinite power that all intellects therefore receive the ability to understand always and with certainty; that souls receive the ability to think discursively without end; that matter has its unlimited potentiality for receiving; that movement and time can flow on without limit; that even the generation of things can continue in its endless alternating succession, as the natural philosophers suppose. For they think that action and infinite motion derive from infinite power, and that anything said to be infinite, whether potentially or in any other way, is so, and is adjudged so, because of that highest infinity which exists in act. Hence the divine nature is called by Orpheus "the infinite end."[7] 4

: V :

God is everlasting.

The stronger the power by which anything endures and is preserved, the longer that thing lasts. If this is so, then God by His infinite power endures Himself and preserves all other things to infinity. Divine truth precedes every beginning of things and succeeds their every end. For it was true before each's beginning that there would be a beginning; and it will be true after each's ending that there was an ending. But whatever is true at any time is true 1

tas ipsa incepisse dicatur aliquando, longe antea per eandem veritatem verum fuerat veritatem illam aliquando incepturam. Ac si desinere fingatur, adhuc postea per eandem veritatem verum erit veritatem illam desivisse. Veritas igitur neque incipere umquam neque desinere cogitari potest. Rursum, si deus super motum tempusque existit omnino, temporalem mutationem a priore in posterius secundum esse atque non esse non suscipit. Accedit quod si deus est summa essendi necessitas, quod in sequentibus ostendemus, numquam potuit poteritve non esse. Denique si quicquid aliquando nascitur, ab aliquo fit priore, et quicquid resolvitur, in aliquid quod antiquius est resolvitur. Non potest incepisse aut desinere quod est primum.

2 Cogitamus saepenumero mente durationem quandam simplicem absque principio atque fine appellamusque eam, ut ita loquar, sempiternitatem. Quae quidem ipse est deus, etiam si minime discernamus. Omnis enim simplex infinitas deus ipse est. Discernere autem tunc prohibet phantasia, quae mox sempiternitatem ipsam simplicem atque consistentem fluxu quodam multiplici induit et confundit. Itaque fallit nos nimirum, dum ad accidentalem temporis fluxum trahit quod est substantialis status aeternitatis. Atque ita impellit, ut quod deus est, tempus esse putemus. Deus ergo aeternus tunc se nobis offert, sed tempore involutus.

3 Nemo vero dubitare debet deum semper esse, quando deus est 'ipsum semper', immo sempiternitas ipsa est ipse deus. Et quae sempiterna dicuntur, illa sunt proprie quae deus propagat per seipsum et in seipsum.

because of truth. But if the truth is said to have begun at a certain time, then long before, because of the same truth, it was true that that truth would begin at a certain time. And if we suppose it comes to an end, even after that, because of the same truth, it will be true that that truth has come to an end. For one cannot think of truth as ever beginning or ending. Again, if God exists totally beyond movement and time, then He does not sustain change within time and mutate with regard to being and not-being from an earlier to a later state. If God is absolutely necessary being, as I shall demonstrate below, He could never have not been and He could never not be. Finally, if something is born at some time, it comes from something prior; and whatever dissolves, dissolves into something older. What is first cannot have begun and cannot end.

We often mentally conceive of a simple duration without beginning or end, and we call it, as it were, sempiternity. This is God Himself even if we do not realize it. For every simple infinity is God Himself. But the phantasy prevents us from perceiving this, for it straightway takes this simple unchanging sempiternity and endows and confounds it with flux and plurality. And so it completely deceives us when it drags what is the substantial stability of eternity down into the accidental flux of time, and thus forces us to think that what God is is time. So eternal God reveals Himself to us then but only wrapped up in time. 2

No one should doubt that God always is when God is "always Himself"; or rather, when sempiternity itself is God Himself. The things which are called sempiternal are properly those which God has propagated through Himself and in Himself. 3

: VI :

Deus est ubique.

1 Ex superioribus probare possumus ubique esse deum. Quemadmodum corpus tangit illud in quo est per quantitatis dimensiones, ita incorporea substantia per virtutem. Quamobrem sicut, si esset in natura dimensio aliqua corporis infinita, esset ubique, ita, postquam est aliqua immensa incorporalis substantiae virtus, necessario haec est ubique. Et quemadmodum particularis causa particulari effectui adest, ceu ignis ignito ligno, ita universalis universali. Ubicumque igitur reperitur vel cogitatur esse quod est universalis effectus, ibidem est et deus qui universalis est causa. Ubicumque est opus aliquod quod per certam causam solam et sine medio fieri necessarium est, ibidem eius causa debet esse. Est autem ubique aliquid quod per solum deum modo quodam creationis potest subsistere. Id vero est materia prima in corporibus, essentia in spiritibus.

2 Appetibile est tamquam bonum ubique simul adesse, ferme non minus quam semper esse. Primo autem bono nihil deest boni. Non prohibetur deus ab aliquo penetrare per omnia; infinitae enim puritati virtutique resistit nihil. Non patitur natura dei circa se loci terminum, sicut non patitur in se terminum dignitatis, quia si summa ipsa infinitas nihil finiti patitur, fit ut deus ita non habeat finitam praesentiam spatii, sicuti non habet vim, actionem durationemque finitam. Nec putandum est ipsum bonum minus toti adesse mundo, quam toti corpori animam. Minus enim est mundus ad deum quam corpus ad animam, magisque eget deo mundus quam corpus anima. Bonum latius est quam vita, quia pluribus convenit; magis quoque necessarium[15] mundo quam vita. Vita enim sublata cessaret mundus moveri; sublato bono esse desi-

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: VI :

God is omnipresent.

We can prove from what has been said already that God is omnipresent. Just as a body has an impact on its context because of its quantitative dimensions, so an incorporeal substance has an impact because of its power. Wherefore, just as some infinite dimension of body if it existed in nature would be everywhere, so a measureless power of incorporeal substance, since it does exist, necessarily exists everywhere. And just as a particular cause is present in a particular effect, fire for instance in an ignited log, so a universal cause is present in a universal effect. So wherever one discovers or conceives of what is a universal effect, there God is present who is the universal cause. And wherever there is a product which necessarily comes into being through one specific cause and without an intermediary, there God must be the cause of it. But something is everywhere which through God alone can subsist by way of creation of sorts. That something is prime matter in bodies and essence in spirits. 1

To be everywhere present at the same time is desirable as a good, no less good, almost, than being always. But the prime good lacks nothing good. Nothing prevents God from penetrating everything; for nothing resists infinite purity and power. God's nature sustains with regard to itself no limit of place, just as it sustains in itself no limit of rank. For if the highest infinity sustains nothing finite, then God has no finite spatial presence, just as He has no finite power, action or duration. One cannot imagine that the good is less present to all the world than soul to all the body. The world is smaller in proportion to God than body to soul; and the world needs God more than the body needs soul. For the good is more diffused than life because it accords with more things; it is 2

neret. Si ergo in uno mundi corpore vivente una quaedam vita ubique est, quod alias ostendemus, multo magis unum ipsum bonum est ubique, etiam extra mundum.

3 Si primum patiens, quod est materia, et essentia per omnia propagatur, multo amplius per omnia et ultra omnia sese propagat primum agens, quod est deus. Non decet mentis machinationem ulterius quam boni praesentiam progredi; illa vero progreditur per immensum. Ac decere Platonici putant infinitum bonum per immensum exuberando ita sese integrum fundere, ut nullam vel imaginariam immensi particulam, sive in mundo sit sive cogitetur extra mundum, relinquat sua praesentia destitutam. Quippe si natura boni est seipsum amplificare, infinitum bonum amplificat infinite seipsum.

4 Difficile reperitur ubi sit deus, quia nusquam est quod nullius vel subiecti vel loci limite cohibetur. Difficilius reperitur ubi non sit, quia in omnibus est illud in quo sunt, per quod fiunt, per quod servantur quaelibet 'ubique'. Deus ideo est in omnibus, quia omnia in eo sunt. Quae nisi essent in eo, essent nusquam et omnino non essent. Per deum hoc ipsum 'ubi' est diciturque 'ubique'. Per deum tamquam ducem et tamquam lucem agit et quaerit, quodcumque agit; quisque et quaerit 'alicubi'. Non desideratur usquam nisi bonum, non reperitur usquam nisi verum. Deus est omne bonum, deus est omne verum. Adde quod deus amplitudo et plenitudo ipsa est. Non video igitur cur non amplificet per cuncta seipsum et singula impleat. Si visibile lumen, quod alicuius est et in aliquo atque finitum, per totum dilatare se mundum potest, certe lumen invisibile, quod sui ipsius et in se ipso infinitum est, per mundum se amplificat et extra mundum. Lux enim finita, sicut ab infinita nanciscitur ut luceat et ut plurimum luceat, ita ut latissime luceat. Si absente ad brevissimum tempus sive per eclipsim sive per

also more necessary to the world than life. Without life, the world would cease to be moved; without the good it would cease to exist. If a single life is omnipresent, therefore, in the one living body of the world (as I shall demonstrate elsewhere), *a fortiori* the one good is everywhere, even outside the world.

If matter, the prime patient, and essence are extended through all, then to a much greater degree does God, the prime agent, extend Himself through all and beyond all. It does not behoove the mind with all its scheming to advance further than the good's presence; but the mind does proceed through the measureless. What is appropriate, say the Platonists, is that the infinite good, brimming over with abundance, should pour itself whole through infinity, so that it leaves no single particle of infinity deprived of its presence, whether it be real or imaginary, whether it is in the world or imagined outside the world. If in fact the nature of the good is to multiply itself, infinite good will multiply itself infinitely. 3

It is difficult to find where God is. For what is confined by the limit of no substrate or location is nowhere. It is even more difficult to find where God is not. For present in all things is that in which things everywhere exist, by which they are made, through which they are preserved. God is in all things, therefore, because all things are in Him. If they were not in Him, they would be nowhere and completely non-existent. Through God "where" itself exists and is said to be "everywhere." Through God as the lord and the light, whatever acts, acts and seeks; and each seeks "somewhere." Nothing is ever sought for but the good, nothing ever found but the true. God is every good, God is every truth. God is fullness and plenitude itself. I do not see, therefore, why He cannot multiply Himself through all things and fill each individual. If visible light, which is of something and in something and finite, can expand itself through the whole world, then the light invisible, which is infinite of itself and in itself, certainly multiplies itself 4

noctem solis lumine tam male se res habent, quam pessime se res, si deus ab eis semper absit, habituras esse putamus? Cur non potius, si absit per momentum id quod ipsum esse est, repente in nihilum ruituras? Sapienter Orpheus in *Saturni hymno* inquit:

> *ὃς ναίες κατὰ πάντα μέρη κόσμοιο γενάρχα*

id est: 'Qui omnes mundi partes habitas generationis princeps'.

5 Cogitamus saepe purissimam quandam capacitatem, quam nulli usquam limites capiant, quae capiat quaecumque possunt esse vel fingi. Quoniam vero pura ipsa infinitas nihil aliud est quam deus, quando illam cogitamus capacitatem, tunc deum ipsum excogitamus, etsi minus animadvertimus. Fallit enim mox suis nos praestigiis phantasia, subito pro divinis radiis adducens tractum aliquem linearum in longum, latum atque profundum, atque ita compellens dimensionem nobis aliquam vel inane videri quod divinum est lumen. Fallit nos iterum quando consideramus deum omnia prorsus implere; tunc enim illa persuadet eum in rebus quodammodo collocari. Sed revera ille sic ubique est, ut in eo sit illud quod 'ubique' appellatur, immo ut ipse sit 'ipsum ubique', quod capit seipsum et reliqua. Et quae praeter illud dicuntur ubique esse, ea sunt proprie quae illud per seipsum amplificat in seipso. Ratio dictat id quod 'ubique' nominatur, nihil esse aliud quam universam naturam rerum, eamque esse deum. Ideoque quando dicimus deum ubique esse, intellegi debere eum in seipso esse atque converso[16] nusquam praeterea abesse deum, si nusquam abest ipsum quod 'ubique' vocatur.

6 Phantasia vero cum putet naturam rerum esse solum hanc ma-

throughout the world and beyond. For finite light, just as it obtains from infinite light the power to light and to light intensely, so it obtains the power to light as far as possible. If it fares ill for things when the sun's light is absent for the shortest time, because of an eclipse or night, how much worse do we suppose it would be if God were always absent from them? Why wouldn't things rush headlong rather into non-existence, if that which is being itself were absent for a moment? Orpheus declares with wisdom in his *Hymn to Saturn*, "You who dwell in every part of the world, prince of generation."[8]

We often think of a capacity which is utterly pure, which no limits can ever contain but which itself can contain everything that is able to exist or be imagined. Since pure infinity is nothing other than God, when we think about that infinite capacity, it is God Himself we are thinking of, though we are not aware of it. Quickly our phantasy misleads us with its tricks, replacing the divine rays all of a sudden with a figure made up of lines of length, breadth and depth, and thus forcing what is the divine light to seem to us some sort of dimension or empty space. When we think that God completely fills all things, the phantasy deceives us again; for then it persuades us that in some sense He is located in things. But He truly is everywhere such that in Him exists what is called "everywhere"; or rather, such that He Himself is "the everywhere" which contains itself and everything else. And all those things, except for His everywhere, which are said to exist everywhere are properly those things which His everywhere multiplies in Himself through Himself. Reason dictates that what is called "everywhere" is nothing other than the universal nature of things, and that nature is God. So when we say that God is everywhere, it should be understood to mean that God is in Himself; and that nowhere, conversely, is God moreover absent, if what is called "everywhere" is nowhere absent. 5

Our phantasy, in supposing that the nature of things is this cor- 6 chinam corporalem, clamat id quod nominatur 'ubique' nihil aliud esse quam totam corporalium rerum extensionem, quam cum opinetur esse amplissimam, diffidit deum hanc omnem posse replere. Ratio contra reclamat corporalem machinam umbram quandam exilem et exiguam esse, quae innumerabiliter in parvas partes partiumque particulas dividatur habeatque parvitatem interminabilem, magnitudinem terminatam. Magnum autem revera asserit esse illud, in quo nihil est parvum, in quo, quicquid est, totum est magnumque aeque. Et sicut totum replicatur per omne quod est intus, sic explicatur totum per omne quod extra. Consistens itaque deus in se, existit ubique. Nec per mundum deus, sed mundus per deum, quatenus potest, extenditur. Et sicut vim divinam, quae infinita est, mundus assequitur modo finito, ita praesentiam eius, quae per immensum undique fulget, finito quodam situ consequitur. Non progreditur per rectam lineam mundus ut attingat deum, qui nusquam abest, sed convolvitur pro viribus circa illum, immo revolvitur in illo ibi dumtaxat, ubi divina lege situs ei motusque praescribitur.

7 Anebon et Abamon, Aegyptii sacerdotes, Plotinus quoque Iamblichusque et Iulianus Platonici non deum tantum, sed omnem quoque mentem, sive angelicam sive animalem, per immensum se integram fundere voluerunt, ita ut huiusmodi spiritus absque mutua confusione sibi invicem insint ubique, quemadmodum diversi habitus virtutum in anima et diversa simulacra colorum in aere. Quorum sententia his fundamentis innititur. Formae spiritu rationali inferiores, quia ex certis terminatisque materiis oriuntur, iisdem necessario cohibentur. Spiritus autem rationales quoniam nullo pacto pullulant ex materia, ideo neque in se certam habent dimensionem, neque dimensioni alicui alligantur. Quapropter cum aeque quamlibet spatii cuiuslibet partem respiciant, aut

poreal machine alone, exclaims that what is called "everywhere" is nothing other than the total extension of corporeal objects; and since it supposes this to be superlatively large, it doubts that God can fill it all. Reason retorts that the corporeal machine is a frail and insubstantial shadow which can be divided countless times into tiny parts and particles of parts and can possess indeterminable smallness but determined bigness. It asserts, however, that the truly big is that in which nothing is small and in which whatever there exists is equally whole and big. And just as the whole is unfolded through all that is within, so the whole is unfolded or extended through all that is without. Thus God, subsisting in Himself, exists everywhere. God is not extended through the world, but the world, insofar as it is able, is extended through God. Just as the world acquires the divine power, which is infinite, in a finite manner, so it comes into God's presence, which shines through all infinity, in a finite location. The world does not proceed in a straight line in order to reach God, who is nowhere absent, but revolves around Him as best it may; or rather, it revolves in Him, only, however, where the position and the movement is prescribed by divine law.

The Egyptian priests, Anebon and Abamon,[9] together with the Platonists Plotinus, Iamblichus and Julian,[10] claimed that not only God, but all mind as well, whether angelic or animal, extends itself whole through infinity. Consequently, such [rational] spirits are mutually present to themselves everywhere without mutual confusion, just as the different habits of virtues are in the soul and the different images of colors in the air. The Platonists' view rests on the following foundations. Forms inferior to rational spirit, because they arise from particular and determined portions of matter are necessarily confined to them. Rational spirits, because in no way do they stem from matter, possess no fixed dimension in themselves and are not bound to any dimension at all. Wherefore, since they can look to any part of any space equally, they are either 7 nusquam sunt, aut sunt in universo. Non est dicendum omnino nusquam adesse quae revera existunt. Nusquam igitur absunt.

8 Mens omnis aliquo modo aeterna est. Quod aeternum est, quamvis indivisible sit secundum tempus, tamen per omnem cursum temporis seipsum porrigit. Sic rursus, quamvis indivisibile sit secundum spatium, tamen per omne spatium dilatatur. Et sicut se habet tempus ad aeternitatem, ita temporale ad aeternum. At momenta temporis momentum aeternitatis reperiunt semper. Puncta igitur corporis temporalis punctum ubique spiritus aeterni reperiunt. Aeterna res, quemadmodum extra tempus est semper, ita extra locum esse videtur ubique. Quocumque momenta temporis fluunt, in punctum aeternitatis incurrunt. Quacumque trahitur linea, punctum attingit. Quacumque tenditur spatium, reperit rem aeternam.

9 Quid est potissimum quod potest ubique esse? Id certe cui non repugnat quantitatis dimensio. Quid rursus quod potest esse semper? Id maxime quod qualitatis actio non expugnat. Quoniam vero qualitas quantitate admodum efficacior est, quicquid non prohibente qualitate semper esse potest, multo magis potest non prohibente dimensione ubique esse. Localis motus, qui extrinsecus motus est, tanto in re qualibet perfectior apparet, quanto intrinseca rei natura est efficacior. Ideo propagare se per omnia, quod motum localem imitatur, exigit ut in re ipsa prius sit virtus ipsius perpetuo conservatrix, quae quidem intrinseca perfectio dicitur; et cui haec intrinseca perfectio competit, consequenter convenit extrinseca per universale spatium dilatatio. Praestantius est semper esse, quod est tamquam intrinsecum, quam ubique esse, quod tamquam extrinsecum est. Idcirco quod potest esse semper, multo magis ubique esse potest. Facilius est enim pigras dimensiones excedere, quam motionem qualitatis et temporis efficacem.

10 Mens tam sibi quam aliis prae ceteris significat naturam, consi-

nowhere or they are universally everywhere. We cannot say that whatever truly exists is present nowhere. So they are absent nowhere.

All mind is in some sense eternal. What is eternal, though indivisible in terms of time, extends itself across the whole course of time. So too, though it is indivisible in terms of space, yet it is spread out over the whole of space. And as time relates to eternity, so does the temporal relate to the eternal. But the moments of time always meet with the moment of eternity. So the points of a temporal body everywhere meet with the point of eternal spirit. The eternal, just as it is always outside time, so it seems to be everywhere outside place. Wherever the moments of time flow, they flow up against the point of eternity. In whatever direction a line is drawn, it meets the point. Wherever space extends, it encounters the eternal. 8

What is it that can be everywhere most? Certainly it must be what the dimension of quantity does not oppose. Again, what can be always? It is preeminently what the action of quality does not overcome. But since quality is much more efficacious than quantity, whatever can be always unhindered by quality, *a fortiori* can be everywhere unhindered by dimension. Motion in place, that is, external motion, appears the more perfect in something the more efficacious its inner nature. So in order to extend itself through everything—which imitates motion in place—a thing must first have the power to preserve itself indefinitely, which we call its inner perfection. Anything to which this inner perfection belongs is consequently capable of external expansion through universal space. To be always, which is like an internal condition, is more outstanding than to be everywhere, which is like an external one. Therefore what can always be, *a fortiori* can be everywhere. For it is easier to exceed the sluggish dimensions [of space] than the efficacious movement of quality and time. 9

Mind more than anything else signifies both to itself and to 10 lium, affectum dei. Prodit ergo ex deo tamquam verbum, immo tamquam verbi significatio a loquente deo. Quoniam vero ubicumque est qui loquitur, illic et verbum, sequitur ut ubique sit mens, sicut ubique deus. Mens cogitatione affectuque immensa est, prout immensa machinatur et vult, perque immensum sua operatione discurrit. Non potest autem ibi lucere operarique ubi non est, neque potest operatio talis latior esse quam essentia. Est igitur in immenso.

11 Finis ignis est ultimi caeli concavum. Ideo flammula quaelibet, si nihil prohiberet, illuc usque evolaret et quando concavum illud attingeret, si dimensionem haberet sufficientem, se per totum illud amplificaret, ut toto eo quod sibi naturale est frueretur. Quod si esset indivisibilis, conaretur esse in quolibet illius puncto tota, ut tota frueretur ubique. Scopus finisque mentis est ipsum verum bonumque, id est deus. Huc essentiali quodam instinctu, ignis instar, currit prius quam vitali, et vitali prius quam intellectuali. Nihil est autem quod obsistat quin essentia mentis usque ad deum penetret: corpus enim spiritui non resistit, multoque minus spiritus. Ac deus omnia penetrat. Attingit ergo mens per instinctum essentialem semper deum. Adde et ubique: nam et ad hoc ipsum nititur et non habet vel assignatam dimensionem vel situs alicuius indigentiam naturalem, per quas ubique esse prohibeatur. Et quia, ubicumque est, aliquid agit, sequitur ut vivat intellegatque ubique semper in deo. Quamvis autem sint mentes quaelibet per immensum, videntur tamen aliae ad aliam immensi regionem manifestius actiones quasdam dirigere, mentes quidem angelicae gubernando, animales vivificando, perinde ac si multae candelae in eadem aula accendantur, quarum singula lumina totam impleant aulam, iuncta quidem invicem, sed non permixta; potest enim lumen a lumine separari. Lumina haec etsi per totam aulam diffunduntur, singula

others the nature, the wisdom, and the will of God. So it issues from God like a word, or rather, like the meaning of a word that God speaks. Since wherever the speaker is, there is the word, it follows that mind is everywhere, just as God is everywhere. Mind in its thinking and willing is without limit, according as it thinks and wills things without limit, and in its activity discourses through the limitless. But it cannot shine forth or do its work where it does not exist, nor can its sphere of activity be more extensive than its existence. So it exists in the limitless.

The goal of fire is the vault of highest heaven. So each little flame, if nothing stopped it, would fly up there, and when it reached the vault, if it had dimension enough, it would fan out through the whole and thus enjoy all that is its by nature. If it were indivisible, it would try to be present wholly at the vault's every point so that everywhere it might enjoy the whole. The target and goal of mind is the true and the good, that is, God. Thither it hastens like fire, driven [first] by its essential instinct prior to its vital one, and by its vital instinct prior to its intellectual one. But nothing can stop the mind's essence from penetrating as far as God; for body does not resist spirit, much less does spirit resist spirit. And God penetrates all. Thus the mind through its essential instinct reaches God always; and, we should add, reaches Him everywhere. For it strives towards this; and it has no dimension assigned to it, no natural need of some location, which might prevent it from being everywhere. And because, wherever it is, it does something, it follows that it lives and understands everywhere and always in God. Now, although all minds exist in the limitless, yet different minds seem manifestly to direct their actions to different regions of the limitless—angelic minds to governing, ensouled minds to giving life. It is as though many candles were burning in a single hall: their individual lights fill the whole hall, and though they are joined, they are not confused together; for you can still tell one from another. Though the lights extend the length of the 11

tamen ad candelas singulas diriguntur. Fieri vero potest, ut mens aliqua putet in eo se tantum corpore esse quod regit, licet sit ultra corpus ubique, sicut mens nostra, quamvis in toto hoc corpore sit, tamen apud multos philosophos in corde tantum esse se putat. Haec illi de mente. Nos autem revertamur ad deum.

: VII :

Deus omnia agit et servat et in omnibus omnia operatur.

1 Esse deum et esse unum primumque et infinitum virtute, duratione, spatio, per superiora monstravimus, ex quibus confirmatum est illud,[17] quod in libro *De veritate et opinione* dixit de deo Parmenides Pythagoreus, *ὄν, ἕν, ἀκίνητον, ἄπειρον*, id est: 'ens, unum, immobile, infinitum'. Hunc vero deum agere omnia et servare et in omnibus omnia operari deinceps ita probabimus.

2 Si deus est unitas simplicissima atque haec una sola in natura est quia est summa, quicquid est praeter deum, multiplex est et compositum. Multitudo autem omnis ab unitate et omnis compositio a simplicium puritate descendit. Si deus est summa veritas et sine veritate esse potest nihil—quomodo enim erit quicquam, nisi et revera sit id quod esse dicitur et verum sit ipsum esse?—a deo cuncta profisciscuntur. Si deus est summa bonitas atque haec per sui naturam summopere sese communicat, cunctis sese deus impartit. Ideoque bonum appetunt omnia, quoniam, cum a bono sint nata, suam originem repetunt, ut unde effecta sunt, inde perficiantur. Res quaelibet semper aliquid agunt, atque eo tempore magis quo meliores in sua specie sunt; et illae maxime quae in meliori sunt specie. Et quaelibet pro viribus sibi similia operantur, similia

hall, yet individual lights are assigned to particular candles. It is possible that some mind may think it exists only in the body that it controls, whereas it exists outside the body everywhere, just as our own mind, though it is in the whole body, yet, in the view of many philosophers, supposes itself to exist only in the heart. This is what they say concerning mind. Let us return to God.

: VII :

God moves and preserves everything and does all things in all.

So far we have shown that God exists, that He is one, first, and infinite in power, duration, and extent. This confirms what Parmenides the Pythagorean said about God in his book *On Truth and Opinion*. God he said is "being, one, motionless, and infinite."[11] Now I shall proceed to prove that this God moves and preserves everything and does all things in all. 1

If God is absolutely simple unity, and if this unity being the highest is one and alone in nature, then whatever is other than God is multiple and composite. But all multiplicity derives from unity and all composition from the purity of simple things. If God is the highest truth, and nothing can exist without truth—for how will anything be unless it truly is what it is said to be and it is true it is itself?—then all things come from God. If God is the highest goodness and goodness by its very nature wholly communicates itself, then God imparts Himself to all things. Hence all seek the good, because, since they were born from the good, they seek out their origin, in order to be perfected there whence they arose. All things always do something. They do more at that time when they are the more excellent in their species; they do most when they are in a more excellent species. All things to the best of their ability do 2

etiam si possunt in specie, et boni gratia operantur. Quapropter a bono per bonum ad bonum fit omnis in rebus quibuslibet actio. Igitur summa bonitas, quia bonitas est, agit; quia summa, agit semper; quia non est in specie aliqua terminata, sed aeque communis est omnibus speciebus, agit in omnes.

3 Praeterea, quoniam deus non miscetur alicui, nullius proprius dux, sed communis existit. Si est communis, commune sibi competit munus. Esse ipsum rebus omnibus est commune. Esse igitur, ubicumque sit, pendet ex deo. Quod mystice tetigit Zoroaster:

Εἰσὶ πάντα πυρὸς ἑνὸς ἐκγεγαῶτα

id est: 'Omnia sunt ex uno igne genita'. Insuper inferiora mundi corpora de non esse migrant in esse et de esse transeunt in non esse. Superiora de alio esse mutantur in aliud, seu de alio essendi modo mutantur in alium. Propterea haec omnia aeque se habent per naturam suam ad esse atque non esse. Si nihil aliud sit super huiusmodi corpora, vel non accepissent esse umquam vel, si quando accepissent, iamdudum esse omnia desivissent,[18] Non accepissent, quoniam si aeque se habent per naturam suam ad esse atque non esse, seipsa ad esse nequaquam determinant. Iam pridem desivissent,[19] quia, cum fluant natura sua, si non ab alio stabiliore detinerentur, iamdudum in nihilum defluxissent. Praeest ergo mobilibus mundi corporibus substantia incorporalis et stabilis. Haec si aeque se habet ad esse atque non esse, ut corpora, rursus indiget alio terminante. Tandem una quaedam substantia sit oportet, quae sit necessario per seipsam. Haec simplex erit omnino. (Quippe si componeretur ex partibus, non per se esset quidem, sed per partium conspirationem atque per illum qui diversas inter se partes conciliavisset. Immo aeque dissolutioni partium subiecta foret ac fuit subiecta connexioni, ideoque non esset ex necessitate,

things like themselves, also if they can like things in their species; and they do them for the sake of the good. So all action in all things whatsoever comes from the good, through the good, and for the good. The highest goodness, therefore, because it is goodness, acts. Because it is the highest, it acts always. And because it is not limited to a particular species but is common equally to all species, it acts on them all.

Furthermore, since God is not mixed with anything, He is the particular leader of no one thing but the common leader of all. If He is common, then the gift [He gives] in common belongs to Him. Being is common to all things. Being, therefore, wherever it may be, depends on God.[12] Zoroaster touched on this mystically: "Everything is born from a single fire."[13] The lower bodies of the world make the passage from not-being into being and cross over from being into not-being. Higher bodies change from one being into another, or from one mode of being into another. So all these bodies are by nature equally inclined to being and to not-being. If nothing else existed above such higher bodies, they would either have never accepted being, or, had they accepted it, they would have ceased to be long ago. They would not have accepted being, because if they are equally and naturally inclined to being and to not-being, they do not determine whether to exist at all. Long ago they would have ceased to be, because, since their nature is fluid, they would long ago have ebbed away into nothingness, had they not been shored up by something else more stable. An incorporeal and stable substance therefore governs the changeable bodies of the world. If this, like bodies, is equally inclined to being and to not-being, then this in turn requires something else to keep it in place. Eventually, there must be a single substance which necessarily exists of itself. Such a substance will be entirely simple. Were it made up of parts, it would certainly not exist through itself, but through the harmony of the parts, and through Him who had harmonized the diverse parts. Or rather, the substance would be 3

cum per dissolutionem posset etiam quandoque non esse.) Talis est utique deus, substantia simplex, necessario per se subsistens. Quam ob causam Orpheus deum appellavit necessitatem:

> δεινὴ γὰρ ἀνάγκη πάντα κρατύνει

id est: 'Fortis necessitas omnibus dominatur'.

4 Si summa essendi necessitas deus est et quod est summum in quolibet genere unum est dumtaxat, nulla res praeter deum erit talis essendi necessitas. Nempe si talem quoque esse vis angelum, ita ut duae sint summae necessitates, deus et angelus, declarare cogeris qua in re angelus differt a deo. Non enim in ipsa essendi necessitate, nam in hac unum abs te ponuntur esse. Igitur erit aliquid aliud praeter ipsam necessitatem in angelo, per quod a deo differre queat. Quapropter non erit angelus summa necessitas, quando est non necessitas pura et sola, sed mixta. Quicquid autem est in aliquo genere summum, puram debet habere generis illius naturam rebus aliis non immixtam, ne minuatur per mixtionem. Cogeris etiam respondere: unde habeat angelus illam necessitati additam proprietatem? Utrum a sui ipsius necessitate, an aliunde? Si primum detur, eandem proprietatem habebit deus a simili sui ipsius necessitate provenientem. Ergo per illam a deo angelus non distinguitur. Si concedatur alterum, sequitur ut aliunde propria angeli ipsius natura nascatur quam ab angelo, quia proprietatem per quam distinguitur extrinsecus adipiscitur. Quod aliunde pendet, non est necessario per seipsum. Non est igitur angelus, aut aliud quodvis, essendi necessitas, sed solus deus. Si nihil aliud praeter deum existit necessario per seipsum, a deo cuncta accipiunt esse.

5 Hinc physicorum quorumdam profana sententia condemnatur, qui materiam, mundum, mentem, non solum semper fuisse opi-

as subject to the dissolution of its parts as it would have been to their connection. Thus it would not exist from necessity, since through dissolution it could also not exist at some time or other. At any rate, God is this simple substance, necessarily subsisting through Himself.[14] That is why Orpheus called God "necessity": "Strong necessity rules over all."[15]

If God is the highest necessity of being and only one thing is highest in any genus, no other thing except God will be this highest necessity of being. If, for instance, you were to claim that angel were also such, so that two highest necessities existed, God and angel, you would have to show how angel differs from God. It cannot be in the necessity itself of being, for in this regard you are supposing they are one. So there will be something in angel apart from the necessity through which it is able to differ from God. Hence angel will not be the highest necessity, since it will not be the pure and simple, but a mixed necessity. The highest in any genus must possess the nature of that genus in a pure form unmixed with other things, for any mixture would diminish it. You would also have to answer the question: Whence does angel receive the property added to the necessity? Does it come from its own necessity, or from elsewhere? If we suppose the first, God will possess the same property, issuing from a like necessity of His own. Hence angel is not distinguished from God through that property. If we concede the second alternative, it follows that the particular nature of angel originates not from angel but from somewhere else, since it is acquiring its distinguishing property from outside itself. What depends on something outside itself necessarily does not exist through itself. The necessity of being, therefore, is not angel or anything else but God alone. Now if nothing other than God necessarily exists through itself, everything takes its being from God. 4

That puts paid to the impious opinion of certain natural philosophers who argue that matter, the world and the mind not only have always existed, but in no way depend in essence on God, 5

nantur, verum etiam nullo modo ex deo secundum essentiam dependere, quamvis secundum actum inde pendeant. Moveri enim operarique ad bonum omnia fatentur tamquam ad finem. Considerare debebant, quicquid sibi in operando non potest sufficere, sed ab extrinseco fine sufficientiam exigit, multo minus in essentia sibi posse sufficere, utpote quod ab extrinseco principio habet essentiam. Quippe si eiusdem est perficere cuius efficere atque converso, sicut omnia bono perficiuntur tamquam fine, sic ab eodem tamquam principio efficiuntur. Et cum essentia in fonte suo perfectissima sit, si quodlibet illorum trium essentiae suae fons esset, cuiuslibet illorum substantia aeque perfecta esset tum ad se invicem, tum ad deum, neque ad deum, sed ad seipsa tamquam ad finem perfectionemque suam converterentur.

6 Sicuti se habet ars ad naturam, sic et natura ad deum. Artium opera eatenus permanent incorrupta, quatenus vi naturae serventur, ut statua constat diu per naturalem lapidis aut aeris soliditatem. Similiter naturalia quaeque eatenus manent, quatenus dei servantur influxu. Et sicut natura operibus suis infert motum, sic deus naturae praestat esse. Tamdiu opera naturae moventur, quamdiu natura movet. Tamdiu igitur existit natura, quamdiu deus servat eam in existendo. Praeterea universum hoc opus dei vel fuit semper vel aliquando incepit esse. Si fuit semper, primum momentum assignari non potest in quo prae ceteris esse a deo acceperit. Ergo aut in nullo accepit, quod est falsum, aut quolibet momento accipit inde. Hoc autem nihil aliud est quam ab eo continue conservari. Si vero esse incepit aliquando, multo magis deo eget tamquam conservatore, siquidem egeret etiam si poneretur aeternum. Omnino autem quod alicui secundum naturam suam convenit, prius convenit quam quod advenit aliunde. Sed

though they depend on Him for their actuality. For they admit that all are moved and act for the sake of the good as their end. They should have taken into account that whatever cannot be self-sufficient in its activity but demands sufficiency from some external end, is even less able to be self-sufficient in its essence, seeing that it receives its essence from a principle outside itself. For if the same thing is responsible for perfecting as for creating, and vice versa, then just as all things are perfected by the good as the end, so all are created by the good as the principle. Since essence is entirely perfect at its fountain of origin, if any of these three, [matter, the world and mind,] were the fount of its essence, the substance of any one of them would be equally perfect both with respect to each other and with respect to God; and they would be turned back, not to God, but to themselves for their end and their perfection.

The relationship of art to nature is the same as that of nature 6 to God. Works of art remain uncorrupted as long as they are preserved by the power of nature: for instance, how long a statue lasts depends on the natural solidity of the stone or bronze. In the same way, natural objects last as long as they are preserved by God's divine influence. And just as nature gives movement to its works, so God gives nature being. The works of nature are moved as long as nature moves them. Nature exists as long as God keeps it in existence.[16] Further, this universal work of God has either always existed, or it came into existence at some point. If it always existed, it is impossible to specify a first moment at which, compared to other moments, it received existence from God. Either it received it at no one moment—but that is wrong—or it is receiving it from Him at every moment. But this is nothing other than to be preserved by Him continually. If, on the other hand, it received being at a particular moment, then all the more does it need God as its preserver, since it would need Him even if it were posited as eternal. Certainly, what belongs to something by its very

operi secundum se convenit non esse, postquam non accedente causa non fuisset. Per causam vero convenit esse. Prius igitur illi ut non sit convenit quam ut sit. Quapropter prius illi competit ut a causa servetur quam ut a seipso, et quia quod naturale est numquam amittitur, semper tale est ut submota causae virtute non perseveret in esse, postquam tale fuit ab initio naturaliter ut non prodiret in esse seorsum a causae actione. Causam vero proprie deum vocamus, qui solus rem quamlibet efficit totam, neque cogitur aut alterius auxilio indigere aut aliunde materiam mutuari, sed cogitur res quaelibet inde tota pendere semper, ut a corpore umbra. Quippe quando causa effectum efficit ipsa totum, atque effectus, si ad substantiam causae comparetur, imaginarium quiddam est et vanum potius quam substantiale, tunc sane effectus tamquam per se vanus continuo causae subsidio indiget, et causa quae fecit totum, conservat totum. Mundus autem si comparetur ad deum, finitus videlicet ad infinitum, vanior est magisque umbratilis quam si finiti corporis umbra finita comparetur ad corpus.

7 Denique summa causa rerum sic rebus penitus dominatur, si res non semel modo ab illa manaverint sed et assidue pendeant, sicut imagines a corporibus fiunt ac servantur in speculo. Quoniam deus agit servatque omnia, ideo in omnibus operatur, id est, causae rerum sequentes deum nihil agunt absque virtute actioneque divina. Si deus angelo esse actumque largitur et servat, largitur etiam agendi virtutem; largitur et actionem atque conservat. Ita quicquid angelus naturaliter operatur, dei operatur virtute: tamquam instrumentum virtute agit opificis. Ergo deus agit non angelum solum, verum etiam ipsum angeli opus, et multo magis quam angelus opus efficit angeli, cum ipse sit prima actionis origo. Si opus hoc quod est factum ab angelo, agitet ipsum aliquid, per

nature belongs to it before what comes to it externally. Non-being belongs intrinsically to something made, since it would not have existed without an external cause. It has being because of the cause. Therefore non-being belongs to it prior to being. So being preserved by a cause belongs to it prior to being preserved by itself. And because what is natural is never lost, it is always such that, were the power of its cause withdrawn, it would not persist in being, since from the beginning it was naturally such that it could not issue into being apart from the action of its cause. Properly, we call that cause God: He alone makes any one thing whole. He is not compelled; He needs no help from another or to borrow material from elsewhere. But everything is compelled totally to depend on Him, as a shadow depends on a body. Since a cause causes its whole effect, and since the effect, if we compare it to the substance of the cause, is something illusory and empty rather than substantial, so the effect, being empty, needs continuously the assistance of the cause, and the cause, which effects the whole, preserves the whole. If we compare the world to God, the finite to the infinite, it is more empty and shadowy than the finite body's finite shadow when compared to the body.

Finally, compare the way the highest universal cause entirely dominates things — if they continually depend upon it and have not issued from it just once — to the way reflections are made by bodies but are preserved in a mirror.[17] Since God moves and preserves all, He operates in all; that is, the causes subordinate to God do nothing without the power and activity of God. If God bestows being and act on angel and preserves being and act, He also bestows the power of acting, and bestows and preserves the action. So whatever angel does naturally it does through the power of God: like a tool it responds to the craftsman's dexterity. God therefore not only moves angel but what angel produces; and much more indeed than angel He produces what angel produces, since He is the first source of action. If this work produced by an- 7

eandem agit dei virtutem, per quam et ipsum factum fuit ab angelo. Quamobrem dei virtute fit, quicquid ubique fit, a quocumque fiat, praesertim cum omnia quae aliquid agunt, esse quodammodo suo operi praebeant—esse inquam hoc aut illud, tale vel tale. Ita cuncta quae sub deo sunt agentia ad unum communem scilicet essendi concurrunt effectum. Agentia vero plurima et diversa in unum opus, quod est esse, non conspirant, nisi quia ipsa sunt unum. Neque unum sunt, nisi quia sub uno sunt atque ad unum. Unius itaque dei agentis primi virtute agentia reliqua operantur.

8 Nonne secundum ordinem effectuum ordinem causarum disponimus? Primum omnium effectum[20] est esse, reliqui siquidem effectus nihil aliud sunt quam quaedam ipsius esse determinationes et proprietates. Prius enim est unumquodque secundum naturam; deinde est hoc aut illud, tale vel tale. Adde quod et ultimum quod amittitur est esse. Prius enim amittitur esse tale quam simpliciter esse. Quare esse ipsum proprius est illius agentis effectus quod est principium finisque omnium. Atque ad id cetera agentia si quid conducunt, primi agentis virtute conducunt. Et ipsa, tamquam inferiora angustiorisque imperii, nihil agunt aliud nisi quod universalem illam dei vim actionemque ubique ad esse universale tendentem distinguunt passim adiuvante deo, et affectiones quasdam esse ipsius inducunt potius quam essendi naturam. Immo, divina virtus per varia media seipsam ad varios distinguit effectus, sicuti solis lumen, quod per se ad quemlibet colorem aeque se habet, si per duas fenestras vitreas penetraverit, quarum altera rubra sit, altera viridis, duos in pavimento splendores efficiet, rubrum scilicet atque viridem. Quod quidem uterque sit splendor, simpliciter habebit a lumine. Quod vero alter rubeus sit, viridis al-

gel moves something, it does so through the power of God, through that self-same power by which it was made by angel. So everywhere whatever comes into being, and by whatsoever it is made, does so because of God's power; and this is especially so since all which do something in a manner bestow being on their work—I mean this or that being, a particular being. Thus all which are agents under God are united in producing one common effect, that of being. But such a large number of different agents cannot collaborate in producing one product, that is, being, unless it is because they themselves are one. They are not one unless it is because they are under one ruler and have one goal. So all the subsequent agents produce because of the power of the first agent, the one God.[18]

Shouldn't we establish the order of causes according to the order of effects? Being is the first of all effects, for the rest are nothing other than particular determinations and properties of being. Every single thing in nature first exists; then it exists as this or that, as a particular thing. Moreover, existence is the last thing lost. For being particularly is lost before being absolutely.[19] Wherefore being itself is properly the effect of that agent which is the principle and end of all. If the subsequent agents contribute anything to being, they do it through the power of the first agent. They themselves, being inferior and of more limited authority, do nothing else save only that, with God's aid, they take that universal power and action of God, which is directed everywhere towards universal being, and establish distinctions here and there, introducing certain states of being rather than the nature itself of being.[20] Or rather, by means of various intermediaries the divine power divides itself into different effects, just as the light of the Sun, which in itself is indifferent to any given color, if it shines through two stained glass windows, one of which is red, the other green, will produce two patches of lights on the floor, one red, one green. That each is bright derives absolutely from the light. That 8 ter, a lumine rursus habebit, sed quantum per tale vitrum penetrans aut tale, aliter aliterque se format.

9 Concludamus primo, quod causa prima vehementius agit in quovis effectu quam reliquae causae, quia vestigium quod ab ea imprimitur, scilicet esse, et prius imprimitur et posterius deletur quam reliquarum vestigia causarum, quasi fortius imprimatur. Deinde, quod ceterae causae super vestigium primae causae sua firmant vestigia, quae sicut omnia sua opera necessario in opere causae primae fundant, sic virtutes actionesque suas in illius virtute actioneque stabiliunt.

: VIII :

Deus agit per suum esse quicquid agit.

1 Sed ne quis Epicureus deum dicat, si multa egerit, sollicitari consilio et opere onerari, meminisse oportet deum, quia per suum esse solum opus suum potest efficere, consilio et electione non indigere. Nam si ipsum esse divinum non tanti esset, ut valeret per se operari, sed consilio quodam, quod ab ipso esse sit differens, indigeret, nullius certe rei esse per se quicquam operaretur. Nunc autem corporum qualitates agunt in se invicem absque consilio. Numquid sol illuminat mundum et ignis calefacit et anima alit corpus per electionem potius quam per esse? Proinde illa etiam quae per electionem agunt, aliquid etiam per esse suum faciunt naturale, id est per virtutem ipsi[21] esse insitam naturaliter. Quippe hominis anima, licet multa per electionem agat, corpori tamen sine electio-

one is red, the other green also derives from the light, but the light takes different forms depending on which window it is shining through.

We can conclude the following. First, the prime cause acts more powerfully in any effect than the subsequent causes, because the footprint printed by it, namely being, is printed earlier and effaced later than the footprints of the other causes; it is, so to speak, printed more deeply. Next, the subsequent causes make their footprints on top of the footprint of the first cause; and just as all their works are necessarily based on the work of the first cause, so they establish their powers and actions in the power and action of the first cause. 9

: VIII :

Whatever God does He does through His own being.

Lest any Epicurean declare that God, if He did so much, would be troubled by deliberation and burdened by the labor, we should remember that God, because He can do His work through His being alone, does not need deliberation or choice. For if the divine being itself were of insufficient strength to work through itself, but needed some deliberation that differed from its being, certainly the being of no other thing would do anything through itself. In fact, however, the qualities of bodies act on each other without any deliberation. Is it through choice rather than through being that the Sun gives light to the world, that fire heats, that the soul nourishes the body? Even things that act by choice do something too through their natural being, that is, through the power naturally innate in that being. A man's soul, though it does many things by choice, yet without choice and by [its] being gives life to 1

ne[22] ipso esse dat vitam. Nonne etiam electio ipsa quodammodo opus est animi? Atque huiusmodi opus ab ipso esse animae est absque praecedente electione, ne similiter illa praecedens electio electione alia indigeat praecedente, et alia rursus alia. Sic opus quodlibet animi requireret ante se electiones innumeras priusquam inciperet fieri, neque inciperet umquam fieri, quoniam infinita transire non licet. Colligamus ita: si actio quae per esse ipsum naturale peragitur inest omnibus, non autem actio illa quae fit eligendo (quia corpora nihil eligunt) atque etiam actionem ipsam electionis consiliique antecedit semper actio quae fit per esse ipsum atque naturam, constat plane actionem hanc, quae ipso esse fit, causae universali et primae, qui deus est, convenire, ut prima communisque actio primi sit et communis agentis.

2 Actio quae fit per esse, fit absque cura atque labore. Sic sol uno actu facillime illuminat quodammodo infinita et gignit illuminando. Ignis plurima facillime calefacit. Anima nutrit corpus digeritque in ipso multa simul absque sollicitudine atque labore. Sic deus per esse suum, quod est simplicissimum quoddam rerum centrum a quo reliqua tamquam lineae deducuntur, facillimo nutu vibrat quicquid inde dependet. Hoc autem interest inter agens primum et agentia reliqua, quod primum agens ita per esse dicitur operari, ut per esse purum agat, reliqua vero per esse, id est, per virtutem aliquam naturalem sive, ut ita loquar, essentialem. Itaque operationem quae a consilio proficiscitur antecedit operatio quae a virtute essentiali peragitur, hanc rursus illa quae a puro fit esse. Et

the body. Isn't choice itself in a sense a product of the thinking soul?[21] Such a product must come directly from the soul's being without any prior choice, lest that prior choice likewise require another prior choice, and so on. Thus any product of the thinking soul would require innumerable choices preceding it before it could begin to come into being. Never would it come into being, as it is impossible to traverse infinity. We may conclude as follows. If action which is brought about by natural being is present in all things, but not the action brought about by choosing (because bodies choose nothing), and if too the action brought about by being itself and nature always precedes the action brought about by choice and deliberation, then it is obvious that the action brought about by being is proper to the first and universal cause, which is God, in order that the prime universal action might be that of the prime universal agent.

Action that comes from being does not involve toil or labor. 2 Thus the Sun with utmost ease lights up an infinite number of things in a way in a single act, and in illuminating generates them. Fire with utmost ease heats a host of things. The soul nourishes the body and digests many things in it without any worry or labor. Thus God through His being, which is an utterly simple universal center whence everything else is spun out like lines, with the utmost ease and command makes whatever depends on Him tremble. There is this difference between the prime agent and the subsequent agents. When we say the prime agent acts through being, we mean it acts through pure being, whereas the others act through the being that is a natural or so to speak essential power. Therefore what precedes the activity that stems from deliberation is the activity which is enacted by the essential power, and this in turn is preceded by the activity which is the result of pure being. The activity brought about by the [essential] power is achieved with greater ease than that brought about by deliberation. By the quanto quae virtute fit facilior est quam quae fit consilio, tanto quae puro esse expletur facilior est quam quae virtute.

: IX :

Deus intellegit seipsum primo, ac etiam singula.

1 Intellectus numquam fieret rei intellegendae capax, nisi esset aliqua sibi cum re ipsa cognatio. Quapropter cum sit inter intellectum et rem intellegendam cognatio, qua via aliquid proficit ad hoc, ut intellegibile fiat, eadem proficit ut sit intellectus. Sed discessus a materia unica via est, quam[23] res quaeque eum adipiscitur terminum, ut intellegenda intellegibilisque sit, id est, talis ut proprie possit intellegi, quia tunc proprie res intelleguntur quando seorsum a materia ac materiae conditionibus cogitantur. Itaque per eundem discessum ad id pervenire quis potest, ut sit intellectus. Sane si separari a materia causa est ut forma quaelibet unum quiddam fiat cum intellectu, multo prius magisque semotum esse a materia causa est ut res aliqua intellectus sit et intellegens. Quia vero nullus a materia remotior est quam deus, exactius nullus intellegit.

2 Rursus, intellegentia appetibilis est tamquam bonum. Per eam enim res quaeque seipsa frui potest ac ceteris omnibus. Primo autem bono, id est deo, nihil deest boni. Adde quod causa omnis per formam agit et quanto amplior causa est, tanto per ampliorem agit formam. Amplissima causa deus est. Amplissima igitur forma est in deo. Nusquam vero est forma amplior quam in mente. Deus igitur habet mentem. Quod inde etiam probatur, quia non decet mentes instrumenta esse eius motoris qui mente careat. Omnes

same measure, the activity executed by pure being is achieved with greater ease than that executed by the power.

: IX :

God understands Himself first and every individual thing too.

Intellect would never be capable of understanding an object if it did not have something in common with it. Given this affinity between intellect and the object to be understood, the way something reaches the point of being intelligible is the same way it reaches the point of being intellect. But departure from matter is the one way for each entity to attain that goal of being understanding and intelligible, of being such in other words that it can be properly understood. For things are properly understood when they are considered apart from matter and material conditions. By the same departure from matter, therefore, someone can attain the goal of being intellect. If being divorced from matter causes some form to be made into something one with intellect, then to have been divorced from matter long before that is the reason why something is [already] intellect and understanding. Because nobody is further removed from matter than God, so nobody understands more perfectly than God. 1

Understanding is desirable as a good. For through understanding each thing can enjoy itself and everything else. But nothing good is wanting to the prime good, that is, God. Again, every cause acts by means of form, and the more far-reaching the cause the more far-reaching the form through which it acts. God is the most far-reaching cause. So the most far-reaching form is in God. But nowhere is form more far-reaching than in mind. Therefore God possesses mind. This is further proved by the following argu- 2

autem mentes dei sunt instrumenta. Ad idem illud quoque confert, quod, cum in deo idem sit essentia et operatio, consequens est ut eius operatio ex earum genere sit quae in externam materiam non transeunt, sed in agente manent, tamquam ipsius perfectiones potius quam materiae. Talis est cognitio et appetitio. In deo igitur saltem cognitio est, intellegentia scilicet vel eminentior quam ipsa intellegentia. Et quoniam intellegentia dei prima intellegentia est, et quicquid est in aliquo genere primum, purum est et solum et in seipso, ideo idem est ibi penitus esse et intellegere, ne si aliud esse sit, aliud intellegere, cogamur intellegentiam illam in alio, id est, in essentia collocare.

3 Item, si prima ibi intellegentia est, est utique perfectissima. Talis est plane quae illi obiecto quod est per ipsam comprehendendum quam proxima est. Sic enim certa est prorsus, nullius indiga atque plenissima. Illa vero intellegentia rei cognoscendae est proxima per quam res intellegens intellegit semetipsam. Propria igitur intellegentia dei est ut seipsum intellegat, praesertim quia si ab externo quodam obiecto intellegentia dei perficeretur, ab eodem perficeretur essentia dei, quae eadem est cum illa, fieretque deus ab alio. Quis dixerit divinam mentem externa sequi ut intellegat, cum externa divinam mentem sequi cogantur ut sint? Quis proprium divinae mentis obiectum[24] posuerit extra deum, cum nulla virtus obiectum suum excedere valeat, deus autem excedat omnia in[25] immensum?

4 Cum deo intellectus et intellegentiae nomen tribuimus, sic accipiendum est ut huiusmodi appellationes secundum causam potius

ment. Minds should not be instruments of a mover who lacks mind. But all minds are instruments of God. The following argument supports this too. Since essence and activity are one and the same in God, His activity consequently must be in the class of activities that do not spill over into external matter, but remain in the agent, as His perfections rather than matter's. Knowledge and desire are of this kind. So in God there is at least knowledge, that is, understanding or something higher than understanding. Because God's understanding is the prime understanding and whatever is the first in a genus is pure, alone and self-sufficient, in this understanding, therefore, being and knowing are completely identical. For were being one thing, knowing another, then we would be forced to locate the understanding itself in something else, that is, in essence [rather than being].

If the first understanding is there [in God], it is assuredly the most perfect. Such understanding is clearly what is the closest possible to the object that it has to understand. For in this way it is utterly certain, wanting nothing and totally complete. But that understanding is closest to knowing its object wherein the thing understanding understands itself. Thus God's own understanding is to understand Himself. This is especially so because, were God's understanding perfected by some external object, His essence, which is identical with His understanding, would be perfected by the same object, and God would be brought into being by something else. Who would claim that the divine mind pursues things outside itself in order to understand, when external things are compelled to pursue the divine mind in order to exist? Who would place the proper object of the divine mind outside God when no power is able to exceed its object, but God infinitely exceeds all things? 3

When we call God intellect and understanding, we must realize that the terms should be understood causally rather than formally. Strictly speaking, we consider angel to be mind and God to be 4

quam per formam intellegantur. Proprie namque angelum mentem esse putamus, deum vero supra mentium genus, ita ut mens sit mentium lumenque luminum. intellegit vero deus quicquid intellegit modo quodam super intellegentiam atque, ut ad rem nostram veniamus, intellegit singula. Nam quicquid intellectus agit, sua agit natura atque ita agit intellegendo. Ergo, quaecumque facit, intellegit. Quod patet in artibus et consiliis. Cum ergo deus per esse suum agat, idque esse non careat intellectu, immo vero esse et intellegere propter summam dei simplicitatem idem sit, oportet ut operetur intellegendo. Eatenus vero cognitio eius extenditur quatenus operatio, cum in deo simplicissimo sit voluntaria cognitio et operatio idem. Operatio per omnia usque ad res extenditur minimas. Ergo minimas res omnes deus intellegit, eo maxime quod, quisquis rerum minimarum causas omnes cognoscit, res intellegit minimas. Deus autem nulla ignorat; cognoscit quippe seipsum; ipse est omnium causa. Ergo primam et summam causarum et rerum omnium causam noscens, noscit omnes.

5 Noscit inquam distincte atque clarissime. Nam dum se videt qui angeli causa est, videt clarissime angelum. Dum angelum intuetur, per eum, si opus sit, illius opera ut per causam propriam intuetur; per illa rursus opera illorum planissime. Ita rerum infimarum[26] tenet causam summam, causas medias atque proximas, ideoque illas clare dinoscit, quamquam non opus est ut extra se deus in causis sequentibus ultimos intueatur effectus, cum ipse sit prima ipsius esse origo et causa essendi sequentibus omnibus. Idcirco dum se inspicit, totum esse rerum quarumlibet inspicit. Totum inquam esse plane atque distincte. Nam si seipsum perfecte cognoscit, totam suam potentiam comprehendit. Potentia sua per singula dilatatur. Cognoscit itaque singula. Item, dum videt essentiam suam et bonitatem rebus communicandam, videt

above mind such that He is the mind of minds and the light of lights. Whatever God understands He understands in a manner that is beyond understanding and — to come to our theme — He understands each individual. For whatever intellect does it does through its own nature and thus it acts through understanding. Therefore it must understand everything it creates. In art or in the making of decisions this is obvious. Since God acts through His being and that being does not lack intellect, or rather, since, because of God's complete simplicity, His being and understanding are identical, it must be that He acts by understanding. God's knowledge and activity are coextensive; for in God, because He is entirely simple, freely to know and to act are identical. His activity extends down to the least of things. Therefore God understands all the smallest things; and the more so, because whoever knows all the causes of the smallest things understands the smallest things. But God knows every cause since He knows Himself. He is the cause of all. So in knowing the first and highest cause of all causes and things, He knows all things.

God knows them, I should add, distinctly and with utmost 5 clarity. In seeing Himself as the cause of angel, He sees angel with utmost clarity. In seeing angel, by way of angel (if He needs to) He sees its works as by way of its own cause; and again, with utmost clarity, He sees by way of these works their works. So God possesses the highest cause of the lowest things and the intermediary causes and the immediate causes, and so He can distinguish them clearly, although He does not need to look outside Himself at the ultimate effects in the secondary causes, since He is the prime source of His own being and the cause of being in all the secondary causes. So when he looks at Himself, He looks at the totality of all things — looks at the totality clearly and distinctly.[22] For if He knows Himself perfectly, He knows the full extent of His own power. His power extends through individual objects. Therefore He knows individual objects. Likewise, when He looks

quot modis sua illa bonitas possit rebus communicari. Res autem tam variae in natura fiunt, quam variis modis divina essentia bonitasque communicatur. Igitur per distinctam bonitatis suae cognitionem distinctas rerum singularum videt proprietates. Nullum enim deesse debet summae intelligentiae genus intelligendi. Quapropter non solum intelligentiam deus habet generum specierumque, ut aliqui voluerunt, sed rerum etiam singularum. Cuiusque enim rei cognitio appetibilis est tamquam bonum aliquod; bonum vero nullum deest deo.

6 Adde quod virtus superior debet nosse quicquid inferior, et aliquid ultra; quod in animis nostris apparet. Quae enim singuli quinque sensus accipiunt singulatim, phantasia summatim discernit et aliquid excellentius. Quod phantasia videt in pluribus imaginibus, intellectus in una videt et clarius: videt singula quae et phantasia, videt insuper rerum rationes universales quas illa nescit. Ita deus unica virtute cognoscit quicquid nos tribus virtutibus,[27] id est, sensibus, phantasia et intellectu cognoscimus. Ergo et universalia intuetur et singula. Intuetur inquam omnes essendi modos qui originem videt essendi et totam comprehendit ipsius esse naturam. Si ita est, inspicit utique singula, quae per varios essendi modos invicem distinguuntur. Hinc Orpheus:

> *καὶ Διὸς ὄμμα τέλειον, ἐπεί γ᾽ ὅσα γίγνεται ἡμῖν*
> *Μοῖρά τε καὶ Διὸς οἶδε νόος διὰ παντὸς ἅπαντα.*

id est: 'Iovis perfectus oculus, quoniam quaecumque apud nos fiunt, fatum Iovisque mens per universum inspicit omnia'.

7 Nemo igitur Epicuro et Averroi fidem[28] adhibeat dicentibus rerum vilissimarum notitiam maiestate divina indignam esse. Deus enim res non in seipsis sed in seipso, non per earum imagines sed

at His own essence and goodness waiting to be imparted to all things, He sees in how many ways that goodness of His can be imparted to them. The variety of things created in nature corresponds to the variety of ways in which the divine essence and goodness is imparted to them. So, through the distinct knowledge of His goodness, He sees the distinct properties of individual things. For the highest understanding should lack no genus of understanding. Thus God has understanding not only of genera and species, as some have claimed, but of individual things as well. For knowledge of each individual thing is desirable as a good, and God lacks nothing that is good.

A further argument. A higher power should know all that a lower power knows and more. This is clear in the case of our own souls. What each of our five senses perceives separately our phantasy discerns in summary fashion and to some extent more excellently. What the phantasy sees in many images, the intellect sees in a single image and more clearly: it sees the individual objects that the phantasy sees, but in addition it sees the universal rational principles which the phantasy is unaware of. Thus God with one power knows everything we come to know with three powers, that is, with the senses, the phantasy, and the intellect. Therefore God sees universal and individual things.[23] He sees all the modes of being, because He gazes at being's source and comprehends its whole nature. If this is so, then He clearly sees individual objects, which are distinguished from each other by their different modes of being. That is why Orpheus says: "Jupiter's eye is perfect, for all that occurs amongst us Fate and Jupiter's mind perceive throughout the universe."[24] 6

No one should therefore believe Epicurus[25] and Averroes[26] when they say that knowledge of the meanest things is unworthy of the divine majesty. For God sees things not in themselves but in Himself, not through their images but through His own essence. Their large number does not perplex Him for He sees them all as 7

per suam essentiam intuetur. Non distrahitur circa plurima sed cuncta conspicit tamquam unum. Non laborat umquam, quia non quaerit, sed possidet. Non divertitur a gravioribus ut consideret leviora, quoniam eodem intuitu haec videt et illa instar oculi, qui uno intuitu stellas in caelo plurimas contuetur. An ignoras, Averroes impie, bonum ipsum ordinis universi esse cuiuslibet partis qualitate praestantius? Quippe cum et Aristoteles tuus in libro *Divinorum* undecimo affirmet partes singulas referri ad bonum ordinis qui in toto est tamquam ad finem. Si igitur deus aliam ullam cognoscit rem nobilem, quod tu non negas, maxime ordinem universi cognoscet. Ordo huiusmodi non aliter intellegi potest quam si pretiosiora quaelibet et[29] viliora inter se discernantur, in quorum intervallis proportionibusque totius ordo consistit. Memento autem haec ipsa, quae vulgo vilissima nuncupantur, singula exactissima quadam arte constructa fuisse, quemadmodum et illa quae habentur pretiosissima. Rursus, quae, dum sola considerantur, minus formosa videri solent, in ordine tamen hoc toto et in ipso totius ordinatore tam sibi quam ceteris aptissime consonare. Totum hoc ita in Apollinis hymno cecinit Orpheus:

> *ἔχεις δέ τε πείρατα κόσμου*
> *παντός· σοὶ δ᾽ἀρχή τε τελευτή τ᾽ἐστὶ μέλουσα,*
> *παντοθαλής, σὺ δὲ πάντα πόλον κιθάρῃ πολυκρέκτῳ*
> *ἁρμόζεις,*

id est: 'Tu habes mundi terminos universi. Tibi curae est principium atque finis. Per te virescunt omnia. Tu sphaeram totam cithara resonante contemperas'.

one. He never has to make an effort, for He does not have to look for them: He possesses them. Nor does He have to turn away from more important matters to consider trivial ones, for He sees both with the same glance like an eye which sees many stars in the sky at a single glance. Are you not aware, Averroes you blasphemer, that the good of the universal order is more eminent than the quality of any of its parts? Your own Aristotle in the eleventh book of his *Metaphysics* claims that individual parts are led back to the good of the order which is in the whole as to their end.[27] If God therefore knows any other noble entity (which you do not deny), then first and foremost He will know the universal order. Such an order can only be understood if the more and less valuable parts are distinguished among themselves; for the order of the whole consists in their intervals and proportions. Remember that things which are commonly considered without value, like the things we hold of most value, have all been constructed with the most consummate art. Remember too that these valueless things, seen in isolation, are deemed for the most part far from beautiful. Yet they most aptly accord both with themselves and with everything else in the whole order and in the orderer of the whole. Orpheus sang of all this in his "Hymn to Apollo": "You possess the limits of the whole world. The beginning and the end are in your care. Through you everything flourishes. You tune the whole sphere with the sound of your lyre."[28]

: X :

Deus intellegit infinita.

1 Vera nos ratio docet deum non solum singula et infima quaeque, verum etiam infinita cognoscere.

2 Si deus potentiam suam perfecte cognoscit, novit distincte omnia ad quae potentiam habet. Nam potentiae quantitas secundum eorum quae potest quantitatem consideratur. Virtus autem dei, cum sit infinita, ad innumerabilia se extendit. Innumerabilia igitur deus cognoscit. Dei cognitio per omnia illa se penitus porrigit quae esse dicuntur, quomodocumque sint aut dicantur. Itaque oportet ut plane intellegat non modo illa quae actu existunt, verum etiam quaecumque potentia esse dicuntur. In rebus autem naturalibus sunt nonnulla, etsi non actu, saltem potentia infinita, capacitas videlicet materiae, progressio motus ac temporis, generationis successio, divisio continui, multiplicatio numeri. Deus igitur plane intellegit infinita, quemadmodum unitas, quae est principium numerorum, infinitos videret numeros actu, si eos numeros qui in ea secundum potentiam sunt videret. Est enim unitas secundum potentiam numerus omnis.

3 Deus per essentiam suam, quasi quoddam exemplar, omnia conspicit. Cum vero in hac essentia sit perfectio infinita, innumerabiles ad eius similitudinem res exprimi possunt, ita ut per innumerabiles perfectionis gradus in melius paulatim progrediantur, quia neque una res quaedam inde formata neque quantalibet finita rerum huiusmodi multitudo infiniti exemplaris integram usurpare potest perfectionem. Atque ita semper absque fine ullo novus superest modus quo aliquid aliud ultra exemplar ipsum valeat imitari. Deus igitur per innumerabiles infiniti exemplaris gradus innu-

: X :

God understands infinite things.

True reason teaches us that God knows not only individual things — even the lowest — but also things infinite. 1

If God has perfect knowledge of His power, then He has a distinct knowledge of everything over which He has power. For the amount of power is reckoned in terms of the number of things it can do. But God's power, since it is infinite, extends to things without number. Therefore God knows things without number.[29] God's knowledge extends itself utterly through all things which are said to exist, irrespective of the way in which they exist or are said to exist. He must therefore understand clearly not only what exists in act but all that are held to exist in potency as well. Among natural objects there are some things which are potentially though not actually infinite: the receiving capacity of matter, the progression of movement and time, the process of generation, the division of what is continuous, the multiplication of number. Therefore God clearly understands infinite things, just as unity, which is the source of numbers, would see infinite numbers in act if it could see the numbers which are in it in potentiality. For unity is potentially every number. 2

God sees everything through His essence as if it were a paradigm. Since this essence contains infinite perfection, innumerable objects can be fashioned in its likeness, in such a way that the scale ascends gradually through innumerable levels of ever increasing perfection. For no single thing formed in this way, nor any finite multitude of such things, however large, can ever take possession of the complete perfection of the infinite paradigm. There is always and endlessly a new way in which something else can further imitate the paradigm. Looking down through the innumerable lev- 3

merabiles intuetur imagines. Esse in deo atque intellegere idem est omnino, ideoque sicut esse eius infinitum est, ita intellegere infinitum. Cum intellectus humanus vim habeat ad ea cognoscenda quae sunt potentia infinita, potest in infinitum species numerorum multiplicare, et in aliis multis absque fine pro arbitrio progredi. Quod si intellectus divinus res actu infinitas non intellegit, sed certum dumtaxat numerum intuetur, quaero numquid ulterius intellegere queat an nequeat? Si potest, deus non intellegit illa actu omnia ad quae intellegenda vim possidet. Si non potest, intellectus humanus plura cognoscere valet quam divinus. Utrumque absurdum est. Res igitur actu infinitas intellegit. Quapropter divina mens, cum sit infinita, merito nominatur ab Orphicis *ἄπειρον ὄμμα*, id est, 'oculus infinitus'.

4 Ex iis[30] eorum philosophorum impius error arguitur, qui finita dumtaxat videre deum existimarunt, quia quaecumque videntur ab eo comprehendantur et quae comprehenduntur necessario finiantur. His in praesentia respondemus idem esse deum et quae in ipso deo videntur ab ipso. Quisquis ergo dicit haec a deo comprehendi, nihil dicit aliud quam haec comprehendi a semetipsis. Absurdum quidem esset rem infinitam ab alio comprehendi. Comprehendi autem a seipsa non est absurdum. Hoc vero nihil est aliud quam ipsam per se porrigi et sibimet penitus adaequari. Non ergo finit se infinitus deus, cum se modo infinito inspicit infinitum, immo suam confirmat infinitatem. Neque absurdum est deum innumerabilia cernere. Non enim cernit ea gradatim enumerando, sed intuendo summatim. Et sicut plura videt tamquam unum, dum illa per unam speciem actu unico speculatur, sic infinitam multitudinem videt tamquam finitam, id est, tamquam rem quandam essentia omnino simplicem, sed quodammodo ratione multiplicem, quia formam suam revera unam vigore et respectu

els of the infinite paradigm, therefore, God sees innumerable images. In God being and understanding are completely identical. Thus, just as His being is infinite, so is His understanding infinite. Since the human intellect has the power to know things that are potentially infinite, it can multiply the number series to infinity, and it can go on at will with many other series endlessly. But if the divine intellect does not understand the things which are actually infinite, and its vision is limited to a fixed number, then I pose the question: Can it or can it not understand anything more? If it can, then God does not actually understand everything He has the power to understand. If it cannot, then the human intellect can understand more than the divine. Either proposition is absurd. So it understands infinite things in act. Because the divine mind is infinite, the Orphics rightly call it, "the infinite eye."[30]

These arguments dispose of the impious error of those philosophers who thought that God only sees what is finite on the grounds that what is seen by Him is comprehended and what is comprehended is necessarily determined. To this I would now respond that God and the things seen in God by God are the same. So whoever says that they are comprehended by God is saying nothing other than that they are comprehended by themselves. It would be absurd for an infinite thing to be comprehended by another. But it is not absurd for it to be comprehended by itself. But this just means that it extends through itself and is completely equal to itself. Thus the infinite God does not confine Himself when He looks on His infinite self in an infinite manner. Rather, He confirms His own infinity. Nor is it absurd to say that God sees an unlimited number of things. For He does not see them by gradually counting them, but by intuiting them all together. And just as He sees many things as one when He regards them via a single species in a single act of vision, so He sees an infinite plurality as finite, as something, in other words, that in its essence is entirely simple but is conceptually as it were multiple. For God re- 4 quodam considerat omniformem, perinde ac si solis lux, colorum fons omnium, quae, ut ita loquar, unicolor est, se tamquam omnicolorem percipiat.

: XI :

Deus voluntatem habet perque illam extra se efficit omnia.

1 Omnis causa per aliquam agit formam et agit effectum ipsius in forma quodammodo similem, ideoque oportet effectus formam a causa comprehendi. Cum vero deus sit omnium causa, necessarium est in eo omnium formas esse. Est ergo deus essentia omniformis. Unde Orphicum illud: Ζεὺς εἶδος πάντων, id est: 'Iupiter species omnium'. Quemadmodum vero in potentia pura, id est materia, sunt omnes naturales formae secundum confusam quandam potentiam, sic oportet in actu puro, id est deo, omnes secundum actum distinctum formas esse. Sed numquid hae formae in deo distinctae sunt secundum quendam naturae modum, quemadmodum in igne lux, calor, siccitas, levitas, perque eas agit ductus quadam naturae suae necessitate? Nequaquam.

2 Prima ratio. Deus cum omnia faciat, si per formas huiusmodi operatur, multo magis multiplex compositusque erit quam quaevis[31] alia causa, sive illae formae in eo essentiales sint sive accidentales. Oportet tamen illum esse omnium simplicissimum. Proinde neque essentiales esse possunt; nulla enim essentia usquam minus una in se esset quam divina. Neque rursum accidentales, nam quo pacto potest deus capere qualitates? Non aliunde, cum pati aliquid

gards His own form, which is in truth one form, as in power and in a certain respect omniform. It is as though the light of the Sun, the source of all color, which is as it were one-colored, were to see itself as all-colored.

: XI :

God possesses will and performs all actions external to Himself through His will.

Every cause acts through some form and produces its effect which is in a way like its form; and therefore the form of the effect must be comprehended by the cause. As God is the cause of all, necessarily the forms of all are in Him. God is therefore in essence omniform. Hence the Orphic saying: "Jupiter, form of all."[31] In pure potency, which is matter, exist all the natural forms confusedly and potentially. Similarly, in pure act, which is God, exist all the forms distinctly and actually. But, really, are these forms differentiated in God as they would be in the way of nature, just as light, heat, dryness and lightness are in fire; and does He act through them prompted by some necessity of His nature? Certainly not. 1

The first proof. Since God makes everything, if He acts through such differentiated natural forms, He will be far more manifold and more compounded than any other cause, whether these forms in Him are part of His essence or accidental. But God has to be the simplest of all. Hence they cannot be essential, for then no essence would ever be less one in itself than the divine essence. Nor can they be accidental, for how can God acquire qualities? They cannot come from elsewhere, for God cannot be acted upon in any way by anything. Nor can they come from Himself, 2

ab aliquo nequeat. Non a seipso, quippe si a se illas accipit, quantum eas dat, vicem gerit efficientis, quantum capit, gerit subiecti vicem. Conditionem vero subiecti subire non potest agens primum purusque actus, cui subiecta sunt omnia. Item, substantia non dependet ab accidente, quamvis accidens dependeat a substantia. Quod non pendet ex alio, seorsum ab alio quandoque existere valet. Igitur potest substantia quaedam seorsum ab accidentium conditionibus limitibusque existere. Quicquid libertatis bonique esse potest usquam, id totum per summi principis bonique potentiam esse potest. Quamobrem deus iam actu illa ipsa substantia est quae potest esse, immo quae est ab accidentibus libera.

3 Conducit ad idem quod effectus modo quodam praestantiore in superioribus causis quam in seipsis esse reperiuntur,[32] atque idcirco in causa summa modo aliquo praestantissimo. Cum vero effectus dei in seipsis substantiae sint, nullo modo in deo tamquam accidentia esse debent. Non tamen illic multae substantiae sunt; itaque sunt illic una quaedam, id est ipsamet dei substantia, quandoquidem oportet in deo cuncta modo quam perfectissimo inveniri atque uniri illi sibique invicem perfectissime. Nequeunt autem modo sublimiore in deo esse atque sublimius uniri tum deo tum sibi ipsis, quam si in deo sint ipse deus. Non sunt igitur in deo rerum formae secundum modum naturae distinctae, per quas naturali quadam necessitate non aliter ducatur ad operandum quam ignis ad comburendum.

4 Secunda ratio. Natura cuiusque est una quaedam forma virtusque ad unum quoddam opus certo modo determinata, toto suo impetu faciens quicquid facit, et faciens necessario. Natura siquidem ignis calida unum quoddam, caloris videlicet, opus facit[33] praecipue atque eodem semper calefacit tenore et, quantum in se est, omnes caloris gradus exercet ubique; igitur quod uno gradu ab

for were He to acquire them from Himself, then as donor He would be acting the agent's role, and as recipient the subject's. But the prime agent and pure act, to which everything is subject, cannot itself undergo the condition of being a subject.[32] Again, substance does not depend on accident, although accident depends on substance. What does not depend on something else can exist apart from it. So a substance can exist independently of the conditions and limits that govern [its] accidents. All the freedom and good that can ever exist is able to exist through the power of the Lord and Good on high. Therefore God already is actually that very substance which can exist, or rather, that substance which is free from accidents.

The following argument leads to the same conclusion. Effects are found existing in causes higher than themselves in a way superior to the way they exist in themselves. Thus in the highest cause they are found existing in the highest way possible. But since the effects of God are in themselves substances, they must not exist in any way in God as accidents. Yet substances do not exist in God as many. Therefore they are all one in Him, are His very substance, since everything has to be found in God in the most perfect way possible, and has to be in perfect union both with God and with itself. In God they cannot be in a more sublime way, or more sublimely united both with Him and with themselves, than by being God Himself in God. So in God the universal forms are not differentiated in the way of nature, are not forms by which as by some natural necessity He would be led to act, as a fire to burn.[33] 3

The second proof. The nature of a thing is a sort of form or power limited in a certain way to producing one particular result, doing whatever it does with all its force and doing it of necessity. If indeed the hot nature of fire mainly produces one result, the effect of heat, and if it always heats in the same manner, and, insofar as it can, burns everywhere with all the degrees of heat, then the fact that one material is heated to one temperature and another to a 4

ea calefiat materia haec et duobus gradibus illa, non ex agentis ordinatione procedit sed ex ordine graduum qui in praeparationibus materiarum reperiuntur. Itaque ignis toti operi non dominatur. Non enim auctor est ordinis graduum qui sunt in opere. Ac si calores duos generaret extra subiecta, quia se toto ageret utrosque, essent aequales utrique; immo et nunc in subiectis omnino similibus similes omnino aequalesque generat. Potest utique natura vel per diversa media vel ex diversis materiis diversa facere. Sublata vero mediorum materiarumque diversitate vel unicum vel simillimum operatur, neque potest, quando adest materia, non operari. Deus autem solus materiam primam corporum et essentias mentium animorumque quam plurimas absque medio subiectoque procreat, quae quidem inter se longe diversae sunt multisque perfectionis gradibus inter se discretae. Merito deus, quia primum agens est, usque adeo universo ipsius operi dominatur ut ipsemet et formas et formarum ordinem graduumque distinctionem efficere valeat. Nullum vero agens effectus et pauciores et minus varios faceret quam deus, immo unicum prorsus ageret deus, si per solum merae naturae modum operaretur, cum divina natura sit omnium simplicissima. Non ergo naturali instinctu impellitur ad agendum.

5 Tertia ratio. Si intellegentia in nobis est efficax et in angelis efficacior, oportet intellegentiam in deo efficacissimam esse. Idem in deo est natura eius atque intellegentia. Idem quoque operationis naturalis modus atque operationis intellectualis ubique esse solet, siquidem tam natura quam intellegentia per formam agit et simile aliquid operatur in forma. Non ergo dicendus est deus aut per nudam naturam aut per adventitiam intellegentiam operari; immo per naturam intellectualem et intellegentiam naturalem. Deo, quia causa prima communisque et felicissima est, operatio convenit na-

temperature twice as hot results not from [fire as] the agent regulating it, but from the determination of the degrees of intensity found in the dispositions of the materials. So fire does not control the result in its entirety. For it is not the cause of the determination of the degrees of heat in what burns. Suppose fire produced two temperatures independently of the materials. Because it would be producing them totally by itself, the temperatures would be equal to each other. Or rather, the fire now generates completely similar and equal temperatures in fuels which are entirely alike. Nature undoubtedly can produce diverse effects either from diverse materials or through diverse means. Take away the diversity of means or materials, however, and it produces the same one or a very similar result. Nor can it not produce when material is present. God alone creates the prime matter of bodies and as many essences of minds and rational souls as possible without an intermediary or a substrate. These differ vastly from each other and are mutually separated by many degrees of perfection. It is not surprising that God, being the prime agent, has such lordship over His entire creation that He Himself can bring forms into being, set them in order, and differentiate one degree from another. But no agent would produce fewer or less varied effects than God, or rather God would do just one thing, if He acted only by way of an unadorned nature, divine nature being the simplest of all. Therefore no [mere] natural instinct impels God to action.[34]

The third proof. If understanding is effective in us and even more effective in the angels, then it has to be most effective in God. In God His nature and understanding are identical. Now the natural and intellectual modes of acting are also everywhere customarily the same, since nature and understanding alike act through form and enact something similar in form. So one should not say that God acts either through an unadorned nature or through extrinsic understanding. Rather, He acts through [His] intellectual nature and natural understanding. Because He is the 5

turalis, quae ceteris prior est, communior et facilior; rursus, quia causa pretiosissima est, convenit operatio intellectualis, quae prior est dignitate in nobis, quamvis non tempore, ideoque est in rerum ordine prima et tamquam pretiosa praestantioribus dumtaxat congruit speciebus. Propria igitur operatio dei est operatio utraque. Est autem apud Platonicos unica divinae essentiae, prout deus est, proprietas. Est igitur utraque in deo eadem operatio.

6 Quarta ratio. Natura nuda bonum hoc respicit aut illud; natura intellectualis universale bonum. Causa igitur quae per nudam agit naturam ita comparatur ad causam quae per naturam agit intellectualem, sicut particularis causa ad universalem et minister ad architectum. Mundi itaque architectus per naturam intellectualem, quantum intellectualis est, operatur.

7 Quinta ratio. Illa prae ceteris operatio deo congruit per quam deus neque ex suo statu neque ex sua simplicitate labatur. Talis in primis est operatio mentis. Operatio naturalis ab agente quidem incipit, sed desinit in id quod patitur, sicut calefactio ab igne in lignum. Intellectualis autem utrumque terminum retinet in agente. Per hanc enim deus, dum se speculando versatur secum, undique versat externa atque, ut Parmenides pythagoreus inquit, rerum orbem mobilem rotat dum se servat immobilem. Oportet praeterea deum esse penitus uniformem, quia super omnium formas existit; immo et omniformem, quia formator est omnium. Quod uniformis simul et omniformis esse queat, sola intellectualis natura facit. Per hanc forma dei seipsam intuendo se concipit tamquam propriam formarum omnium rationem. Videt enim in se quicquid est cuique proprium, dum cernit quo gradu divinam formam quodli-

prime, universal and most propitious cause, natural activity is proper to God, being prior to, and more universal and more easy than, other activities. On the other hand, because He is the most precious cause, proper to Him is intellectual activity, which in us is the first in dignity if not in time and so it is first in the universal order; and as the most precious activity, it is in accord only with the more eminent species. Thus both activities are the proper activity of God. However, for the Platonists, in the divine essence insofar as it is God there is just one property. Thus in God the two activities are identical.

The fourth proof. A mere nature looks to particular goods, but an intellectual nature to the universal good. So the cause that acts through an unadorned nature compared to the cause that acts through an intellectual nature is like a particular cause compared to a universal one, or an assistant to an architect. Thus the architect of the world, insofar as He is intellectual, acts through [His] intellectual nature.[35] 6

The fifth proof. The sort of activity which best accords with God is the one that does not undermine His changelessness or His simplicity. Such above all is the activity of mind. The activity of nature starts in the agent, but ceases in the object acted on, just as heating goes from the fire to the fuel. But intellectual activity retains both termini in the agent. For through intellectual activity God, while He is engaged in contemplating Himself, is everywhere pondering external things; and thus, as Parmenides the Pythagorean puts it,[36] He makes the universal moving orb rotate while He remains motionless Himself. Moreover, God must be utterly uniform because He exists above the forms of all things. Or rather, He must be omniform because He is the giver of forms to everything. That He can be uniform and omniform at the same time is due solely to [His] intellectual nature. Through it God's form, in regarding itself, conceives of itself as the rational principle proper to all foms. For it sees in itself whatever is proper to each 7

bet imitari queat quove deficere. Ut ecce: dum intellegit formam suam per modum vitae, non autem cognitionis, ut ita loquar, imitabilem, concipit formam ideamque plantarum; dum vero imitabilem per modum cognitionis quidem, sed non intellegentiae, propriam animalis ideam; atque ceteras eodem pacto. Profecto in omnibus quae non casu sed vel natura vel proposito fiunt, necesse est effectionis finem esse effecti operis formam. Causa vero agens actionem ad formam non ob aliud quicquam dirigit quam per formam in ipsa manentem. Neque ad certas dirigit formas aliter quam vel per certas formas vel per certas formarum rationes in seipsa conceptas. Cum igitur mirabilis ordo mundi casu ordinis experte[34] constare non possit, necesse est in opificis ipsius intellegentia formam esse, ad cuius similitudinem sit effectus. Et quoniam dei proposito universi ordo potissimus est, principalis penes illum idea est idea ordinis universi. Ratio vero ordinis atque totius haberi non potest, nisi rationes propriae partium omnium ex quibus totum constituitur habeantur, quemadmodum architectus aedificii speciem non potest concipere, nisi proprias partium eius conceperit rationes.

8 Proprie igitur in deo sunt omnium rationes. Neque aliunde rerum species habent ut distinctae sint, quam unde habent ut sint. Neque divina simplicitas ob idearum multitudinem minus est simplex, cum per formam unam unoque intuitu omnes contueatur. Neque dicitur idea divina essentia prout simpliciter est essentia, sed quantum huius speciei vel illius est exemplar. Quocirca quatenus rationes ex una essentia plures intelleguntur, eatenus plures dicuntur ideae,[35] respectusque huiusmodi quibus multiplicantur ideae non a rebus ipsis efficiuntur, immo ab intellectu divino suam

form when it discerns to what degree something can imitate the divine form and to what degree fall short of it. For instance, when it understands its own form as imitable in the mode of life but not of knowledge (if I may put it like that), then it is conceiving of the form and idea of plants; but when as imitable in the mode of knowledge but not of understanding, then it is conceiving of the idea proper to the animal, and so on.[37] In everything that happens not by chance but by nature or design, the goal of the effecting process is necessarily the form of the work effected. But the active cause directs the action towards that form not on account of something else but through the form abiding in itself. It does not direct the action towards particular forms except by way of certain forms or certain rational principles of forms, rational principles conceived in itself. Thus, since the amazing order of the world could not come about through chance devoid of order, [its] form must necessarily exist in the understanding of its maker, in whose likeness it is made. And since the order of the universe is the most important for God's plan, the principal idea with Him is the idea of the universe's order. But one cannot conceive of the rational principle of the order and the whole unless one [first] conceives of the rational principles proper to all the parts from which the whole is constituted, just as an architect cannot conceive of the appearance of a building unless he has conceived of the reasons proper to its parts.

Properly then the rational principles of all things are in God.[38] 8
Things' species derive their distinctions whence they derive their being. Nor is the divine simplicity any less simple on account of this multitude of ideas, since God perceives them all by way of one form and at a single glance. The divine essence is called an idea not according as it is essence absolutely, but insofar as it is the model of this or that species. Thus, insofar as the many rational principles deriving from one essence are understood to be many, to that extent the ideas are said to be many; and such relations[39] (by

ad res essentiam comparante. Neque sunt, ut ita dicam, reales respectus huiusmodi, quales illi quibus personae distingui dicuntur, sed potius intellecti. Sub una idea multa et cognoscuntur et fiunt. Nonnulla etiam per ideam aliorum perspiciuntur, utpote per ideam boni atque habitus malum atque privatio et, ut quidam putant, per ideam formae materia. Proprietates quoque substantiae per ideam substantiae cognoscuntur, qualitates vero communes propriis designantur ideis, quemadmodum architectus per domus ipsius formam omnia effecit accidentia quae domum a principio comitantur. Sed quae domui iam factae contingunt, puta picturae atque similia, per alias disponuntur ideas.

9 Sed iam diffusius quam proposuimus de ideis hic quasi casu quodam occasionem nacti tractavimus. Haec autem est, etsi canes quidam aliter latrant, certissima Platonis nostri Platonicorumque sententia. Quod et supra tetigimus et alias latius declarabimus.

10 Probavimus hactenus primam causam varios effectus suos per multiplicem sapientiae ordinem operari, potius quam per nudae simplicisque naturae necessitatem. Probabimus deinceps volente deo non operari eum externos effectus per meram intellegentiam, nisi accedat voluntatis assensus. Quod quidem disputationis huius erat propositum.

11 Prima ratio. Causa prima omnia per se, ut in sequentibus ostendemus, ad finem optimum per vias rectissimas modo congruentissimo dirigit. Hoc facere nequit, nisi per intellectum anticipet

which the ideas are multiplied) result not from things themselves but rather from the divine intellect comparing its own essence to things. Such relations are not, so to speak, real in the same way as the relations are real by which persons[40] are said to be distinguished, but rather are relations of the intellect. Under one idea many things are known and are brought into being. Some things are even apprehended through the idea of their opposite, as evil and privation through the idea of good and of habit, or, as some people think, matter through the idea of form. So the properties of a substance are known through the idea of that substance, whereas the common qualities are designated by their own ideas, just as an architect realizes all the accidental characteristics which accompany a house from its beginning by way of the form of the house itself. But additions to the house after its completion, pictures and such like, are arranged by way of other ideas.

I have treated the subject of ideas at greater length than I intended, taking the opportunity that chance offered. Although some dogs may bark to a different tune, these are the views of our beloved Plato and the Platonists, and most true they are. What I have also just touched on above I will demonstrate more fully elsewhere. 9

So far I have shown that the first cause produces His various effects through the manifold structure of His wisdom rather than through any compulsion of [His] unadorned and simple nature. Now I shall show, God willing, that He does not produce these effects outside Himself through His pure understanding unless, additionally, His will assents. This was the goal, after all, of this discussion. 10

The first proof. Through itself the first cause, as I shall demonstrate below, guides everything to the best end by the most direct routes and in the most appropriate way. It cannot do this unless, through its intellect, it anticipates the end, discerns the routes, 11

finem, discernat vias, metiatur proportionem quae inter vias est ac finem; per voluntatem rursus finem approbet ac viam talem prae ceteris eligat. Hinc Plato in *Timaeo, Phaedone, Philebo, Politico* illos philosophos detestatur, qui naturalium rerum causas vel ad fortunam vel ad ipsam sive materiae sive naturae necessitatem referunt. Ipse vero naturalia quidem existimat instrumenta quaedam intellegentiae potius quam agentia, singulosque effectus praecipue ad finalem, efficientem, formalem causam ubique reducit. Quamobrem si quis quaerat quam ob causam terra sit rotunda, respondet quia videlicet rotunditatis idea participat, ad cuius similitudinem sapientia mundi artifex idcirco terram disposuit, quoniam iudicavit voluitque boni ipsius gratia fore melius ita sese habere.

12 Secunda ratio. Quod comitatur quicquid est, id enti, quantum ens est, convenit. Quod tale est, in eo quod primum ens est, reperiatur oportet. At quicquid est, hoc habet ut et absens bonum appetat, et in praesenti bono libentissime conquiescat. Profecto natura, sensus, intellectus absens bonum appetit, praesens amplectitur. Totum hoc natura sensus[36] expers per inclinationem quandam facit, sensus per appetitum, intellectus per voluntatem. Ergo cum deus sit, ut peripatetico more loquar, ens primum, quis divinum intellectum negabit praesens bonum suum, quod est omne bonum, per voluntatem libenter amplecti? Sicut in sua veritate videt omnia vera quae ipsa illuminante fiunt vera, ita in sua bonitate vult bona omnia quae et ipsius propagatione nascuntur et ipsa perficiente fiunt bona. Mens autem quaelibet volendo facit opera potius quam videndo. Videndo enim replicat formas intus, volendo eas explicat extra; videndo respicit verum, cui propria puritas est, volendo attingit bonum, cui propria est diffusio.

and measures the proportion between the routes and the end; and unless, through its will, it approves the end, and chooses one particular route over the others.[41] Hence in the *Timaeus*, the *Phaedo*, the *Philebus* and the *Statesman*,[42] Plato expressed his abhorrence of those philosophers who refer the causes of natural things either to fortune or to some necessity of matter or of nature. He himself considers natural things the instruments of understanding rather than as agents, and everywhere he refers all individual effects back principally to the final, efficient, and formal cause. Thus if you ask him why the world is round, his reply is that it is so because it participates in the idea of roundness, and that the craftsman of the world in His wisdom fashioned it in the likeness of that idea, since He adjudged and willed that for the good's sake it would be better so.

The second proof. What accompanies whatever exists belongs 12 to that entity as an entity. Such has to be found present in that which is the first being. But whatever exists will both desire the absent good and rest content most willingly in the present good. The nature, sense and intellect all desire the absent good and embrace the present good. The nature devoid of sense does it entirely through some inclination, whereas sense does it through desire, and the intellect through the will. Therefore, since God is — to speak like an Aristotelian — the prime being, who can deny that the divine intellect freely embraces its own present good, which is the whole good, through the will? Just as God in His own truth sees all the true things which are made true by truth illuminating them, so in His own goodness He wills all the good things which are born good by the propagation of goodness and by its perfecting them. But mind fashions all its works by willing rather than by seeing. For by seeing it reflects upon the forms within, whereas by willing it unfolds them without. By seeing it gazes at the true whose property is purity, whereas by willing it attains the good whose property is [its] diffusion.[43]

13 Tertia ratio. Sensus intellectusque ipsius cognitio, quia tamquam imaginarium quiddam in creaturis est, nullum substantialem effectum efficit, nisi per affectum, quod essentiale quiddam esse videtur; unde quanto vehementius afficitur, tanto potentius operatur. Quod quidem indicat quodammodo struthii oculus avidissime intentus in ovum. Si intellegentia dei in creando efficacior est quam struthii intuitus in fovendo, immo si immensae est efficaciae, quod patet ex eo quod neque subiecto neque instrumento neque tempore indiget in creando, coniectari possumus voluntatis affectum esse in divina intellegentia potentissimum. Adde et iocundissimum, si modo intellegentia quae perfectissima est quaeve integerrimo et perfectissimo obiecto semper et undique fruitur, suavissima esse debet.

14 Quarta ratio. Ubi non est voluntas, quae est inclinatio mentis ad bonum, ibi non est mentis voluptas, quae est dilatatio voluntatis in bonum et quies voluntatis in bono. Si non est ibi voluptas ubi est ipsum bonum, nusquam voluptas erit, quae, ubicumque est, fit ratione boni. In ipso igitur bono voluptas est et voluntas. Affectus huiusmodi, si in creaturis est generationis initium, certe in creatore ipso est creationis origo.

15 Quinta ratio. Si agentia omnia tam secundum naturam quam secundum artem opera sua semper ad finem, id est, ad bonum ordinant et bonitate sua id faciunt, accipiunt autem operandi ordinem ab agente primo atque illud est ipsum bonum, constat ipsum opera sua ad finem optimum ordinare. Si enim bona particularia, quia bona sunt et quia ordinantur a summo bono, ad bonum aliquod ordinant singula, quanto magis universale bonum ordinabit ad bonum cuncta, videlicet ad universale bonum? Deus igitur ad

The third proof. The knowledge that comes from the senses and the intellect, because it is in created things like something imaginary, produces no substantial effect except through an affect [of the will],[44] in that it seems to be something essential. Hence the stronger the will is affected, the more powerfully it acts. A good example in a way is the ostrich's eye so avidly fixed on its egg. If God's understanding is more effective in creating than the ostrich's gaze in hatching an egg, or rather if it is superlatively effective—and this is proved by the fact that in creating it needs no substrate, no instrument and no time—then we can conjecture that the affect of the will is most powerful in the divine understanding. One might add that the affect has to be most joyful there, if only because the divine understanding—which is utterly perfect and always and everywhere enjoys the most complete and perfect object—has to be the most delightful. 13

The fourth proof. Will is the inclination of the mind towards the good, and where it does not exist the mind has no pleasure; for pleasure is the dilation [or reaching out] of the will towards the good and the repose of the will in the good. If there were no pleasure where the good is, there would be no pleasure anywhere, for wherever pleasure exists it comes by reason of the good. So pleasure and will are in the good itself. The affect [of the will], if it is the starting point of generation in creatures, is certainly the origin of creation in the Creator Himself. 14

The fifth proof. If all agents, whether naturally or artfully, order their works towards an end, namely the good, and if they do this by their goodness while accepting the order of doing it from the prime agent (and that is the good itself), then it is agreed that the good orders its works towards the best of ends. For if particular goods, because they are good and because they are ordered by the highest good, order individual things towards a particular good, how much more will the universal good direct all things towards the good, that is, towards the universal good? So God draws all 15

seipsum tamquam finem ducit omnia. Nullus enim actionis divinae finis est extra deum, quoniam finis in eodem ordine locatur, una cum eo quod agit ad finem estque bonum quiddam et causam movet agentem. Nihil autem in eodem ordine cum deo locatur, nisi ipse deus. Deus alieno non servit bono. Numquam enim particulari bono servit omne bonum. Deus insuper non movetur ab aliquo. Si dei finis est ipsa sua bonitas, deus suo modo suam appetit et diligit bonitatem. Cum vero et deus sit intellectualis et bonitas eius intellegibilis, intellectuali dilectione diligit eam. Dilectio huiusmodi in voluntate versatur. Deus igitur vult seipsum. Vult inquam se tamquam finem sui ipsius et omnium. Ex voluntate autem finis provenit operatio circa illa quae diriguntur ad finem. Quapropter divina voluntas, ut Plato in *Timaeo* inquit, creaturarum omnium est initium.[37] Idem apud Mercurium Trismegistum saepissime legitur. Putant enim principium universi perfectissimum actionis modum habere debere, id est, ut voluntate sua omnino sit effectionis dominus, qui omnino est dominus effectorum, dominus inquam libera voluntate disponens. Nam si necessitate vel naturae vel intellegentiae ageret, ageret[38] simul omnia atque infinita simul; singula quoque cogeret et momento raptaret.

things towards Himself as the end. For there is no end of divine action outside God, because the end is located in the same order as the agent that moves things towards the end. The end is something good and it moves the moving cause. But nothing can belong to the same order as God except God. God is not a slave to a good outside Himself. For the universal good is never a slave to a particular good. Moreover, God is not moved by another. If God's end is His own goodness, God in His own way desires and loves His own goodness. But since God is intellectual and His goodness is intelligible, He loves it with an intellectual love. Such love involves the will. God therefore wills Himself. He wills Himself as His own end and as the end of everything else. But activity in respect to things that are directed towards the end springs from the will for the end. So the divine will, as Plato says in the *Timaeus*,[45] is the beginning of all created things.[46] We find the same view expressed time and again in Mercury Trismegistus.[47] They both believe that the principle of the universe must have the most perfect mode of action: that He, who is the lord of all that is made, must through His will be the lord of all making, and by "lord" I mean He who disposes by His free will. For if He acted by the necessity of [His] nature or understanding, He would enact all things and infinite things at the same time, and in one moment compel individual things to be and [yet] destroy them.

: XII :

Voluntas dei necessaria simul et libera est, et agit libere.

1 Satis probatum, arbitror, deum non necessitate naturae aut intellegentiae sed voluntatis imperio singula procreare. Quemadmodum vero voluntas eius necessaria simul et libera sit, in praesentia demonstrandum esse censeo.

2 Ratio prima. Caveat quisque diligentissime ne in tam temerariam impietatem fortuito incidat, ut aliquando suspicetur deum ita esse operarique ut forte contigerit. Si nulli umquam rei forte contingit esse operarique id quod naturaliter est operaturque — puta igni non contingit sorte sed oportet quod calidus sit et calefaciat — summo autem enti naturale est ut sit et summo actui naturale est ut agat, sequitur deum, qui summum ens et plus quam ens et summus actus existit, nullo modo secundum contingentiam esse vel agere. Si ubi plus est rationis, ibi sortis est minus, in deo qui summa ratio est vel fons rationis, nihil potest cogitari fortuitum. Si fortuna non efficit rationem, cum eius contraria sit, immo sit privatio rationis sive defectus, quonam pacto producit aut deum aut divinam aliquam actionem qualibet ratione superiorem? Si deus est illa ipsa regula ita rerum omnium ordinatrix ut ab eis quae proxime sequuntur eam omnem contingentiam auferat, quomodo eum sorte quadam obtigit sic esse vel operari? Quamobrem deus non ut obtigit ita existit et agit — alioquin nullus usquam ordo reperiretur umquam — sed ut decuit, immo ut decet. Decet autem, quia decorum. Ipse vero decor est ipse deus, a quo et per quem omnia decentia fiunt. Immo vero est agitque ut necesse est. Necesse est per ipsam necessitatem. Necessitas autem ipse est

: XII :

The will of God is necessary and free at the same time and acts freely.

I think it has been sufficiently shown that God creates individual things not through any necessity of [His] nature or understanding, but through [His] will's command. Now I have to demonstrate, I think, how His will is necessary and free at the same time. 1

The first proof. Every person should take extreme care not to fall unawares into the mindless blasphemy of ever supposing that God exists and acts by chance. If nothing ever is or does by chance what it is and does naturally — fire, for instance, does not happen by chance but is hot and makes things hot of necessity — but if it is natural for the highest being to be and for the highest act to act, then it follows that God, who is the highest being (and more than being) and the highest act, cannot be or act in any way contingently. If there is less of chance where there is more of reason, nothing can be supposed fortuitous in God who is the highest reason and the fount of reason. If fortune does not produce reason, since it is reason's contrary, nay, the taking away or lack of reason, how can it produce either God or any divine action superior to any reason? If God is that rational law which so orders the universe that it strips away all contingency from the things which follow it most closely, how could it happen by chance that God thus exists and acts? Wherefore God does not exist and act thus by chance — otherwise it would be impossible to find order anywhere — but as it behooved Him, nay as it behooves Him. It behooves Him because it is becoming. But comeliness itself is God Himself from whom and through whom all things are becoming. Or rather, He is and He acts as it is necessary. It is necessary through necessity itself. But necessity is God Himself, and 2

deus, per quem et cetera necessaria sunt quaecumque sunt necessaria. Igitur ita est deus ut est. Ita agit ut agit. Et quoniam necessitati nulla praeest necessitas, ideo ibi est summa libertas. Libertas est appetibilis tamquam bonum. In summa vero bonitate est quicquid usquam desiderari potest tamquam bonum. Liber est quicumque vivit ut vult. Vivit ut vult prae ceteris ipsa bonitas, cuius vitam vult voluntas omnis, praeter quam nihil aliqua vult voluntas. Est deus id quod est, ita ut aliud non potuerit esse, quia est, ut ita dicam, omne ens omnisque potestas, immo neque voluerit, quia est omne bonum. Posse autem aut velle aliter se habere imbecillitas esset insipientiaque in deterius, immo in nihilum ruitura.

3 Ratio secunda. Si incitamentum boni in singulis maxime omnium necessarium est et maxime omnium voluntarium spontaneumque, certe in ipso bono summa naturae necessitas una cum summa voluntatis libertate concurrit, ut alias probavimus. Atque ibi naturae necessitas voluntatis confirmat libertatem et libertas necessitati consentit, usque adeo ut necessario liber voluntariusque deus sit et voluntarie necessarius.

4 Ratio tertia. Quamdiu res aliqua boni ipsius quasi est expers, tamdiu sibi displicet et aliud quiddam praeter se expetit. Quando vero fit boni particeps, iam sibi ipsi placet seque vult et talis est iam qualis vult esse. Et quo magis hoc assequitur, eo magis sibi placet magisque talis est qualem se esse vult ipsa. Quapropter ipsum bonum in primis hoc habet, ut se velit summopere sibique placeat et tale sit omnino quale vult ipsum.

5 Ratio quarta. Si quanto magis aliqua deo propinquant, tanto minus servilia sunt magisque sui iuris evadunt, deus sui iuris est maxime, ut non modo, qualis ipse suapte natura est, talia velit, verum etiam, qualiter vult, talis sit omnino; rursus qualia vult, talia

through Him all other necessary things are necessary. Therefore God is as He is, and acts as He acts. Since necessity is not subject to necessity, in God, accordingly, is the highest freedom. Freedom is desirable as a good. But in the highest good is everything that can ever be desired as good. Whoever lives as he wants to live is free. But goodness itself, above all other goods, lives as it wants to live and every will wants its life and no will wants anything except it. God is what He is such that He could not be something else, because He is, so to speak, all being and all power; or rather, He would not want to be something else because He is all good. But to be able or to want to be different would be weakness or folly, and would ensure [His] degeneration, nay [His] annihilation.

The second proof. If the stimulus of the good in individual entities is the most necessary of all things and yet the most voluntary and spontaneous, certainly the highest necessity of nature along with the highest freedom of the will meet in the good itself (as I have demonstrated elsewhere). There the necessity of nature confirms the freedom of the will, and freedom so accords with necessity that God is necessarily free and willing and willingly necessary. 3

The third proof. As long as something has almost no share of the good, it is displeasing to itself and desires something other than itself. But when it comes to participate in the good, it is now pleasing to itself and wants itself and is now such as it wants to be; and the more it achieves this goal, the more pleasing it is to itself and the more it is such as it wants itself to be. So the good itself is preeminently such that it most wants itself and is pleasing to itself and is utterly such as it wants itself to be. 4

The fourth proof. If the closer things get to God, the less subservient they are, and the more independent they become, then God is independent to the highest degree, so that not only does He want things such as He is Himself in His own nature, but also He is completely such as He wants to be; on the other hand, He 5

quoque faciat et cuius gratia. Nullum enim[39] agens usquam vel suae actionis liberum principium erit vel finem suae actioni praescribet, nisi principium finisque universi et suae actionis sit dominus et finem suae statuerit actioni. Sed ad propositum redeamus.

6 Ratio quinta. In quibus tria haec — scilicet esse, intellegere, velle — re ipsa inter se discrepant, in iis non est absoluta libertas, quoniam in rebus huiusmodi modus volendi sequitur intellegendi normam; haec essendi conditionem; esse denique sequitur eum qui dedit esse. At in deo idem est re ipsa esse, intellegere, velle. Quamobrem ita est per voluntatem suam intellegentiae essentiaeque suae compos, ut non modo sicut est et sicut intellegit suapte natura, ita quoque velit, verum etiam sicuti vult, ita intellegat atque existat. Ob hanc forsitan rationem Zoroastris sectatores tradunt deum quodammodo agere semetipsum. Quod in hunc ferme modum, quem dicam, Plotinus exposuit. Deus est actus, non alterius, non circa alterum, sed suimet et circa seipsum. Est enim actus intra se manens. Quoniam vero actus est propter naturam infiniti boni infinite fecundus, ideo non caret acto, id est genito, acto scilicet infinito. At quoniam et per actum intimum fit aliquid intimum et solus deus est infinitus, quod inde actum, id est genitum, est intra deum, est ipsemet deus. Deus est actus pervigil atque perpetuus ex se, in se, circa se penitus. Ergo ut agit et vigilat, ita prorsus existit. Totus nixus divini actus circa se vertitur. At dum sibi innititur, quodammodo seipsum agit, id est gignit, quia si respexerit alio, se perdet. Quapropter esse divinum actus est ad seipsum, quando non esse divinum foret actus ad aliud. Deus vult seipsum. Velle autem et agere, immo etiam esse, idem est omnino. Igitur se volendo se agit, id est producit, immo se iam

does such things too as He wants to do and He does them for His own sake. For no agent will ever be the free beginning of its own action or prescribe the end to its own action unless it is the beginning and end of the universe: unless it is the lord of its own action and has prescribed an end to its own action. But let us return to the argument.

The fifth proof. In those things where being, understanding and willing are truly at odds there is no absolute freedom, because in things of this kind the manner of willing follows the rule of understanding, and this in turn follows the condition of being, and being follows the one who gave it being. But in God being, understanding, and willing are truly identical. Wherefore He is compounded of His understanding and essence by means of His will, such that not only does He will just as He is and as He understands in His own nature, but He also understands and exists just as He wills. That is perhaps why the disciples of Zoroaster teach us that God in some way enacts Himself. Plotinus has explained this more or less as follows: God is act, not of another, not for another, but of Himself and for Himself.[48] For He is act remaining within itself. But because such act is infinitely abundant on account of the nature of the infinite good, it does not lack what is acted, produced in other words, and that is infinite. But since an internal act has an internal product, and since God alone is infinite, what is thence acted, that is, produced, is within God, indeed is God Himself. God is act, unsleeping and perpetual, from Himself, in Himself, and wholly with regard to Himself. Thus as He acts and keeps watch so He exists absolutely. The whole thrust of the divine act is centered on itself. Yet as long as God thus depends on Himself, in a way He enacts Himself, produces Himself in other words, because if He looked to another He would destroy Himself. So divine being is act directed towards itself, since divine not-being would be act directed towards another. God wills Himself. But willing and doing — indeed even being — are utterly iden- 6 ponit vel signat in esse. Ex iis[40] confici vult Plotinus deum non ita esse ut sorte obtigit vel ut coegit necessitas, sed ut vigilat, agit atque vult ipse. Sed haec deus ipse viderit. A nobis vero id tantum ubique affirmari optamus, quod deo sit dignum, quale est quod ante proposuimus, in deo videlicet cum summa necessitate summam congredi libertatem.

7 Ratio sexta. Sola divina bonitas est absolutum divinae mentis obiectum. Nam quaelibet vis aequari obiecto potest, excedere minime. Nihil autem extra deum est quod deus excedere nequeat. Vult autem seipsum deus absoluta quadam voluntatis necessitate. Ultimum namque finem suum necessario volunt omnia. Divina bonitas dei finis est ultimus, cuius gratia vult quicquid vult. Aut ergo fatendum est deum nihil velle atque esse gustus omnis expertem, quod est absurdum, aut affirmandum, si quid vult, necessario velle seipsum, praesertim cum in deo esse ac velle sit idem. Volendo se vult reliqua omnia, quae, prout in deo sunt, sunt ipse deus; prout ex deo manant, sunt divini vultus imagines atque ad divinam bonitatem referendam comprobandamque, tamquam ad finem praecipuum, ordinantur. At vero ille divinae voluntatis actus qui prout divinam respicit bonitatem absolute necessarius est — ille inquam prout respicit creaturas a quibusdam non absolute necessarius appellatur. Nam quamvis voluntas finem ipsum necessario velit omnino, ea tamen quae diriguntur ad finem conditionali quadam necessitate vult, immo etiam nonnumquam nulla necessitate vult, si quid ex illis est, sine quo finis possideri queat. Divina autem bonitas non indiget creaturis.

8 Ratio septima. Conducit ad haec quod deus volendo propriam

tical. Therefore, by willing Himself, He enacts Himself, that is to say, He produces Himself; or rather, He already puts Himself or impresses Himself into being. Plotinus wishes to conclude from this that God is not as He is by chance or as necessity compels, but as He Himself keeps watch, and acts, and wills. But let God Himself resolve such mysteries. As for me, I choose at all points only to affirm what befits God, as in the argument above when I argued that the highest freedom and the highest necessity conjoin in God.

The sixth proof. Divine goodness alone is the absolute object of the divine mind. For a faculty can equal its object but cannot exceed it. But nothing exists outside God that God cannot exceed. God wills Himself with an absolute necessity of His will. For all things necessarily want their ultimate end. Divine goodness is God's ultimate end, and for its sake He wills whatever He wills. We must therefore either confess that God wills nothing and is devoid of all preference, which is absurd; or we must affirm that, if He does will, He necessarily wills Himself, especially since being and willing are identical in God. By willing Himself, He wills all other things, which, to the extent that they are in God, are God Himself; and to the extent that they emanate from God, are images of the divine countenance and are set in order for the principal purpose of referring to and confirming the divine goodness. But the act of the divine will, which insofar as it regards the divine goodness is absolutely necessary, this act, I say, insofar as it regards creatures, some people pronounce not absolutely necessary. For although the will necessarily completely wills its own end, yet it wills those things which are means to the end by a conditional necessity; or rather, it sometimes even wills with no necessity at all, if among them there is anything in the absence of which the end is still attainable. The divine goodness, however, has no need of created things.[49] 7

The seventh proof. Confirming this is the fact that God, in 8 bonitatem non ob aliud vult alia bona nisi tamquam ipsius imagines. Cum autem divina bonitas immensa sit, innumerabiles ad eius exemplar effingi imagines possunt — innumerabiles inquam praeter eas insuper quae in his saeculis effinguntur. Itaque si ex eo quod propriam vult bonitatem, necessario esse vellet singula quae imitari eam possunt, certe vellet infinitas creaturas existere, infinitis modis divinam bonitatem repraesentantes. Si autem vellet, utique essent. Sed hac in re meminisse oportet, ut placet divo Thomae Aquinati nostro, splendori theologiae, quamquam divinae voluntatis actus secundum conditionem positionemve quandam dici potest rem hanc aut illam necessario velle (videlicet postquam semel eam voluit, cum sit divina voluntas non aliter immutabilis quam essentia), ipsum tamen suapte natura non habere eum necessitatis absolutae respectum ad effectus suos quem ad seipsum habet.

9 Ratio octava. Si deus est perfecta entis causa atque ens proprius est effectus dei, eo usque saltem dei actus amplificare se potest, quo usque entis potentia potest amplificari, praesertim cum passivam potentiam ab actu superiore duci oporteat. At in huiusmodi potentia entis continetur quicquid rationi entis non adversatur, quemadmodum in potentia corporalis naturae sunt quaecumque naturam non auferunt corporalem. Nihil autem effingi potest quod entis rationi repugnet, nisi eius oppositum, hoc est, quod dicitur non ens. Contradictio sola rationem non entis includit. Quaecumque igitur contradictionem nullam includunt, ut Peripatetici putant, in entis potentia includuntur atque ea omnia potest deus efficere. Quod inde confirmatur quod mens exclusa contradictione potest per omnem, immo per immensam, entis latitudinem se porrigere. Non debet autem effectrix dei potestas minus

willing His own goodness, wills other goods for no other reason except as images of Himself. But since the divine goodness is measureless, innumerable images can be fashioned after its likeness — innumerable in the sense of over and beyond the images which have been fashioned in this world already. If it necessarily followed from the fact that He wills His own goodness that He would will objects to exist which can imitate His goodness, then He would certainly will infinite creatures to exist which represent the divine goodness in infinite ways. But if He should [so] will, then they would exist. We should remember at this point, however, that our divine Thomas Aquinas, theology's splendor, was of the opinion that although the act of the divine will, in terms of a particular condition or position, can be said necessarily to will this or that thing (after God has once willed it, that is, since the divine will is as immutable as the [divine] essence), yet God in His own nature does not have that respect of absolute necessity with regard to His effects as He has to Himself.[50]

The eighth proof. If God is the perfect cause of an entity and an entity is properly an effect of God, then God's act can extend itself at least as far as an entity's potentiality can be extended, especially since the passive potentiality must be led by the higher act. But whatever is contained in this entity's potentiality is not opposed to the entity's rational principle, just as in the potentiality of corporeal nature are all the things which do not detract from corporeal nature. One can imagine nothing which is in conflict with an entity's rational principle except its opposite, which is called a non-entity. Contradiction alone includes the rational principle of a non-entity. Therefore, as the Peripatetics maintain, whatever includes no contradiction is included in an entity's potentiality; and God can make all such things. This is confirmed by the fact that, if we exclude contradiction, mind can extend itself through the whole expanse, nay through the measureless expanse, of being.[51] But God's power to effect should not be less abundant 9

ampla esse quam mentis potentia machinatrix. Adde quod si divinus intellectus bona innumerabilia intuetur, voluntas autem eius ad omnia illa se potest convertere quae intellectus offert tamquam bona, consequens est ut voluntas dei finitis obiectis non adstringatur; igitur et potestas eius ad infinita se porrigit. Quorsum haec? Ut intellegas quicquid contradictionem non includit divinae potentiae subiici atque, cum multa non sint in natura rerum, quae tamen si essent, contradictionem nullam inferrent (quod patet praecipue circa numerum, magnitudinem intervallaque stellarum), scias plurima sub divina potentia contineri, quae tamen in rerum ordine numquam reperiuntur; et cum deus eorum quae potest quaedam faciat, quaedam non faciat, eum nulla vel naturae vel intellegentiae vel voluntatis necessitate, sed libera voluntatis electione talia operari.

10 Ratio nona. Non iniuria deus electione, ut ita dixerim, quadam operari dicendus est, siquidem agentia omnia, quaecumque per aliud agunt ducunturque ad operandum, reducenda sunt ad agens primum. Quod ita per se agat, ut seipsum ad agendum ducat; ergo ut in actionem suam penitus se convertat; ergo ut intellegat velitque operari aut non operari rursusque ita vel aliter operari. Quae autem hoc modo proficiscuntur a deo, nullus ignorat electione libera proficisci. Nullus tamen sapiens nescit electionem in deo ab essentia non differre

11 Verum ne putet forte aliquis divinam voluntatem, si ad creata respexerit, singulis vim inferre, meminisse oportet voluntatem dei malle universi bonum quam apparens alicuius particulae commodum.[41] Nam in illo bono expressior fulget divinae bonitatis imago; bonum[42] illud in ordine quodam videtur consistere. Exactus ordo

than the mind's potentiality to devise. In addition, if the divine intellect contemplates innumerable goods, and if His will can turn towards all the things His intellect presents to it as good, then God's will cannot be confined to finite objects. Therefore His power too extends to infinite things. What is the point here? To help you understand that whatever does not include contradiction is subject to the divine power. To help you realize too [first], since many things do not naturally exist, and yet, if they did, they would involve no contradiction (as is particularly obvious in the case of the number and size of the stars and the distances between them), that many things are contained under the divine power which are nowhere to be found in the order of nature; and [second], since God makes, and does not make, only some of the things in His power to make, that He does such by the free choice of His will, and not by any necessity of either His nature, His understanding or His will.[52]

The ninth proof. That God works through a choice (if I may call it that) is a reasonable proposition. For all the agents which by way of something else act and are led to acting must be led back to the prime agent. This acts through itself in such a way that it can lead itself to acting, and therefore turn itself totally towards its own action, and therefore understand and will either to act or not to act, and again to act in the same way or otherwise. But nobody can be unaware that actions that proceed from God in this way are the result of [His] free choice. No wise man, nevertheless, can be unaware that in God choice does not differ from essence. 10

Lest someone think perhaps that the divine will, whenever it looks to created things, imposes its power on individuals, we should recall that the will of God puts the good of the whole before the apparent advantage of any particular small part. For in the whole the image of the divine goodness shines out the more clearly. The good of the whole clearly consists in some sort of order. This care- 11

requirit ut omnes rerum gradus in universo contineantur, ita ut quaedam sint causae stabiles, quaedam mobiles, et illae quae mobiles sunt, effectus producant insuper magis vagos et quodam variabili modo. Nam effectus proximarum causarum modum potius quam remotarum imitari videntur. Deus autem non modo res ipsas vult esse, verum etiam essendi modos qui ad eas per consequentiam requiruntur. Cum vero rebus quibusdam secundum naturae suae modum conveniat ut sint quodammodo contingentes, deus eligit aliquid, ut theologi quidam inquiunt, quodammodo secundum contingentiam evenire. Nihil tamen ita praevaricatur, ut vel ordinem universi perturbet vel ordinatoris effugiat providentiam.

: XIII :

Deus amat et providet.

1 Si deus sibi ipse placet, si amat seipsum, profecto imagines suas et sua diligit opera. Diligit faber opera sua, quae ex materia fecit externa. Amat multo magis filium genitor, quem ex materia intrinseca generavit, quamvis eam prius acceperit, dum comederet, aliunde. Amat deus ardentius sua quaelibet opera, cum non acceperit aliunde materiam, sed ipse idem materiam creaverit qui et formavit, quo fit ut et solus et totius operis causa fuerit. Si deus usque adeo amat opera sua, bona illis vult. Quod vero vult consequitur. Igitur bene illa disponit et summa sui bonitate disponit quam optime. Sicut enim fecunditas proclivitasque ad agendum agentibus omnibus ab agentis primi fecunditate ingenita est, sic diligentia in custodiendis operibus inserta est singulis a diligentia

fully worked-out order requires that all the grades of things be contained in the universe, such that some are causes at rest, others moving causes, and that those which are moving are producing effects, moreover, which are more erratic, and producing them in a variable way. For effects seem to imitate the manner rather of their immediate causes than that of their more distant ones. But God not only wills things themselves to exist, He also wills the ways of being which are required for them consequently. Since some things, however, by way of their own nature are meant to be contingent one might say, God chooses, as some theologians put it, for something to happen, as it were, contingently. But nothing strays so far off track that it troubles the universal order or escapes the providence of the orderer.[53]

: XIII :

God loves and provides for His creation.

If God pleases Himself, if He loves Himself, certainly He loves His images and His works. A craftsman loves the works which he makes from external matter. Far greater is the love of a father for the son he has conceived from matter within, even though he first received the matter from elsewhere when he ate. God loves all His works even more intensely, since He did not receive the matter from elsewhere, but He created it Himself—He who also gave it form—whence He alone was the cause of the whole work. If God so loves His works, He wills good things for them. What He wills, He attains. So He fashions them well: in His highest goodness He fashions them in the best possible way. For just as the fruitfulness in all agents and their proneness for action has been implanted by the fruitfulness of the prime agent, so the innate 1 prima agentis primi, omnium tamquam filiorum procuratoris. In quo quanto maior fecunditas est quam in ceteris, tanto et diligentior providentia.

2 Rursus, deus sui gratia facit cuncta, quia si ad alium finem praeter seipsum ageret, ab illo fine penderet actio dei, ergo et ab eodem agendi voluntas, ab eodem quoque deus, cum idem sit deus deique voluntas. Si ad sui finem facit omnia atque ipse summum est bonum, ad bonum, ut Plato vult in *Timaeo*, cuncta disponit, ita ut singula pro natura sua divinam capiant bonitatem. Praeterea, cum omnia bonum appetant bonique appetitio bona sit et ideo ab ipso sit[43] primo bono unde sunt bona omnia, sequitur ut a[44] divina bonitate illecta divinam appetant bonitatem. Quis igitur negaverit deum res gubernare, cum ad bonum dirigat finem?

3 Elementa membraque[45] mundi contraria, sua inter se natura formae virtutisve[46] pugnantia, quo pacto coirent in unum ac manerent tamdiu[47] invicem copulata mutuarentque sibi vicissim naturas motusque et mutuarentur, nisi ab una aliqua excellentiori virtute connecterentur? Porro, si mundi gubernatio his membris eius inter se contrariis relinquatur, haec ponderibus librata suis locisque disiuncta invicem non miscebuntur. Ac si misceantur, nihil aliud agent quam calida, frigida, sicca, humida, rara vel densa et reliqua generis eiusdem. Ordinem vero formarum, figurarum, revolutionum nullum constituent, siquidem et in artibus huiusmodi ordinem non materia facit, non instrumenta, sed sola artificis cogita-

concern felt by individuals for their works comes from the primary concern of the prime agent, who looks after everything as His sons. To the degree His fruitfulness exceeds that in all other things, His providence is the more caring.

God does everything for His own sake. For if He acted for any other end than Himself, His action would depend on that end; and His will to act would depend on the same end, and so would He Himself (since God and His will are identical). If He does everything for His own end and He Himself is the highest good, then He disposes everything for the good, as Plato says in the *Timaeus*,[54] with the result that individual things receive the divine goodness each according to its nature. Furthermore, since all things desire the good and the desire for the good is good (and therefore comes from the prime good which is the source of all goods), it follows that things seek the divine goodness attracted by the divine goodness. How can one deny that God is at the helm when He steers everything towards the good? 2

How do the different elements and components of the world that are naturally opposed to each other in form or power combine into one and remain bound together for such a length of time, and exchange natures and motions among themselves and are themselves exchanged, if they are not linked together by a more eminent power? If the government of the world were left to these mutually conflicting members, those kept in balance by their own weight and separated in space would not intermingle. If they did, they would produce nothing other than things that were hot, cold, dry, wet, rare, dense, and the rest of the like qualities. They would not establish an order at all of forms, figures, or revolutions, seeing that such an order even in the arts comes not from the material or the tools but from the thinking alone of the craftsman. Although heaven in a way rules the elements, yet it does not so rule without itself being ruled from elsewhere. For in it such a great variety of forms, powers, and motions are arranged in one stable order not 3

tio. Et si caelum quodammodo elementa regit, non tamen ita regit quin ipsum aliunde regatur. Tanta enim in ipso diversitas formarum, virtutum, motionum, non ab ipsis caeli corporibus suapte natura diversis mobilibusque, sed a virtute quandam superiore, per se una prorsus et stabili, in ordinem unum stabilemque dirigitur. Denique naturale agens, sive elementale sive caeleste, tum quia mobile est ideoque egenum imperfectumque semper aliunde dependet, tum quia necessitate naturae seque toto agit quicquid agit, ideo mensuram modumque agendi per certos gradus certo fini convenientem a rectore quodam superno sortitur. Calidum enim seu secundum formam sive secundum virtutem simpliciter ubique et omnino dissolvit, frigidum vero condensat. Quod igitur tam illud utiliter convenienterque dissolvat quam hoc simili ratione condenset, idque continue et ordinatissime faciant, non a natura simplici, non a casu, sed a causa superna suscipiunt. Et quia sphaerae continuo motu continue a praesenti habitu digredientes in seipsis non quiescunt, ideo et sunt et moventur ab alio penes quem sit finis cuius gratia moventur et agunt, siquidem finis motiones ad finem intentione quadam necessario antecedit. Hinc Aristoteles in libris[48] *Divinorum* ait: 'Sicut ordo partium exercitus invicem et ad totum procedit ex ordine totius ad ducem unum, ita ordo mundanarum partium invicem et ad totum pendet ex ordine totius ad deum'. Unde concludit, sicut exercitus ordo est in duce, ita mundi totius ordinem esse in deo, uno tantum principe mundi.[49] Proinde partes mundi et corpuscula quaelibet[50] ad certum finem per viam ordinatissimam et commodissimos modos aut semper aut plurimum ita proficiscuntur, ut peragant saepissime opera sua quanto melius effici possunt, perinde ac si artem intus haberent et artem quidem absolutissimam; immo tam mirabili ratione progrediuntur, ut humanam artem rationemque exsuperent.

by the heaven's bodies themselves, which are naturally diverse and in motion, but by a higher power, which is through itself one and motionless. Finally, a natural agent, whether elemental or celestial, both because it is mobile and therefore, being deficient and imperfect, always depends on another, and because by the necessity of its nature and its whole self it does whatever it does, accordingly is allotted by some supernal ruler the measure and manner of acting which is appropriate for proceeding via specific steps to a specific end. For either formally or potentially heat in its simplicity everywhere and totally melts, while cold freezes. But that the one melts in an appropriate or useful way, while the other for a like reason freezes, and that they do so in a continuing and orderly way, this they derive not from simple nature, not from chance, but from a supernal cause. Since the spheres in their continuous motion, departing continuously from their present habitual condition, find no rest in themselves, they receive their existence and their motion from another; and this possesses the end for whose sake they are moved and act, since the end by a necessary intention[55] precedes the motions towards the end. Hence Aristotle writes in his *Metaphysics*: "Just as the order of the parts of an army with respect to themselves and to the whole stems from the order of the whole with respect to its leader, so the order of the world's parts with respect to themselves and to the whole depends on the order of the whole with respect to God."[56] From this he concludes that just as the order of an army is in its general, so the order of the world is in God, in the one and only leader of the universe. Therefore the parts of the world and its every little body either always or for the most part proceed to a specific end via a carefully planned route and the most appropriate ways; and they so proceed that for the most part they perform their actions as well as they can be performed. It is as though they had some skill within, and a consummate skill at that; or rather, they proceed with such a wonderful reason that they outstrip human skill and reason. Since

Et cum ipsa corpora sui motus ignara sint ac propterea finem, ad quem non casu sed necessario tendunt, sibi ipsa praescribere[51] nesciant, habeant tamen praescriptum — alioquin non ad hunc magis finem quam ad alium pergerent — constat eis ab alio quodam finem praescribi quem appetant, a cuius sapientia ita ducantur ad finem, sicuti sagittae[52] ad signum a prudentia sagittarii diriguntur.

4 Ubinam haec sapientia est? Si in summo deo, providet rebus deus, cum conciliet invicem repugnantia, ne se vicissim interimant, atque ad fines optimos cuncta[53] perducat; sin in alia quavis infra deum angelica mente vel anima, scito deum omnia quae infra se sunt movere. Quare si angelica mens aut anima quaedam regit mundum ducitque ad bonum, certe et ducta[54] a deo et dei virtute id agit. Quapropter deus primus ac summus est rector, qui providere potest omnibus, si potest per intellectum omnia facere, cum praestantius sit per intellegentiam facere, quam considerare et conservare iam facta. Scit etiam regere cuncta, si facere non nescivit. Vult denique gubernare et custodire quae sua sunt, quae fecit ipse, quibus non invidet bene essendi dona, postquam non invidit munus essendi. Gubernat autem quaelibet facilitate mirabili.[55] Neque enim[56] alienas tractat materias quas acceperit aliunde, sed suas quas facit ipse. Neque attingit extrinsecus, sed intrinsecus agitat. Inest namque rerum omnium penetralibus. Neque laborat circa plurima, sed per ipsum esse suum, qui universalis omnium cardo est, sequentes versat cardines, id est, essentiam, vitam, mentem, animam, naturam, materiam. Atque, ut Platonicus aliquis diceret, per cardinem quoque cuiusque ordinis proprium ipsum proprium versat ordinem, id est, per unam essentiam essentias omnes, per vitam unam vitas, per mentem mentes, per unam similiter animam singulas animas, per naturam naturas, per materiam vero

the bodies are unaware of their motions and accordingly are unable to appoint for themselves the end for which they are making (making not by chance but necessarily), and since nonetheless they do have the appointed end (otherwise they would no more pursue this end than another), then it is agreed that the end they seek is appointed for them by another. By its wisdom they are led towards the end just as arrows are aimed at the target by the archer's practiced skill.

Where then is this wisdom? If it is in God on high, then God provides for things, since He reconciles mutual opposites so that they do not destroy one another and leads them all to the best possible ends. But if this wisdom were in any other thing below God, in angelic mind or in soul, it must still be acknowledged that God moves all below Himself. So if angelic mind or some soul rules the world and leads it towards the good, certainly it does so led by God and the power of God. God then is the first and highest ruler. He can provide for all if He can make all through His intellect. For it is more eminent to make by means of the understanding than to think about and preserve what has been already made. If He knows how to make all, He knows how to govern all. Finally, He wills to govern and preserve what are His own, what He has made; and He does not begrudge them the gifts of well-being since He has not begrudged the gift of being. But He governs everything with marvelous ease. For He is not dealing with alien materials which He has received from elsewhere, but with his own materials which He makes Himself. He does not affect them from without, but moves them from within. For He is present in the very heart of all things. He does not toil away in many [actions]; rather, through His own being, which is the universal axis, He rotates the axes which follow upon it: essence, life, mind, soul, nature, matter. As someone who is a Platonist would say, by means of the axis appropriate to each order He rotates the appropriate order itself: all essences by means of one essence, all lives by 4 materias. Neque eius decreto aliquid reluctatur, quia immenso intervallo superat omnia. Divine de divina natura ita cecinit Orpheus.

Ἀενάῳ στροφάλιγγι θοὸν ῥύμα δινεύουσα

id est, 'Perpetuo cardine velocem impetum volutans'. Compertum est esse in animali nervum quendam circa nucam, quem qui trahunt, cuncta simul animalis membra ita movent, ut singula propriis motibus moveantur. Simili quodam tractu,[57] scribit Aristoteles in libro *De mundo*, a deo mundi membra moveri: ubi providentiam asserit apertissime. Quam in decimo quoque *Moralium* significat et in *Physicis*, ubi probat naturam certum ubique optimumque finem respicere, operaque ipsius opera esse intellegentiae non errantis.[58]

5 Vidimus Florentiae Germani opificis tabernaculum, in quo diversorum animalium statuae ad pilam unam connexae atque libratae, pilae ipsius motu simul diversis motibus agebantur:[59] aliae ad dextram currebant, aliae ad sinistram, sursum atque deorsum, aliae sedentes assurgebant, aliae stantes inclinabantur, hae illas coronabant, illae alias[60] vulnerabant. Tubarum quoque[61] et cornuum sonitus et avium cantus[62] audiebantur, aliaque[63] illic simul[64] fiebant et similia succedebant[65] quam plurima, uno tantum[66] unius pilae momento. Sic deus per ipsum esse suum, quod idem re ipsa[67] est ac intellegere atque velle quodve est simplicissimum quoddam omnium[68] centrum, a quo, ut alias diximus,[69] reliqua tamquam lineae deducuntur, facillimo nutu vibrat quicquid inde dependet.

6 Taceat igitur Lucretius Epicureus, qui casu fieri ac ferri vult mundum, et constantem formosissimi ordinis habitum ex instabili deformique privatione ordinis proficisci existimat, perinde ac si

means of one life, all minds by means of one mind, similarly individual souls by means of one soul, individual natures by means of one nature, individual materials by means of one matter. Nothing resists His decree, for He is superior to everything by a measureless distance. Divinely Orpheus sang of this divine nature: "Turning [its] swift onrush on a perpetual axis."[57] A sinew has been found near the nape of an animal's neck that when tugged moves all the animal's limbs simultaneously so that they are individually moved each in its own way. According to Aristotle in his treatise *On the World*, the limbs of the world are moved by God with a similar tug.[58] This manifestly asserts the existence of providence, which Aristotle also signifies in the tenth book of the *Nicomachean Ethics* and in the *Physics*, where he shows that nature everywhere looks to a certain end—the best possible—and that its works are the works of an understanding that does not err.[59]

We saw recently in Florence a small cabinet made by a German craftsman in which statues of different animals were all connected to, and kept in balance by, a single ball. When the ball moved, they moved too, but in different ways: some ran to the right, others to the left, upwards or downwards, some that were sitting stood up, others that were standing fell down, some crowned others, and they in turn wounded others. There was heard too the blare of trumpets and horns and the songs of birds; and other things happened there simultaneously and a host of similar events occurred, and merely from one movement of one ball. Thus God through His own being, which is in reality the same as His understanding and His will, or is something entirely simple—the universal center from whom (as we have declared elsewhere) the rest of things are drawn out like lines—has only to nod His head and everything which depends on Him trembles. 5

Let us hear no more from Lucretius the Epicurean, who wants the world to come about and be borne along by chance, and who believes that the constant condition of its order, beautiful and full 6

quis ex insipientia sapientiam et ex tenebris nasci lucem arbitraretur. An tu, Lucreti, quotiens casu absque consilio et proposito fine moveris, totiens uno quodam recto tramite ad certum eundemque terminum proficisceris? Nequaquam; sed hac et illac oberras. An quando absque arte et praescripto fine tractas lapides, tunc ordinatissimis et contextis invicem parietibus aedificium construis et aspectu pulcherrimum et usui commodissimum? Nequaquam; sed deformem inutilemque congeriem. Considera plantas et animalia, quorum[70] singula membra ita disposita sunt, ut alterum alterius gratia sit locatum, alterum serviat alteri. Certe uno sublato tota ferme compago dissolvitur. Cuncta denique membra totius compositi gratia sunt digesta et compositum ipsum, scilicet planta[71] et animal, convenientibus instrumentis instructum ad opera naturae propriae necessaria, omnibus alimenta, loca temporaque provisa; terra et aqua his alimenta parant; caelum temperat aquam ac terram. Tandem partes mundi cunctae ad unum quendam totius mundi decorem ita concurrunt, ut nihil subtrahi possit, nihil addi. An si tu omni consilio fuisses arboribus et animalibus provisurus, aliter providisses? Non aliter, sed neque tam bene. Consilium igitur consilio tuo melius haec[72] disponit, alioquin videres quotidie quam plurimis tam membra quaedam sua quam instrumenta ubique deesse. Item[73] ex equi semine nasci canes, ficus ex malis, et membra hominis annexa leonibus, hominibus asinorum, cadere stellas, ascendere lapides. Nunc vero quia singulae mundi partes certis seminibus ortae, distinctis figuris praeditae, recta via,[74] congruis[75] temporibus et ordinibus pulcherrime et commodissime[76] certos petunt terminos atque repetunt, consequens est ut

of forms, proceeds from an unstable and formless privation of order, as if someone were to suppose that wisdom was born from stupidity, or light from darkness.[60] Tell me Lucretius, whenever you make a casual movement, without plan or purpose, do you always proceed by a single direct route to the same specific goal? Of course not. You wander hither and thither. And when you are playing with stones, not using any skill and without a pre-established plan, do you erect a building with stoutly built walls all in order, a building extremely elegant to look at and ideally suited to its purpose? Of course not. What you make is a useless and unsightly pile of stones. Think of plants and animals: their separate parts are so designed that the position of one is to the advantage of another; they serve each other. Certainly, when one is removed, the whole structure is virtually destroyed. Next, all their parts are arranged for the sake of the composite whole, and the composite itself, that is, the plant or animal, is equipped with the instruments it needs to do the works of its own nature: the foods, the habitats, and the seasons have been provided for all. Earth and water provide food for them; the heavens temper the water and earth. In the end all the world's parts come together to form for the whole world a unique harmonious beauty from which nothing can be subtracted and to which nothing can be added. If you had to provide for trees and animals using all your wisdom, would you have done it differently? No, not differently, but not as well. A wisdom greater than yours designed these things, otherwise day after day you would be seeing things everywhere with missing limbs or organs: dogs born from horse semen, figs from apples, human limbs attached to lions, humans with the limbs of asses, stars falling, and stones ascending. But in reality because the individual parts of the world, having been born from particular seeds and endowed with distinctive shapes, seek and seek again specific goals — seek them by the most direct route, at the appropriate times and arrangements, and in a manner both very beautiful and eodem modo moveantur, quo et illa quae arte et consilio moventur humano.

7 Si modo eodem, ergo eadem paene[77] arte eodemque consilio—et tanto praestantiore quanto pulchrius et stabilius ordinantur—consilio inquam non ambiguo et mobili, sed certo penitus atque subito, et intuitu potius quam discursu. Si enim in opere non est mora vel[78] transgressio usquam vel retractatio, non est ambiguitas in opifice. Intuitum huiusmodi per translationem quandam consilium appellamus, non quod ibi alia investigentur ex aliis, sed quod alia aliorum gratia fiant. Solent inertes homines de artificiis consultare. At vero qui[79] artem perfecte callet nihil consultat amplius, sed ita habitu facit sicut natura formis. Quod si est ars alicubi perfectissima, ibi certe est unde mirabile hoc opus mundi disponitur. Artem huiusmodi in natura fortasse locabis sensus omnis experte? Ego vero sensu carere te dicam, si tam fueris alienus a sensu, ut non sentias, si bestiolae quaeque terrenae sentiunt, oportere multo magis totum mundum et artificem[80] omnium naturam sensum habere, sensum, inquam, rationalem, si rationabilius sua opera ordinat quam hominis ratio. Admirationem minuit diuturna consuetudo. At si parentes tui te clausa undique domo sic ab infantia educavissent, ut mirabilem hunc mundi decorem ante annum aetatis trigesimum non vidisses, procul dubio novum deinde harum rerum spectaculum esses usque adeo admiratus, ut, quamvis ante ambiguus, postea tamen[81] numquam ambigere potuisses quin cuncta unius sapientissimi artificis providentia fiant atque regantur.

8 Fateamur igitur: necessarium est, Lucreti, quod cum partes effectusque mundi constanti ordine procedant, non potest totus ipse mundus praeter constantiam ordinemque vel nunc procedere vel ab initio prodiisse. Fateamur denique, quod neque sua sponte

ideally suited—it follows that they are moved in the same way as those things enacted by human skill and design.

7 If things are moved in this same way, then it is by the same skill almost and the same design; but by a design which is the more eminent to the degree that things are arranged more beautifully and with more stability—by a design, I say, which is neither changeable nor subject to motion but absolutely certain and instant, and which is intuitive rather than discursive. For if no hesitation nor violation of rule nor correction occurs in his work, then there is no lack of certainty in the craftsman. Using a metaphor we call such intuition a "design," not because some things in this case are known by way of others, but because some are done for the sake of others. People who are unskilled usually seek counsel about making something. But a consummately skilled craftsman no longer deliberates: he works from habit just as nature does with its forms. But if perfect skill exists anywhere, it is in the making of this wonderful artifact, the world. Perhaps you will claim that this skill resides in nature, which is devoid of all sense. But I would reply that it is you who are devoid of sense if you are so far from having sense not to see that, if all the little beasts on earth have sense, much more must the whole world and nature, the universal craftsman, have sense—and by sense I mean rational sense, if nature designs its artifacts more rationally than man's reason can. Daily familiarity dulls our sense of wonder. But had your parents brought you up from infancy immured in a house so that you had never gazed upon this wonderful beauty of the world before you were thirty, then doubtless you would so wonder at this new spectacle of nature that, however much you had doubted beforehand, yet afterwards you could never doubt that all things are made and ruled by the providence of the one all-knowing craftsman.

8 Therefore we must accept, O Lucretius, that since the world's parts and effects proceed in constant order, then of necessity the whole world itself cannot now proceed, nor could it have pro-

movetur mundus sine vita, neque tam diu, tam[82] aequaliter volvitur sine potentissima vita, neque tanto ordine[83] sine sapientissima mente, neque tam optime et commodissime absque summo bono, sed vita quaedam una, regina[84] unius mundani corporis, potentia, sapientia, bonitate praecellens mundum providentissime et ab initio et continue perducit ad optimum. Haec vel summus est deus vel dei summi pedissequa. Si summus est deus,[85] deus providet certe. Si dei pedissequa, deus etiam providet, quoniam primum principium sui ipsius gratia agit movetque cuncta. Divine de Iove dixit Orpheus:

Παντογένεθλ᾽ ἀρχὴ πάντων, πάντων τε τελευτή

id est: 'Omnium genitor principiumque et finis'. Ideo si vita mundi providet, profecto ducta a deo, ad dei providet finem. Igitur ad dei bonitatem omnia denique diriguntur.

9 Atqui haec bonitas[86] cum totius operis sui habeat curam, certe partes negligit nullas. Ex singulis enim constat optimus totius compositi status et habitus. Totum hoc Orpheus sic expressit:

Πάντ᾽ ἐσορᾷς καὶ πάντ᾽ ἐπακούεις καὶ πάντα βραβεύεις

id est: 'Omnia intus inspicis, omnia intus audis, omniaque distribuis'. Quoniam vero tota mundi compago gratia divinae bonitatis referendae est instituta, et partes mundi gratia ipsius compagis appositae sunt, non est in toto hoc opere summa prorsus perfectio requirenda, sed quanta sufficit ad sublimiorem auctoris perfectionem pro viribus indicandam. Neque exigenda est in quavis mundi parte quaelibet partis illius perfectio, sed quae ceteris partibus concinat totique conducat. Sic licet nonnunquam aliqua particulae alicuius mundanae conditio videatur per se esse culpanda, si tamen ad totius statum comparetur, inveniemus non aliter mundum posse bene disponi quam ita. Sane universi conditor non to-

ceeded at its inception, without constancy and order. Next we have to accept that the world does not move of its own accord without life; nor is it revolved so long and so regularly without life at its most powerful; nor revolved in such an orderly manner without mind at its wisest; nor revolved so excellently and so aptly without the highest good. But a unique life, queen over the unique world body, excelling in power, wisdom, and goodness, has most providentially directed the world from the beginning and without ceasing towards the best. This life is either the highest God, or a handmaid of the highest God. If it is the highest God, then clearly God is provident. God is provident too if life is His handmaid, since the first principle acts on and moves all for His sake. Orpheus describes Jupiter in these divine words: "Father, beginning and end of all things."[61] If the life of the world provides, guided certainly by God, it provides, therefore, for God's end. Thus all things are directed finally to God's goodness.

This goodness, since it has a care for its whole work, certainly does not neglect any of the parts. For the excellence of the state and condition of the whole composite structure depends on the parts comprising it. Orpheus sums up the matter thus: "You see all within, you hear all within, you distribute all."[62] But since the world's structure as a whole has been established for the sake of recalling the divine goodness, and since the world's parts have been set in place for the sake of the structure, the absolutely highest perfection should not be sought for in the whole work, but only enough perfection to indicate, insofar as it can, the more sublime perfection of its author. In any one of the world's parts we should not demand any and every perfection of that part, but rather that which is in harmony with the remaining parts and connects it to the whole. Thus, although any one condition of any particular part of the world may sometimes seem to be defective in itself, yet if we compare that condition to the state of the whole, then we will find that the world cannot be better arranged than it is. The 9

tum ipsum ad partes ullas, sed partes potius ad totum refert. Merito igitur quae alicubi circa partes vel mala videntur vel deformia, denique in totius ornamentum bonumque evadunt. Quapropter apud Orpheum deus vocatur:

Ἀΐδιος ζωὴ, ἠδ' ἀθανάτη τε πρόνοια

id est: 'Sempiterna vita, immortalisque providentia'. Hanc providentiam Mercurius esse dicit generis humani tutricem, et Plato in quarto *Legum* libro inquit deum continere principia, media finesque omnium, ambire cuncta ac recte disponere singula, mitibus religiosisque viris esse propitium, superbos impiosque punire.

Neque tolli putat per divinam providentiam nostri arbitrii libertatem, immo servari, quod aperit in decimo libro *De republica,* in libro etiam *De regno* et in *Critia,* quia deus non tam sciendo facit quam volendo, alioquin simul cuncta fecisset et faceret, faceret quoque mala,[87] Item, sicut in praescientia dei futuri scripti sunt rerum eventus, ita et eventuum causae modique agendi. Et sicut opera nostra nota sunt deo, ita et nostra voluntas quae nostrorum est operum causa et modus liber agendi. Sicut enim praevidet te id facturum, ita praevidet te ita, id est voluntarie libereque, facturum.[88] Quare divina praevisio, si conditionis alicuius positione[89] reddit necessaria nostra opera, reddit necessarium, id est confirmat,[90] similiter agendi modum, hoc est nostri iudicii libertatem; quoniam deus naturarum[91] omnium temperator cuique rei conservat, non subtrahit naturam quam dederat. Sic dum regit cuncta, singula pro singulorum regit natura: ascendentibus elementis ad ascensum conducit, descendentibus ad descensum.[92] Si regit animalium motum, quia ille natura sua progressivus est, confert ad gradiendum. Si caelos ducit, quia ob rotunditatem natura volubiles sunt, confert ad circuitus ambitum. Si animos pulsat, quia illi sur-

Founder of the universe does not refer the whole to any of its parts, but rather the parts to the whole. So what may seem bad or ugly as far as the parts are concerned will in the end contribute justly to the beauty and good of the whole. That is why Orpheus calls God: "Sempiternal life and immortal providence."[63] Mercury [Trismegistus] says that this providence is the protectress of the human race.[64] And in the *Laws* book four Plato declares that God contains the beginnings, middles, and ends of all things; that He encircles all and rightly disposes individual things; that He is gracious to men who are meek and devout even as He punishes the proud and the impious.[65]

Plato supposes that providence does not impair the freedom of our will to choose, but rather serves that freedom—he explains this in the tenth book of the *Republic*[66] and in the *Statesman* and the *Critias*[67]—because God makes not so much by knowing as by willing, otherwise He would have made and would make all things simultaneously, and additionally would make bad things. Again, just as all future events are written down in God's foreknowledge, so too are the causes of those events and their modes of action. Just as our deeds are known to God, so too is our will which is the cause of our deeds and the manner of freely doing them. For just as He foresees what you are going to do, so He foresees that you are going to do it voluntarily and freely. Wherefore the divine foreknowledge, if it renders our deeds necessary by imposing some condition, similarly it renders necessary—it confirms in other words—our manner of doing them, that is, the freedom of our judgment. Because God, the universal moderator, preserves each thing, He does not retract its nature once He has given it. Thus, while He rules over all, He rules over individuals according to the nature of each, helping the ascending elements in their ascent, the descending elements in their descent. If He rules over the movement of animals, He helps them to move forward because their motion is naturally progressive. If He guides the heavsum deorsumque[93] libere volubiles sunt, pulsat et libere, ita ut alliciat, non trahat; non cogat, sed persuadeat. Quod Zoroaster ita testatur:

> Πατὴρ οὐ φόβον ἐνθρῴσκει, πειθὼ δ' ἐπικεύει

id est: 'Pater non incutit metum, sed persuasionem inducit'.

II Quoniam vero motor primus praevalere debet et dominari, ideo sic animos, ut Plato vult, quasi cogit ad bonum, ut bonum ipsum nolle non possint. Bonum enim necessario volunt omnia, cuius ratione volunt quicquid volunt, sicut necessario malum ipsum nolunt, cuius ratione nolunt quicquid nolunt. Nam si adaequatum appetitus obiectum est ipsum bonum, certe bonitas est ratio ipsa appetitui appetendi quicquid appetat, ita ut in omni re quam appetit, non aliter bonum appetat quam visus in omni colore videat lumen. Ac si appetat ulterius nihil appetere, hanc quoque appetendi vacationem eligit tamquam bonam. Animus igitur necessario fertur ad bonum. At quia deus debet naturam animo propriam reservare, ideo iudicium ipsi relinquit liberum, per quod de agendis suo more consultet atque e multis sibi propositis aliud alio melius iudicet et quod aptius ad bonum consequendum censuerit, eligat.

ens, He helps them complete their full circuit because their natural motion, given their rotundity, is to revolve. If He impels thinking souls, because they too revolve but are free to go upwards or downwards, He freely impels them, so that He attracts them rather than dragging them along, persuades not compels them. Zoroaster attests to this: "The Father does not inspire fear but leads by persuasion."[68]

But since the prime mover has to prevail, has to rule, in Plato's view it so compels thinking souls in a way towards the good that they cannot not wish for the good.[69] For all things necessarily want the good, and because of the good they want whatever they want, just as they necessarily want not to have the bad, and because of the bad do not want whatever they do not want. For if the adequate object of the appetite or will is the good itself, then goodness is certainly the reason for the appetite desiring whatever it desires, so that in everything it desires it desires the good, just as the sight sees the light in every color. But if it desires to desire nothing further, then the will is choosing this emptying itself of desiring as the good. Therefore the thinking soul is necessarily borne towards the good. But because God has to preserve the nature proper to the thinking soul, He leaves its judgment free. Through this free judgment the soul can deliberate in its own manner about what it should do, judge from the many options before it that one thing is better than another, and elect what it judges to be particularly appropriate for attaining the good. II

LIBER TERTIUS

: I :

Descensus per quinque gradus fit, per quos est factus ascensus. Qui gradus invicem congrue comparantur.

1 Ascendimus hactenus a corpore in qualitatem, ab hac in animam, ab anima in angelum, ab eo in deum unum, verum et bonum, auctorem omnium atque rectorem. Corpus appellant Pythagorici multa, qualitatem multa et unum, animam unum et multa, angelum unum multa, deum denique unum. Quia corpus ad quamlibet speciem indeterminatum est et suapte natura sine fine dividuum, cuius materiam in infinitum fluxuram inquiunt, nisi forma sistat et uniat. Qualitas ad materiam specie terminandam confert et est per se quodammodo individua, sed per admixtionem corporis fit divisibilis. Anima materiam specie terminat, neque per se neque per inquinationem corporis est divisibilis, sed mobilis multitudo. Angelus receptaculum specierum est et multitudo immobilis. Deus super species, immobilis unitas. Deum, aiunt, per se omnino indissolubilem esse, quia ipsa unitas statusque sit. Corpora vero ex elementis composita, prorsus dissolubilia, quoniam in eis et multitudo unitatem et motus superat statum. Sed angelos, animas, sphaeras et stellas dissolubiles quidem videri quodammodo, quatenus partes habent; esse tamen indissolubiles, propterea quod in ipsis unitas statusque multitudinem motumque exsuperant. Hic autem est nodus ille divinus quo deus, ut Timaeus putat, haec per se solubilia semper indissoluta conservat.

2 Tam potens est unitatis ipsius statusque munus, ut in infimo solum universi gradu excedi ab oppositis videatur, sed tamen inte-

BOOK III

: I :

We descend through the five levels by which we ascended and set up an appropriate comparison between them.

So far we have made our ascent from body to quality, from quality to soul, from soul to angel, and from angel to God, the one, the true and the good, author and ruler of all things. The Pythagoreans describe body as "the many," quality as "the many and the one," soul as "the one and the many," angel as the "one-many," and God as "the one." Because body is undetermined with regard to any particular species and is by its own nature endlessly divided, so its matter, they claim, would be in flux infinitely if form did not call it to a halt and give it unity. Quality contributes to limiting matter by a species; it is in itself undivided in a way, but becomes divisible by being mixed with body. Soul limits matter by a species; it is not divisible either in itself or through the body's contamination but is a mobile plurality. Angel is the receptacle of [all] the species and is an immobile plurality. God is above the species, an unmoving unity. God, they say, is absolutely indissoluble, because He is Himself unity and stability; bodies, however, being composed of elements, are completely dissoluble because in them plurality overcomes unity, and movement stability. But angels, souls, spheres, and stars, they say, appear dissoluble in a way in that they contain parts; but they are indissoluble in that their unity and stability surpass their plurality and motion. This is what provides the divine bond whereby God, in Timaeus' view,[1] always preserves things that are in themselves dissoluble from dissolution. 1

So powerful is the gift of unity itself and of stability that only at the lowest level of the universe does it seem to be overtaken by 2

rim ibi quoque quodammodo vincat, siquidem materiam ipsam infinitae multitudini mutationique subiectam semper custodit in unitate substantiae atque ordinis permanentem. Est utique deus unitas, ut probavimus. Est et immobilis, quia neque ab alio movetur, cum nihil sit illo validius, neque a seipso, quia ad melius se transferre nequit, cum sit ipsum bonum; ad deterius autem nihil sua sponte se movet. At[1] si deus fluere de[2] alio dicatur in aliud, quaeremus numquid novum aliquid assequatur an nihil. Si nihil assequitur novum, neque mutatus est quidem; si novi aliquid, ante non omnia possidebat. Quod non possidet omnia, non est deus. Deus ex eo quod est ubique, non mutat locum; ex eo quod est omnium finis, circa aliud non movetur; ex eo quod est simplicissimus, etiam in se est immobilis. Nam si moveatur in se, aut partem ipsius alteram ad alteram admovebit, aut saltem nova quaedam in seipso cum veteribus congregabit. Erit enim per substantiam quod erat ante ac novam insuper induet formam, neque esse poterit simplicissimus.

3 Denique deus ipsa[3] unitas est. Unitas status ipsius est fundamentum, quia sicut in multitudinem motus progreditur, sic unitati status innititur. Illud enim in quavis natura stare dicitur quod unum in ea continue habitum ita possidet ut ab eius naturae unitate non discedat. Fundamentum vero status omnis quis dixerit esse mutabile? Possumus autem rationes huiusmodi per argumentationem illam Numenii pythagorici confirmare. Quicquid, inquit, secundum praeteritum futurumque mutatur, privationem quandam habet admixtam: futurum enim nondum est, praeteritum non amplius est. In deo autem, cum ipse sit primum ens actusque summus, nulla est privatio. Est igitur immutabilis.

its opposites [multiplicity and motion]. Yet even there the gift sometimes prevails in a way, since it continually keeps the matter, which is subject to infinite plurality and change, constant in the unity of substance and order. God, of course, is unity, as I have already shown. He is immoveable, being moved neither by another, since nothing is stronger than He, nor by Himself, since He cannot pass over into anything better in that He is the good itself. Nothing, however, moves towards the worse of its own accord. But if someone were to say that God flows from one thing into another, then we will ask whether or not He acquires anything new. If He acquires nothing new, then He has not been changed. If He acquires something new, then He did not possess all things beforehand. What does not possess all things is not God. Because God is everywhere, He does not change place. Because He is the end of all things, He does not move with respect to another. Because He is most simple, He does not move even within Himself. For if He moved in Himself, He would either move one part of Himself towards another, or at least combine in Himself some new things with the old. For as regards substance, He would be what He was before, but He would in addition assume a new form—in which case He would no longer be entirely simple.

Again, God is unity itself. Unity is the basis of stability itself, because, just as movement is a progression towards plurality, so stability rests in unity. In any nature we call stable that which continually possesses one habitual condition such that it never departs from the unity of its nature. But who would suggest that the foundation of all stability is itself subject to change? We can confirm this line of reasoning by turning to the arguments of Numenius the Pythagorean.[2] He declares that anything that changes in the past or the future contains some admixture of privation, for the future is not yet and the past is no longer. But in God, since He is the prime being and highest act, there is no privation. Therefore God is unchangeable. 3

4 Angelus quoque immobilis est, quoniam a deo, totius bonitatis fonte, bonum per seipsum haurit absque medio, et uno aeternitatis puncto impletur inde ac permanet semper bonitate plenissimus. Quoniam vero omnis effectus extra causam suam productus aliquid causae servat et inferior etiam evadit quam causa, ideo angelus proxime deo creatus aliquid dei servat, amittit et aliquid. Deus quidem unitatem habet et statum. Retinere utrumque non potest angelus; esset enim deus ipse, non angelus. Neque etiam amittit utrumque, ne proximum ac primum dei opus evadat opifici dissimillimum. Quid ergo? Unitatemne solam retinebit an statum? Solam unitatem nequit sine statu. Unitas enim ipsa est prorsus immobilis. Itaque retinebit statum, sed a simplici decidet unitate, ut angelus sit immobilis multitudo. Neque iniuria multitudinem angelo assignamus, quia si sit perfecta et absolutissima unitas, erit summa et interminata potestas, siquidem virtus in unitate consistit. Interminata potestas unus ipse est deus.

5 Porro, si corporis proprium est suscipere atque pati, naturae autem incorporalis proprium dare et agere, in natura corporali dicitur esse potentia, potentia scilicet, ut aiunt theologi, susceptiva atque passiva: in natura incorporali actus, id est efficacia ad agendum. Ideo qualitas, quia per se quodammodo incorporalis est, aliquam agendi vim habet, unde et actus cognominatur; quia vero in materia suscipitur et dividitur fitque inde quodammodo corporalis, hinc non merus est actus, sed passione corporis inquinatus. Constat igitur qualitas ex actu atque potentia. Anima, licet sit a materia separabilis atque ob id actus dicatur et a passione corporis aliena, tamen nondum merus est actus. Est enim mobilis. Si movetur aliquid, per motum nanciscitur quo ante caruerat. Ut carebat, potentiam illam habet, quam susceptivam et quodammodo passivam potentiam nuncupamus. Ut agit movendo nonnihil, est

Angel too is not subject to movement, because it drinks in goodness from God, the fount of all goodness, through itself, without any intermediary; and at one point in eternity it is filled, and it remains brimful with goodness forever. But since every effect that is produced outside its cause retains something of its cause and yet emerges inferior also to the cause, angel, being created closest to God, retains and yet loses something of God. God possesses unity and stability. Angel cannot retain both; for then it would be God, not angel. Yet it does not lose both either, for the first of God's works and the nearest to Him would then emerge as completely unlike its maker. So which does it retain, unity alone or stability? It cannot have unity alone without stability; for unity is utterly motionless. So it will retain stability but fall away from simple unity, the result being that angel is plurality without movement. Indeed, it is quite reasonable to assign plurality to angel, because, if it were perfect and complete unity, it would be the highest and unlimited power, since power resides in unity. But God alone is unlimited power. 4

If it is the characteristic of body to receive and to be acted upon, but characteristic of incorporeal nature to give and to act, then in corporeal nature dwells what we call potency (the potency the theologians call receptive or passive), and in incorporeal nature act, that is, the capacity for action. Therefore quality, since it is in a sense incorporeal in itself, has some power to act, and can be referred to as act. But because it is received in matter and divided up and thus made in a way corporeal, it is not pure act but rather act contaminated with the passivity of body. So quality is composed of both act and potency. Soul, though it is separable from matter and on account of this called act, and though it has nothing to do with the passivity of body, nonetheless is not yet pure act. For it is moveable. If something is moved, it obtains through movement what beforehand it had lacked. As it was lacking, it has the po- 5 actus, et dum acquirit aliquid, etiam actus efficitur. Est ergo anima ex potentia et actu composita.

6 Sed numquid angelus actus est merus? Minime. Deus plane, quia distat penitus a materia, in qua passiva potentia est sine ulla agendi virtute, ideo merus esse intellegitur vigor agendi seorsum a suscipiendi patiendique natura. Si deus est purus actus, nequit angelus esse talis, quia quod unum in se est numquam fit plura, nisi per alienae naturae additamentum. Unica est ipsius puri actus natura et definitio. In deo quidem est, ut patet. Quod si etiam in angelo dicatur esse, interrogabimus, numquid in angelo sit aliquid aliud praeter actum, necne? Si nihil, unus solummodo restat actus purus, siquidem nihil differt actus qui tribuitur angelo ab actu dei, cum nihil insit utrisque praeter actum, et actus ipse sua ratione sit unus. Sin additum est aliquid angelo praeter actum, non amplius est angelus purus actus, sed infectus permixtione et actus non absolutus, sed talis potius aut talis, sicut non est pura lux quae viridis est vel rubens, sed est et lux simul et qualitas elementorum aliqua, per quam rubens fit vel viridis. Quapropter angelus quoque ex actu componitur et potentia.

7 Atque hoc est quod in *Philebo* vult Plato, ubi ait deum esse rerum omnium terminum, infiniti expertem; res autem alias praeter ipsum omnes ex termino et infinito componi. Terminum vocat actum, infinitum vero potentiam, quae secundum se indeterminata terminatur et formatur ab actu.

8 Sed ut ad rem veniamus, potentia quidem angeli in essentia sua est, quae prius quodammodo fit a deo quam ab ipso formetur. In primo namque creationis suae momento angelus est solummodo, in alio ab auctore illustratur, ut sit intellegens atque formatur. Idcirco essentia illa principio informis est quodammodo et tamquam passivum subiectum quoddam exponitur ad actum intelle-

tency we call receptive or in a way passive. But as it is acting by moving something, it is act, and whenever it obtains something, it is made act too. Soul then is composed of potency and act.

Surely angel is not pure act? Not at all. Obviously God, because He is at the furthest remove from matter (wherein exists the passive potency without any power of acting), is understood to be the pure force of acting separated from the nature of receiving or sustaining. If God is pure act, then angel cannot be. For what is one in itself can never become many, except by the addition of a nature alien to it. The nature and definition of pure act itself is unique. It is in God, obviously. If it were also said to be in angel, we would have to ask whether or not anything exists in angel besides act. If nothing exists, then only one pure act is left, since the act that is attributed to angel does not differ from the act of God, in that nothing is present in both besides act and act itself by its very reason is one. But if something besides act is added to angel, then angel is no longer pure act, but has been contaminated by some sort of mixture; and it is not absolute act, but act of a particular sort. In the same way something green or red is not pure light, but light plus some quality of the elements which makes it red or green. Thus angel too is composed of act and potency. 6

This is what Plato means in the *Philebus* when he says that God is the limit of all things and is free from the infinite, while all things besides God are composed of the limit and the infinite.[3] The limit Plato calls act and the infinite, potency (potency, in itself undetermined, is limited and given form by act). 7

But to return to our subject. The potency of angel is in its essence, which is in a way brought into being by God prior to receiving form from Him. For at the first moment of its creation angel only exists. In the next moment it is illumined by its creator so that it becomes intelligent and takes on form. So its essence is in a way formless in the beginning, exposed like a passive substrate to 8 gendi et formarum idearumque ornatum suscipiendum, de quo Zoroaster ait:

> *Πάντα γὰρ ἐξετέλεσσε πατὴρ καὶ νῷ παρέδωκε δευτέρῳ*

id est: 'Omnia perfecit pater et menti praebuit secundae'. Est igitur angelus multitudo, cum constet ex pluribus — multitudo, inquam, immobilis. In illo certe deo inferior est, quod non est vera unitas sicut deus. In hoc propinquat quod est ferme, ut ita loquar, sicut deus, immobilis.

9 Recte post deum, immobilem unitatem, ponitur angelus, immobilis multitudo; post angelum, anima, quae longius etiam distat a deo, quia est mobilis multitudo. Multitudo quidem est, cum nihil post deum esse queat unitas simplicissima. Est quodammodo mobilis, quia longius recedens a deo, propinqua fit corporum qualitatibus quae penitus agitantur. Si omnino immobilis esset, esset utique angelus; si omnino mobilis, esset qualitas. Medium tamen aliquod inter angelum esse oportet et corporum qualitates, ne omnino immobilis angelus omnino mobili qualitati sit proximus. Sit itaque partim immobilis, partim etiam mobilis. Stabit eius substantia, neque in maius minusve aut hoc aut illud mutabitur. Fluet autem operatio, et modo haec, modo alia, atque aliter et aliter operabitur. Qualitas autem anima inferior est, quandoquidem per essentiam operationemque mutatur. Qualitate inferius corpus, qualitas enim movetur et movet: movet enim corpora. Corpus movetur quidem;[4] movet nihil.

10 Angelus quidem, quod sit unum quiddam et quod sit, actus non a seipso habet, sed a deo vere uno actuque purissimo. Sed quod sit multiplex per potentiam suscipiendi et patiendi habet ex seipso; quantum extra deum productus, a productoris perfectione degenerat. Multitudo igitur naturalis est angelo. Anima quoque, quod una quaedam substantia sit et quod sit actus stabilis per essentiam, non a seipsa, sed a deo sortitur actu uno et stabilissimo.

receive the act of understanding and the ornament of the forms and ideas. Zoroaster puts it like this: "The father perfected all things and presented them to the second mind."[4] Angel then is a plurality, since it is composed of many things, a plurality I should add not subject to movement. With respect to plurality, it is of course inferior to God in that it is not a true unity as God is. With respect to mobility, it approaches Him in that it is almost, so to speak, immobile just as God is.

After God, an unmoving unity, it is correct then to place angel next, an unmoving plurality; and then after angel, soul, which is more distant from God still, since it is a plurality subject to movement. It is a plurality because nothing after God can be absolutely simple unity. And it is in some respect subject to movement because the further it recedes from God, the closer it comes to corporeal qualities which are totally subject to movement. If it were entirely immobile, it would be angel; if entirely mobile, it would be quality. Yet there has to be a mean between angel and corporeal qualities in order that angel, which is entirely immobile, not be directly juxtaposed to quality, which is entirely mobile. Thus the mean has to be partly immobile and yet partly mobile. Its substance will be at rest, not changing in size or in any other respect. But its activity will be in flux, and it will do now this and now that, and in one way and in another. But quality is inferior to soul because it changes in its essence and operation. Body is inferior to quality, for quality is moved itself and moves other things, for it moves bodies. Body indeed is moved but moves nothing. 9

That it is one something and is act, angel owes not to itself but to God who is truly one and the purest act. But that it is plural, it owes to itself by way of its power of receiving and being acted upon. Insofar as it has been created outside God, it falls short of the perfection of its creator. So plurality is natural to angel. Soul too owes the fact that it is a single substance and in essence a stable act not to itself but to the gift of God, who is the one abso- 10

Quod vero multiplex sit et passiva ex seipsa possidet, quia sub deo locatur. Quod denique mobilis ex seipsa rursus, quia sub angelo. Sicut igitur unitas naturalis est deo et angelo multitudo, ita motus naturalis est animae.

11 Lux dei producit angelum, sub dei scilicet umbra; lux dei animam sub umbra producit angeli. Angelus a dei uno actu unitatem stabilem adipiscitur, sub dei umbra cadit in multitudinem. Anima a dei luce statum nanciscitur, sub umbra dei multitudinem, sub angeli umbra mutationem. Fons unitatis deus, fons multitudinis angelus, fons motionis est anima. Deus per seipsum unitas, angelus per deum est unus, per se multiplex. Anima per deum una, per dei umbram — id est, quia sub deo est simul cum angelo — multiplex, per seipsum mobilis. Qualitas per superiora habet ut moveat aliquid, per se habet ut materiae misceatur. Corpus per qualitatem ut agat; per se solum, ut patiatur. Qualitas uno gradu excedit corpus, quod movet ipsum; uno saltem cedit animae, quod movetur ab illa. Anima saltem uno excedit qualitatem, quod ex seipsa movetur; uno cedit angelo, quod mutatur. Angelus animam uno, quod manet; deo cedit uno, quod multiplex.

12 Deus tamen per hoc unum abit super omnia in infinitum. Quod ita cecinit Zoroaster:

> ὁ πατὴρ[5] ἥρπασσεν ἑαυτόν,
> οὐδ' ἐν ἑῇ[6] δυνάμει νοερᾷ κλείσας ἴδιον πῦρ

id est: 'Pater[7] seipsum rapuit, neque in mente quidem quae illum sequitur proprium inclusit ignem'. Quasi dicat: nullam habet cum ceteris comparationem. Corpus ab alio movetur solum, nihil enim natura sua facit. Qualitas movet aliud et movetur ab alio. Anima movet quidem aliud, sed a seipsa movetur. Angelus movet alia, id est agit in alia, ipse quidem stabilis, sed non stabilis per seipsum, nam per divinam stat unitatem. Quid enim aliud stare

lutely stable act. Its plurality and passivity it owes to itself because it is beneath God; its mobility it also owes to itself because it is beneath angel. So just as unity is natural to God and plurality to angel, so motion is natural to soul.

God's light created angel but under the shadow of God. God's light created soul but under the shadow of angel. From God's single act angel acquires its stable unity, while under God's shadow it slips into plurality. From God's light soul obtains stability, while under His shadow it has plurality, and under the shadow of angel, mutability. God is the fount of unity, angel, the fount of plurality, soul, the fount of motion. God through Himself is unity, angel through God is one but through itself is many. Soul is one through God, many through God's shadow (being together with angel beneath God), and mobile through itself. Quality owes its ability to impel something into motion to what is above it; to itself it owes its capacity for being mixed with matter. Body owes its ability to act to quality; but to itself alone its capacity to be acted upon. Quality is one degree superior to body in that it moves it, but one degree inferior to soul in that it is set in motion by soul. Soul is one degree superior to quality in that it moves itself, but one degree inferior to angel in that it is subject to change. Angel is one degree superior to soul in that it is at rest, but one degree inferior to God in that it is many. 11

Yet by virtue of this one aspect alone God surpasses everything to an infinite extent. Zoroaster expresses it like this: "The father enraptured himself; he did not implant his own special fire in the mind that follows him."[5] It is as though he were saying that God cannot be compared with anything else. Body can only be moved by another; it does nothing of its own nature. Quality both moves another and is moved by another. Soul moves another but is moved by itself. Angel moves others (in the sense that it acts on others), and is itself at rest — not at rest through itself but through the divine unity. For, as we said before, what is being at rest other 12

est, ut diximus, quam in naturae suae unitate perseverare? Movet quoque per deum. Virtute enim primi actus agunt agentia omnia quicquid agunt. Deus per se movet agitque omnia, ipse quidem stabilis per seipsum. Sane quia omnia quae per aliud talia sunt, reducuntur ad primum aliquid quod est tale per semetipsum, idcirco quaecumque stabilia sunt et moventia per aliud, retulimus ad deum per se stabilem et per se moventem. Et quaecumque mobilia sunt ab alio, puta corpora et qualitates, retulimus ad animam mobilem per seipsam—per se inquam mobilem, quia si a deo descendas per angelum, tam deus quam angelus stare tibi videbitur. Primum quod mobile tibi occurret est anima. Quicquid primo tale est in aliquo genere, per se est tale, puta quod primo lucidum aut calidum, per se lucet et calet. Sic anima, quoniam est primum mobile inter omnia quae sunt mobilia, est utique per se mobilis. Cuius rei signum est quod corpora quae carent anima impulsu solum agitantur externo; quae animam habent sua sponte moventur et in quamlibet loci partem. Et quoniam anima id praestat corporibus ut per se quodammodo in partem quamlibet moveantur, sequitur ut ipsa sit vere et primo mobilis per seipsam primumque mobile, postquam per eius praesentiam apparet in corpore imago aliqua per se mobilis facultatis, fitque ibi motus in omnem partem. Quod significat animam esse fontem motus, unde libera et universalis effluit agitatio. Per haec solutum arbitror pythagoricum illud aenigma a Xenocrate usurpatum, scilicet animam esse numerum se moventem: *numerum*, id est naturam multiplicem, *se moventem*, id est sua proprietate mutabilem.

13 Talem vero naturam esse alicubi oportere, multa nobis, ut significavimus, iam declarant. Primum, quod omne quod per aliud tale est, reducitur ad aliquid quod per se sit tale. Secundum, quia

than persisting in the unity of one's nature? Angel also moves through God. For whatever all agents do, they do through the power of the prime act. God moves and does all through Himself, and is Himself at rest through Himself. Because all that are what they are through another are brought back to a first something which is what it is through itself, so all that are both at rest and move others by another we refer back to God who through Himself is both at rest and moves others. And all that are moveable by another, such as bodies and qualities, we refer back to soul which is mobile through itself—mobile through itself, I should add, because if you descend from God through angel, it will appear that both God and angel are at rest. The first mobile thing you will come across is soul. Whatever is first of its kind in any genus is such through itself; for instance, the first in the genus of light or heat lights or heats through itself. Thus soul, because it is the first mobile entity among all things that move, is mobile through itself. An indication of this is that bodies which lack soul are only set in motion by some external impulse, while those that have soul move of their own accord and in any direction they wish. Since soul gives bodies the ability to be moved in any direction in a way through themselves, it follows that soul truly is the first to be mobile through itself: it is the first mobile thing. For through its presence an image of its capacity to move on its own appears in body, and from this arises movement in every direction. This proves that soul is the source of movement and that the uncontrolled turbulence of the universe issues from it. This, I think, is the solution to that Pythagorean riddle appropriated by Xenocrates, namely that soul is "self-moving number"—"number" indicating its plural nature, "self-moving" that its property is to be mutable.[6]

As I have pointed out, we have a number of arguments already to the effect that an entity of this nature must exist somewhere. First, everything which derives its nature from another can be referred back to something which is what it is through itself. Sec- 13

cum sint multa quae moventur ab alio, si omnia talia sunt, vel in infinitum vagabimur vel circulo revolvemur eodem, ut idem sit primus motor et ultimus, causa idem atque effectus, neque in rebus ordo sit ullus. Quocirca ad motorem aliquem pervenire compellimur, qui iam non moveatur ab alio, Sed motor ille qui proxime praecedit corpora quae moventur ab alio, non est prorsus immobilis, longius enim distant duo haec: quod ab alio mobile, quod omnino stabile. Medium eorum est quod ex seipso mutabile. Tertium, quia si tanto melius res quaelibet movetur, quanto est motori propinquior, et ad optimum motum perveniendum est, oportet alicubi esse aliquid in quo eadem sit mobilis et motoris essentia. Quartum, quia si movendum est aliquid, oportet vel motorem ad[8] mobile ipsum converti vel contra vel utrumque vicissim. Ponantur igitur in natura angeli deusque solum et corpora. Illi ad haec non accedent, quia sunt immutabiles, neque haec ad illos, quia suapte natura torpent. Ergo nec ullus erit motus in rebus. Sit ergo necesse est natura quaedam sua sponte mutabilis quae, per se accedens ad corpora torpentia, <ea> suscitet et ipsa pervigil vices in seipsa prius experiatur quam edat in corpore, ut sicut a spiritali substantia fit substantia corporalis, sic a spiritali motu corporalis motus efficiatur. Quod quidem intellexisse Platonem in *Legibus* arbitror, ubi inquit: 'Si nunc stent omnia, et paulo post moveri aliquid debeat, quid primo movebitur?' Ipsum videlicet quod per seipsum agile est ad motum, tamquam movendi virtuti propinquius, cuius motum cetera quoque motui subiecta sequentur. Id vocat in *Phaedro* fontem et principium motionis: *fontem*, quia ex se eam habet, *principium*, quia effundit in alia.

ond, since many things exist which are moved by another, if all were such, then we would either wander on to infinity, or else go round and round in the same circle. Consequently the first and last mover would be the same, the cause would be the same as the effect, and no order would exist anywhere. Therefore we are compelled to arrive at a mover that is not already moved by another. But the mover which immediately precedes bodies which are moved by another is not totally immoveable. For then there would be too great a distance between what is moved by another and what is completely at rest. Their mean is what is mutable through itself. Third, if the closer a thing is to its mover the better it is moved, and if we have to reach the best motion, then somewhere there has to be something in which the essence of the thing moved and of the mover are identical. Fourth, if something has to be set in motion, then either the mover has to turn towards the thing to be moved, or vice-versa, or both by turns. So let us imagine that in nature there exist only angels, God, and bodies. God and angels, because they are immutable, will not turn towards bodies; nor bodies towards them, because bodies are naturally inactive. So no movement will exist at all in nature. Therefore there has to be some mutable nature which of its own accord turns towards inactive bodies and arouses them. Always alert, it experiences changes in itself before producing them in body, with the result that, just as corporeal substance is made by spiritual substance, so corporeal movement is produced by spiritual movement. I think Plato realised this when he asked in the *Laws*: "If everything were currently at rest and somewhat later something had to move, what would be the first thing to move?"[7] Obviously it would be what moves easily on its own, as being closest to the power of moving and whose motion is followed by everything else also subject to motion. In the *Phaedrus* Plato calls this the source and principle of motion: "the source" because it has motion from itself, "the principle" because it pours it out into other things.[8]

14 Sed hic oritur dubitatio. Si deus et angelus movent aliquid, atque anima illis subiicitur, ab illis utique agitatur, quomodo igitur a se movetur? Respondeamus in hunc modum. Cum suspiceret pratum Apelles, conatus est ipsum coloribus in tabula pingere. Pratum quidem totum subito se monstravit et subito appetitum Apellis accendit. Demonstratio huiusmodi et accensio actus quidem dici potest, quoniam agit aliquid, motus vero nequaquam, quia non peragitur paulatim. Motus enim est actus per temporis momenta discurrens. Actus vero considerandi atque pingendi, qui in Apelle fit, motus ideo dicitur quoniam transigitur paulatim. Modo enim alium florem inspicit, modo alium, pingitque similiter. Pratum profecto facit ut anima Apellis videat ipsum et appetat pingere, sed ut subito. Quod autem per diversa temporis momenta nunc herba alia, nunc alia videatur et similiter exprimatur, non ipsum efficit pratum, sed Apellis anima, cuius ea natura est ut non simul inspiciat varia referatque, sed paulatim. Ergo motionis huius quae in videndo est atque pingendo initium et finis est pratum. Inde enim pictoris coepit consideratio; eodem tendit et appetitio. Sed fons, per quem talis actus paulatim fit et tempore motusque dicitur, est pictoris ipsius anima.

15 Similiter apud Platonicos anima rationalis perpetuo quodam lumine deum quodammodo et angelum cogitat sive auguratur, seque ipsam appetit ad eorum similitudinem pingere, tum speculatione, tum moribus atque actione. Sese paulatim formando se movet. Motio haec ex animae ipsius natura effluit proprie tamquam fonte proprio motionis, operationis scilicet temporalis. Incitatur autem a supernis tamquam ab extrinseco initio atque fine. Infusio quae a supernis manat in animam una stabilis subita fit et aeterna, et quantum in se est, similia quoque in anima operatur, id est su-

At this point a doubt arises. If God and angel move something, and soul is subordinate to them and assuredly roused to action by them, how then is it moved by itself? Let us answer in this way. When Apelles admired a meadow, he tried to paint a picture of it with colors.[9] All the meadow instantaneously appeared and instantaneously excited Apelles' desire [to paint it]. This instantaneous appearance and incitement can be called act it is true, since it does something, but not movement, since it does not act step by step. For movement is act that traverses moments in time. But the [subsequent] act of observing and painting which occurs in Apelles is called movement because it does take place gradually. He looks first at one flower, then at another, and he paints them in the same way. To be sure, it is the meadow that makes Apelles' soul see it and yearn to paint it, but it does this instantaneously. It is Apelles' soul, not the meadow, that makes him look first at one blade of grass then at another over various moments of time and to depict them in the same gradual way. And it is the nature of his soul not to examine various blades of grass and represent them all at once but to do so gradually. The beginning and end of this movement which consists in seeing and painting is the meadow; for the painter's observation began with the meadow and his desire is directed towards it. But the source by means of which such an act occurs gradually over time and is called movement is the soul of the painter himself. 14

According to the Platonists, the rational soul in a kind of perpetual light similarly considers or conjectures about God in a way and angel, and desires to paint itself in their likeness, now in speculation, now in its behavior and activity. Gradually, in forming itself, it moves itself. This movement properly does flow out of the soul's own nature as its own fountain of movement defined as activity within time; but it is aroused by those above, as by a beginning and end outside itself. This stream that flows into the soul from those above is one, constant, instantaneous and eternal; and 15 bita et stabilia et aeterna. Quod autem operationes animae et opera paulatim tempore fiant atque mutentur, ex propria animae natura supernis imbecilliore procedit.

16 Sed rem totam hoc accipe exemplo. Sol ex seipso lumen habet; infundit ipsum momento in Mercurium; Mercurius quoque momento totum suum accipit lumen manetque semper deinde plenissimus. Sol idem lumen momento infundit in Lunam; Luna non suscipit ipsum momento, sed tempore. Nam prout alias aliter in Solem vertitur, alias aliter accipit lumen, et per naturam suam vicissitudine luminis variatur. Sol deum, Mercurius angelum, Luna significat animam. Quod autem de Mercurio dico, de omnibus similiter super Lunam stellis dictum intellege. Sicut enim illae ad Solem, sic ad deum angeli referuntur. Anima vero sola sicut Luna ad Solem, ita se habet ad deum. Quapropter nihil obstat quin anima a divinis descendat capiatque divina, et tamen per naturam propriam moveatur semperque moveri possit et vivere.

: II :

Anima est medius rerum gradus, atque omnes gradus tam superiores quam inferiores connectit in unum, dum ipsa et ad superos ascendit et descendit ad inferos.

1 Ceterum ut ad id quandoque veniamus quod cupimus, in quinque gradus iterum omnia colligamus, deum et angelum in arce naturae ponentes, corpus et qualitatem in infimo; animam vero

insofar as it can it produces the same in the soul, namely effects that are instantaneous, constant and eternal. That the soul's activities and works, however, occur and change gradually over time is the result of the nature proper to the soul being much weaker than those above.

Let me give you a single example which will illustrate the whole matter. The Sun gets its light from itself and in an instant pours it into Mercury. Mercury likewise receives all its light in an instant, and remains thereafter always brimful of light. Likewise, the Sun pours the same light in an instant into the Moon, yet the Moon does not receive it in an instant but over the course of time. For according as she turns herself towards the Sun at one time in one way, at another in another, so she variously receives his light; and because of her very nature she varies with the light's alternation. The Sun represents God, Mercury represents angel, and the Moon, soul. What I say about Mercury take as said likewise about the other stars above the Moon. The angels relate to God as the stars to the Sun. But the soul alone relates to God as the Moon to the Sun. So nothing prevents the soul from descending from the divine and apprehending the divine, and yet from being moved by its own nature and from being able always to be moved and to live. 16

: II :

The soul is the middle level of being. It links and unites all the levels above it and below it when it ascends to the higher and descends to the lower levels.

So that we may finally reach the desired goal, let us once more assemble things on five levels, placing God and angel at the summit of nature, body and quality at the foot, but soul halfway between 1 inter illa summa et haec infima mediam, quam merito essentiam tertiam ac mediam more Platonico nominamus, quoniam et ad omnia media est et undique tertia. Si a deo descenderis, tertio descensus gradu hanc reperis; tertio quoque ascensus gradu, si supra corpus ascenderis. Huiusmodi essentiam in natura summopere necessariam arbitramur. Quoniam angelus quidem, ut Platonici dicunt, vere est, id est stat semper, qualitas fit, id est movetur aliquando, ideo qualitas omnino differt ab angelo, tum quia haec movetur, ille manet, tum quia haec fit aliquando, ille est semper. Ergo opus est medio, quod partim cum angelo, partim cum qualitate conveniat. Quid illud? Numquid quod est, id est intrinsecus manet, aliquando? Non. Tale enim aliquid non reperitur. Nam quod per tempus aliquod intrinsecus, id est vel ex se vel ex statu proxime, manet, manet et semper. Itaque medium erit illud quod semper fit, id est movetur. Quod quia semper est, cum angelo congruit; quia movetur, cum qualitate. Unde sequitur esse oportere essentiam tertiam horum mediam, quae semper moveatur et vivat suoque motu vitam diffundat in corpora. Recte dicitur a Platonicis, super id quod est in parte temporis esse quod est per omne tempus; super illud rursus esse quod est per aevum; denique super illud aevum existere. Sed inter illa quae sunt aeterna solum atque illa quae solum sunt temporalia esse animam quasi quoddam vinculum utrorumque. Cui quidem hac in re similes quodammodo sunt partes corporis mundani praecipuae. Sunt et qui caelum empyreum tamquam prorsus immobile in aeternitate ponant, ceteras vero sphaeras in aeternitate simul et tempore, composita denique in tempore tantum; similiter quoque puros intellectus in gradu primo, sed intellectus animales in secundo, tandem animas corporales in tertio.

2 Verum ut ad propositum revertamur, omne opus quod con-

those on high and those below. We would do well to call soul the third and middle essence, as the Platonists do, because it is the mean for all and the third from both directions. If you descend from God, you will find soul at the third level down; or at the third level up, if you ascend from body. We believe that such an essence in nature is an absolute necessity. Because angel, as the Platonists say, truly is (it is always unchanging), whereas quality becomes (it is set in motion at any time), it follows that quality differs totally from angel, both because it is subject to movement and angel is at rest, and because it comes into being at some point and the other always exists. So a mean is needed which shares some characteristics with angel and others with quality. What can that be? Is it that which exists — is internally at rest — for a time or two? No. For such a thing cannot be found. For what remains internally at rest for a time — remains, that is, either because of itself or because of its proximity to rest — also remains forever. Therefore the mean will be that which is forever becoming or being moved. Because it is forever, it is in harmony with angel, because it is being moved, with quality. Consequently, a third essence must exist as their mean, which can always be in motion and alive, and which can by means of its motion infuse life into bodies. The Platonists were right in saying that above what exists for a portion of time is what exists for all time; and above that in turn is what exists eternally; and above that is eternity. But between the things that are purely eternal and those that are purely temporal is soul, a bond as it were linking the two. In this respect the most important parts of the world's body are in a way similar to soul. Some place the sphere of the empyrean, being absolutely motionless, in eternity, but the other spheres simultaneously in eternity and time, and compounded objects finally in time alone. Similarly, they place pure intellect on the first level of being, ensouled intellects on the second, and corporeal souls on the third.

But let us return to our theme. Every work composed of several 2 stat ex pluribus, tunc est perfectissimum quando ita ex suis membris conglutinatur ut unum fiat undique, sibi constet et consonet, neque facile dissipetur. Quod liquido in quatuor elementorum temperamento corporalis natura demonstrat, ubi terra et ignis longe distantes per aerem copulantur et aquam. Multo magis in universo dei opere connexio partium est ponenda, ut unius dei unum quoque sit opus. Deus et corpus extrema sunt in natura, et[9] invicem diversissima. Angelus haec[10] non ligat, nempe in deum totus erigitur, corpora negligit. Iure perfectissima et proxima creatura dei fit tota divina transitque in deum. Qualitas etiam non connectit extrema, nam declinat ad corpus, superiora relinquit, relictis incorporeis fit corporalis. Hucusque extrema sunt omnia, seque invicem superna et inferna fugiunt competenti carentia vinculo. Verum essentia illa tertia interiecta talis existit ut superiora teneat, inferiora non deserat, atque ita in ea supera cum inferis colligantur. Est enim immobilis, est et mobilis. Illinc cum superioribus, hinc cum inferioribus convenit. Si cum utrisque convenit, appetit utraque. Quapropter naturali quodam instinctu ascendit ad supera, descendit ad infera. Et dum ascendit, inferiora non deserit. Et dum descendit, sublimia non relinquit. Nam si alterutrum deserat, ad extremum alterum[11] declinabit; neque vera erit ulterius mundi copula. Profecto idem facit quod aer inter ignem aquamve medius, qui cum igne in calore, cum aqua convenit in humore. Illic cum igne calet semper, hic cum aqua humet. Illic tenuatur et clarescit ut ignis, hic vicissim hebescit ut aqua. Immo vero idem facit quod solis lumen. Id enim a sole descendit in ignem et ignem implet, neque deserit solem. Semper soli haeret, semper implet et ignem. Inficit[12] quidem aerem et infecto aere non inficitur. Similiter oportet essentiam tertiam et divinis simul haerere et implere

parts is at its most perfect when its members are so firmly cemented together that it becomes completely one, is consistent with and in harmony with itself, and does not easily break apart. Corporeal nature demonstrates this clearly in the blending of the four elements, where earth and fire, which are far apart, are linked together by air and water. Even more must we postulate such bonding of parts in God's universal work, in order for the one God's work to be one too. Now God and body are the extremes of nature and completely different from each other. Angel does not link them, for the whole of angel reaches up towards God and neglects body. For it is with justice that the most perfect of God's creatures and that closest to Him should become completely godlike and pass over into God. Nor does quality connect the two extremes, since it sinks downwards to body, abandons those above, and, having abandoned the incorporeal, becomes corporeal. Thus far all are extremes, and the higher and the lower flee from each other since they lack a proper bond. But the third essence set between them is such that it cleaves to the higher while not abandoning the lower; and in it, therefore, the higher and the lower are linked together. For it is both immobile and mobile. The former characteristic it shares with the higher, the latter with the lower. If it shares characteristics with both, it seeks after both. So by a natural instinct it ascends to the higher and descends to the lower. In ascending, it does not abandon the things below it; in descending, it does not relinquish the things above it. For were it to abandon either, it would swing to the opposite extreme and no longer be the world's true bond. It acts in the same way as air, which is an intermediary between fire and water, combining with fire to produce heat and with water to produce humidity. The combination with fire keeps it always hot, with water, damp. In the first case it is rarefied and bright like fire, in the second it becomes sluggish like water. Or rather, it acts like the light of the Sun. Sunlight descends from the Sun into fire and fills the fire without abandoning the Sun. It al-

mortalia. Dum divinis haeret, quia spiritaliter illis unitur et spiritalis unio gignit cognitionem, illa cognoscit. Dum implet corpora, intrinsecus illa movens, illa vivificat. Est igitur divinorum speculum, vita mortalium, utrorumque connexio.

3 Sed quomodo corporibus iungitur? Num forte, cum corpus aliquod ingreditur, unum quoddam illius corporis tangit punctum, atque ita dicitur unita corporibus? Nequaquam. Uniretur enim puncto, non corpori, neque totum corpus illud vivificaret, sed punctum viveret unum, toto corpore vita carente. Immo vero, si in unum semper collecta punctum ita sibi ipsi unita perseveraret, idem esset quod angelus, qui longe distat a corpore, vel saltem divinis eo modo haereret quidem, corpora vero relinqueret. Igitur non uni dumtaxat corporis puncto coniungitur, sed pluribus atque ita partes corporis implet. Sed numquid ita implet ut albas carnes albedo et omnino quaevis qualitas materiam propriam? Minime. Sic enim esset idem quod qualitas atque relictis divinis ad corpus penitus declinaret. Albedo ita in tota est carne ut cum ea aequaliter in partes plurimas extendatur et dividatur, et pars albedinis secundum physicos in parte sit carnis, et in maiori carnis parte pars maior albedinis, in minore sit minor. Sic albedo facta est corporalis.

4 Idem pateretur essentia illa quam tertiam esse putamus, si non aliter quam qualitas ista funderetur in corpus atque ita ad alterum naturae extremum tracta esse desineret copula mundi. Quamobrem cum corpus ingreditur, singulis corporis particulis tota fit

ways clings to the Sun and it always fills the fire. It mixes with the air yet is not infected by the air's contagion. Similarly, the third essence must cling to things divine and fill things mortal. When it clings to things divine, because it is spiritually united with them and spiritual union begets knowledge, it knows them. When it fills bodies, moving them from within, it gives them life. Thus it is the mirror of things divine, the life of things mortal, the bond joining the two.

But how is it joined to bodies? Are we to suppose that when it enters a body it is in contact only with a single point of that body? Is this what we mean when we say it is united with bodies? Surely not. For it would be united with a point not with a body; nor would it bring life to the whole of the body but only to the point, while the body as a whole would lack life. Or rather, if it remained concentrated into a single point and thus united to itself, it would be the same as the angel, which is far removed from the body; or at least it would cling to things divine in this way but abandon bodies. So it is not attached to one point only of the body, but to many points, and thus fills the body's parts. But are we to suppose that it fills them in the way that whiteness fills white flesh, or any other quality wholly fills its own matter? Certainly not. For if that were so, it would be the same as a quality and, having abandoned things divine, it would completely decline towards the body. Whiteness is so present in the flesh as a whole that it is extended and divided up equally with the flesh into many parts; and thus, as the physicists tell us, part of whiteness is in part of the flesh: a larger part of whiteness in a larger part of the flesh, a smaller part in a smaller. In this way whiteness has become corporeal. 3

The essence we are supposing the third essence would suffer the same fate if it were extended through body in the same way as whiteness. Dragged towards one of the extremes of nature, it would cease to be the link that binds the world together. Therefore when it enters a body, it is present in its entirety in the indi- 4

praesens, neque dividitur distrahiturve in partes ullas ad hoc, ut partibus corporis a se invicem distantibus adstet. Nam per vim individuam tangit corpus, non per latitudinem quantitatis. Igitur integra remanens atque simplex, singulis partibus tota et indivisa fit praesens, quemadmodum tota vox significatioque quodammodo simul in singulis domus est partibus, cum tota paene simul audiatur et intellegatur in singulis. Neque impossibile est hanc essentiam, cum sit individuum quiddam in seipso existens, amplae corporis moli sic totam esse praesentem. Immo vero ex eo quod et individua est et non clauditur loco, potest tota totum quicquid in loco est penetrare et comprehendere. Extensio enim quantitatis, ubicumque reperitur, talem vim et praesentiam prohibet, ita ut res extensa per quantitatem nequeat tota esse simul in pluribus. Quin etiam res illa, quae licet individua sit, est tamen alicubi affixa corporis quantitati, sicut punctum quod tamquam lineae terminus signatur in linea; nequit tota esse simul per partes quaslibet corporis. Sic punctum, quod est alicubi in linea aliqua circuli designatum, neque in omnibus lineis aliis inest, neque per totam diffunditur lineam aut circulum. Punctum vero quod circuli centrum est, nullius lineae proprium, in omnibus quodammodo lineis reperitur quae inde ad circumferentiam deducuntur. Et cum nullum punctum quod in circumferentia designatur totum circulum aeque respiciat, centrum tamen quod in nulla circumferentia proprie figitur universum circulum aeque circumspicit. Non potest igitur esse tota simul in pluribus res illa quae dividua est, neque etiam res illa quae, licet sit individua, certum[13] tamen in re alia dividua habet situm. Tertia vero illa essentia neque extensa est, quia esset qualitas, neque in extensione sita alicubi, quia non per se ac libere moveretur, si non subsisteret per seipsam. Quapropter est instar puncti

vidual parts of the body. It is not divided up or separated into any parts in order to be present in the parts of the body that are distant from each other. For it is through its undivided power, not its quantitative extension, that it makes contact with the body. Remaining whole and simple, therefore, it becomes present as an undivided whole in the individual parts, just as a spoken word and its meaning are wholly and simultaneously present in a manner in the different parts of a house in that they are heard and understood almost simultaneously in the different parts. Nor is it impossible for this essence, in spite of being undivided and existing in itself, to be thus present in its entirety throughout the broad mass of a body. Indeed, because it is undivided and not confined in a location, it can, in its entirety, penetrate or envelop all of whatever is confined in a location. For the extension of quantity, wherever it is found, does prevent such [ubiquitous] power and presence, with the result that some thing extended by way of quantity cannot be present in its entirety in many things at once. Moreover, even if that thing is undivided, it is attached somewhere to the quantity of a body, just as the point at the end of a line is imprinted in the line. The thing cannot be present in its entirety throughout different parts of the body at the same time. Similarly, a point imprinted somewhere in any radius of a circle is not present in the other radii, nor is it spread along the length of the whole radius or throughout the circle. But the point which is the center of the circle and does not belong to any particular radius is found in a way in all the radii that are drawn from the center to the circumference. And although no point imprinted on the circumference regards the whole circle equally, yet the center, which properly is not attached to any circumference, does regard the whole circle equally. So that thing being divided cannot be present in its entirety at the same time in many things, nor can it, even if it is undivided, yet have a fixed position in another divided thing. The third essence, however, is neither subject to extension — for then it would

alicuius in seipso viventis et ab omni quantitate et situ penitus absoluti. Ideo ambit aeque omnem corporis situm, et quando corpus ingreditur, quia ipsa non est proprium quantitatis alicuius punctum, non adstringitur ad punctum aliquod corporeae quantitatis. Quippe cum sit extra quantitatis genus, non determinatur ad tangendum punctum aliquod quantitatis, sed est, ut centrum, in lineis omnibus et circulo toto.

5 Hinc etiam illud sequitur ut haec essentia et dividua sit simul et individua: dividua, quia per divisionem corporis vitalem sui umbram diffundit, dum diversis partibus corporis se communicat; individua, quia integra simul adstat et simplex. Dividua, inquam, quia umbra eius in toto corpore est dividuo; individua, quia ipsa per modum individuum est in qualibet corporis parte tota. Individua rursus, quoniam stabilem habet unitamque substantiam; dividua, quoniam per operationem in plura dividitur, dum per motum operatur et tempus. Individua tertio, quia suspicit superiora quae admodum sunt unita; dividua, quia ad inferiora declinat, quae plurimum dividuntur. Talis quaedam natura in ordine mundi videtur summopere necessaria, ut post deum angelumque, qui neque secundum tempus neque secundum dimensionem dividui sunt, ac supra corpus et qualitates quae tempore dimensioneque dissipantur, sit medium competens, quod temporali quidem discursione quodammodo dividatur, non tamen sit dimensione divisum; neque rursus in sua quadam natura collectum maneat semper ut illi, neque in partes discerpatur ut ista, sed individuum sit pariter et dividuum.

6 Haec illa ipsa essentia est quam Timaeus Locrus et Plato in li-

be a quality — nor is it positioned somewhere in extension — for it would not be moved freely of itself if it did not subsist of itself. It is like a point then that is in itself alive and totally free from quantity and from being in a location. Therefore it encircles the body's every position, and when it enters the body, because it is not itself a point properly of any one quantity, it is not restricted to any particular point of the body's quantity. Since it lies outside the genus of quantity, it is not limited to touching some particular point of quantity. Like the center of a circle, it is in every radius and in the circle as a whole.

It also follows from this that the third essence is simultaneously both divided and undivided: divided, because it spreads its life-bringing shadow through the body's division when it communicates itself to the body's different parts; undivided, because it is present at the same time whole and unmixed. It is divided, I repeat, because its shadow is in all the body which is divided; but it is undivided, because it exists entire in an undivided way in any part of the body. Again, it is undivided, because it has a stable and unified substance; but it is divided, because in the course of its operation it is divided into many parts when it acts through movement and in time. Third, it is undivided, because it looks up at things above which are fully unified; but it is divided, because it sinks down towards things below which are utterly divided. Such a nature seems to be completely necessary in the world's order, in order that, after God and angel, who cannot be divided according to time or dimension, but before body and qualities, which are dispersed in time and dimension, a harmonious mean may exist, a mean that may be divided in a way by sequential temporal activity but not divided by dimension, and that may neither remain always gathered in a nature of its own like God and angel, nor be scattered about like body and quality, but be undivided and divided equally. 5

This is that essence which Timaeus of Locri and Plato in the 6 bro *De mundo* constare dixerunt ex individua dividuaque natura. Haec illa est quae seipsam inserit mortalibus, neque fit ipsa mortalis. Sicut enim seipsam inserit integram, non discerptam, ita et integram retrahit, non dispersam. Et quia dum corpora regit, haeret quoque divinis, corporum domina est, non comes. Hoc maximum est in natura miraculum. Reliqua enim sub deo unum quiddam in se singula sunt, haec omnia simul. Imagines in se possidet divinorum, a quibus ipsa dependet, inferiorum rationes et exemplaria, quae quodammodo et ipsa producit. Et cum media omnium sit, vires possidet omnium. Si ita est, transit in omnia. Et quia ipsa vera est universorum connexio, dum in alia migrat, non deserit alia, sed migrat in singula ac semper cuncta conservat, ut merito dici possit centrum naturae, universorum medium, mundi series, vultus omnium nodusque et copula mundi.

7 Qualis sit tertiae huius essentiae natura satis, ut arbitror, diximus. Quod autem haec ipsa sit propria rationalis animae sedes facillime inde conspicitur, quod huiusmodi est rationalis animae definitio: 'Vita et intellegens discurrendo et corpus vivificans tempore'. Haec eadem est essentiae illius conditio. Nam vivit, intellegit, corpori praestat vitam. Quod vivat apparet, quoniam ea in terris vivere dicimus, quae sua quadam interiori virtute per omnem partem moventur, sursum, deorsum, ante, retro, ad dextram et sinistram. Ita plantae moventur et animalia. Ubi igitur est motus intimus et communis, ibi vita. Vita, inquam, ibi est vis ipsa interna movendi. Vis huiusmodi ibi est praecipue, ubi totius agitationis fons est et origo primusque[14] motus. Maxime enim est motus intimus atque communis, ubi est primus. Primus autem motus in tertia illa essentia ponitur. Ibi igitur vita est. Vita inquam talis ut eius

De Mundo[10] described as compounded from undivided and divided nature. This is what implants itself in things mortal without itself becoming mortal. For just as it implants itself as a whole and is not split asunder, so it withdraws as a whole and is not dispersed. And because it controls bodies while it also clings to things divine, it is the mistress of bodies, not their companion. This is the greatest miracle in nature. For the remaining things below God are each individually something singular in themselves, but this essence is all things together. It possesses within itself images of things divine on which it depends, and these images are the reasons and paradigms of the lower entities which in some sense it produces. Because it is the universal mean, it possesses the powers of all. If this is so, it passes into all. And since it is the true bond of everything in the universe, when it passes into some things, it does not abandon others, but it moves into individuals while forever preserving all things. It can with justice, accordingly, be called nature's center, the mean of everything in the universe, the succession or chain of the world, the countenance of all things, and the knot and bond of the world.

I think I have said enough about the nature of this third essence. That it is the proper seat of the rational soul, however, we can easily see from the following definition of the rational soul: "It is life which understands discursively, and gives life to the body in time." These are precisely the characteristics of the third essence. For it is alive, it understands, and it gives life to the body. It is obviously alive, for among terrestrial beings, the ones we describe as alive are those that are moved by an inner power of their own in all directions, up and down, forward and backward, to the right and to the left. That is the way plants and animals are moved. So where movement exists that is internal and common [to the whole body], there is life. What I mean by life then is where this internal power of moving exists. This power is to be found pre-eminently in the source, origin and first movement of all activity. For move- 7 participatione corpora vivant et moveantur. Nam est vita corporibus per naturam quam proxima. Illa igitur essentia tertia est vita vivificans corpora.

8 Est etiam intellegens. Quippe si motus alicubi perfectus est, perfectissimus certe est ubi primus. Nulla enim perfectio in posteriores motus, nisi a primo descendit. Igitur motus est in tertia essentia motionum omnium perfectissimus. Is[15] est autem qui a fonte suo discedit quam minimum, qui suo fundamento maxime iungitur, qui unus et aequalis est summopere, qui seipso sufficiens est, qui figuram perfectissimam imitatur. Talis autem est circuitus, ut cuique constat, qui etiam solus omnium motionum est sempiternus. Alii quippe motus aliquem attingunt terminum ultra quem non liceat progredi, cum nullum sit usquam spatium infinitum. Circuitus autem ut semel eadem repetit, ita bis ac ter et quater simili repetit ratione, idemque in eo finis est atque principium: ideo cum finiri videtur, tunc incipit. Circuitus igitur sempiternus est essentiae tertiae proprius ita ut per motum in seipsam circulo reflectatur. Merito, si movetur ex se, movetur et in seipsam, ut finis aliquis motionis fiat ubi aliquod est principium, siquidem ipsa motionis causa quodammodo sui ipsius gratia edit motum. Igitur essentia illa a seipsa incipiens perpetuo in seipsam revolvitur, vires suas a summis per medias ad infimas explicando, ac rursus infimas per medias ad summas similiter replicando. Si ita est, seipsam et quae possidet intus animadvertit. Si animadvertit, certe cognoscit. Cognoscit autem intellegendo, dum essentiam suam spiritalem et a materiae limitibus absolutam agnoscit. Talium namque cognitio dicitur intellectio. In nobis profecto videmus cognitionem nihil esse aliud quam spiritalem unionem ad formam aliquam spiritalem. Visus per suum spiritum spiritali colorum imagini iunctus videt. Iunctus vero materiae nihil cernit, quod patet si quis super

ment is internal and common to the utmost degree where it is the first. But first movement is located in that third essence. So that is where life is — life of such a sort that bodies come alive and are moved through participation in it. For life by its very nature is as close as possible to bodies. That third essence then is the life which gives life to bodies.

It is also intelligent. If motion is perfect anywhere, the most perfect must be where the first motion is. For no perfection whatsoever exists in later motions unless it derives from the first motion. So the motion in the third essence is the most perfect of all motions. But this is the motion that departs as little as possible from its source; that remains very much joined to its foundation; that is single and equal to the greatest possible degree; that is sufficient for itself; and that imitates the most perfect figure. This, as everybody would agree, is the circular motion, which is also the only sempiternal motion among motions. Others reach a limit beyond which they may not proceed, since nowhere is there infinite space. But circular motion, as it recurs once, so it recurs twice, three times, four times, and for the same reason; and in the circuit the end and the beginning are the same. Thus when it seems to be finishing, it is just beginning. Sempiternal circular motion, then, is proper to the third essence insofar as the essence is brought back in a circle to itself through motion. If it is moved from itself, it is also moved to itself, in order for it to make an end of the motion where a beginning exists, seeing that the cause itself of motion, in a sense, produces motion for its own sake. So the third essence, starting from itself, circles perpetually back to itself, by unfolding its powers from the highest powers, through the middle and down to the lowest, and likewise by enfolding them again commencing from the lowest, through the middle, and up to the highest. If this is so, it must be aware of itself and what it contains within itself. If it is aware, it must know. But it knows by understanding as long as it recognizes its essence as spiritual and free from the limita- 8

aciem oculorum solidum aliquod corpus posuerit. Mens quoque nostra spiritali virtute incorporalibus[16] rerum speciebus rationibusque unita res ipsas intellegit. Similiter cum essentia tertia, quae quidem spiritalis est, sibi ipsi coniungitur, spiritali modo seipsam animadvertendo cognoscit atque intellegit. intellegit etiam divina, quibus spiritali modo haeret quam proxime. intellegit et corporalia, ad quae declinat etiam per naturam. Cognoscit inquam temporaliter discurrendo, cum per operationem sit mobilis.

9 Ex omnibus his colligitur talis quaedam essentiae tertiae definitio, scilicet vita quae corpora per naturam vivificat. Cognoscit quoque seipsam et divina et naturalia per discursum. Quicumque vero non viderit eandem esse animae quoque rationalis definitionem, is[17] anima caret rationali. Quapropter anima rationalis in essentia tertia habet sedem, obtinet naturae mediam regionem et omnia connectit in unum.

tions of matter. For it is knowledge of such which is called understanding. We can see in our own case that knowledge is nothing other than spiritual union with some spiritual form. Sight occurs when its spirit is joined to the spiritual image of colors. If the union is to matter, it sees nothing—this is obvious if someone puts a solid body in the line of sight. Our mind too, having been joined by our spiritual power with the incorporeal species and reasons of things, understands objects themselves. Similarly, when the third essence, which is spiritual of course, is joined to itself, it knows and understands itself by becoming aware of itself in a spiritual way. It also understands things divine, to which it clings as closely as possible in a spiritual way. And it understands things corporeal, to which by nature it also descends. It knows, I say, by a discursive process over time, since through its activity it is mobile.

From all this we can put together the following definition of the third essence. It is life that of its own nature gives life to bodies. It also knows itself and divine and natural things through discursive reasoning. But anyone who cannot see that this definition is identical to the definition of rational soul lacks a rational soul. Wherefore the rational soul has its seat in the third essence, and occupies the middle region of nature, and joins all things into one. 9

LIBER QUARTUS[1]

: I :

Tres sunt animarum rationalium gradus. In primo est anima mundi, in secundo animae sphaerarum, in tertio animae animalium quae in sphaeris singulis continentur.

1 Principio quinque gradus accepimus ascendendo. Deinde eos descendendo invicem comparavimus. Tertio in eorum medio rationalem animam collocavimus. Deinceps animae huius gradus, sicuti solent Mercuriales theologi, perscrutabimur.

2 Generatio principium est nutritionis et augmenti. Nusquam enim aut nutriri aut augeri absque partium quarundam generatione quicquam potest. Exploratum autem habemus, ubi generationem nutritio et augmentum sequitur, ibi vitam animamque inesse. Terram vero videmus seminibus propriis generare innumerabiles arbores animantesque et nutrire et augere. Augere etiam lapides quasi dentes suos et herbas quasi pilos, quamdiu radicibus haerent, quae si evellantur et extirpentur e terra, non crescunt. Quis feminae huius ventrem vita carere dixerit, qui tam multos sponte sua parit foetus et alit, qui sustinet se ipsum, cuius dorsum dentes promit et pilos? Eadem est de aquae corpore ratio. Habent igitur animam aqua et terra, nisi forte quis dixerit viventia illa, quae nos, cum seminibus propriis carere videantur, ab anima

BOOK IV

: I :

There are three levels of rational souls: in the first is the world soul, in the second the souls of the spheres, in the third the souls of the living creatures contained within the individual spheres.

We started by recognizing five levels of being in ascending order. Next, we took them in descending order and compared them together. Thirdly, we placed rational soul on the middle level. Now we will examine the levels of rational soul in the manner of the theologians who were followers of Hermes Trismegistus.[1] 1

Generation is the principle of nourishment and growth. For nowhere can anything be nourished or grow without the generation of particular parts. But where nutrition follows generation and growth there we know for certain that life and soul are present. But we see the earth generating large numbers of trees and living creatures from their own seeds, and nourishing them and making them grow. Stones grow too like its teeth, and plants like hairs as long as they are attached by the roots; but as soon as they are pulled up or torn out of the earth, they stop growing. Who would say that the womb of this mother lacks life, when of her own accord she brings forth and nourishes so many offspring, when she sustains itself, and when her back produces teeth and hairs?[2] The same holds true of water's body. Therefore water and earth possess soul,[3] unless perhaps someone were to say that the living things, which we claim are made from the soul of earth or of water, since they seem to lack their own seeds, are not born from 2 terrae fieri dicimus aut aquae, non ex tali anima nasci, sed ex influxibus caelestium animorum.

3 At vero Platonici negabunt influxus illos, cum sint accidentia quaedam a suis vitalibus substantiis longe seiuncta, posse vitalem hic substantiam generare, quia nequeat accidens generare substantiam, nisi tamquam instrumentum substantiae subiiciatur. Substantiae inquam proximae, nam instrumentum seorsum ab artifice non movetur ad artis formam. Sic influxus illae[2] vitae caelestis ab ipsa vita remotus vitalem formam non generabit. Merito caelestis instinctus, quia communis est cuilibet elemento, in quolibet determinatur ad vitam aliquam in ipso elemento gignendam a communi totius elementi vita, eique subditur ut instrumentum. Sed neque etiam ullo pacto generabit ipse. Cum enim nihil ultra proprium agat gradum, nullo modo potest accidens generare substantiam, sed materiam dumtaxat accidentali quadam praeparatione disponere.[3] Oportere autem elementis hanc vitam inesse intus fabricatricem ea ratio persuadet, quod et ad substantiam generandam substantia est opus agente, et ad perfectam actionem opus est perfecta agentis ipsius praesentia. Quando vero substantia corporalis corporali substantiae admovetur ad aliquam actionem, quod in agente ipso substantiale est remanet extra, quod penetrat intro est prorsus accidentale. Opus est autem substantia penetrante, ut substantia fiat inde fiatque perfecte. Substantia talis incorporea est et vivens.

4 Praeterea causae naturales, quia per naturam suam agunt, ideo ad certum effectum non aliter quam certa naturae suae ratione feruntur, alioquin non magis ad hunc effectum vergerent quam ad illum. Quo fit ut quatenus operi faciundo quadrant, eatenus operentur atque contra. Quapropter herbae animantesque quae sola putrefactione nasci videntur in terra, non minus a propriis causis oriri debent quam quae propagatione nascuntur. Sed ubinam sunt

such a soul, but from the influences of the celestial souls [of the stars].

Platonists, however, will deny that celestial influences, as particular accidents far removed from their own living substances, can generate a living substance here on earth. For accident cannot generate substance, unless it is subject as an instrument to the substance; and I mean to the substance closest to it.[4] For apart from the craftsman an instrument is not moved to craft the form of an artifact. Thus an influence descending from celestial life will not generate a vital form if it is far removed from that life itself. Quite properly, this celestial impulse, because it is common to every element, is limited in any one element to producing in the element a particular life from the life which is common to the whole element: it serves it as an instrument. But in no way will the celestial impulse itself generate [life]. Since nothing can act above its own level of being, in no way can accident generate substance: it can only dispose matter by a sort of accidental preparation. A convincing argument that this generative life, however, must be present in the elements is that a substance is needed as agent to generate substance, and the perfect presence of the agent itself is needed for [such] a perfect action. But when one corporeal substance approaches another in order to act on it in some way, what is substantial in the agent remains outside [the patient]; what penetrates within is entirely accidental. But penetrating substance [not accident] is needed in order for substance to be made, and perfectly made from it. Such substance is incorporeal and living. 3

Natural causes, moreover, because they act by way of their own nature, are borne towards a definite effect only because of the definite rational principle of their own nature, otherwise they would no more tend towards one effect than another. Consequently to the extent they are fitted to doing a work, they do it; and vice versa. Therefore plants and living things which appear to come to birth in the earth only as a result of putrefaction must arise from 4

hae propriae causae? Proculdubio in terrena vita sunt terrenarum vitarum causae propriae. Nam etsi eas caelestibus animis attribueris, oportebit tamen caelestes communesque instinctus ad terrenas particularesque animas per universalem terrae animam contrahi, ut a caelesti communique ad oppositum, id est terrenum particulareque, per medium competens, id est terrenum communeque progrediaris.

Rursus, si causas illas quae propriae dictae sunt in multorum agentium concursu posueris, cogeris denique unam quandam proprii ordinis determinatam causam assignare, quae causas varias et hinc atque illinc confluentes ad effectum proprium ordinet atque determinet. Erunt igitur illae causae in anima terrae, quae per naturalem ideam rationemque vitis vitem, per muscarum rationem muscas efficiet. Faciet inquam talia in materia sic prius aut sic ab anima ipsa disposita, dum ad eam disponendam sic aut sic contrahit mundanos instinctus. Proinde, si ars humana nihil est aliud quam naturae imitatio quaedam, atque haec ars per certas operum rationes fabricat opera, similiter efficit ipsa natura, et tanto vivaciore sapientioreque arte quanto efficit efficacius et efficit pulchriora. Ac si ars vivas rationes habet, quae opera facit non viventia, neque principales formas inducit neque integras, quanto magis putandum est vivas naturae rationes inesse, quae viventia generat formasque principales producit et integras. Quid est ars humana? Natura quaedam materiam tractans extrinsecus. Quid natura? Ars intrinsecus materiam temperans, ac si faber lignarius esset in ligno. Quod si ars humana, quamvis sit extra materiam, tamen usque adeo congruit et propinquat operi faciundo ut certa opera certis consummet ideis, quanto magis ars id naturalis implebit,

their own causes no less than things born from propagation. But where are these causes of theirs? Undoubtedly the proper causes of terrestrial lives are in terrestrial life. For even were you to attribute the causes to celestial souls, the general celestial impulses will nevertheless have to be confined[5] within particular earthly souls by way of the universal soul of the earth, in order for you to proceed from what is celestial and general to its opposite, what is earthly and particular, by way of an appropriate intermediary, what is earthly and yet general.

Again, even were you to posit the said proper causes in the confluence of many agents, in the end you would still have to assign one specific determined cause to its proper order; and this cause will order and determine the different causes flowing together from all directions in order to achieve the proper effect. The proper causes, therefore, will be in the soul of the earth, which will produce a vine by means of the natural idea or rational principle of the vine, and produce flies through the rational principle of flies.[6] It will make them such, I should add, in matter that has first been made specifically ready by the soul itself, when in order to prepare the matter it contracted the terrestrial impulses in specific ways. Hence, if human art is nothing but an imitation of nature, and this art fashions its products by means of their definite rational principles, nature must work in the same way, but with an art which is much more enduring and full of wisdom in that it works with greater effectiveness and makes more beautiful things. But if art—which produces works that are not alive and introduces forms that are neither primary nor whole—has living rational principles, there is all the more reason to suppose that rational principles are present in nature, which does generate living things and produce forms that are primary and whole. For what after all is human art? It is a sort of nature handling matter from the outside. And what is nature? It is art molding matter from within, as though the carpenter were in the wood. But if human art, though

quae non ita materiae superficiem per manus aliave instrumenta exteriora tangit, ut geometrae anima pulverem quando figuras describit in terra, sed perinde ut geometrica mens materiam intrinsecus phantasticam fabricat? Sicut enim geometrae mens, dum figurarum rationes secum ipsa volutat, format imaginibus figurarum intrinsecus phantasiam perque hanc spiritum quoque phantasticum absque labore aliquo vel consilio, ita[4] in naturali arte divina quaedam sapientia per rationes intellectuales vim ipsam vivificam et motricem ipsi coniunctam naturalibus seminibus imbuit, perque hanc materiam quoque facillime format intrinsecus.

6 Quid artificium? Mens artificis in materia separata. Quid naturae opus? Naturae mens in coniuncta materia. Tanto igitur huius operis ordo similior est ordini qui in arte est naturali quam ordo artificii hominis arti, quanto et materia propinquior est naturae quam homini, et natura magis quam homo materiae dominatur. Ergo dubitabis certorum operum certas in natura ponere rationes? Immo vero sicut ars humana, quia superficiem tangit materiae et per contingentes fabricat rationes, formas similiter solum efficit contingentes, sic naturalem artem, quia formas gignit sive eruit substantiales ex materiae fundo, constat funditus operari per rationes essentiales atque perpetuas. Plurimae animantes tum in terra, tum in aqua sola putrefactione nascuntur absque ullo semine corporali. Quam plurimae ex seminibus procul iactis ab animali diu postea partim fomento quodam extraneo accedente, partim sine manifesto fomento pullulant. Herbae omnes arboresque, quamquam vel serendo vel plantando quotidie propagantur, ta-

it is outside the matter, is nevertheless so well attuned and so close to making the work that it can bring definite works to completion in conformity with definite ideas, how much more then will the art of nature be able to achieve this, the art which does not touch the outer surface of matter with hands or other external tools in the way the geometer's soul touches the dust as he traces figures on the ground, but rather as the geometer's mind fashions imaginary matter within? For just as the geometer's mind, when it ponders in itself the rational principles of figures, forms the phantasy from within with the figures' images, and through this phantasy forms too the phantastic spirit, and does so without toil or deliberation, so in nature's art a certain divine wisdom by way of the intellectual rational principles fills with natural seeds the life-giving and motive force linked to it; and through this force it forms with utmost ease the matter too from within.

What is a work of art? The mind of the artist in disjunct matter. What is a work of nature? The mind of nature in conjunct matter. The order of a work of nature, therefore, is more like the order in the art of nature than the order of a human artifact is like the art of man. This is to the degree that matter is closer to nature than to man and nature has greater sway over matter than man does. How then can you hesitate to posit in nature definite rational principles of definite works? Or rather, just as human art, which works through contact with matter's surface and fabricates by way of contingent rational principles, produces likewise only contingent forms, so the art of nature, it is evident, because it gives birth to or extracts substantial forms from matter's depths, operates entirely by way of rational principles that are essential and permanent. A large number of living things, both on earth and in water, are born by putrefaction alone without any corporeal seed. An even larger number come from seeds that have been ejaculated to some distance by an animal and then germinate considerably later in part with the application of some external warmth, 6

men quotidie multis in locis absque semine vel germine corporali sponte nascuntur, ut omittam quod multi philosophi post aquarum miranda diluvia etiam animalia perfectiora ex terra existimant procreari. Oportet tamen certa quaedam ex certis quibusdam seminibus exoriri, et quae ex potentia in actum transeunt, per causam quandam in actum perduci talem, quae ipsa iam in se talem vel aequalem vel praestantiorem habeat actum. Neque sufficere putandum est, si universalis remotaque causa tantum sit praestantior, alioquin imperfectissimae quaeque apud nos causae possent in virtute caelestium perfectissima quaeque producere.[5]

7 Haec omnia significant adesse ubique per terram et aquam in natura quadam artificiosa vitalique spiritalia et vivifica semina omnium, quae ipsa per se gignant ubicumque semina corporalia desunt, semina rursus derelicta ab animalibus foveant, atque ex putrido vinaceo semine, cuius et una et vilis natura est, variam, ordinatam pretiosamque generent vitem, viribus videlicet suis variis, rationalibus, pretiosis. Eadem natura vitalis substantiales elementorum formas e fundo materiae ipsius educit, quo non penetrant substantiae corporales; elementales insuper qualitates, quae per se urerent solum frigefacerentque et similia, ad colorum figurarumque speciosissimam ducit varietatem vitaeque vigorem.

8 Praeterea, quando ex frigidorum corporum collisione fit ignis, ubi non praeerat ignis nisi potentia quadam (et illa quidem remota ab actu), ipsa per rationem ignis efficacissimam generat ignem. Et ubicumque solae apparent qualitates accidentales ad generationem conferre nonnihil, quae tamen per se absque substantia quadam effectui congrua nequaquam sufficiunt, ipsa vicem genitricis sub-

in part without any apparent assistance. All plants and trees, though they are daily propagated by sowing or planting, yet daily too in many places they are born spontaneously without seed or corporeal bud (and I omit that many philosophers think that animals which are even more perfect are born from the earth after extraordinary floods). Yet certain definite things have to come from certain definite seeds, and what passes from potency into act has to be brought into this act by a cause that already contains such an act within itself, or one that is equivalent or more eminent. Nor should one suppose it enough if the universal and remote cause were merely more eminent, otherwise certain of the most imperfect causes here with us would be able to produce certain superlatively perfect effects, [those] in the power of the celestials.

All these points signify that present everywhere through earth 7 and water in an artful and vital nature are the spiritual and life-giving seeds of everything. These seeds can generate of themselves wherever bodily seeds are missing; they can rewarm seeds that have been left behind by animals; and from one withered grape pip, whose nature is single and lowly, they can bring forth the vine with all its variety, order, and value to man, namely with their varied, rational, and splendid powers. The same vital nature draws out from the depths of matter, where corporeal substances do not penetrate, the substantial forms of the elements. Moreover, it takes the elemental qualities, which of themselves can only burn or freeze or whatever, and adds to them the precious variety of colors and shapes and the vigor of life.

Moreover, when fire results from the collision of cold bodies 8 where no fire existed before except in potency (and that potency far removed indeed from act), the living nature generates fire through the rational principle of fire which is efficacious in the extreme. And wherever accidental qualities alone appear to contribute something to generation, yet are incapable of doing so themselves without a substance in accord with the effect, it is that living

stantiae gerit. Quin etiam corpora mixta, quae propter terrenam vel aquaticam crassitudinem secundum se pigra sunt et vilia, ad mirabiles aliquas actiones extollit, immo etiam ad animos hominum et fascinandos et roborandos, quod absque virtute animi et quidem potentioris effici nequit. Virtute enim naturae vivacis et sapientis, quae his[6] ipsis est infusa corporibus, herba hierobotanum, ut Magi inquiunt, confert divinationibus medicorum; achates fovet visum, obtundit venenum, praestat vires atque facundiam;[7] praesens adamas magneti quod rapit aufert; corneola sanguinis sistit fluxum et mitigat iras; onyx accendit iras, terret in somniis;[8] corallus denique, ut testantur Metrodorus et Zoroaster, insanos terrores amovet, fulgura repellit et grandinem. Animis certe nostris tempestatibusque natura illa praestat, cuius virtute talia fiunt — quam esse oportet infusam[9] corpusculis infimis — ut infima secum praeter ipsorum naturas ad supernorum elevet actiones. Esse vitam huiusmodi mundo infusam Strato et Chrysippus confitebuntur, sed ipsam esse summum deum asseverabunt.

9 Platonici id negabunt, quia super eam vitam quae alicuius est et in aliquo, esse decet eam vitam quae sui ipsius et in se ipsa consistit. Vita vero mundanae alicuius sphaerae non minus familiaris est sphaerae suae quam humano corpori animus sit humanus. Quapropter vita sphaerae, sive alicuius sive totius, neque prima est vita neque deus. Deus enim summus summa est unitas. A summa unitate secundum Platonicos multitudo forsan aliqua statim proficisci potest, non tamen tanta debet diversitas discordiaque sese invicem corrumpentium qualitatum. Rursus, summae bonitati pulchritudinique nihil mali et deformis est proximum; mala vero multa defor-

nature that plays the role of the mother substance. It can raise up compound bodies which in themselves are inert and worthless because of their earthy or watery density, and get them to perform certain remarkable actions, even to allure and strengthen men's souls; and this it cannot do without the power of a rational soul, and a very powerful one at that. For by the power of this wise and enduring nature, which has been infused in these compound bodies, the herb hierobotanum[7] (as the Magi tell us) helps doctors to divine the nature of an illness, while agate improves eyesight, dulls the effects of poison, and endows us with strength and eloquence; diamond by its presence deprives a magnet of its power of attraction; cornelian stops a flux of blood and mitigates fits of anger; onyx sparks fits of anger and causes nightmares; and coral, according to Metrodorus and Zoroaster, removes the terrors of madness and drives away lightning and hail.[8] Certainly, this nature presides over our souls and [their] tempestuous emotions and by its power they are made what they are. [But] it has to be infused in the lowest and most insignificant bodies too, so that it may raise them with itself, over and against their own natures, to perform the actions of higher beings. Strato and Chrysippus will acknowledge that such a life permeates the world, but they go on to claim that it is the highest God.[9]

Platonists will deny this, because above this life which belongs 9 to another and exists in another there has to be the life that exists of and in itself. But the life of any one of the world's spheres is no less close to its sphere than man's rational soul to his body. So the life of a sphere, whether of some part of it or of the whole, is neither that primary life nor is it God. For God on high is highest unity. According to the Platonists, it is perhaps possible for some sort of plurality to issue directly from that unity, but certainly not such a great diversity and discord of mutually destructive qualities. Again, nothing evil or ugly comes close at all to the highest goodness and beauty; but many evil and ugly things occur in the prox-

miaque contingunt circa materiam. Praeterea, si deus est ipsum esse, non potest esse forma materiae. Talis enim forma non est esse ipsum, sed essendi principium. Et quia deus est esse, ut ita dixerim, adeo absolutum ut non sit in essentia aliqua, multo minus est in materia. Item, cum deus sit prima efficiens causa, agit sua omnia primo; forma vero materiae non agit primo omnia. Compositum enim primo agit potius quam pars compositi. Rursus, compositi partes in potentia quadam sunt ad ipsum totius actum. In deo autem nulla est ad ulteriorem actum potentia. Non ergo ex ipso et materia fit animal unum, ut stulte putant Almariani. Animal quippe rationale ex se ipso movetur, unde moveri potest et non moveri, atque tum velocius moveri, tum tardius. Quod tale est non perseverabit in motione perpetua et aequali, nisi lege alicuius superioris, quod nullo modo mutetur. Deus igitur non est globi alicuius anima, ne ex ipso et globo animal unum conficiatur cogaturque habere supra se ducem.

Sed numquid sphaerae vitam esse angelum concedemus naturalesque formas ab ideis mentis angelicae proficisci? Nequaquam. Corpus enim sicut per talem aut talem essentiam ad vitam talem aut talem, ita per talem vitam ad mentem talem necessario praeparatur. Ideo Plato in *Timaeo* deum inquit mentem animae, animam corpori coniunxisse, quasi non possit clara mens opaco corpori aliter quam per animam perspicuam copulari, sicut et lucidum corpus denso per diaphanum, id est perspicuum, iungitur, ut quod et lucem per se habet et aliis exhibet, ei quod luce caret et impedit lucem, per naturam mediam coniungatur quae, licet per se careat luce, non tamen impedit lucis ingressum. Ac si mentis nostrae operatio per quandam a materia separationem perficitur, operatio mentis angelicae, quae in genere intellectuali perfecta est, longe se-

imity of matter. Furthermore, if God is being itself, He cannot be the form of matter. For such a form is not being itself but the rational principle of being [namely essence]. And because God is being so absolute (if I may put it like that) that He is not in any particular essence, much less is He in matter. Again, since God is the primary efficient cause, He enacts all His acts first;[10] but the form of matter does not enact all things first. For the compound [as a whole] acts first, not a part of the compound. Furthermore, the parts of a compound are in a kind of potency with regard to the act of the whole. But in God there is no potency with regard to a still further act. So God is not made one living being from that act and from matter, as the followers of Amaury de Bène stupidly suppose.[11] A living being that is rational moves of itself; so it can move or not move, and move now faster now slower. But such a being will not persist in continuous and regular movement unless by the law of some higher being which is not liable to change at all. So God cannot be the soul of any one sphere, lest a single living creature be formed from Him and from the sphere and be compelled to have a leader still above it.[12]

But would we then concede that the life of the sphere is angel and that natural forms issue from the ideas of angelic mind? Not at all. For just as a body is prepared by such or such an essence for such or such a life, so is it necessarily prepared by such a life for such a mind. Thus Plato in his *Timaeus* says that God joined mind to soul and soul to body,[13] as though lucid mind could only be joined to opaque body by way of transparent soul, just as a bright body is joined to a dense by means of a diaphanous or transparent body. This is in order that what has light of itself and displays it to others may be joined to what both lacks and blocks light by means of some middle nature, which, though it may lack light of itself, nonetheless does not block the entry of light. But if the activity of our mind is perfected by a certain separation from matter, then the activity of angelic mind, which is perfect in the genus of

mota est a materia. Cum vero angelus ipse nihil aliud sit quam mens et, qua ratione mens est, operando materiam fugiat, quonam pacto angeli substantia materiae proxime inhaerebit? Decet, ut quemadmodum particulares hominum mentes particularia ipsarum corpora per animas proprias, id est per animales vires, attingunt et movent, ita communes sphaerarum mentes communia corpora per animas complectantur et ducant. Sic enim et sphaerae illae vitam insitam possidebunt, et mentes divinae e sublimi statu nequaquam deiicientur, et super vitas sphaerarum, quae intellectuales sunt simul et animales, erunt angelicae vitae, quae solum intellectuales existunt. Super has erit deus, vita vitarum. Adde quod si mens angelica indivisibilis immutabilisque est et super locum tempusque omnino, nulla ratione quadrabit corpori divisibili, mutabili, loco temporique subiecto, aut formas in eo tales efficiet, nisi anima intercesserit. Quae, quia indivisibilis est superque locum, formatur ab angelo sive ducitur; quia vero mutabilis est et aliquid habet temporis, congruit cum materia et formas acceptas desuper deducit in se ipsa ad mutabilem temporalemque naturam, per quam facillime transeunt in corpus quoque mutabile, atque in ipso divisibiles iam evadunt.

II Placet ergo Platonicis deum per se ipsum formare angelos, per angelos animas, per has postremo materiam, formasque a summa vita et actu gradatim degenerare, usque adeo ut in materia iam neque revera vivae neque efficaces appareant. Nempe a deo in angelum, ex una essentia transeunt in multiplices qualitates; ab hoc in animam, ex statu in motum aliquem efficacem; ab hac in corpus, ex vitali activoque motu in mutationem mortalis naturae passivam. Quamobrem, si aquae terraeque vita insita est, neque tamen haec est deus (ne immensus actus vilissimae potentiae sit

intellect, is far removed from matter. But since angel itself is nothing other than mind, and since for the very reason it is mind it shuns matter when it acts, in what manner will angel's substance adhere closely to matter? It is appropriate that, just as individual human minds make contact with and move their individual bodies by means of their own souls—that is, their vital forces—so the general minds of the spheres embrace and guide their general bodies by means of their souls. For in this way the spheres will have life implanted in them, and [yet] the divine minds will by no means be cast down from their high estate. Above the lives of the spheres, which are simultaneously intellectual and animate, will be the angelic lives which are solely intellectual. Above them will be God, the life of lives. Moreover, if angelic mind is indivisible, unchangeable and completely above time and place, there will be no reason either for it to accord with body which is divisible, changeable and subject to time and place, or for it to make such forms in body unless soul intercedes. For soul, because it is indivisible and above place, is formed or guided by angel; but because it is changeable and partly partakes of time, it is compatible with matter. It takes the forms received from on high and leads them in itself down into changeable and temporal nature through which they cross over with greatest ease into the body (which is also changeable); once there, they become divisible in it.

It is the view of the Platonists that God formed angels by Himself, but souls by means of angels, and matter by means of souls; and that forms gradually degenerate from the highest life and act, until eventually when they appear in matter they are no longer really alive or capable of activity. Certainly, in moving from God to angel, forms pass from a single essence into multiple qualities; and from angel to soul, from rest to a productive motion; and from soul to body, from vital and active motion to the passive changeability of mortal nature. If life is innate in earth and water and yet this life is neither God (lest unlimited act be assigned to the lowli- II

addictus), neque angelus (ne clarissima mens obscurissimae naturae sit proxima), consequens est ut aqua et terra animas habeant, quarum artificio hae sphaerae rebus pretiosissimis exornentur, quemadmodum et animulae quaeque animalium aquaticorum et terrenorum, videlicet duce sphaerae suae anima, corpuscula sua per insita semina gratissime pingunt atque figurant.

12 Globo terreno una anima sufficit, quoniam ipse unus est omnino partibus in molem unam continuatis. Una quoque anima orbi sufficit aquae. Necesse est tamen geminas esse horum duorum animas specie invicem differentes. Quod ostendunt ipsorum corporum naturae diversae specie, qualitatibus et effectibus. Si globi tales propter crassitudinem a spiritus puritate remoti atque angusti propriis animabus vivunt, vivunt et multo magis globi omnes superiores qui et puriores sunt et ampliores admodum, quorum fomento terra et aqua parturiunt. Animam suam habeat aer, suam ignis, eadem ratione qua terra suam et aqua. Similiter octo caelorum globi animas octo: tot enim apud veteres erant caeli.

13 In terra multa sunt animalia quae propriam habent animam a communi anima terrae distinctam, quia moventur loco, quod terra non facit; quia separata cum sint a terra vivunt (quod lapides et plantae non faciunt, quae per animam vivunt terrae, non suam); quia se a terra vel volatu vel aedificiis et machinis tollunt in altum. In aqua rursus plurima sunt animalia viventia propriis animabus. Si a deo fecunda et ornata est aqua et terra, cur non aer et ignis praeter communes animas suas etiam animas multas contineant et animalia propria? Idem de caelorum sphaeris argumentare, ubi stellae cum sint inter se quantitate, luce, virtute motuque diversae

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est potency) nor angel (lest mind in all its clarity be juxtaposed to the most murky of natures), it must be, therefore, that earth and water have souls by whose artifice these [two] spheres are adorned with the most precious embellishments. In the same way the little souls of earth and water animals, with the soul of their own sphere to guide them, paint and shape their little bodies most delightfully by way of the seeds implanted in them.

One soul suffices for the earthy sphere, for the sphere is entirely one with all its parts in one continuous mass. One soul too suffices for the sphere of water. Yet the twin souls of the two spheres must differ from each other in [their] species. This is evident from the fact that the natures of their bodies differ in species, in qualities and in effects. If such spheres, circumscribed though they are and far removed because of their grossness from the purity of spirit, are alive with their own souls, then the higher spheres, which are much purer and more ample and by whose nurturing earth and water give birth, are still more alive. Air has its own soul and fire its for the same reason that earth and water have theirs. Similarly, the eight spheres of the heavens have their eight souls. For such was the number of the heavens according to the ancients. 12

Many animals exist on the earth that have their own souls distinct from the common soul of the earth. For they move locally as the earth does not; they remain alive even when they are not in contact with the earth, which stones and plants (deriving life as they do from the soul of the earth, not from their own soul) do not do; and they can lift themselves from the earth on high either in flight or in buildings or machines. In water too are many creatures living with their own souls. If earth and water have been made prolific and beautiful by God, why may not air and fire contain many souls besides their common souls, and contain their own animals too? Argue the same for the celestial spheres where the stars, since they differ among themselves in quantity, light, 13

et singulae proprios circuitus peragant, specie quoque diversas animas habent. Quae quidem stellae ita caelos ornant ut aquam aquatica et terrena animalia terram. Animalia illa caelestia ob maximam lucis copiam clare perspicimus, terrena quoque et aquatica, quia et propinqua sunt nobis et sua crassitudine oculis sese monstrant. Aerea vero et ignea non videmus, quia neque etiam ignis et aeris cernimus elementa, cum neque lucis ingentissimae beneficio neque molis crassitudine appareant oculis terrenorum.

14 Animam ipsam terrae rationalem esse necessarium est, quandoquidem animalia quaedam terrae ratione non carent, praesertim cum opera terrae pulchriora sint quam hominum opera. Si anima huius infimi globi ratione capta non est, neque etiam superiorum globorum animae sunt rationis expertes. In terra et aqua talis est distinctio partium, quod terrenorum corporum quaedam sunt minus pura, quaedam purissima. Illa animas irrationales habent, ista rationales. Idem in aqua, ubi sunt pisces irrationales in luteis partibus aquae; sunt etiam daemones aquei, quas[10] Nereides vocat Orpheus, in quibusdam sublimioribus exhalationibus aquae, quales sint in hoc aere nubiloso, quorum corpora videntur quandoque acutioribus oculis, praesertim in Perside et Africa, ut existimat Zoroaster. Adiungit Porphyrius illos daemones videri solum in quorum corporibus praeter aquae exhalationem ignis abundat, idque in oriente contingere atque meridie. Illos insuper tangi, in quibus praeterea multum est terrae quales fuisse temporibus suis apud Tuscos inquit. Sed in globis omnibus super aquam non sunt animantes nisi compotes rationis, quoniam non dividuntur globi illi in partes crassas et tenues, et quicquid ibi est, aqueis exhalationibus longe est purius. Sed liceat hic una cum Pythagoricis parumper confabulari.

15 Quoniam vero omnis multitudo maxima ad paucum est nume-

power and movement and individually perform their own revolutions, have souls that differ in species too. Now the stars adorn the heavens just as the creatures of earth and water adorn the earth and the water. These celestial animals we see clearly because of the abundance of their light. The creatures of earth and water we also see because they are close to us and with their density they present themselves to our eyes. But the airy and fiery creatures we do not see, because we do not see for that matter the elements of fire and air, given that they do not appear to earthly eyes even with the aid of brightest light, and they have no density of mass.

The soul of the earth must be rational since certain of earth's animals do not lack reason, and since especially the works of the earth are more beautiful than men's works. If the soul of this lowest sphere has not been robbed of reason, the souls of the higher spheres are also not without reason. In earth and water the different parts are distinguished such that some of the earthly bodies are less pure, others are very pure. The former have irrational souls, the latter rational. The same occurs in water, where irrational fishes live in the muddy parts, but where water daemons (Orpheus calls them Nereids)[14] live in certain rarefied water vapors such as those in the cloudy air. Their bodies are sometimes seen by sharper eyes, especially in Persia and Africa, according to Zoroaster.[15] Porphyry adds both that those daemons in whose bodies fire abounds besides the water's vapor are only seen, and that this happens in the East and South; but that daemons in bodies where there is a great deal of earth besides can also be touched. Instances had occurred, he says, in his own day among the Tuscans.[16] But in all the spheres higher than water no animals exist that do not possess reason, because those spheres are not divided into dense parts and rare parts, and whatever exists there is far purer than watery vapors. At this point permit me to exchange a few words with the Pythagoreans. 14

Since every large plurality has to be reduced to a small number, 15 rum colligenda, paucus numerus ad paucas unitates, unitates paucae ad unitatem unam, ideo innumerabilis animarum turba in qualibet sphaera mundi viventium ad paucas animas in ea ipsa sphaera praestantiores, puta principes duodecim, est reducenda. Sed cur ad duodecim principes maxime? Quia sicut unum mundi corpus duodecim apud priscos continet artus, hi vero articulos plurimos, sic una mundi anima animas duodecim, hae plurimas. Sed hae ita continent plurimas, ut duodecim primo contineant principales. Cur? Quia cum anima cuiusque sphaerae ex primo duodenario animarum numero selecta sit et accomodata sphaerae, merito recurrit rursus in duodenarium, cuius numeri signum in sphaera prima habemus et ultima. In prima quidem per zodiacum cernimus animalia siderea duodecim. In quolibet autem illorum stella quaedam est principalis, tamquam cor animalis illius in caelo picti. In quo quidem corde vitam agit anima totius sideris principalis. Illic igitur animae divinae duodecim a Pythagoricis collocantur: in Arietis corde Pallas; in corde Tauri Venus; Geminorum Phoebus particularis; Cancri Mercurius; Leonis Iupiter particularis; Virginis Ceres; Librae Vulcanus; Scorpionis Mars; Diana Sagittarii; Capricorni Vesta; Aquarii Iuno; Piscium vero Neptunus. In ultima quoque sphaera, scilicet terra, duodecim vitae sunt hominum. Quippe vitam agunt homines per rationem cerebro assignatam, per iram cordi, per concupiscentiam iecori attributam. Si quis nulla harum virium uti dicatur, ne spirabit quidem; si quis ratione sola, non amplius erit homo. Immo impossibile est animam corpori coniunctam sola incedere ratione. Sola quoque irascendi vi uti nequit, quia haec semper vel rationi servit vel cupiditati. Sola etiam cupiditate non potest: haec enim roboratur semper vel a ratione depravata, vel iracundia. Ergo necessarium est aut per omnes

and the small number to a few unities and the few unities to one unity, the numberless host of souls dwelling in any one of the world's spheres has to be led back to the few most important souls dwelling in that sphere, let us say to the twelve principal souls. Why chiefly to twelve princes? Because, just as the single body of the world according to the ancients possesses twelve limbs and each of these contains many joints, so the single soul of the world contains twelve souls and these contain many more. But the twelve souls contain many more to the extent that first they contain twelve principal souls. Why? Because, since the soul of each sphere has been selected from the first group of twelve souls and accommodated to its sphere, it is reasonable that it should have recourse a second time to the number twelve, the mark of which number we have in the first and in the last sphere. In the first sphere across the zodiac we see twelve sidereal animals. In each of these animals shines a principal star, like that animal's heart painted in the sky. The soul of the whole constellation lives life in that heart. This is where the Pythagoreans, accordingly, locate the twelve divine souls: in Aries' heart, Pallas; in Taurus', Venus; in Gemini's, Phoebus "particular";[17] in Cancer's, Mercury; in Leo's, Jupiter "particular"; in Virgo's, Ceres; in Libra's, Vulcan; in Scorpio's, Mars; in Sagittarius', Diana; in Capricorn's, Vesta; in Aquarius', Juno; and in Pisces', Neptune.[18] Also in the last sphere, earth, there are the twelve lives of men. Men live life by way of reason which is assigned to the brain, of irascibility[19] which is assigned to the heart, and of desire which is attributed to the liver. If anyone is alleged to use none of these faculties he will not even be breathing. If someone lives by reason alone, he will no longer be a man. Or rather, it is impossible for a soul joined to a body to proceed by reason alone. A person cannot use the faculty of irascibility alone, because it is always subservient to reason or to desire. He cannot even use desire alone, for desire is always strengthened by corrupted reason or by irascibility. So a person must proceed by way

illas vires incedere aut duas. Prima igitur humana vita quae ratione utitur magis, ira minus, concupiscentia minime. Secunda quae ratione magis, minus concupiscentia, ira quam minimum. Tertia quae magis ira, ratione minus, libidine minimum. Quarta quae ira magis, cupiditate minus, ratione minime. Quinta quae libidine multum, ratione parum,[11] ira paululum. Sexta quae multum libidine, ira parum, paulum ratione. Ita ex communi trium virium usu sex vitae conficiuntur. Nascuntur sex aliae ex usu duarum. In prima ratio superat iram, in secunda e converso, in tertia ratio superat concupiscentiam, in quarta contra, in quinta ira dominatur concupiscentiae, in sexta e converso. Si in sphaeris mundi duabus extremis duodenarius numerus observatur, observatur in mediis.

16 Quamobrem, sicut incepimus paulo ante, plurimas animas in qualibet sphaera viventes ad duodecim principales in eadem viventes sphaera per ordinem reducamus. Accipiamus iterum duodecim principes in una quavis sphaerarum duodecim. Tot enim apud priscos sunt sphaerae mundi. Referamus illas ad duodecim animas illarum sphaerarum communes, duodecim rursus sphaerarum animas ad unam ipsius unius materiae animam. Quoniam vero anima est mentis particeps, et super naturam participem oportet esse naturam per se plenam, ideo animarum genus ad mentes extollitur liberas mentesque tandem ad unam mentem. Et una mens, quia et mens est et unum, ad unum simpliciter est erigenda, quod non sit unum hoc aut unum illud, ceu vel una mens vel una anima, sed unum ipsum, quod vocat Pythagoras universalem Apollinem. Vult enim 'Απόλλονα dici, quasi ἁπλοῦν, quod significat simplicem, et quasi ἀ-πολλῶν,[12] quod significat semotum a multitudine. Idem vocat τἀγαθόν, id est ipsum bonum, quoniam bonitas et perfectio cuiusque in eius unitate consistit, ut si in rebus idem est bonitas atque unio, supra res quoque idem sit ipsum primum unum primumque bonum. Quapropter primum unum bonumque proxime uni praeest menti; una mens multis mentibus, primum forte duodecim ducibus mentibus, duodecimque sub illis duode-

of all, or [at least] of two, of these faculties. The first type of human life employs reason more, irascibility less, desire least; the second, reason more, desire less, irascibility least; the third, irascibility more, reason less, desire least; the fourth, irascibility more, desire less, reason least; the fifth, desire much, reason little, irascibility barely at all; and the sixth, desire much, irascibility little, reason barely. So from the use commonly of the three faculties emerge six kinds of life. A further six are produced from the use of [just] two faculties: in the first, reason rules over irascibility; in the second, the reverse; in the third, reason rules over desire; in the fourth, the reverse; in the fifth, irascibility rules over desire; and in the sixth, the reverse. If the number twelve is seen in the two spheres at either extreme of the cosmos, then it will be observed in the intermediate spheres.

To return to what we commenced a little earlier, in order, therefore, let us bring the host of souls living in any one sphere back to the twelve principal souls living in that same sphere; and again, let us accept that there are twelve princes in any one of the twelve spheres, for according to the ancients such is the number of the spheres in the cosmos. Let us refer the twelve princes back to the twelve general souls of those spheres; and in turn refer those twelve souls of the spheres back to the one soul of matter as itself one.[20] But since soul participates in mind, and above a participating nature must be a nature that is complete in itself, so the genus of souls is lifted up to the free [unparticipating] minds, and these minds finally to the one mind. This one mind, being both one and mind, must be raised to the absolute One, which is not one this or one that (one mind, say, or one soul) but the One itself, what Pythagoras calls the universal Apollo. For he interprets Apollo as *haploun*, meaning "simple," or as *a-pollôn*, meaning "cut off from the many."[21] He calls it *tagathon*, the Good itself, because the goodness and perfection of each thing consists in its unity, so that, if goodness and unity are the same in nature, then above nature the prime 16

nariis plurimisque deinceps praeest; denique et animae mundi uni. Una anima mundi duodecim animabus sphaerarum duodecim. Animae duodecim praesunt duodecim duodenariis animarum; cuiusque scilicet sphaerae anima praeest animabus duodecim in sphaera sua praestantioribus. Duodecim denique duodenarii praesunt innumerabilibus animabus, nam in qualibet sphaera duodecim illae principes animae alias illius sphaerae ducunt animas. Haec autem Musarum chorea cantat saltatque perpetuo, ut ait Orpheus, musicis modulis ad Apollinis ipsius imperium:

> *σύ δὲ πάντα πόλον κιθάρῃ πολυκρέκτῳ*
> *ἁρμόζεις,*

id est: 'Tu totum caelum canora cithara temperas'. Sed satis hactenus cum Pythagoricis confabulati sumus. Ad institutum iam Platonicum ordinem redeamus.

17 Sphaeras mundi vivere una ratione probavimus, pergamus ad aliam. Cum videamus sphaeras mundi moveri et motores aliquos illarum excogitemus, sciamus praeterea esse non posse sphaeram aliam super aliam aut motores alios super alios absque fine, fateri cogimur esse aliquam sphaeram quae moveatur primo. Si primo movetur, principio certe movetur intrinseco; nempe, ut supra tetigimus, quod primo calet et friget, calore et frigore intrinseco calet et friget. Semper enim quod per aliud est tale, ad aliquid diximus reducendum quod sit tale per semetipsum. Ac si minima quaeque corpuscula mundi habent quodammodo in se ipsis suorum motuum operumque virtutes, quod in partibus elementorum et herbis apparet atque animantibus, quanto magis sphaerae mundi amplissimae in se ipsis possident conversionum suarum principia; principia inquam familiarissima, quibus sphaerae coniunctiores

One and the prime Good are the same too. Therefore the prime One and Good rules over the one mind next to it; the one mind rules over the many minds, firstly perchance over the twelve leading minds perhaps, then over the twelve groups of twelve minds under them, and then over the multitude of minds and finally over the single world soul. The one world soul rules over the twelve souls of the twelve spheres. These twelve souls rule over the twelve twelves of souls. The soul of each sphere, in other words, rules over the twelve most important souls in its sphere. Then these twelve rule over numberless souls; for in any sphere the twelve princely souls govern that sphere's other souls. But this choir of Muses sings and dances perpetually, as Orpheus says, in musical measures to the command of Apollo himself: "It is you who rule and temper the whole heaven with your melodious lyre."[22] But we have conversed enough with the Pythagoreans. Let us return to the Platonic order as planned.

We have provided one argument that the world's spheres are alive. Let us proceed to another. Since we see the world's spheres are moved and we suppose there must be movers of them, and since moreover we know that one sphere cannot be above another or some movers be above others to infinity, we are forced to admit that one of the spheres is moved first. If it moves first, we can be sure that its principle of motion is within. Certainly the first thing that is hot or cold is heating or cooling from the heat or cold within, as we indicated above. For we established that what possesses a given property from another must always be referred to what has the property of itself. But if some of the world's smallest bodies possess in themselves in a way the powers of their own motions and actions—and this appears in the parts of the elements and in plants and animals—then all the more so do the spheres of the world in all their amplitude possess in themselves the principles of their own revolutions. Those principles are intimately their own, and the spheres are more closely joined to them than our 17

sint quam nostris animabus corpora nostra, siquidem motus tanto naturalior efficaciorque est, quanto mobile est motori coniunctius. Motus autem caeli ceteris a violentia alienior est, naturalior, efficacior. Sed quaenam illa principia sunt? Num qualitates aliquae? Puta sicut gravitate et levitate partes elementorum moveri videntur atque calore operari et frigore, ita mundi sphaerae per qualitates huiusmodi revolvuntur? Nequaquam. Qualitas enim quia situ et partibus terminata est atque uni cuidam est addicta materiae, agit etiam terminate fatigaturque, ut nequeat aut semper aut eodem modo movere, et quaelibet qualitas unicum opus agit et ad unicum movetur terminum. Quid calor agit nisi calorem, frigus frigiditatem? Levitas sursum trahit solum; gravitas vero deorsum. Numquam igitur qualitas contrarium aliquem effectum principalis sui operis faciet natura sua, numquam ad locum unde discessit sponte redibit, numquam inde discedet sponte quo se naturaliter contulit. Caelum autem movetur semper aequaliter, variosque et inter se contrarios producit effectus, atque ad hanc diversitatem contrariis modis materiam disponit inferiorem. Figurationes varias induit, nec ullum habet certum in suo circuitu terminum, sed quodcumque signaveris punctum super caeli dorsum, ad illud innumere quaelibet caeli pars accedet rursusque recedet facillime,[13] non per aliquam violentiam. Quod enim est violentum, neque diuturnum est neque semper idem et ordinatum. Adde quod cum caelum contrariis simul motibus revolvatur, si qualitate duceretur, certe contrariis qualitatibus moveretur. Non tamen illic esse possunt contrariae qualitates atque naturae, ubi nulla est pugna, nullus interitus. Item, cum natura determinata sit, ideoque non queat indeterminatum diversumque finem, qualis est motus, appetere, quietis gratia tantum movet. Motus autem circularis secundum se non dirigitur ad quietem. Ergo neque a natura agitur neque, si quando

bodies are joined to our souls, since motion is more natural and more efficient to the extent that what is moved is the more closely joined to the mover. But the motion of the heavens is more distant from violence than other motions, more natural and more efficient. But what then are those principles? Surely they are not some qualities? Are we to suppose that just as the parts of the elements seem to be moved by heaviness and lightness and to act through heat and cold, so the world's spheres are turned round by such qualities? Certainly not. Because quality is limited by its location and parts and is confined to one particular lump of matter, it acts too in a limited way and it becomes exhausted. The result is that it cannot move always or in the same way, and each quality does one job and aims at one single goal. What does heat do except produce heat, and cold cold? Lightness only lifts things and heaviness drags them down. So quality will never of its own nature produce some effect that is the contrary of its principal action; never of its own accord return whence it departed; never unaided depart from the place it has naturally returned to. But heaven is always moved regularly, and produces different and mutually contrary effects, and prepares inferior matter for this diversity in contrary ways. It assumes various configurations and it has no fixed limit in its circuit; but if you mark a point on the back of heaven, every part of heaven will reach that point an unlimited number of times and depart again with utmost ease and not through violence of any kind. For what is violent is neither long-lasting nor always the same and ordered. Furthermore, since heaven revolves with contrary movements at one and the same time, if it were ruled by quality, then it would be moved by contrary qualities. But contrary qualities and natures cannot occur there where there is no strife or destruction. Again, since nature is determined, and thus cannot desire an end which is undetermined and variable like movement, it moves only for the sake of rest. But circular movement is not in itself directed towards rest. So it is

quiescat, sistitur a natura. Praeterea qualitas extensa in corpore in se ipsam reflecti non valet cum sit corpori alligata. Quonam igitur pacto dabit qualitas caelo revolutionem in semetipsum, quae in se non habet sui ipsius reflectendae virtutem? Item, cum corpus nihil per naturam agat suam sed per qualitatem, et qualitas non suo ductu vim praestet corpori sed quatenus ipsa aliunde movetur, si qualitas aliqua movet caelum, ipsa interim aliunde movetur.

18 Quid illud quod ipsam movet? Deusne? Minime. Nam prima causa, cum infinite excedat omnia, nulli corpori familiaris est, sed aeque omnibus est communis et ab omnibus absoluta. Si enim deus esset proprius alicuius corporis agitator, non esset amplius omnium. Ideo ut sit omnium, non est rector proprius alicuius. Sphaerae tamen familiarissimos, ut diximus, motores requirunt. Ac etiam, quia discretae sunt invicem et diversis motibus agitantur, alios atque alios motores proprios exigunt, quandoquidem esse debet inter motorem motumque proportio. Neque probanda est eorum sententia, qui motores sphaeris ita distribuunt ut deus primae accommodetur, reliquis reliqui intellectus. Nam cum secundum proportionem distributio fiat, sicut sphaerae in natura ordineque conveniunt invicem, ita invicem congruent deus et intellectus. Non superabit deus reliquos intellectus, nisi quantum prima sphaera superat reliquas, nec erit immensus. Erit quoque compositus ex natura communi, qua cum aliis congruet, atque ex propria, per quam distinguetur.

19 Praeterea, si deus ipsa bonitas est (haec autem rem quamlibet movet tamquam appetibile appetitum), deus caelum movet tam-

not started by nature, nor, if it comes to rest, is it stopped by nature. Furthermore, quality extended in body cannot turn back upon itself, since it is bound to body. So how will quality give heaven the power of revolving on itself when it does not have in itself the power of turning back upon itself? Again, since body does nothing through its own nature but through quality, and quality does not provide that power to body by its own motion, but only to the extent that it is itself moved by some other source, then if some quality moves heaven, it is itself in the meantime being moved by some other source.

What is it that moves it? Is it God? Surely not. For the first cause, since it infinitely exceeds all things, is closely related to no one body, but is equally common to all bodies and yet independent of them all. For if God were the mover of some particular body, He would no longer be the mover of all. So as the governor of all, He is not the exclusive governor of some particular body. Yet, as we declared, the spheres need movers who are as close to them as possible. But because the spheres are distinct from each other and moved by different movements, they severally need their own movers, since mover and movement have to be proportionate. The view of those people who distribute movers to the spheres in such a way that they assign God to the first sphere and the other intellects to the remainder is unacceptable.[23] Since distribution must occur according to proportion, and just as the spheres are in mutual harmony in their nature and order, so God and the intellects will then be in mutual harmony. God will be superior to the other intellects only insofar as the first sphere is superior to the rest, and He will not be measureless. Furthermore, He will be compounded both from a common nature by virtue of which He will be in harmony with the others, and from His own nature by means of which He will be distinguished [from them]. 18

Moreover, if God is goodness itself and this goodness moves everything as the object of desire moves the appetite, God moves 19 quam finis. Corpus autem ad finem extrinsecum non movetur, nisi per interiorem aliquam formam finis quidem ipsius cupidam effectricemque motionis. Ergo inest caelo forma bonitatis primae cupida effectrixque motus. Quae quidem aviditas neque caeca est ut lapidum neque irrationalis ut bestiarum. Quomodo enim aviditas, primae veritati sapientiaeque propinqua, caeca irrationalisque erit? Praesertim cum maiori ordine moveat suum corpus quam nostra ratio nostrum. Non igitur deus moveat caelum proxime, sed forma quaedam caeli propria, vitae rationisque compos et divinae cupida bonitatis. Ac si quis dixerit temperatione quadam moveri caelos, sicut aeneae quondam Archimedis volvebantur sphaerae, compelletur eam ipsam temperationem non minus substantialem, vitalem, rationalem esse fateri quam sit temperatio qua terrenorum animalium membra moventur, postquam illa primae substantiae, vitae, rationi propinquior est, et apparet tum natura sua tum motibus aequabilior.

Sed numquid illa est angelus? Nequaquam. Vita enim ipsa caelestis familiarissima est caelo et una cum suo corpore quodammodo circumcurrit. Angelus neque familiaris motor est neque movetur. Nempe super motorem mobilem esse decet motorem alium qui sit immobilis. Rursus, angelus est penitus stabilis. Ab eo vero quod stabile est omnino tam repentinus, tam varius motus non provenit. Si angelus stabilis est omnino, caelum vero ab alio mobile, aliquo certe medio indigent quod sit mobile per se ipsum. Nam rei omnino stabili succedit proxime res per se ipsam mobilis, et huic succedit res per aliud mobilis, siquidem res mobilis per se ipsam, ex eo quod mutatur, convenit cum re illa quae permutatur ab alio; ex eo autem quod se ipsam regit, quia sic in sua natura se sistit neque e sua sede delabitur, convenit cum re illa quae penitus permanet. Quid tandem est istud per se mobile quod proxime caelum volvit? Nihil est aliud praeter animam. Haec enim est quae et

heaven as the final cause. But body is not moved extrinsically towards an objective unless by some internal form which is desirous of its end and which brings about motion. Therefore present in heaven is a form desirous of the prime goodness and which brings about motion. This yearning is not blind like that of stones, nor irrational like that of beasts. For how would a yearning so close to the prime truth and wisdom be blind or irrational, especially since it moves its own body in a more orderly way than our reason moves ours? So God must not move heaven proximately; rather a form does, which belongs specifically to heaven and which is possessed of life and reason and is desirous of divine goodness. But if anyone were to say the heavens are moved in a certain harmonious balance, as once the brazen spheres of Archimedes revolved,[24] he would be forced to admit that the tempering itself is no less substantial, living and rational than the tempering whereby the limbs of earthly animals are moved, inasmuch as it is closer to the prime substance, life and reason, and appears more even in both its nature and movements.

Can heaven's mover be angel then? Certainly not. For the celestial life itself is the most intimate [mover] of heaven and revolves in a way together with its body. Angel is neither the intimate mover nor is it moved; for above the mobile mover must be another mover that is motionless. Angel furthermore is completely at rest. But from what is entirely at rest no sudden or varied motion can arise. If angel is completely at rest, but heaven is moveable by another, they assuredly need some mean that is mobile through itself. For next in succession after what is utterly at rest is something that is mobile of itself; and succeeding this is something moveable by another. This is because what is self-moving shares the fact that it is changed with what is changed by another; but that it rules itself, because it remains in its own nature and does not descend from its abode, it shares with what is utterly at rest. What then is it that moveable of itself revolves the heavens next to

per se ipsam est mobilis et talis motionis vestigium praestat corporibus. Nam et si dicatur semotus motor aliquis movere caelum, non prius tamen caelo dabit motionis actum, quam vim motricem caelo coniunctam infuderit. Vis huiusmodi una cum caelo extensa esse non debet, alioquin a se ipsa discederet, ideoque caelo facultatem ad se ipsum redeundi perpetuo praestare non posset. Igitur erit indivisibilis; non tamen adstricta dimensionibus, sicut punctum, quia non posset se ipsam et dimensiones ab eodem in idem libere volvere. Est autem in toto caelo ubique tota, ut moveat efficacissime totum. Est itaque vis illa coniuncta indivisibilis, libera ubique, qualis est rationalis anima. Illius praesentia vivit caelum, cuius motus vivificus est, cum vivificet omnia.

21 Denique cum in animalibus instrumenta illa vivant, per quae animae viventia generant, quis dubitabit vivere caelum, siquidem vitae alicuius instrumentum est ad viventia generanda? Nonne motus, ut ita loquar, spontaneus, ubicumque est, vitae interioris est signum? Talis autem maxime est, ubi naturalis est circuitus. Quid enim magis sponte movetur, quam quod in se ipsum naturaliter recurrit, et circa naturalem cardinem atque intra naturalem superficiem se volutat? Nulli ergo corpori vita magis intrinseca est quam mundi sphaeris. Neque diffidendum est animal unum fieri ex sphaeris animisque divinis. Quia cum proprium sit materiae quidem asciscere formam, formae vero complecti materiam atque ducere, idque totum ibi fiat magis, ubi tam materia quam forma praestantior est, quis neget ex animis illis qui nostris praestantiores sunt, atque ex sphaeris quae nostris corporibus simpliciores diuturnioresque sunt, continent quoque nostra trahuntque et generant, animal unum et indissolubile confici? Nonne corpora illa propter mirabilem simplicitatem tenuitatemque quasi spiritalia sunt? Ergo praesentibus spiritibus facilius animantur quam prae-

it? It is nothing other than soul. For soul is both moveable of itself and bestows on bodies the imprint of its movement. Even were we to say that some remote mover moves the heavens, yet it will not bestow the act of motion on the heavens before it has imparted an inner moving power to them.[25] Such a power must not be coextensive with the heavens or else it would separate from itself, and thus be unable to bestow on heaven the power of perpetually returning on itself. So it will be indivisible, yet not, like the point, confined to dimensions, because then it could not freely turn itself and the dimensions in a circular motion. But it is totally present everywhere in the whole of heaven in order that it may move the whole in the most efficient way. The power, therefore, that is joined [to heaven] is indivisible [and] everywhere free like the rational soul. Because of its presence, heaven is alive. Its movement is life-giving since it gives life to all.

Finally, since in animals those organs are alive by means of which souls generate living things, who will doubt that heaven is alive, seeing that a life uses it as an instrument for generating living things. Isn't movement that is spontaneous, if I may cull the term, a sign of inner life wherever it occurs? This is particularly true in the case of natural circular movement. For what is moved more spontaneously than what reverts naturally to itself and turns itself around a natural axis and within a natural periphery? So life is intrinsic to no body more than it is to the world's spheres. Nor should one doubt that one animate being is fashioned out of the spheres and the divine souls. For, since it is proper for matter to receive form, but for form to embrace and rule matter, and since this all occurs more completely there where matter and form alike are more eminent, who will deny that one indissoluble living being is fashioned out of the souls that are more eminent than ours, and out of the spheres that are more simple and lasting than our bodies, and that contain, rule and generate our bodies? Aren't those bodies, because of their marvelous simplicity and tenuity, almost 21

sente igne sulphur accenditur. Sic enim excellentissima materia excellentissimae formae, id est intellectuali, coniungitur usque adeo ut numquam dissolvantur. Si corpora mixta, quanto magis discedunt ab intemperantia elementalium qualitatum acceduntque ad caelestium corporum temperantiam, tanto magis vitae cognitionisque capacia fiunt, proculdubio caelestia corpora vitae cognitionisque capacissima sunt. Genus mentium sublimius est quam caelum et caelo cognatius est quam terrae. Ergo cum multae sint mentes terrenis coniunctae corporibus tamquam formae, necessarium est mentes et plures et prius et magis caelestibus corporibus quam terrenis tamquam formas esse coniunctas.

22 Non solum autem caelos, verum etiam elementa vivere Platonici arbitrantur, ut diximus. Nam cum videant omnes sphaeras mundi et multa insuper quae his annectuntur composita motu intrinseco moveri absque extrinseco impellente, animas iudicant illis inesse. Ac si quis quaerat de ascensu et descensu elementorum atque compositorum, respondebunt Platonici illum quoque per animam fieri. Per animam inquam sphaerae suae quae sicut magnes ferrum, ita particulas sphaerae suae revocat ad se ipsam. Unde fit etiam ut motus lapidis descendentis ab alto, quo magis terrae propinquat, eo fiat velocior, et flammae motus similiter ascendentis, quo fit caelo propinquior, eo evadit rapacior. Quippe cum anima sphaerae e propinquo rapiat vehementius, trahit quoque ad idem anima mundi. Et quemadmodum si homines ferri quidem ipsius motum videntes, magnetem non viderent, ferrum ex se ipso moveri putarent dum trahitur a magnete, ita nunc qui sphaerarum animas non intellegunt, corpuscula quaelibet credunt ex se moveri. At enim cum nulla mens artificis tam recte aut mem-

spiritual? They are more readily animated, therefore, in the presence of spirits than sulfur flares up in the presence of fire. For the most excellent matter is so closely joined to the most excellent, that is, to the intellectual, form that they can never be dissolved. Compound bodies, the further they depart from the discord of elemental qualities and the closer they approach to the harmony of the heavenly bodies, the more capable they become of life and of cognition. If this is so, then undoubtedly the most capable of life and of cognition are the heavenly bodies. The genus of minds is higher than the heavens, and more akin to them than to the earth. Since many minds, therefore, have been joined as forms to earthly bodies, necessarily even more minds, and earlier and more completely, have been joined as forms to heavenly bodies than to earthly bodies.

Platonists believe, as I have indicated, that not only the heavens but the elements too are alive. Since they see all the world's spheres and many compound things which are linked to them are moved by an inner movement without anything external impelling them, they conclude that souls are present in them. But if someone were to ask about the ascent and descent of the elements and of compound objects, the Platonists will reply that the ascending and descending too is brought about through the soul; through the soul, I say, of their own sphere, which recalls the small parts of its sphere to itself as a magnet attracts iron. That is also why the motion of a stone falling from on high accelerates the closer it approaches earth, and why the motion of an ascending flame burns more ravenously the closer it approaches heaven. Since the soul of the sphere attracts the more vehemently the closer it is, the world's soul too attracts for the same reason. If people, when they perceive the motion of a piece of iron, were not to see the magnet, they would suppose that the iron were being moved by itself when it was being attracted by the magnet. Just so do those who do not understand about the souls of the spheres believe that all the little 22

bra sua aut instrumenta moveat quam corpuscula illa moventur in mundo, necessarium est illa corpuscula non ab inerti qualitate solummodo, verum etiam ab artificiosa natura moveri et duci. Porro, naturalis motus elementorum est, qui cancellos naturae naturalisque loci non transgreditur, id est perpetuus circuitus in suo loco atque sphaera naturali figurae suae persimilis. Circuit ignis et aer, ut luna, quod crinitarum indicat revolutio. Circuit aqua iugiter refluendo. Terra si, ut voluit Aegesias, moveretur,[14] in circulum moveretur; ut volunt plurimi, manet per superficiem. Circuunt partes eius mundi centrum quodammodo, prout se invicem circa ipsum undique sempiterno coarctant annixu. Ascensus autem aut descensus non proprie naturalis est motus, sed ad locum motumque naturalem subita per rectam lineam restitutio quae, quoniam ab alio terminatur perque unicum semper dirigitur tramitem, liquido nobis ostendit elementorum partes ex se ipsis minime agitari. Nam et sponte quiescerent, neque agerent viam semper eandem, et aqua posset interdum aerem proximum non frigefacere aut in praecipitium non defluere. Nam etsi animae sphaerarum eundem semper tenorem servant, non tamen putandum est animulas, id est vires proprias elementalium partium, si tamquam motrices illis insint, talem ordinem servaturas, quandoquidem animae nostrae non servant. Augmentum vero plantarum atque saxorum est ab anima terrae, ideo solum quamdiu haerent terrae crescunt. Corpora brutorum et hominum seiuncta a sphaeris vivunt, quia proprias habent animas, quod indicat illorum figura variis instrumentis munita, figurae sphaerarum penitus dissimilibus; indicat et complexio a sphaerarum complexione alienissima. Sicut se habet

bodies move of their own accord. Clearly, since no craftsman's mind can move his hands or his tools as deftly as those little bodies are moved in the world, necessarily those bodies are moved and ruled not just by unskillful quality but also by nature's skillfulness. Again, the natural movement of the elements is what does not trespass beyond the bounds of nature and of natural place; in other words, it is an everlasting circular movement in its place and sphere perfectly resembling the sphere's natural shape. Fire and air move in a circle like the Moon, as the revolution of comets shows. Water moves in a circle, ceaselessly flowing back. If earth were moved, as Hegesias claimed,[26] it would be moved in a circle. It stays still, most people believe, on the surface. [But] its parts in a way make a circle around the center of the world insofar as they pack themselves together on all sides around the center continuously pressing in. But ascent or descent are not strictly speaking natural motion, but a sudden restoration by way of a straight line to a natural location and motion, a restoration which, because it is ended by another[27] and is always directed along a singular path, clearly shows us that the parts of the elements are not moved of their own accord. For then they would also come to rest of their own accord and would not always follow the same path; and water would be able occasionally not to make the air close to it cold or not pour down in a precipitous cascade. For, although the souls of the spheres always keep the same tenor, yet we must not think that little souls—the powers, that is, of the elemental parts, if they are present in them as motive forces—are going to preserve such an order, seeing that our own souls cannot preserve it. But the growth of plants and rocks comes from the earth's soul; so they grow only as long as they cling to the earth. The bodies of men and animals live separated from the spheres because they have their own souls. This is clear from their shape which is protected by various instruments fundamentally different from the shape of the spheres. It is clear too from their composition that completely

mobile ad mobile, ita motor ad motorem. Ergo ut corpus ad corpus, sic anima se habet ad animam. Itaque corpora seiuncta inter se per situm, naturam, figuram, quantitatem motumque et speciem seiunctam habent et animam; coniuncta vero coniunctam.

23 Una tamen est super singulas mundi anima. Unius enim viventis opificis unum debet esse opus vivens. Non est unum vivens, nisi per vitam unam. Non habet unam vitam, nisi unam habeat animam. Merito cum lateat, ut plerique disputant, in omnibus sphaeris una prima et informis per se materia, una illius est anima. Quidnam in causa est quod, licet contraria inter se sint mundi membra, in unum tamen conspirant et alia aliis vires suas communicant, nisi quia una anima huius ingentis animalis humores quamvis diversos contemperat, ac membra per situm seiuncta et qualitatem vitae et motus conspiratione continuat? Undenam[15] fit ut inferiora nutus sequantur superiorum et omnia mundi membra, ut ita loquar, compatiantur invicem, nisi ab una communi natura? Una vero natura ab una fit anima. Neque minus unitum esse oportet divinum hoc animal quam sit quodvis aliud animal, siquidem est omnium potentissimum. Ergo si inter cetera animalia quodlibet corpus per unam quandam suam animam gubernatur, multo magis mundani huius animalis membra per unam animam vinciuntur. Quae si ita se habet ad corpus suum sicuti nostra ad nostrum, non aliter ipsa in qualibet mundi parte est tota, quam anima nostra tota in qualibet nostri corporis parte, alioquin non posset universum perfecte connectere, vivificare, movere. Sicuti se habet natura ad corpus, sic anima ad naturam. Ergo quemadmodum in[16] universo corpore natura universalis est ubique, ita in universa natura ubique universalis est anima.

differs from the composition of the spheres. Mover relates to mover as object moved to object moved. Thus soul relates to soul as body to body. So bodies that are separated among themselves because of location, nature, shape, quantity and movement must also have a species and soul that are separate; bodies that are joined, a species and soul that are joined.

Yet above individual souls is the one soul of the world. For 23 there has to be one living work of the one living craftsman. It is not one and alive except through one life. It does not have one life unless it has one soul. Since, as the majority argue, one prime matter in itself unformed lies concealed in all the spheres, it is proper that its soul be one. What is it that is responsible for making the limbs of the world, though they are in opposition to each other, nonetheless work together and variously share their powers, unless it is that one soul tempers the humors, however diverse, of this huge living being, and takes the spatially separated limbs and the quality of life and of motion and joins them in concord? How else could the lower parts follow the bidding of the higher, and all the limbs of the world be in sympathy, so to speak, with each other, except by sharing one common nature? One nature comes from one soul. This divine animal should not be any less united than any other animal, seeing that it is the most mighty of all. If among the other animals, therefore, any body whatsoever is governed by a single soul of its own, *a fortiori* the limbs of the world animal are bound into one by a single soul. If this soul's relationship to its body is the same as our soul's to our body, then it is present in its entirety in any given part of the world in a way that is no different from our soul's being present in its entirety in any part of our body; otherwise it could not bind the universe perfectly together, or vivify and move it. Soul relates to nature as nature to body. So just as a universal nature exists everywhere in the universal body, so a universal soul exists everywhere in that universal nature.

24 Quod autem sphaerarum animae sint rationales, ostendit dispositio motuum mundanorum semper ad id quod est melius et pulchrius proficiscens. Sicut enim motus tam velox, liber et diuturnus ab intima vita fit, sic tam mirabilis ordo movendi tamque artificiosa progressio a sapientissima quadam arte ipsius vitae procedit. Nam quod sphaeras ad idem semper per eadem dirigit, non necessitas quaedam est vita carens, ut vulgo videtur, sed ars integra et sapientia felix quae, quoniam non errat in consultando, quemadmodum mortales solent, motu et opere non vagatur. Denique caelum ab intellegentia quadam moveri, id quoque nobis argumento est, quod caeli corpus motibus suis ita ordinat elementa disponitque composita, ut animae intellectuales compositis corporibus infundantur. Hae vero corporibus caelestibus valde praestantiores sunt. Corporea igitur natura caeli, cum per se supra speciem suam neque agat quicquam neque disponat, certe in hac ipsa actione dispositioneque, ubi ad speciem mentis perfecte[17] conducit, a mente divina tamquam instrumentum ab artifice ducitur. Quae quidem mens animae suae inest, quandoquidem praestantissimi corporis anima praestantissima est animarum.

25 Tres sunt praecipui, ut Magi putant, principes super mundum, Oromasis, Mitris, Arimanis, id est deus, mens, anima. Dei proprium est unitas, mentis ordo, animae motus. A deo solo prima ipsa fit in mundo unitas partium et totius; a mente virtute dei fit ordo partium unitarum; ab anima superiorum virtute fit motus operis ordinati. Movet anima mundum mutabiliter per se ipsam, movet ordinate per mentem, perseverat semper in uno hoc officio per unitatem dei ipsius aeternam. Sic illorum trium principum[18] tria haec, ut dixi, in mundo videntur vestigia. Quod Plato videtur[19] in epistola ad regem Dionysium tetigisse, quem locum in li-

That the souls of the spheres are rational is shown by the fact that the disposition of the world's movements always tends towards the better and the more beautiful. For just as the motion which is extremely swift, independent and long-lasting comes from the life within, so the astonishing orderliness of that motion and its supremely skillful progression come from the art of that life, an art of superlative wisdom. For what always guides the spheres via the same means to the same end is not a necessity lacking life, as it vulgarly appears, but a perfect art and blessed wisdom, which, since it does not err in its deliberating, as mortals customarily do, does not wander in its motion and activity. Finally, another argument for us that heaven is moved by an intelligence is that the body of heaven by its motions so orders the elements and disposes compound things that intellectual souls are poured into compound bodies. Now these souls are far superior to the heavenly bodies. So heaven's corporeal nature, since of itself it neither does anything nor disposes anything that goes beyond its own species, in this doing and disposing, where it assembles perfectly in accordance with the species [or idea] of a mind, for a surety is led by the divine mind, as a tool is guided by a craftsman. This mind is indeed present in heaven's soul, since the soul of the most eminent of bodies is the most eminent of souls. 24

According to the Magi, the world has three chief rulers, Oromasis, Mitris and Arimanis, that is God, mind and soul.[28] To God belongs unity, to mind order, and to soul movement. From God alone comes the prime unity in the world of the parts and of the whole. From mind by the power of God comes the order of the united parts. From soul by the power of the higher two comes the movement of this ordered creation. Through itself soul moves the world in a changeable way, through mind it moves it in an orderly way, and through the eternal unity of God Himself it continues forever in this single task. Thus, as I have said, these three rulers seem to leave three imprints in the world. Apparently, 25

bro *De amore* latius declaravimus. Mitto quod quaelibet species naturalis a deo habet ut sit unaque sit, a deo per mentem ordinem, ab utroque perpetuitatem, sed ab anima caeloque habet ut multiplex per singula sit atque mutabilis. Mens enim et anima, quoniam a causa omnino immobili per ipsius substantiam proxime procreantur, substantia immutabiles prorsus evadunt. Naturales autem species, quoniam a stabilibus causis, id est deo et mente, per causas actione mobiles, id est animas caelosque, manant,[20] etiam substantia quodammodo sunt mutabiles, quamvis causarum stabilium munere per continuam singulorum successionem perpetuae videantur. Unde enim mobiles causae motionis perpetuitatem habent, inde harum effectus continuam generationis successionem. Caelestes sphaeras habere animas, non modo Platonici, sed omnes etiam Peripatetici confitentur. Quod Aristoteles docet libro *De caelo* secundo, rursus septimo et octavo *Naturalium*, secundo *De anima*, undecimo *Divinorum*; Theophrastus etiam discipulus Aristotelis libro *De caelo*. Quod Avicenna et Algazeles summopere confirmarunt. Augustinus Aurelius in libro[21] *Enchiridion* et Thomas Aquinas in libro *Contra gentiles* secundo tradunt nihil, quantum ad Christianam doctrinam spectat, interesse caelestia corpora animas habere vel non habere.

26 Sphaeras autem elementorum vivere, etsi plane constat apud Platonicos, de his tamen Peripatetici veteres nihil disseruerunt. Recentiores autem nonnulli ambigunt, quia elementa videantur compositorum gratia instituta fuisse atque esse tanto compositis viliora quanto sunt propinquiora materiae. Sed ad haec Platonici respondebunt integras quidem elementorum sphaeras totius mundi gratia institutas fuisse, non gratia huius compositi vel illius;

Plato was referring to this in his letter to King Dionysus[29] in a passage I have treated at some length in my *De amore*.[30] I will pass over the fact that any natural species has its existence and unity from God, its structure from God through mind, and its perpetuity from both; but from soul and heaven that it is multiplied in individual beings and subject to change. For mind and soul, because they are directly created by a cause which is altogether immobile by way of its substance, are accordingly entirely immutable in substance. But the natural species, because they emanate from unchanging causes—that is, from God and mind—by way of causes that move when they act—that is, by way of the souls and the heavens—are also mutable in a way in substance, although by the gift of the unchanging causes and through the continuous succession of individual things they appear to be perpetual. For the mobile causes' perpetuity of motion comes from the same source whence the causes' effects derive the continuous succession of [their] generation. Not only Platonists but all the Aristotelians too say that the heavenly spheres have souls. Aristotle teaches this in the *De caelo* Book II, in the *Physics* Books VII and VIII, in the *De anima* Book II, and in the *Metaphysics* Book XI,[31] as does Aristotle's pupil Theophrastus in his *De caelo*.[32] Avicenna and Algazales have fully confirmed it.[33] Augustine in his *Enchiridion*[34] and Thomas Aquinas in his *Contra Gentiles* Book II[35] teach us that as far as Christian doctrine is concerned it is unimportant whether celestial bodies do or do not have souls.

Although it was obviously agreed among the Platonists that the spheres of the elements were alive, yet the ancient Aristotelians did not discuss the issue. But several more recent thinkers doubt it on the grounds that the elements appear both to have been created for the sake of the objects compounded from them and to be inferior to the compounds to the extent that they are closer to matter. To this the Platonists will counter that the spheres of the elements in their entirety were established for the sake of the whole world, 26

particulas autem elementorum, quae et segregantur ab elementi totius integritate et miscentur in hoc aut illo composito corpore, corpusculi talis causa commisceri. Et quamvis harum particularum qualitates sint primae materiae proximae, integra tamen elementa, quia in ordine principalium mundi membrorum connumerantur, valde propinqua sunt tum mundi totius formae, tum summi opificis exemplari universo atque proposito, tum divinis caelestium mentium sphaerarumque influxibus, qui in particulas et corpuscula mixta non aliter quam per integra defluunt elementa. Atque hoc pacto elementorum globi digna receptacula fiunt rationalium animarum.

27 Sunt praeterea in igne et aere, propter situm perspicuitatemque ipsorum caelis convenientem, partes aliquae quasi e regione sideribus respondentes, quae directis quibusdam nobilitatae influxibus sufficienter praeparantur ad mentes suscipiendas. Partes autem[22] seu aquae terraeque crassiores, sive ignis aerisque in terris diffusi,[23] a globis propriis segregatae[24] animos non merentur, quia et globorum amittunt dignitatem, et propter impetum corporum externorum simplicitatem suam puritatemque non servant. Quod si diligentius miscentur invicem, quousque diuturna qualitatum temperatione aequalitatem quandam recuperent similem sphaerarum aequalitati, primum quidem mirabiles[25] operationes quasdam consequuntur in mixtis; deinde vitam in plantis, tum sensum, denique rationem.

28 Si quis autem divinorum animorum nomina nosse desideret, sciat Orphei theologiam sphaerarum animas ita partiri, ut quaelibet vim geminam habeat, unam in cognoscendo positam, alteram in sphaerae corpore vivificando atque regendo. Ergo in elemento terrae illam vim Plutonem Orpheus nominat, hanc Proserpinam;

not for the sake of this or that compound, but that the particles of the elements, which are cut off from the entirety of the whole element and are mingled into this or that compound body, are mingled together for the sake of that little body. And although the qualities of their particles may indeed be close to prime matter, yet the elements in their entirety, because they are counted in the order of the principal parts of the world, are much closer to the form of the whole world, to the universal model and plan of the highest craftsman, and to the divine influences of the celestial minds and spheres. These influences flow down into the particles and into the little bodies compounded from them just as they flow through the elements in their entirety. And in this way the spheres of the elements become receptacles worthy of rational souls.

In fire and air, moreover, because of their location and the transparency they have in common with the heavens, are particular parts which respond as it were to the constellations directly opposite them, and which, ennobled as they are by certain unmediated influences, are sufficiently prepared to receive minds. But the grosser parts either of water and earth, or of fire and air diffused in earth, being separated from their proper spheres, do not deserve thinking souls, both because they have foregone the dignity of their spheres, and because they are not preserving their own simplicity and purity owing to the impact of external bodies. But if they are mixed together with great diligence to the point that they are able to recover from the long-lasting tempering of qualities a certain uniformity like the uniformity of the spheres, then they do result first in certain wonderful activities in compounded bodies, next in life in plants, then in sense, finally in reason. 27

But if anyone wants to know the names of the divine souls, he should be aware that the theology of Orpheus divides the souls of the spheres in such a way that each has a twin power, one concerned with knowing, the other in the sphere's body with giving life and ruling. So Orpheus calls the one power in the element of 28

in aqua Oceanum illam, hanc Thetim; in aere fulminatorem Iovem atque Iunonem; in igne Phanetam et Auroram; in anima sphaerae lunaris illam Bacchum Licnitum, hanc Thaliam musam; in anima rursus Mercurii sphaerae illam vim Bacchum Silenum, hanc Euterpem;[26] Veneris Lysium[27] et Eratonem;[28] Solis Trietericum et Melpomenem; Martis Bassareum atque Clionem;[29] Iovis Sabasium et Terpsichorem; Saturni Amphietum Polymniamque; octavae sphaerae Pericionium et Uraniam; in anima vero mundi vim primam vocat Bacchum Eribromum, secundam musam Calliopem. Quapropter apud Orpheum singulis Musis praeest Bacchus aliquis, quo vires illarum divinae cognitionis nectare ebriae designantur. Ideo Musae novem cum Bacchis novem circa unum Apollinem, id est circa splendorem solis invisibilis debacchantur. Sed haec de nominibus divinorum animorum dicta sufficiant.

29 Verum hanc omnem disputationem hac ratione breviter concludamus ut antiquorum more dicamus eos esse penitus deridendos, qui partes elementorum impuras, ex quibus animalia constant, vitam et rationem habere fatentur, tota vero puraque elementa negant, quasi pars toto sit melior, et mundum vita carere volunt et sensu, qui tamen vitam dat[30] plantis quae non fiunt ex semine, sensum dat[31] animalibus quae per coitum non gignuntur.

30 Quamobrem tres rationalium animarum gradus colligimus. In primo sit anima mundi una. In secundo duodecim sphaerarum animae duodecim. In tertio animae multae, quae in sphaeris singulis continentur. Haec omnia quae ad sphaerarum animas pertinent, ex Platonicorum opinione narrata, tunc demum affirmentur,

earth Pluto, the other Proserpina; in water, Oceanus and Thetis, in air, Jupiter Lord of the Lightning Bolt and Juno; in fire, Phanes and Aurora; in the soul of the sphere of the Moon, Bacchus Licnites and the Muse Thalia. Again, in the soul of the sphere of Mercury, the one power is Bacchus Silenus, the other Euterpe; in that of Venus, [Bacchus] Lysius and Erato; in that of the Sun, [Bacchus] Trietericus [and] Melpomene; in that of Mars, [Bacchus] Bassareus and Clio; in that of Jupiter, [Bacchus] Sabasius and Terpsichore; in that of Saturn, [Bacchus] Amphietus and Polymnia; and in that of the eighth sphere, [Bacchus] Pericionius and Urania. But Orpheus calls the first power in the soul of the world Bacchus Eribromus, and the second, the Muse Calliope. Accordingly, in Orpheus' scheme a particular Bacchus rules over the individual Muses,[36] and the powers of the Muses, drunken by the nectar of knowledge divine, are signified by his name. Thus the nine Muses along with the nine Bacchuses together celebrate their ecstatic rites around the single figure of Apollo, that is, around the splendor of the invisible Sun. But this is enough about the names of the divine souls.

Let me briefly bring this whole discussion to an end by commenting, in the manner of the ancients, that people are making utter fools of themselves: both those who declare that the impure parts of the elements from which animals are made do have life and reason, while denying them to the elements themselves in their entirety and purity (as though the part were superior to the whole); and those who maintain likewise that the world lacks life and sense, although it gives life to plants that do not spring from seed, and gives sense to animals that are not born from coitus. 29

We conclude then that there are three levels of rational souls: in first place is the single world soul; in second, the twelve souls of the twelve spheres; and in third, the many souls which are contained in the individual spheres. All which pertains to the souls of the spheres and here set forth from the point of view of the 30 cum Christianorum theologorum concilio diligenter examinata placuerint.

31 Nam et Plato in *Epinomide,* ubi sub propria persona ipse loquitur, de his sub divisione sic inquit: 'Impossibile est terram, caelum stellasque omnes et quae ex his constant moles, nisi anima singulis aut adsit aut insit, tam exquisita ratione annis, mensibus diebusque circumvolvi, nobisque omnibus bona omnia facere'.

: II :

Animae sphaerarum movent sphaeras per legem fatalem, et movent in circulum, quia ipsae sunt circuli.

1 Quonam pacto caelestes animae sphaeras suas movent? Profecto quemadmodum placet Platonicis, sicut corpus tuum anima tua per appetitum. Qui appetitus illic quoque a cogitatione excitatur, cogitatio ibidem a fatali illius animae lege. Ideo Plato in libro *De regno* inquit: 'Caelum movet fatum et innata cupiditas'. Quod accepisse videtur a Zoroastre, a quo omnis manavit theologorum veterum sapientia. Ille enim ubi de caelo loquitur, inquit:

> ἀϊδίῳ βουλῇ φέρεται, ἀεὶ τρέχει ἔργῳ ἀνάγκης,

id est: 'Sempiterna voluntate fertur, semper necessitatis opera currit'. Quod perspicue intellegemus, si ita rerum ordinem considerabimus.

2 Est aliquid quod dicitur super omne, est aliquid quod sub omni. Quod dicitur super omne deus est, qui non potest esse

Platonists will be confirmed only when a council of Christian theologians, after careful examination, agrees upon them.

For Plato too in the *Epinomis,* speaking in his own person, makes the following comments concerning the matters under discussion:[37] "It is impossible for the earth, the heavens, and all the stars and the masses they comprise, to perform their yearly, monthly, and daily revolutions with such exquisite rationality and to render all things good for us all, unless soul is present near them or is in them individually."[38] 31

: II :

The souls of spheres move the spheres in accordance with the law of fate; they move them in a circle because they are themselves circles.

How then do celestial souls move their spheres? According to the Platonists in the same way as your soul moves your body: through desire. The desire in a celestial sphere too is aroused by reflection; and reflection there by its soul's fatal law.[39] Thus Plato says in his book, *The Statesman,* "Fate and inborn desire moves the heavens."[40] He apparently adopted this view from Zoroaster, from whom emanates all the wisdom of the ancient theologians. For in speaking of the heavens, he says: "It is borne along by the sempiternal will; it is always traversing the works of necessity."[41] We will understand this clearly if we consider the order of things in the following way. 1

There is something said to be above the All and something said to be under the All. What is said to be above the All is God, who cannot properly be the All, because He is the utterly simple unity 2

proprie omne, quoniam est simplicissima unitas super numerum. Sub omni haec corpora singula. Oportet igitur inter id quod est super omne et id quod sub omni esse aliquid medium. Id autem est omne ipsum totumque et rerum omnium cumulus. Erit autem triplex omne, sive totum triplex. Primum quidem omne proxime ab ipsa dei unitate dependet. Idcirco eatenus unitum esse necessarium est, quatenus fieri potest, cum fiat ipsi unitati simillimum. Esse vero potest aliquid tribus modis unitum: essentia, puncto atque momento. Essentia scilicet, ut una substantia sit, non ex substantiis pluribus composita. Puncto, ut non dispergatur in partes plures, per quas cogatur in plura distrahi puncta locorum. Momento, ut quicquid habere potest umquam nutu oculi nanciscatur, neque per varia temporum momenta sit varium. Ergo illud omne, quod statim ex deo est ipsi similius, omnibus his modis est unitum. Is est angelus qui, quamvis prout pendet ex alio, mutabilis quodammodo dici possit, tamen quia infinito dei statui praecipue proximus procreatur in ipsumque convertitur sine medio, stabilis prorsus evadit. Sequitur secundum omne quod, quia secunda quadam intentione pendet ab uno, unum iam modum unitatis amittit. Retinet duos: unum quidem restat essentia atque puncto, sed momentis fit varium. Talis est anima. Tertium omne est materia mundi, quae una substantia est, sed non solum momentis variatur, ut anima, sed etiam diffunditur per puncta locorum.

3 Sed cur in hoc descensu tempus reperitur prius quam locus? Tum quia tempus spiritalis actionis alicuius comes est, locus est comes corporis, ideoque tempus ad spiritum efficaciamque propius quam locus accedit, tum quia ab unitate in multitudinem gradatim est descendendum. Quotiens vero rei essentia localem multitudinem subit, totiens et operatio eius temporalem patitur numerum,

above number. Under the All are the particular objects here. Now some mean must exist between what is above the All and what is under the All. But that mean is the All itself, the whole and the accumulated mass of all things. But this mean will be a threefold All, or a threefold whole. The first All derives directly from God's unity itself. To the extent that it can become so, therefore, it must necessarily be united, since it is made most like unity itself. But something can be united in three ways: in essence, in a point in space, in a moment in time: in essence, that it may be a single substance, not compounded from several substances; in a point in space, that it may not to be divided into many parts by virtue of which it would be forcibly splintered into many points in space; in a moment in time, that it may find in a twinkling of an eye whatever it can ever possess and not be different in different moments of time. Hence that All, which comes immediately from God and is most like Him, is united in each of these three ways. This is angel, which although insofar as it depends on another it can be said to be mutable in a way, yet because it is created immediately proximate to the infinite immutability of God and is turned towards God without an intermediary emerges as completely immutable. The second All follows. Because it depends on the One by a second intention,[42] it is already losing one mode of unity. It retains the [other] two: it remains one in essence and in a point in space, but it becomes different in the moments of time. Such is soul. The third All is the matter of the world, which is one in substance, but not only varies in terms of moments, like soul, but is also scattered over different points of space.

In this downward progression why is time found before space? 3 First, because time accompanies any spiritual action, while space is the companion of body, and so time comes closer to spirit and its capacity to act than space does; second, because one must descend from unity to multiplicity by stages. But as often as a thing's essence is subject to spatial multiplicity, thus often does its activity non e converso. Essentia enim operationem unione et perfectione superare potest, contra nequaquam.

4 Membra denique mundi quaelibet non omne, sed sub omni dicuntur esse. Quapropter angelus continet in se rerum omnium rationes: omnes inquam habitu simul et actu. Anima rursus omnes, sed habitu quidem, non actu. Materia omnes quidem potentia, non tamen habitu neque actu, sed per successionem suscipit omnes. Oportet profecto animam ipsam esse quodammodo omnia, de qua Zoroaster ait:

καὶ ἴσχει κόσμου πολλὰ πληρώματα κόλπων,

id est: 'Mundanorum sinuum multas plenitudines comprehendit'. Nam si inter sublimia et infima est media, necessario in se continet sublimium illorum munera et imagines, infimorum autem vires et exemplaria. Sed ea parte qua cum angelica mente communicat, evadit angelo similis; alia parte dissimilis. Igitur sphaerarum animae in mentibus suis ideas cunctas simul habent habitu atque actu. In suis potentiis infimis motricibus corporum cuncta iterum habent generandorum semina possessione[32] et habitu simul, non actu. Media pars illarum, scilicet ratio, sequitur mentem, quia corpora illarum perfectissima ac ferme nullius egena sola animae infima parte reguntur satis. Ideo media pars caelestium animarum, quae sua natura mobilis est, quia otium agit ab opere corporali, absorpta a mente fit stabilis.

5 In nobis vero propter nostri corporis indigentiam media quoque pars movetur ut infima, difficili et operosa nimium administratione corporis ita cogente. Apparet etiam quodammodo motus, ut vult Plotinus, aliquis in ipsa rationali caelestium animarum parte. Cum enim a deo omnium unitate, tum per unitatem suam

sustain temporal plurality; but not the other way about. For essence can excel activity in unity and perfection, but not the contrary.

The world's various members are said to be not the All but under the All. So angel contains within itself the rational principles of all things, all the principles, I say, in habit and act together. Next, soul contains them all, but in habit not in act. Matter contains them all in potency, yet not in habit or act; but by way of succession it sustains all things. Soul itself must really be all things in some manner. Zoroaster says about it: "It holds within the many plenitudes of the world's bosom and folds."[43] For if it is the mean between the highest and the lowest things, it must contain within itself the gifts and images of those above but the powers and models of those below. But in that part whereby it communicates with angelic mind it becomes like angel, in its other part unlike. So in their minds the souls of the spheres contain all the ideas simultaneously in habit and in act. In their lowest powers, those that move bodies, the souls again have all the seeds for generating, but they have them together in possession and habit, but not in act. The middle part, that is the reason, follows mind. This is because the bodies of the spheres' souls, being most perfect and in need of nothing virtually, are sufficiently ruled by the soul's lowest part alone. So the middle part of the celestial souls, though mobile by nature, because it lives in leisure from corporeal labor, has been absorbed by mind and becomes stable. 4

In our case, however, because of the needs of our body, the middle part is moved too like the lowest part, compelled by the difficult and extremely laborious task of looking after the body. According to Plotinus,[44] some movement is apparent in a way even in the rational [middle] part of the celestial souls. For since that part flows out from God, from the unity of all, down through its own unity which is its mind's head, and then down through its mind which is the reason's head, it also flows back through its 5

quae suae mentis est caput, tum per mentem suam quae caput rationis est, effluat[33] refluitque quoque per mentem unitatemque suam in deum, omnium unitatem, siquidem haec deum ipsum primo naturaliter appetit, secundo intellegit, tertio intellectualiter amat, quarto amatoria quadam[34] unione consequitur. Actionem vero quae ad terminum quendam per media transit, motum Platonici nominant ac, si tempore transit, temporalem motum; sin vero momento, motum appellant aeternum. Qualis est in animarum caelestium ratione. Licet autem media haec pars illarum in mentem conversa omnes simul videat rationes, tamen pars illarum infima, utpote mutabilibus corporibus cognatissima, non tantae virtutis est, ut valeat uno actu ferri in semina universa. Cupit tamen ferri actu in omnia, ne frustra sint in eius potentia omnia. Fertur ergo in illa nixu multiplici, et modo haec actu consequitur, modo illa, sed priora amittit actu, cum incurrit in alia. Non ergo complectitur simul cuncta, semper autem ad omnia nititur. Currit itaque semper. Huiusmodi cursus est motus primus: huius autem cursus intervallum tempus primum est. Ad cursum illum currit mundus. Ad tempus illud fluunt tempora mundi. Hunc ego esse arbitror ipsum, ut est apud Orpheum, mutantem Protea formas. Cum vero semina illa certo sint numero terminata et anima currat semper, certo temporis spatio transit omnia. Quibus peractis vel quiescere cogitur, ut nobis videtur, vel recurrere paulatim per omnia denuo atque eandem in mundo telam generationis retexere, ut placuit Zoroastri, qui iisdem aliquando causis omnino redeuntibus eosdem similiter effectus reverti putat. Qua quidem ratione tam ipse quam alii multi successores eius humanorum corporum resurrectionem confirmaverunt. Circuitus autem universi intervallum annis solaribus sex et triginta millibus expleri voluere Platonici, quem magnum ac mundanum appellant annum. Huius finem

mind and its unity up to God, the unity of all. Since this is so, first it naturally desires God Himself, second it understands Him, third it loves Him with an intellectual love, and fourth it attains Him in a union of love. But action which proceeds to a certain end through intermediary stages the Platonists refer to as movement, and, if it takes place in time, as temporal movement; but if it occurs in an instant, they call it eternal movement. Such is the movement in the reason of the celestial souls. Although the middle part of these souls, turned back as it is towards mind, may see all the rational principles at the same time, yet these souls' lowest part, being most akin to changeable bodies, does not have sufficient power to be able in one act to be borne into the seeds of all things. Yet it yearns to be borne into them all in act, lest all the seeds are in it potentially for naught. Thus it is by way of repeated striving that it is borne into them, and in act it attains now these seeds, now those; but it loses earlier seeds in act when it hurries on to others. So it does not embrace all seeds at the same time, but is always striving for them all. So it is always coursing onwards. Its course is the first motion. The span of this course, however, is the first time. The world runs to that course. The times of the world flow to that time. I believe this is Proteus himself, as he appears in Orpheus, always changing his shape.[45] But since the seeds are determined in a fixed number and the soul is always hurrying onwards, the soul traverses them all in a fixed interval of time. Having done this, it seems to me, it must either rest, or run back step by step a second time through them all, and reweave the same web of generation in the world. This was Zoroaster's view, who believed that when exactly the same causes returned at some point in time, the same effects would similarly recur.[46] With this argument he and many others among his successors have upheld the resurrection of human bodies. But Platonists have claimed that to be completed the circuit of the universe takes an interval of thirty-six thousand solar years, what they designate the Great or

Mercurius mundi senium vocat; Plato in libro *De regno*, mundi restitutionem.

6 Sed ut movendi caeli planius modum intellegas, exemplum accipe. Cogitat Euclides nocte Megaris abire Athenas Socratem auditurus accipitque laternam. Totum illud iter in primis communi cogitatione praescribit. Ex hoc universali proposito non fit proprius passus aliquis, nisi particularis cogitatio intercedat primum passum designans. Ergo laterna primum ostendit passum, hunc ipsum statim cogitat imaginatio, hunc elegit appetitus, hunc peragunt pedes. Quo peracto laterna passum secundum monstrat, mox illum cogitat Euclides, appetit, peragit. Similiter tertium atque alios. Eadem ratione in anima sphaerae fieri arbitrantur, ubi mens ratioque ipsius communiter statuit totidem in caelo figuras et in materia formas per caeli motum effingere, quot videt ideas et conceptus in angelo per dei ipsius effingi virtutem, ut tale ipsa pro viribus mundanum opus efficiat, quale deus facit angelicum, atque ita primum imitetur artificem. Non tamen incipit movere caelum aut aliquid operari, nisi motrix potentia, quae est eius infima pars, quasi laterna unum aliquid suorum seminum genus promat prae aliis et quasi oculis offerat. Cum primum vis generis alicuius seminum ceteris seminibus praevalet, imaginatio ipsa, quae infimae huic potentiae annexa est, illud cogitat, idem et appetit, idem explicat in caelo, format in elementis, serit in caelo, parit in elementis. Eodem modo fit per seriem successionis in seminibus aliis. In hac serie successionis fatalis consistit lex; in illa cogitatione cupiditas. Sic 'caelum movetur a fato et innata cupiditate', eodem quasi modo quo in nobis spiritus et humores a vehementi cogitatione

Cosmic Year.[47] Mercury [Trismegistus] calls the ending of this period "the old age of the world,"[48] Plato, in *The Statesman*, "the restoration of the world."[49]

Here is an example so you can understand more clearly the way heaven moves. Euclid conceives the idea of going by night from Megara to Athens in order to hear Socrates, and he takes a lantern.[50] The first thing he does then is to trace out a general conception of the whole journey. But he does not take a single step because of this overall plan, unless a particular conception indicating the first step intervenes. So the lantern lights up the first step, the imagination immediately forms a conception of it, desire chooses it, and the feet take the step. Once taken, the lantern lights up the second step, and Euclid immediately forms a conception of the step, desires it, and performs it. Similarly with the third step and so on. The same process, they think, occurs in the soul of a sphere, when its mind and reason decide in general by way of the heaven's motion to trace out as many figures in heaven and forms in matter as it sees ideas and concepts are fashioned in angel through the power of God Himself. This is in order that it may produce, insofar as it can, a work in this world which is in a way comparable to God's producing an angelic work, and thus imitate the first artificer. Yet the soul of a sphere does not start to move heaven or to do anything, until, like the lantern, its power to move (which is its lowest part) picks out one particular genus of its seeds from the rest and lights it up so to speak for the eyes. As soon as the force of a particular genus of seeds stands out from the rest of the seeds, the imagination, which is connected to the [soul's] lowest power, forms a conception of the genus, desires it, unfolds it in heaven, forms it in the elements, sows it in heaven, gives birth to it in the elements. The same process takes place by way of the order of succession in the other seeds. The fatal law consists in this, the order of succession, while desire consists in that, the forming of a conception. Thus "heaven is moved by fate 6

affectuque vibrantur atque formantur. Neque putes tam novos in mundo effectus, tam varias in caelo figuras momentis singulis explicari, nisi per novas variasque animarum illarum affectiones. A causa enim quae stabilis est omnino, stabile fit et opus.

7 Neque arbitrandum est caeli animam fatigari movendo, si nostra non fatigatur. Motores enim qui cum mobili extensi non sunt fatigari non solent, videlicet si infinito[35] statui, motionum omnium fini sint proximi. Praeterea, quantum ineptum est infimum terrenumque corpus ad motum, tantum sublime corpus est agile. Quod si et levis aura pulverem agitat et ventus inclusus terrae visceribus quassat montes, miraberis sublimes animas tenuissima corpora nutu levissimo volvere? Praesertim cum ea circa naturalem cardinem et in ambitu proprio moveant, atque ipsa ad motum huiusmodi naturali[36] instinctu magis conducant, quam terrenum corpus ad descensum, quando anima nostra corpus suum per declivia ducit.

8 Profecto, caeli corpus ita aeque se habet et facile ad quemlibet situm circa centrum, sicut elementalis materia ad quamlibet formam, immo vero multo magis. Proinde sicut animae convenit efficacia ad movendum, ita corpori[37] proclivitas ad motum. Corpus enim, quoniam ab actu fit, in actu est, ad actum dirigitur, idcirco naturam habet ut per formas suas semper exerceatur. Quoniam vero et substantiam et qualitatem divisibilem habet, cogitur, quicquid aut agit aut patitur, secundum modum divisibilem, id est secundum motum, agere atque pati. Confert autem caelestium motus eiusque varietas ad generationem generandarumque rerum diversitatem. Variis enim figuris caelum exornat; caelestes[38] vires vehementius in elementa transmittit; movet elementa cogitque ut multis invicem modis commisceantur; eorumque globum undique

and inborn desire"[51] almost in the same way as the spirits and humors in us are shaken and formed by vehement thinking and feeling. Nor should you suppose that so many new effects in the world and so many various figures in heaven are unfolded in successive moments, except by way of those [heavenly] souls' new and various affections. For from a cause which is completely stable comes a stable result.

We should not suppose that the soul of the heavens is tired by moving if our soul is not tired. For movers who are not extended along with the object they move do not customarily tire, that is, if they are closest to infinite rest, the end of all motions. Furthermore, a sublime [heavenly] body is as fit for motion as the lowest earthly body is unfit. And if a light breeze can set the dust in motion, and a wind trapped within the bowels of the earth can shake mountains, will you be surprised if sublime souls at the slightest command revolve bodies of the utmost thinness? This is especially since they are moving them around a natural axis and in their own circuit, and by natural instinct they incline more to this kind of movement than an earthly body does to descent (when our soul is leading its body downhill). 7

Heaven's body is as equally and easily adapted to any position around the center[52] as the matter of the elements is adapted to any form, or rather, much more so. Just as efficacy in moving is appropriate to the soul, so a proclivity for motion is appropriate to the body. For body, since it comes into being from act and is in act and is directed towards act, therefore possesses through its forms the nature always to be in act. But since it has both substance and divisible quality, it is compelled to do or be done to whatever it does or is done to in a divisible way, that is, in a moving way. But the motion of heavenly bodies and its variety contributes to generation and to the diversity of things to be generated. For the motion embellishes the heavens with various figures; it transmits the heavenly powers to the elements more vehemently; it moves the ele- 8

vicissitudine quadam aeque illustrat et fovet. Praeterea ipsa mundi materia neque omnes simul in caelo figuras neque formas sub caelo omnes simul potest habere, siquidem inter se multae contrariae sunt. Ubique tamen appetit omnes tamquam naturae suae perfectiones. Hinc ad sempiternum motum proclivis efficitur, ut quod non potest statu consequi, successione saltem quodammodo consequatur.

9 Verum cur in circulum maxime sphaerae rotantur? Quamvis id modo significaverim, altius tamen exordiamur. Deus circulus unus est, quoniam a se est, circuli instar, et in se ipsum, prout non habet extra se principium sui vel finem, sed in se incipiens, desinit in se ipsum. Angelus duplex est circulus, tum quia illuc redit unde manavit (dum suum intellegit et diligit auctorem), tum quia considerat semetipsum. Anima est triplex circuitus, quia respicit deum, quia se ipsam considerat, quia a causis rerum ad effectus descendit, rursusque ab effectibus ascendit ad causas. Si circuunt tres hi caeli motores, quid obstat quo minus caelum quoque in circuitum rapiatur? Et postquam caelum imitatur causas supernas in figura et substantia sua, cur non etiam in motu operationeque imitetur? Mobili animae subiicitur caelum, inde ipsum moveri incipit. Ut semel coepit moveri caeli pars una, propter continuationem trahit aliam secum pellitque aliam, seque invicem necessario reflectunt in gyrum. Stare nequit caelum, quandoquidem eius anima nescit quiescere, neque tamen locum sui naturalem relinquere vult. Ita fit ut circa idem revolvatur et in eodem. Caelum semper mobile est, siquidem terra, quae maxime ab eo distat, est semper immobi-

ments and compels them to be mixed together in many ways; and equally it lights and warms their sphere everywhere in an alternating pattern. Moreover, the matter of the world cannot possess all the figures in heaven at the same time, or all the forms under heaven at the same time, since many of them are contrary to each other. Yet everywhere it desires them all as the perfections of its own nature. Hence it is made capable of sempiternal movement, so that it can attain by succession, in a way at least, what it cannot attain by rest.

But why do the spheres chiefly rotate in a circle? Though I have just indicated the answer, let us go into this more deeply. God is one circle, because He is from Himself like a circle and in Himself insofar as He does not have His beginning or ending outside Himself; but beginning in Himself, He ends in Himself. Angel is a double circle, because it returns to the point whence it emanated (when it understands and loves its creator), and because it contemplates itself. Soul is a triple circle, because it gazes back at God, because it contemplates itself, and because it descends from the causes of things to their effects, and then ascends from effects to their causes. If these three movers of heaven circle, what is to stop heaven too from being swept up into this circuit? And since heaven imitates the higher causes in its shape and substance, why shouldn't it do so in movement and activity too? Heaven is subject to soul which is mobile, whence it begins to be moved. Once one part of heaven begins to be moved, because of [its] continuity it pulls another part with it and pushes another, and the related parts necessarily turn each other round in a circle. Heaven cannot stand still, since its soul knows no rest; and yet it does not want to relinquish its natural position. Thus it is made to revolve around the same [point] and in the same [place]. Heaven is always in motion, since earth which is as far removed from it as possible is always motionless. What is always in motion necessarily returns to 9 lis. Quod movetur semper, necessario ad idem revertitur; nullum enim rectum[39] corporalium spatium infinitum.

Praeterea Plato in libro *De regno* inquit: Solis rebus omnium divinissimis convenit status omnino mutationis expers. Mundus autem, quia corpus est iamque a divinorum dignitate degenerat, ideo immutabilis prorsus esse non potest. Quoniam vero divinis proximum est, consentaneum fuit circulari ipsum motione moveri quae, cum in eodem, circa idem, secundum eadem, simili iugique continuatione volvatur, quam minime fieri potest a locali stabilitate discedit. Haec ille. Adde quod sicut inter omnes species motionum solus localis motus, quia quasi extrinsecus est, subiecti sui substantiam qualitatemque naturalem mutare non cogitur, sic circuitus inter locales motus, quia solus non mutat locum, dici posse videtur quasi non motus. Si stare quis caelum velit, figat ipsum Saturni caelum in cardine quandocumque lubet. Tunc semicirculus ipsius sphaerae alter super caput nostrum, stat alter[40] super caput Antipodum. Cum vero partes omnes huius sphaerae sine ulla naturae discrepantia inter se simillimae sint, nulla est ratio per quam alia pars hic sit magis, illic alia. Ergo inferior semicirculus, quia cum loco hoc nostro aeque convenit ac cum regione Antipodum, ita nitetur hic esse, sicut ibi, et superior semicirculus propter eandem convenientiam ad locum illum contendet esse illic, sicut et hic erat. Ex hoc nixu pars altera pellet alteram, dum quaelibet pars propter aequalem convenientiam volet ubique pariter esse. Est utique octavae sphaerae concava superficies locus naturalis sphaerae Saturni. Ibi devexum Saturni sphaerae concavum tangit octavae. Quaelibet particula huius sphaerae, quia aeque convenit cum qualibet octavae particula, omnes affectat particulas illius at-

the same point. For there is no straight [motion] of bodies [traversing] infinite space.[53]

Moreover in *The Statesman* Plato says: "Rest that is totally without change belongs only to the divinest things of all. But the world, because it is body, and already falls short of the dignity of things divine, cannot be completely without change. Because it is the closest possible to things divine, however, it was best for it to be moved in a circular motion, which, since it revolves in the same place, around the same point, according to the same conditions, and continues everlastingly in the same way, it strays as little as it possibly can from resting in a place." Thus Plato.[54] We might add that just as among all the species of motion only motion in a place, because it is as it were external, is not compelled to change the substance and natural quality of its subject, so among motions in a place [only] circular motion, because it alone does not change place, can be called it would seem a sort of non-motion. Whoever wants heaven to be at rest should, when it takes his fancy, attach Saturn's sphere to the [world's] axis. Then one semicircle of the sphere would be above our head, the other above the head of the Antipodes. Now since all parts of this sphere would be mutually completely alike without any difference of nature, there is no reason why the one part would be more here than the other part there. Thus the lower semicircle, because it is equally suited to our region here as to the region of the Antipodes, will strive to be here just as it was there; and the upper semicircle, because of the same suitability for the region of the Antipodes, will strive to be there just as it was here. From this striving one part will push the other, while each part, because of its equal suitability, will want to be equally everywhere. In actual fact the concave or inner surface of the eighth sphere is the natural location of the sphere of Saturn. The convex surface of Saturn is in contact with the concave surface of the eighth sphere. Any particle of Saturn's sphere, because it is equally compatible with any particle of the eighth sphere,

tingere. Si quiescat, singulae tangent singulas, non quaelibet cunctas. Currendo autem ferme assequitur quod assequi quiescendo non poterat, tanta est huius sphaerae ad illam aviditas. Praeterea sphaerae Saturni anima tota simul est in quibuslibet sphaerae punctis. Sphaera haec animae fruendae cupida ideo currit, ut per omnes sui partes ubique tota anima perfruatur. Advolat rapidissime ut, quoad fieri potest, ubique sit tota simul ubicumque tota simul est anima. Et quia nusquam reperit stantem animam, quiescit et ipsa nusquam. Et sicut anima assidue circa deum quasi centrum convolvitur, ita corpus tractum ab illa semper circum animam revolvitur quasi centrum. Stat autem in eodem cardine caelum, quia et anima propter mentis participationem quietis alicuius est particeps. Id agunt omnes rationales animae in corporibus suis. Id omnia corpora agunt ad animas, sive de sphaerarum ac siderum animis loquamur, seu daemonum atque hominum. Quod si minus in nostro hoc crasso corpore apparet, fit tamen in aethereo animae indumento, de quo disputabimus alias, quod voluit Zoroaster in nobis assidue volvi.

II Denique hanc de motu caeli disputationem hac sententia concludamus: Neque corpus caeli mobile neque motorem, qui ad motum caeli movetur, esse praecipuum motionis huius principem atque finem, ne in huiusmodi motu labor transgressioque contingat. Motus enim ad stabile et circa stabile efficitur semper et regitur.

yearns to come into contact with all the particles of that sphere. If it remains at rest, individual particles will be in contact with individual particles, but no one particle with them all. But by continuing its course it almost attains what it could not attain by remaining at rest, such is the longing of this sphere for the other. Furthermore, the soul of the sphere of Saturn is wholly and simultaneously present at its sphere's every point. This sphere, desirous of enjoying its soul, so proceeds on its course that everywhere through all its parts it enjoys the soul entire. It wings its way with utmost speed so that, insofar as it can become so, it is everywhere wholly and simultaneously wherever the soul is wholly and simultaneously. And because it never finds the soul at rest, it never stops moving itself. Just as the soul revolves continuously around God as its center, so the body which is drawn along by it always revolves around the soul as its center. But heaven remains stationary on the same axis, because [its] soul, in that it participates in mind, also participates in a degree of rest. All rational souls do this in their bodies. All bodies do this for [their] souls, whether we are speaking about the souls of the spheres and constellations or those of demons and men. But if such is less apparent in this gross body of ours, it happens nonetheless in the soul's aethereal envelope, which we will discuss elsewhere, and which Zoroaster held to be revolving within us continually.[55]

Finally, let us conclude this discussion of the movement of heaven with this thought: Neither heaven's mobile body nor the mover which is moving in order to produce the heaven's motion is the principal leader and end of this motion, lest in such motion fatigue and deviation may occur. For the motion is always around a fixed point and directed towards what is at rest. II

Notes to the Text

The first and only complete modern edition of Ficino's *Platonic Theology* was published by Raymond Marcel in the series 'Les classiques d'humanisme' (3 vols., Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1964–70). Marcel collated the two surviving manuscripts and the seven early modern editions of the text; he (or rather his apparatus) demonstrated that the only two independent witnesses to the text were the *editio princeps* (Florence: Antonio Miscomini, 1482), which Ficino saw through the press and himself (almost certainly) corrected, and the MS dedication copy, Biblioteca Medicea-Laurenziana, Plut. LXXXIII, 10. Both appear to descend independently from a common source, presumably the author's archetype. For this edition both of these witnesses have been completely recollated. (We are grateful to dott.ssa Franca Arduini, director of the Biblioteca Laurenziana, for permitting Professor Hankins to collate the Laurenziana MS *in situ*.)

The last paragraph of Book II, chapter 12, and most of Book II, chapter 13, are largely identical with passages from Ficino's *Disputatio contra iudicium astrologorum* (ff. 16r, 3v–8r, 10v). The latter text was published in part by Paul Oskar Kristeller in his *Supplementum Ficinianum* (Florence: Olschki, 1937, vol. II, pp. 11–76) from the *codex unicus*, Florence, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale MS Magl. XX, 58 (partly autograph). The relevant portions of this manuscript have been recollated as well.

Marcel's reporting of the two main witnesses was not always accurate, and the differences from his edition are indicated individually in the textual apparatus. Marcel also made a large number of conjectural additions, which he usually, but not always, indicated with square brackets. Almost all of these have been deleted since they are, as a rule, unnecessary for comprehension of the text.

ABBREVIATIONS

A	the *editio princeps*, Florence, 1482.
L	Florence, Biblioteca Mediceo-Laurenziana, MS Plut. LXXXIII, 10
M	Florence, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, MS Magl. XX, 58
ex . . . corr.	the printed corrigenda in *A*, almost certainly added by Ficino
Marcel	the reading of Marcel's text

PROEM AND BOOK I

1. perscrutetur *L*
2. censuit *Marcel*
3. sumus *L*: simus *A, Marcel*
4. ostendimus *L*
5. tres habet *L*
6. oportet *L*
7. *ex* si *corr. A*
8. coacta *Marcel*
9. *L omits* aliquae
10. alibi *L*
11. Extat forma individua *before* supra *Marcel*
12. at *L*
13. generatio *L*
14. naturae forma *AL and printed editions*] *Marcel emends to* natura formae
15. *ex* Nunc quid *corr. A*
16. simulatque *A*
17. *ex* universi et omnino corporeis *corr. A*
18. *ex* firmitate *corr. A*
19. proprio *Marcel*
20. arte *Marcel*
21. *Marcel omits* aliter
22. *emended to* cogitur: cogit *AL, Marcel*
23. invisibili *Marcel*
24. *ex* substantialem illi *corr. A*
25. *Marcel omits* omnibus
26. *emended to* sequatur: sequitur *AL, Marcel*
27. ascendamus *L*
28. *A omits* adultam
29. si *L*
30. eadem *Marcel*
31. motus *L*
32. proximae *L*
33. illis *L*
34. proximae *L*
35. quae — qualitas *AL*] illa qualitatum proxime genetrix omnino immobilis *Marcel*
36. et *L*
37. *ex* Ad *corr. A*

38. *L corrects from* admittit: admittit *A*
39. competeret *Marcel*: competent *AL*
40. *ex* speciem suam sole *corr. A*
41. *ex* in corpore *corr. A*
42. moveri *L*
43. computasse *L*
44. sunt *Marcel*
45. id *added by A in the corrigenda*
46. *L omits* et
47. decies] decies millies *Vulgate*
48. anima *Marcel*
49. tua animae tuae *Marcel*
50. informis *A*
51. *Marcel adds* autem *after* Tanto
52. numquam *Marcel*

BOOK II

1. Platonicae theologiae de immortalitate animorum liber secundus incipit *L*
2. rectum *L*
3. illius *A, Marcel*
4. *L corrects from* absolutè: absolute *A, Marcel*
5. utriusque *A*
6. est *L*
7. quae *Marcel*
8. his *L*
9. *Marcel's emendation*
10. suum *Marcel*
11. *Marcel reads* sint] sunt *AL*
12. effectum *Marcel*
13. esse *Marcel*
14. superiori *A*
15. *Marcel adds* est *after* necessarium
16. e converso *Marcel*
17. id *L*
18. *ex* desinissent *corr. A*
19. *ex* desinissent *corr. A*
20. effectuum *Marcel*
21. *perhaps* ipsis
22. per electionem *L*
23. quam *L, A (after correction)*] *Marcel and A (before correction) give* per quam
24. *ex* abiectum *corr. A*
25. *added by A in the corrigenda*
26. infirmarum *Marcel*
27. *omitted by Marcel*
28. *ex* finem *corr. A.*
29. *A adds in the corrigenda*: et
30. his *Marcel*
31. quavis *L*
32. *Marcel reads* reperientur] reperiuntur *AL*
33. *omitted by Marcel*
34. ex parte *A*
35. idea *Marcel*
36. *A omits* intellectus absens — natura sensus
37. initium est *Marcel*
38. *omitted by Marcel*

39. nullum enim] nullumque *Marcel*
40. his *Marcel*
41. Verumne putet—commodum] Igitur nemo putet divinam providentiam vel ex seipsa vel per caelum singula necessaria reddere. Sed meminerit quisque voluntatem dei malle universi bonum quam [apparens *cancelled*] propriam alicuius particulae [commodum *cancelled*] qualitatem *M*
42. bonumque *Marcel*
43. *Marcel omits* sit
44. *omitted by L*
45. *M omits* membraque
46. *M omits* formae virtutisve
47. tamdiu] tam diutissime *M*
48. libro *L*
49. *M omits* Et si caelum—principe mundi
50. quaeque *M*
51. perscribere *M*
52. sagitta *Marcel*
53. quaeque *M*
54. conmota *M*
55. *Added in the margin of M in Ficino's hand:* Ac multo certe facilius [quam *cancelled*] infinitus ille sol omnia regit quam sol finitus illuminet et generet naturalia. Neque enim in eo aliud est esse atque intellegere, aliud velle atque agere. Neque vel [*superscript*] extra [se *cancelled*] aspicit ut videat omnia, sed eodem intuitu videt omnia quo se ipsum, vel aliud praeter se ipsum vult tanquam [omnia *cancelled*] finem, ut faciat singula servetque et moveat.
56. enim *cancelled in M*
57. tactu *Marcel*
58. *M omits* ubi providentiam . . . non errantis
59. Vidimus Florentiae—agebantur] Venit Florentiam anno 1475 mense Februario Germanus quidam faber aerarius. Tabernaculam quotidie vulgo monstrabat suis manibus fabricatum, in quo ut ipsi bis vidimus aeneae statuae plurimae cernebantur hominum, equorum, canum, avium et serpentum omnes ad unam quandam pilam ita connexae atque libratae, ut ad illius motum singulae diversis motibus agerentur *M*
60. aliquas *M*
61. *M omits* quoque
62. *M omits* et avium cantus
63. et aliae *M*
64. *M omits* simul
65. *M omits* et similia succedebant

66. uno tantum] omnia tamen uno *M*
67. *M omits* re ipsa
68. omnium] rerum *M*
69. *M omits* ut alias diximus
70. plantas et animantes quarum *A (before correction).*: arbores et animantes, quarum *M*
71. arbor *M*
72. ista *M, A (before correction)*
73. *M omits* quam plurimis . . . deesse. Item
74. debitis viis *M*
75. *M omits* congruis
76. utilime *sic M*
77. *M omits* paene
78. *M omits* mora vel
79. At vero qui] Atqui *M*
80. autricem *M*
81. postea tamen] tamen deinceps *M*
82. tam diu, tam] tam diutissime *M*
83. tanto ordine] tam ordinatissime *M*
84. *M omits* regina
85. deus est *M*
86. *M adds after* bonitas *in the hand of Ficino:* non universum ad partes ullas, sed partes potius refert ad universum. Ideo quae videntur interdum partis alicuius incommoda in totius commodum et quae alicubi, sive deformia sive mala, in totius ornamentum bonumque evadunt. Rursus [cum totius, *etc.*]
87. *M omits* Totum hoc Orpheus . . . quoque mala. Item. *In M there follow five pages (f. 8r, line 19,* Profecto bonum *up to f. 10v, line 5,* iniuria. Quis [sicut in praescientia dei]), *which are here omitted.*
88. *M omits* Sicut enim—facturum
89. *M omits* conditionis alicuius positione
90. *M omits* id est confirmat
91. naturam *M (after correction)*
92. descendendum *M*
93. *M adds superscript* hac et illac *before* sursum deorsumque

BOOK III

1. Ac *A, Marcel*
2. ex *L*
3. *ex* ipse *corr. A*
4. *Marcel omits* movetur et movet—movetur quidem
5. *πατὴρ ἑαυτὸν A*
6. *A omits* ἑῇ
7. *Marcel adds* per *after* Pater
8. vel *L*
9. *L omits* et
10. *ex* ista *corr. A*
11. alternum *Marcel*

12. Inficit *L*] Perficit *A, Marcel*
13. centrum *L*
14. *ex* priusque *corr. A*
15. iis *A*
16. in corporalibus *A*
17. iis *A*

BOOK IV

1. Quartus liber *A*: Platonicae theologiae de animorum immortalitate liber quartus incipit *L*
2. illae *L (with diphthong)*: ille *A, Marcel*
3. Sed neque—disponere *added by A in the corrigenda*
4. ut *after* ita *deleted by A in the corrigenda*
5. Neque sufficere—producere *added by A in the corrigenda*
6. iis *L*
7. *ex* fecundiam *corr. A*
8. in somniis *AL*: insomniis *Marcel*
9. et *after* infusam *deleted by A in the corrigenda*
10. quas *AL*: quos *Marcel*
11. paulum *L*
12. ἀπολλων *A*: απωλλον *L*: *emended to* ἀπὸ πολλῶν *by Marcel*
13. facillimae *L*
14. *Marcel reads* moveretur: moventur *AL*
15. *ex* Unde natura *corr. A*
16. in *added by A in the corrigenda*
17. perfectè *L (apparently)*: perfecte *A*: perfectae *Marcel*
18. *ex* principium *corr. A*
19. *ex* noster *corr. A*
20. manant *AL*: manent *Marcel*
21. *omitted by Marcel*
22. aquae *L*
23. diffusae *Marcel*
24. *emended to* segregatae: segregare *AL, Marcel*
25. mutabiles *L*
26. Euterpe *AL*: Euterpen *Marcel*
27. Lysium *(scil. Dionysium) AL*: Lysinum *Marcel*
28. *corrected to* Eratonem: Erato *AL, Marcel*
29. Clio *AL, Marcel*
30. *Marcel emends to* dant
31. *Marcel emends to* dant
32. possessione *AL*: *Marcel emends to* successione
33. refluat *L*
34. quaedam *Marcel*
35. infinito *L (apparently)*: in finito *A, Marcel*
36. natura *L*
37. corporis *L*
38. caelestesque *Marcel*
39. rerum *Marcel*
40. aliter *L (apparently)*

Notes to the Translation

ABBREVIATIONS

Avicenna, *Opera*	*Auicene peripatetici philosophi ac medicorum facile primi opera* (n.pl., 1508; repr. Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1961).
Bidez-Cumont	Joseph Bidez and Franz Cumont, *Les mages héllenisés: Zoroastre, Ostanès et Hystaspe d'après la tradition grecque* (Paris: Les Belles lettres, 1938).
Collins	Ardis B. Collins, *The Secular Is Sacred: Platonism and Thomism in Marsilio Ficino's Platonic Theology* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1974).
Des Places	Édouard Des Places, ed., *Oracles Chaldaïques, avec un choix de commentaires anciens* (Paris: Les Belles lettres, 1971).
Diels-Kranz	Hermann Diels and Walther Kranz, eds., *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, 3 vols. (Berlin: Weidmann, 1906–1910).
Ficino, *Opera*	Marsilio Ficino, *Opera omnia* (Basel: Heinrich Petri, 1576; repr. Turin: Bottega d'Erasmo, 1959).
Janus-Mayhoff	Ludovicus Janus and Carolus Mayhoff, eds., *C. Plini Secundi Naturalis historiae libri XXXVII*, 6 vols. (Stuttgart: Teubner, 1967–70).
Kaske-Clark	Carol V. Kaske and John R. Clark, eds., *Marsilio Ficino: Three Books on Life* (Binghamton, NY: Renaissance Society of America, 1989).
Marcel, *Banquet*	Raymond Marcel, *Marsile Ficin: Commentaire sur le Banquet de Platon* (Paris: Les Belles lettres, 1956).
Marietti	Petrus Marc, ed., *Thomas Aquinas: Liber de veritate Catholicae fidei contra errores infidelium qui dicitur Summa contra gentiles*, 3 vols. (Turin: Marietti, 1961).

PG	Jacques-Paul Migne, ed., *Patrologiae cursus completus. Series Graeca,* 161 vols. (Paris: Migne, 1857–1866.)
PL	Jacques-Paul Migne, ed., *Patrologia cursus completus. Series Latina,* 221 vols. (Paris: Migne, 1844–1891).
Quandt	Wilhelm Quandt, ed. *Orphei Hymni,* 4th ed. (Dublin: Weidmann, 1973).
Saffrey-Westerink	Henri-Dominique Saffrey and Leendert Gerrit Westerink, eds., *Proclus: Théologie Platonicienne,* 6 vols. (Paris: Les Belles lettres, 1968–97).
Schiavone	Michele Schiavone, ed., *Marsilio Ficino: Teologia platonica,* 2 vols. (Bologna: Zanichelli, 1965).
Stählin	Otto Stählin, ed., *Clemens Alexandrinus,* 3rd ed., 4 vols. (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1960–1980).
Tambrun-Krasker	Brigitte Tambrun-Krasker, *Oracles chaldaïques, recension de Georges Gémiste Pléthon* (Athens: Academy of Athens, 1995).
Wachsmuth	Curtis Wachsmuth and Otto Hense, eds., *Ioannes Stobaius: Anthologium,* 2nd ed., 5 vols. (Berlin: Weidmann, 1958).

For Ficino's debts to Aquinas we have noted below two kinds of parallel passages from the *Summa contra Gentilies* assembled by Collins in *The Secular Is Sacred,* those indicating either "almost verbatim copying" or "a close similarity in thought" (p. 114). A third category, consisting of similarities "not marked enough to justify any conclusion about the presence of Thomistic influence," has been ignored. We follow Collins throughout in citing the paragraph numbers from the 1961 Marietti edition of the *Summa;* thus, in the citation 1.43.363, "363" refers to the paragraph number of the Marietti edition.

PROEM

1. *The Platonic Theology* is the title of the masterpiece of Proclus (410/412–485 AD), the last great Neoplatonist of antiquity, who served—next only to Plotinus (205–269/270 AD), the founder of Neoplatonism—as Ficino's guide to the Platonic mysteries. Ficino achieved a rare mastery of

many of Proclus' complex works to which he was often deeply indebted. He was wary, however, of acknowledging this, since Proclus had attacked Christianity. *On the Immortality of the Soul* is the title both of one of Augustine's earlier treatises (from which Ficino quotes extensively at the end of Book V) and of Plotinus' *Enneads* 4.7.

BOOK I

1. Ficino quotes these opening sentences in a letter (1474?) to a great friend, the diplomat Francesco Bandini, in the first book of his *Letters* (Ficino, *Opera,* p. 660).

2. *Aeneid* 6.734.

3. Democritus of Abdera (born *ca.* 460 BC) was an atomistic materialist. Aristippus of Cyrene, a contemporary of Socrates (469–399 BC) was the founder—Ficino and others mistakenly supposed—of the Cyrenaics, a group of hedonistic philosophers. Epicurus of Samos (341–270 BC) combined Democritus' atomism with the Cyrenaics' hedonism. Cf. Aristotle, *De anima* 1.2.405a.

4. The Cynics, founded by Diogenes (*ca.* 400–325 BC), were the forerunners of the Stoics who regarded Zeno of Citium (335–263 BC) as their founder. Though materialists, both schools postulated a passive and an active principle in nature. Cf. Aristotle, *De anima* 1.2.405a.

5. Ficino credits these three philosophers with recognizing the immateriality of the soul. Heraclitus of Ephesus (*fl.* 500 BC) taught that the *logos* of the universe is the same for each man; but since the body of each man is different, the part of us that recognizes the common *logos* must be incorporeal; cf. Aristotle, *De anima* 1.2.405a. Marcus Varro (116–27 BC), a Roman grammarian and philosopher, was, like Cicero (106–48 BC), a pupil in Athens of the Middle Platonist Antiochus of Ascalon (ca. 120–ca. 68 BC). Augustine, *City of God,* 7.5.23, says his philosophy "only goes as far as the soul and not all the way to the true God." Marcus Manilius (first century AD) was a Roman astrologer who praised the superiority of the human soul over the body in his didactic poem, *Astronomica* 4.866–935.

6. Anaxagoras of Clazomenae (*ca.* 500–428 BC) claimed that mind exists

apart from the material universe; cf. Plato, *Cratylus* 400A, *Phaedo* 97C; and Aristotle, *De anima* 1.2.405a, *Metaphysics* 1.3.984b. Little is known of Hermotimus, though Aristotle's notice in the *Metaphysics* suggests he was the countryman and teacher of Anaxagoras.

7. The sun image dominates Plato's *Republic* 6–7.

8. Perhaps Ficino is thinking of *Timaeus* 31B and 53C.

9. *Habitus* is a term from medieval Aristotelian philosophy signifying an acquired but habitual state, an optimum condition, even a second nature wherein something has (re)gained its perfect form. It is synonymous at times with a trained or cultivated potentiality.

10. Cf. Aristotle, *Categories* 10b.12–15.

11. Plotinus, *Enneads* 2.6.3; 4.3.2; 7.8.

12. Remission and its antithesis intension are scholastic concepts signifying the power or intensity of a formal quality.

13. Until the seventeenth century, Mercurius or Hermes Trismegistus was thought to be an Egyptian sage of immense antiquity who had lived just after Moses, or was even his coeval. His writings included the *Corpus Hermeticum* and the *Asclepius* (extant only in a Latin version attributed to Apuleius), along with various other Greek theosophical, magical and philosophical treatises, the majority of them compiled, we now realize, in the second and third centuries AD. However, Ficino regarded them as one of the primary sources of Plato's Platonism, not surprisingly, since they frequently echoed the *Timaeus*. At Cosimo de' Medici's request in 1463, he even put aside his Plato translation in order to translate the fourteen treatises then known to him of the *Corpus Hermeticum* (which he called the *Pimander* after the first treatise).

14. Timaeus Locrus was an Italian Neopythagorean of the first century AD (or at the earliest of the third or second centuries BC) who compiled a treatise, *De mundo*, that was essentially an abstract of Plato's *Timaeus*. Ficino and his contemporaries thought of him, however, as one of Plato's Pythagorean teachers, and therefore as the primary source, not the inheritor, of much of the material in Plato's famous dialogue.

15. Hermes Trismegistus, *Pimander* 8.3, 12.22, and *Asclepius* 14–15. For Timaeus, see Plato, *Timaeus* 49A–52B. Cf. Augustine, *Confessions* 12.6, and Proclus, *Elements of Theology*, prop. 72.

16. Plotinus, *Enneads* 2.4.11, or 3.6.16–19.

17. Averroes (1126–1198), an Islamic philosopher who taught in Cordoba, became famous as arguably the greatest commentator on Aristotle. Ficino regarded him as infamous, however, for propounding the view that Aristotle believed our minds are part of a cosmic mind and not individually immortal.

18. Averroes, *De substantia orbis*, cap. 2; cf. Aristotle, *De caelo* 1.9.277b26–278b9; *Metaphysics* 14.2.1088b14–28.

19. Proclus, *Theologia Platonica*, 5.30, ed. Saffrey-Westerink, vol. 5, p. 111.

20. Ibid.

21. Syrianus (d. 438 AD) was an important Athenian Neoplatonist whose extant writings include a commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. He was the teacher of Proclus who often cites him approvingly.

22. Body is first, quality second, angel fourth, and God fifth.

23. Ficino is citing the riddle from the commentary on the *Chaldaean Oracles* no. 1 by the controversial Byzantine Platonist, George Gemistus Pletho (1360–1452) (ed. Tambrun-Krasker, p. 5 [ed. Des Places, frg. 110]; cf. p. 60 f.), who had inspired Cosimo de' Medici to found 'a kind of academy' — or so Ficino was to claim in 1492 in the preface to his great Plotinus translation (Ficino, *Opera*, p. 1537). Ficino follows Pletho in assuming that Zoroaster was the author of this compilation assembled in the late second century AD by Julian the Chaldaean or his son Julian the Theurge, and destined to make a profound impact on Iamblichus, Proclus and other late ancient Neoplatonists. He was much taken by the oracles and by Pletho's Proclian analyses of them, based as they were in turn on Psellus' *Expositio in Oracula Chaldaica* (PG, vol 122, col. 1124 ff.).

24. *Chaldaean Oracles* no. 32 (ed. Tambrun-Krasker, p. 4 [ed. Des Places, frg. 79]; cf. p. 18 with Pletho's commentary, and pp. 146–147 with editorial commentary).

25. An abstract of *Metaphysics* 12.8.1073a. Cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 2.91, at *Aristoteles argumentatur sic*.

26. Avicenna (980–1037) was a Persian Muslim whose philosophical system owed much to both Aristotelianism and Neoplatonism. He thought that each of the nine heavenly spheres was occupied and moved by an angelic mind, and that the tenth and innermost sphere (which contains the earth) was occupied by an active mind which constantly endows individual human souls with possible forms. For his views on angels see his *Metaphysics* 9.3 (Avicenna, *Opera*, f. 104rb), and compare his *De caelo et mundo*, cap. 12 (= ibid., f. 41ra).

27. *Metaphysics* 12.8.1074a.1–17. Cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 2.92 at *Sciendum est*, a section Ficino seems to have in mind throughout this particular argument.

28. Dionysius the Areopagite is the pseudonym of a Christian follower of Proclus who wrote *ca.* 500 AD. His works enjoyed great authority throughout the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, however, since he was falsely but widely identified with the disciple referred to in Acts 17.34 as among St. Paul's first converts in Athens. The misdating, moreover, makes his Proclianism both apostolic and pre-Proclus! Ficino is referring to the *Celestial Hierarchy*, cap. 14 (= PG vol. 3, col. 321A).

29. Daniel 7.10.

30. Iamblichus of Chalcis in Syria (*ca.* 250–325 AD) was a major Neoplatonist who explored the possibilities of dividing Plotinus' unitary realm of mind into the intelligible and the intellectual. Proclus further and fully elaborated on this refinement and it is his complex presentation, in the *Platonic Theology*, of nine intelligible and nine intelligible-intellectual gods, of seven intellectual gods, and of twelve cosmic gods that Ficino is alluding to here.

31. *Chaldaean Oracles* no. 28a (ed. Tambrun-Krasker, p. 3 [ed. Des Places, frg. 1]; cf. p. 16 with Pletho's commentary, and p. 133 with editorial commentary).

32. An echo probably of Psalm 36.9: "Quoniam apud te est fons vitae: et in lumine tuo videbimus lumen."

33. *Enneads* 5.3–5 deal with this principle.

BOOK II

1. *Excessus* is a term in late ecclesiastical Latin meaning "excessive power" or "surplus."

2. E.g., Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 5.7.1017a–b, 5.30.1025a, 7.4.1029a–1030a; Aquinas, *Commentarium in Aristotelis Metaphysica*, book 5, lect. 9.

3. Cf. Plotinus, *Enneads* 2.9—the great treatise "Against the Gnostics."

4. Cf. Eusebius, *Praeparatio evangelica* 11.19, and Augustine, *City of God* 10.29. Amelius was an important pupil of Plotinus from 246–269/270 AD who praised the opening of St. John's Gospel. In his *De Christiana religione*, cap. 11, Ficino links him with Plotinus, Numenius and Iamblichus as thinkers "who had studied not to condemn, but to emulate Christian theology" (Ficino, *Opera*, p. 17).

5. *Esse ipsum, prout . . . finito, finita*: cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 1.43.363 (Collins, No. 3).

6. *Omne agens tanto . . . agendi virtutem*: cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 1.43.368 (Collins, No. 4).

7. Orpheus, *Hymns* 10.8 (Quandt, p. 10)—the "Hymn to Nature."

8. Orpheus, *Hymns* 13.8 (Quandt, p. 14)—the "Hymn to Cronos."

9. For Anebon see St. Augustine's *City of God* 10.11 which cites Porphyry's *Letter to Anebo*; cf. Eusebius, *Praeparatio evangelica* 5.7. For Abamon and Anebon see Iamblichus's *On the Egyptian Mysteries* 1.1–2 (where Iamblichus adopts Abamon as his alias).

10. Plotinus, *Enneads* 4.9, 5.1–3; Iamblichus, *On the Egyptian Mysteries* 1.5, or more probably the famous enigma at 8.2 (cf. Ficino, *Opera*, pp. 1408, 1903); Julian, *Hymn to the Sun* 137C ff. Though condemned by Christians as an apostate, the ascetic Emperor Julian (332–363 AD) was a notable Neoplatonist and Ficino makes several discreet references to his famous oration, in Greek, to King Helios (*Oration* 4).

11. These key terms are culled from Diels-Kranz, 1.28B. 235–240, frg. 8. The fragment in question is from the first part—mainly preserved by Simplicius in his commentary on Aristotle's *Physics*—of the two-part

Poema on "Truth" and "Opinion" by Parmenides, the great Eleatic monist (born *ca.* 515 BC). Ficino thought of him and his followers as inheritors of the Pythagorean wisdom and as Plato's guides to the metaphysics of the One. Cf. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 9.22.

12. *Praeterea, quoniam . . . pendet ex deo:* cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 2.15.925 (Collins, No. 5).

13. *Chaldaean Oracles* no. 29 (ed. Tambrun-Krasker, p. 3 [ed. Des Places, frg. 10]; cf. p. 17 with Pletho's comment, and p. 135 with editorial commentary).

14. *Insuper inferiora mundi . . . per se subsistens:* cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 2.15.927 (Collins, No. 6).

15. *Hymns* 3.11 (Quandt, p. 4) — the "Hymn to Night."

16. *Sicuti se habet ars . . . in existendo:* cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 3.65.2402 (Collins, No. 8).

17. *Praeterea universum hoc . . . in speculo:* cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 3.65.2404 (Collins, No. 9).

18. *Quamobrem dei virtute . . . reliqua operantur:* cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 3.66.2409 (Collins, No. 11).

19. *Simpliciter* is a scholastic term meaning "purely" or "absolutely." Its antonyms are *multipliciter,* meaning in a composite or complex manner, or *secundum quid* meaning "according to something" or "in a certain respect."

20. *Nonne secundum ordinem . . . essendi naturam:* cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 3.66.2412 (Collins, No. 12).

21. *animus* is translated throughout as "thinking" or "rational" soul to distinguish it from *anima* "soul." Ficino often underplayed this ancient distinction, however.

22. *Ergo minimas res omnes . . . atque distincte:* cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 1.50.419 (Collins, No. 14).

23. *Adde quod virtus superior . . . et singula:* cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 1.65.534 (Collins, No. 15).

24. *Hymns* 59.13–14 (Quandt, p. 42) — the "Hymn to the Fates."

25. Cf. Cicero, *De natura deorum* 1.21–22, 51–56; and Lucretius, *De rerum natura* 2.646–48.

26. Averroes, *Commentarium in Aristotelis Metaphysica* 12.37.

27. *Metaphysics* 12 (lambda).10.1075a10 ff. For Ficino, note, book lambda is the eleventh, not the twelfth book.

28. *Hymns* 34.14–17 (Quandt, p. 27) — the "Hymn to Apollo"; cf. Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata* 5.8.48 (ed. Stählin 2.358.11).

29. *Si deus potentiam suam . . . deus cognoscit:* cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 1.69.577 (Collins, No. 17).

30. *Hymns* 8.1 (Quandt, p. 8) — the "Hymn to Helios." Note that the hymn has *aionion omma* not *apeiron omma,* i.e., 'the eternal eye', not 'the infinite eye'.

31. No such Orphic saying is extant. Either Ficino had in mind the "Hymn to Zeus" at the close of pseudo-Aristotle's *De mundo* 7.401a (Kern's frg. 21a) — Augustine refers to it in his *City of God* 7.9 — and notably lines 2 ("Zeus is the head and the middle, of Zeus were all things created"), 5 ("Zeus the breath of all"), and 7 ("Zeus the ruler of all"). Or else he was thinking of the cognate citation in Plato's *Laws* 4.715E — " God, as the old story goes, holding the beginning and end and middle of all things which exist" — which is line 7 of the Orphic "Hymn to Zeus" (Kern, frg. 21; Quandt, No. 15.) cited in nn. 61 and 65 below. His choice of *species* here to render *eidos* plays on the two meanings "form" and "species." Cf. Cicero, *Academica* 1.8.30–31.

32. *Deus cum omnia faciat . . . sunt omnia:* cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 1.51–52.430, 1.23.215 (Collins, No. 18).

33. *Item, substantia non . . . ad comburendum:* cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 1.23.219 (Collins, No. 19).

34. *Natura cuiusque est una . . . ad agendum:* cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 2.23.990, 2.22.982 (Collins, No. 20).

35. *Natura nuda bonum hoc . . . est, operatur:* cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 2.23.998 (Collins, No. 21).

36. Diels-Kranz, 1.28B. 242–3, frg. 12, a brief fragment of the *Poema* of

Parmenides quoted in Simplicius' commentary on Aristotle's *Physics* 31.13–17, 39.14–16.

37. *Oportet praeterea deum esse . . . eodem pacto:* cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 1.54.451 (Collins, No. 23).

38. *Profecto in omnibus quae . . . omnium rationes:* cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 2.39.1156, 2.42.1186 (Collins, No. 24).

39. *Respectus* is a synonym in scholastic philosophical terminology for *relatio,* meaning "relation" or "proportion": *respectus idealis* is contrasted with *respectus realis* in the following arguments.

40. *Persona* signifies in scholastic usage that to which all that is individual and particular—as distinct from what is common to the species—is referred to as its sustaining principle.

41. *Causa prima omnia per se . . . caeteris eligat:* cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 2.23.994 (Collins, No. 27).

42. Is Ficino referring here to divine causality? If so, the references may be to *Timaeus* 28A–32C, 47E–48A, *Phaedo* 99A–C, *Philebus* 26E ff., and *Statesman* 269C–270A.

43. *Quod comitatur quicquid . . . est diffusio:* cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 1.72.620 (Collins, No. 28).

44. *Affectus* can mean as here the "inclination, desire or longing" of the will; but it can also be the faculty itself of desire as well as in general "state, condition, or situation." Cf. *ethos* in Plato's *Republic* 400D.

45. *Timaeus* 29E.

46. *Si agentia omnia tam . . . omnium est initium:* cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 1.72.625 (Collins, No. 29).

47. *Pimander* 10.2–4; *Asclepius* 20. In his notable preface (*argumentum*) to his *Pimander* translation (Ficino, *Opera,* p. 1836), Ficino describes the *Asclepius* as being *De voluntate divina,* and the *Pimander* as being *De potestate et sapientia Dei.*

48. *Enneads* 6.8.7,13,16 or possibly 5.5.11, 6.5.11.

49. *Sola divina bonitas est . . . indiget creaturis:* cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 1.74.634, 1.80.678, 1.81.683 (Collins, No. 30).

50. *Conducit ad haec quod . . . seipsum habet:* cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 1.81.685, 1.83.702,704 (Collins, No. 31).

51. *Si deus est perfecta . . . se porrigere:* cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 2.22.983 (Collins, No. 32).

52. *Quorsum haec? Ut . . . talia operari:* cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 2.23.991 (Collins, No. 33).

53. *Verum ne putet forte . . . effugiat providentiam:* cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 1.85.713–714, 1.85.712 (Collins, No. 34).

54. *Timaeus* 30A.

55. "by a necessary intention" is a scholastic notion meaning "given the necessity of the relationship between intention or purpose and the end intended."

56. *Metaphysics* 12.10.1075a10–15, cited by Aquinas in his *Summa contra Gentiles* 1.78.

57. *Hymns* 10.22 (Quandt, p. 11)—the "Hymn to Nature."

58. *De mundo* 6.398b15–25.

59. *Nicomachean Ethics* 10.7.1177a14–1178a8, 10.8.1178b8–32; *Physics* 2.8–9.198b10–199b32.

60. *De rerum natura* 2.1058–64, 1090–93; 5.187–95, 416 ff.

61. *Hymns* 15.7 (Quandt, p. 16)—the "Hymn to Zeus." Cf. n. 31 above and n. 65 below.

62. *Hymns* 61.8 (Quandt, p. 44)—the "Hymn to Nemesis."

63. *Hymns* 10.27 (Quandt, p. 11)—the "Hymn to Nature."

64. *Pimander* 1.19; *Asclepius* 19, 39–40.

65. *Laws* 4.715E–716A. Cf. nn. 31 and 61 above.

66. *Republic* 10.617D–620E .

67. *Statesman* 274D; *Critias* 109B–C.

68. *Chaldaean Oracles* no. 34 (ed. Tambrun-Krasker, p. 4 [ed. Des Places, frg. 14]; cf. p. 19 with Pletho's exegesis, and pp. 150–151 with editorial commentary).

69. *Gorgias* 468, 499E, 506C, *Symposium* 206A, *Euthydemus* 278E, *Philebus* 20D (the good as the end of action or desire).

BOOK III

1. Plato, *Timaeus* 41B.

2. Cf. Eusebius, *Praeparatio evangelica* 11.10.

3. *Philebus* 16C–18E, 23C. Cf. Ficino, *In Philebum* (ed. Allen, pp. 384–424).

4. *Chaldaean Oracles* no. 30 (ed. Tambrun-Krasker, p. 4 [ed. Des Places, frg. 7]; cf. p. 17 with Pletho's exegesis, and pp. 135–142 with editorial commentary). For "Second Mind" see Plato's *Letter* II, 312E ff.

5. Ibid. no. 33 (ed. Tambrun-Krasker, p. 4 [ed. Des Places, frg. 3]; cf. p. 18 with Pletho's exegesis, and pp. 147–150 with editorial commentary).

6. Cf. Aristotle, *Topics* 6.3.140b2. Cf. Plato, *Phaedrus* 245E, Cicero, *Academica* 2.39.124, Plutarch, *De animae procreatione* 1012D–E, and Iamblichus, *De anima* apud Stobaeus 1.364 (ed. Wachsmuth).

7. *Laws* 10.895A–B.

8. *Phaedrus* 245C–D.

9. Pliny, *Natural History* 35.97 (ed. Janus-Mayhoff, p. 265).

10. *Timaeus* 34C–35A.

BOOK IV

1. Note that Zoroaster is not the original theologian of soul theology, though the opening of chapter 2 below will declare that he is the source "of all the wisdom of the ancient theologians."

2. The earth's back *(dorsum)* can produce teeth (stones) and hairs (plants) only because of a pun. In Latin *dorsum* means both "back" and "mountain-ridge."

3. The soul of the earth as one of the four elements is not to be confused with the world soul, the soul of the whole cosmos of four elementary and eight celestial spheres.

4. Cf. Plotinus, *Enneads* 2.5.6.

5. A technical scholastic term, *contrahere* denotes the way universals are reduced to or confined within particulars.

6. A reference to the Stoic and Augustinian notion of seminal reasons.

7. Hierobotanum (literally "the holy herb") was identified in antiquity with vervain (*verbena supina*), as in Pliny's *Natural History* 22.2.3. But Ficino identifies it in his *De Vita* 1.10.44 (ed. Kaske-Clark) with the broad-leaved endive *(cichorium endiva)*.

8. See Bidez-Cumont, 2:199.

9. Strato of Lampsacus, a pupil of Theophrastus, became head of the Lyceum in 287 BC. He exempted the deity from creating or moving the world, assigning all to nature. Cf. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.3, and Cicero, *De natura deorum* 1.13.35, *Academica* 2.38.121. Chrysippus (280–207 BC) became head of the Stoic school and expounded the Stoic notion that the world itself is a god and has a soul. Cf. Cicero, *De natura deorum* 1.14.39.

10. *agere primo* is a scholastic phrase meaning "to act in the first place" in contrast to *agere consequenter*, "to act in consequence of something else."

11. *Praeterea si deus . . . putant Almariani*: cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 1.27.252–53 (Collins, Nos. 36 and 37). Amaury [Amalric] de Bène (died *c.* 1207) was a Schoolman whose leading pantheistic thesis—that God is the essence of all created beings—was expressly condemned by ecclesiastical authorities in 1210 and again in 1215.

12. *Animal quippe rationale . . . supra se ducem*: cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 1.27.255–56 (Collins, No. 38).

13. *Timaeus* 30B.

14. Orpheus, *Hymns* 24 (ed. Quandt, pp. 20–21)—the "Hymn to the Nereids."

15. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives*, Preface 6–7. Cf. Ficino's own translation of Psellus's *De daemonibus* (Ficino, *Opera*, p. 1940).

16. Porphyry, *De abstinentia* 3.2,4 in Ficino's own translation (Ficino, *Opera*, pp. 1935–37).

17. Phoebus *particularis* and Jupiter *particularis* perhaps signify the plane-

tary Phoebus and Jupiter as opposed to the Apollo and Jupiter who are identified with Christ and God the Father in syncretistic forms of Christian Platonism. See also Allen, *Platonism*, pp. 126–28.

18. Cf. Ficino's *De amore* 5.13 (ed. Marcel, p. 198), and his epitome of *Laws* 5 (Ficino, *Opera*, p. 1502).

19. This *ira* is the *thumos* of Plato's faculty psychology. Viewed negatively it is anger, ire, or wrath; viewed positively, the mettle, ardor, or spirit we admire for instance in a race horse.

20. I.e., to the world soul, the soul of the cosmos.

21. Cf. Plutarch, *De Iside* 381F; and Plotinus, *Enneads* 5.5.6 where indeed *Apollo* is taken to mean "not" (*a-*) "of many" *(pollôn)*. It became a Neoplatonic commonplace.

22. Orpheus, *Hymns* 34.16–17 (ed. Quandt, p. 27) — the "Hymn to Apollo." Cf. Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata* 5.8.48 (ed. Stählin, 2.358.11).

23. Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 12.8.1073b–1074a.

24. Cf. Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations* 1.25.63, *De republica* 1.14.21–22.

25. A scholastic concept: a *motor coniunctus seu intrinsecus* is a mover connected to the moved, an inner mover, the opposite of a *motor separatus seu extrinsecus* (an external mover).

26. Hegesias, Cyreniac philosopher (fl. c. 300 BC), mentioned in Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 2.85–86, 93–96. Schiavone (ad loc.) suggests that Ficino may mean rather the Hicetas of Cicero's *Academica* 2.39.123; see also Dilwyn Knox, "Ficino, Copernicus and Bruno and the Motion of the Earth," *Bruniana et Campanelliana*, 5 (1999): 329–361 at 337–38.

27. That is, by the circular axial motion of a cosmic sphere or of the cosmos itself.

28. Cf. Plutarch, *De Iside* 369D–E, *De animae procreatione* 1026B; Diogenes Laertius, *Lives*, Preface 8; Pletho, *Commentary on the Chaldaean Oracles* no. 34 (ed. Tambrun-Krasker, p. 19). These three old Persian (Zoroastrian) deities are more usually transcribed as Ahura Mazda (or Ormuzd), Mithras, and Ahriman (or Angra Mainyu).

29. Plato, *Second Letter* 312E ff.

30. *De amore* 2.4 (ed. Marcel, p. 150–51).

31. *De caelo* 2.2.285a; *Physics* 7.1.241–42, 8.6.259b; *De anima* 2.3.414b–415a; and *Metaphysics* 12.8.1073b.

32. Theophrastus, *De caelo* does not survive, but a similar passage is found in the surviving fragment of his *Metaphysics*, cap. 8, in *Theophrasti Eresii opera*, ed. F. Wimmer (Paris, 1866), p. 411.

33. Albertus Magnus, *De causis* 2.36, in *Opera*, ed. Borgnet, vol. 10, p. 532.

34. Augustine, *Enchiridion* 58 (= *PL* vol. 40, col. 260)

35. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 2.70.

36. For the nine Bacchoi, see the *Orphic Hymns*, nos. 30, 45–50, 52–54 (ed. Quandt, pp. 24–25, 34–39). These are addressed to Dionysou (30) Dionysou Bassareos Trieterikou (45), Liknitou (46), Perikioniou (47), Sabaziou (48), Hiptas (49), Lysiou (50), Trieterikou (52), Amphietous (53) and Silenou Satyrou Bakchon (54). For Eribromos, Ficino could turn to 30.1, 45.4 and 48.2.

37. *sub divisione* means in scholastic terminology "in the present portion of the discussion" and refers to the *divisio operis* which begins a scholastic lecture.

38. *Epinomis* 983B–C.

39. Later in this chapter when discussing Euclid of Megara's decision to walk by night to Athens, Ficino will argue that the "fatal law" consists in "the order of succession" in time, while desire consists in "the forming of a conception."

40. *Statesman* 272E; cf. *Timaeus* 42D–E.

41. This is quoted from of Psellus's commentary on the *Chaldaean Oracles* 1128b 4–5 (ed. Des Places, frg. 107 and p. 166) — the first half of line 4 and the last half of line 5.

42. A "second intention" is scholastic terminology associated primarily with Ockhamist psychology. It means a second-order or mental conception of something arising from reflection on a first conception, or "first intention," derived from the perception of something real.

43. *Chaldaean Oracles* 12.3 (ed. Tambrun-Krasker, p. 2 [ed. Des Places, frg. 96]; cf. p. 9 with Pletho's commentary, and pp. 84–88 with editorial commentary).

44. *Enneads* 4.3 (esp. 4.3.18), 4.4.

45. *Hymns* 25 (ed. Quandt, p. 21) — the "Hymn to Proteus."

46. This is too vague a reference to identify.

47. Plato's *Timaeus* 39C–D refers to the Great or Cosmic Year without assigning a value to it — Cicero's *De natura deorum* 2.20.51–52 observes that the length of this period was "hotly debated." A Pythagorean conception that goes back at least to Oenopides of Chios (fl. c. 450–425 BC), it became standard in the Neoplatonic and Ptolemaic traditions.

48. *Asclepius* 26.

49. *Statesman* 269C–270D.

50. This is not the famous mathematician who flourished around 300 BC under Ptolemy I, but Euclid of Megara (450–380 BC), who was an associate of Socrates and was present at his death. Afterwards he hosted Plato and other members of the Socratic circle. See Diogenes Laertius, *Lives*, 2.10.106–12.

51. Plato, *Statesman* 272E. Cf. n. 40 above.

52. Namely its soul, as the following arguments make clear.

53. Cf. the penultimate paragraph of Book 3 above where Ficino has argued, on traditional Aristotelian grounds, that "nowhere is there infinite space." The sentence may be corrupt.

54. Plato, *Statesman* 269D–E (paraphrased).

55. Cf. Pletho's commentary on the *Chaldaean Oracles* no. 14: "Do not soil the pneuma or give depth to the surface" (ed. Tambrun-Krasker, pp. 10–12; see pp. 89–103 with editorial commentary).

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